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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to establish a significant commonality and compatibility 
between the principles underpinning the political and social philosophies of 
GWF Hegel and John Stuart Mill. The role of the individual and the social order 
in both their theories is discussed and assessed separately and in turn in 
reference to their respective seminal works on the proper structure, principles 
and function of modern political infrastructure. Through an interpretation of 
the fundamental tenets and goals of their theories of the social order I argue 
for a coherent modern reconstruction of their doctrines, within which I locate 
parallels and contrasts as they apply. Both theorists as ultimately put forward 
similar arguments for freedom as an intersubjectively·developed capacity, the 
ideal social order as rational framework for the management of ethical and 
political engagement, linked to a social holism that ties individual and social 
progress inextricably. A respect for individual particularity of perspective and 
practice is integral both of their social frameworks, but that such a space must 
be harmonised within a rational political community worthy of individual 
obligation. Finally their social and political theories can be understood as 
complementary, each providing insights which the other lacks. Mill suffers 
from an insufficient regard for the social basis of identity and interconnected 
nature of the modern institutional framework, while Hegel displays an 
insufficient regard for Mill's caveats concerning the repressive potential of 
institutional structures and the dangers of overly empowered bureaucracies. In 
conclusion key elements of the two theorists' projects stand as separate but 
II 
not in any way fundamentally opposed to each other. This points to the 
possibility of a via media between a politics of individualism and a politics of 
community, suggesting strong potential for reconciliation between liberal and 
communitarian perspectives. 
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Introduction 
Seeking common principles in a 
clashing ancestry 
On the political level, one of the most widely debated issues in Western Democracies 
concerns the respective merits of individual freedom and socio-political bonds - or (in 
current terminology) of Liberalism versus Communitarianism. Inspi red by the legacy 
of Reformation and Enli ghtenment , champions of individual liberty consider the 
essence of politics to be the defence of personal rights and liberties against 
encroachments emanating from government or the public sphere; seen from this 
vantage , all community standards or shared public bonds appear questionable and 
possibly oppressive ... Countering this liberal focus advocates of community are quick to 
point to the corrosive effects of egotism and possessive individualism on moral and 
political life (Dallmayr, 1993: 4-5). 
If there is a crux point, a fault-line in the discourse over the concept of 
freedom as practiced in a modern democracy, it lies with what can seem like a 
dangerously nebulous set of concerns. Our concepts of individual liberty, 
community and social morality are often, it seems, on a three·way collision 
course. 
Whenever we turn to our bills of rights in a state of moral confusion , bemused 
at whether pornography counts as free speech or drug use as cultural 
expression, we step, sometimes blindly, into this centuries' old grey area. We 
do so as the heirs to a patchwork synthesis of ideas and concepts drawn from a 
series of thinkers who believed radically different things about the nature of 
the individual and society, and about how a state oversees the interaction 
between the two. The bill of rights (and to a large extent constitutions and 
law in general) in a modern constitutional democracy is often a broadscale 
cease-fire in a bloody, multi-faction ideological running war. We laud freedom 
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of speech and opinion as libertarians would. Our notions of the fierce 
protection of property and privacy still rest on the logic of the rights-primacy 
theorists. Notions of civic obligation and duty (such as compulsory voting) hark 
back to the principles of the republican school of thought. A weary nod is 
given to the socialists whenever we sign off on a welfare state protocol or some 
other broadscale economic safety net designed to further social equality. 
These days, the theories meld and reflect each other, rendering the battle 
lines less distinctive. 
Throughout the above, one crucial tension runs. It is a tension seldom made 
explicit, but is certainly implicit within many of the debates ongoing within the 
democratic arena - questions surrounding gun control policies, hate speech, 
drug and substance abuse, specific cultural rights and even the long-standing 
moral questions of socialist state practices. This is the tension between 
varying notions and definitions of individual freedom, and to what extent the 
state is mandated to ensure and encroach on these. If we step back and assess 
any of the various civil liberties debates of our time, understanding them in 
terms of individual practice vs . social obligation, we find those fuzzy battle 
lines become far more clearly drawn. These debates, at heart, are questions 
of individual practice within a social context. The issue at stake is to what 
extent the one affects, and should be allowed to affect, the other. 
One side, long versed in the dictates of liberalism and rights primacy, 
understands individualism as an atomized, singular force that must be shielded 
from the totalitarian proclivities of both state and mass rule. On this side of 
the line the cast is readily recognisable - civil rights activists, defenders of 
expanded free speech, campaigners for legalised drug use, pro-choice factions 
and just about anyone who feels the individual's conduct is their own affair, 
provided it doesn't hamper anyone else's freedoms in the process . The other 
side sees the abstracted political individual as a long-preached falsehood, 
insisting that the social context in which people find themselves and are 
3 
formed must be allowed to dictate certain norms and practices, usually 
culturally entrenched. Here we find the communitarians and conservatives, 
advocates of an enforced moral culture, people who use terms like "community 
standards", "moral majority" and "family values" a lot. Their concerns, as Bell 
(1993: 7) sets them out are that "[t]here is undoubtedly a worrying trend in 
contemporary societies towards a callous individualism that ignores community 
and social obligations, and liberal theory does not seem up to the task of 
dealing with this problem". 
The aim of this thesis is to assess the architecture of principles put fOfY"{ard by 
two of the greatest of the political thinkers of the early modern age - John 
Stuart Mill and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. They stand as the controversial 
heroes and intellectual ancestors of the libertarian and communitarian schools 
respectively. "In Mill" Skorupski (1989: 337) claims "Liberalism found its 
philosopher". Wood, in the introduction to his edition of the Philosophy of 
Right describes Hegel as perhaps "[liberalism]'s deepest and most troubling 
critic".l 
The contraposition of the two is eminently suitable for the purpose I have given 
myself here. Mill can be understood as a high priest of negative spaces - of a 
social structure in which individualism is sacrosanct. Hegel, conversely, is 
often associated with a highly conservative vision of society - one that demands 
that the individual's ethics must be defined by the social norms and practices 
of the community that surrounds her. What I hore to achieve by drawing on 
the affinities and clashes between these two thinkers is a crystallisation and 
clarification of what the modern mindset values or scorns in individualism and 
social embeddedness. From this I aim to deduce which approach to civil rights 
best caters for a useful and valid modern sense of freedom. 
'pR _ Edi tor's introduction: xi 
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This requires cutting through much jargon and rhetoric (abundant on both 
sides) and assessing the principles that lie beneath. It requires a re -
examination of what we mean by freedom , of why we place such a heavy 
premium on individuality, or on social cohesion. As will become more apparent 
over the course of this inquiry, there are tensions and clashes between the two 
thinkers that cannot be reconciled . This, I feel, is as it should be. In the spirit 
of rational confrontation that both men believed in (in one form or another) 
what I hope to draw out is not a broad scale parity between them, so much as a 
common consequence of principles inherent in both their theories. 
Their visions of the ideal and developed social order are, after all, radically 
different. Hegel's ideal social structures are all directed to allowing 
individuals to feel at home in the world they inhabit, to be able to affirm the 
universal will as their own . Individuals in the ideal Hegelian social structure 
participate in a harmonious, if diversified, whole which itself embodies 
freedom, but which they treat ultimately as consequence and embodiment of 
their collected wills as individuals. As Hegel argues: 
The ignorant man is unfree because he faces a world which is foreign to himse lf, a 
world in which he tosses to and fro aimlessly, to whi ch he is re lated only externally, 
unable to unite the alien world to himse lf and feel at home in it as much as his home 
(Hegel, as cited in Plant, 1983: 147). 
This idea of true freedom as a reconciliation between self and social 
environment has been taken up by modern communitarian writers as a demand 
for a state that recognises, and legislates to protect, the importance of 
community standards and practices. 
Mill has no such high-gloss theoretical strictures in mind. His ideal order is a 
realm of constant intellectual flux - his institutions an island of sanity and 
tolerance in a diverse and uncertain world, in which even a commitment to 
maintaining order requires openness to the most progressive of thinking. If 
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there is harmony, it comes from tolerance, and a mutual understanding of 
boundaries that must be in place - lest state rule, mass rule or the arbitrary 
wills of others render society a stagnant quagmire of long-held dated , and 
dangerous notions. 
If we look beyond the surface tensions between the two theorists, we discover 
that there are certain key affinities. I aim to prove that there is room for Mill 
in Hegel, and room for Hegel in Mill. A few thinkers, such as Allan Wood, have 
already toyed with this comparison: 
For Hegel, as for John Stuart Mill, freedom in the ordinary sense is a very important 
good, but its value is conditional on the specific conditions of human self·actualisation 
in modern society (Wood, 1990: 52). 
The chapters which follow examine just how deep such affinities of principle 
run. The crux of my comparison of these two theorists will be to examine the 
thought and principles at play in their respective major works on the subject of 
the state and the individual. These will be Mill's famed essay On Liberty and 
Hegel's last published work The Philosophy of Right. Other works will be 
referred to only as relevance demands. 
In the coming chapters, the role the individual and the social order play in each 
theorist's position are examined. The relevant background philosophical 
dynamics and political theory goals that underpin each social vision are 
discussed as a pre-amble to each , in order to provide the necessary conceptual 
vocabulary to assess the architecture of their principles. 
In doing so, I do not take the Millian and Hegelian positions precisely as set out 
in the original texts. As Nietzsche would remind us : "One repays a teacher 
badly if one remains only a pupil" (1971: 1 03)2. Both bodies of theory require 
~ Nietzsche, F. J 971 Thus Spoke Zaratllllstm (Translated by R. 1. Hollingdale). Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
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some degree of re-construction, clarification, and identification of their 
central, durable, framework of principles. The examination of On Uberty, as it 
was never written as an expert-level text but rather as a public appeal, 
necessitates a significant drawing out of practical implication and principle 
architecture, with reference to other hallmark Mill works. 
Whereas Mill stands guilty of saying too little, Hegel , in a sense, is guilty of the 
opposite sin. The detailed minutiae of the system he sketches out in The 
Philosophy of Right, such as Hegel's conception of the state structure and his 
treatment of class and gender, are often archaic and indefensible as modern 
policy guidelines. Thus, I concur with Har.dimon that: 
[t]he central motivation for abstracting from the details of Hegel's own account is to 
make it possible to appropriate the features of his account of the modern social world 
that are attractive while avoiding those that are unat tractive (Hardimon, 1994: 254) . 
This being said, I believe one must be careful in such a process of abstraction 
not to jettison anything crucial to Hegel's actual principles or (obviously) to 
splice in anything that would contradict them. It is the spirit of this respect for 
the coherence and authenticity of his arguments that I attempt to re-interpret 
troubling and obscure (yet nonetheless central) concepts such as Geist (the 
objective universal or world spirit) in the Hegelian position , ins~ead of simply 
jettisoning them as many modern scholars are inclined to. 
What emerges from this examination is a distilled Millian and Hegelian position 
on the structure and institutional ethos of the social order, purified of 
superfluous archaisms. I identify within both of these certain profound 
commonalities and compatibilities, specifically and significantly in the way 
both theorists understand the ideal social order as safeguarding and enhancing 
(rather than limiting) true individual freedom without instantiating a callous or 
disinterested society. I see both theorists as holding that the social order is 
best conceived as a rational common framework for the management of ethical 
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and policy engagement, dedicated to preserving and developing the capacity 
for true individual autonomy in an intersubjective context. Beyond this, I 
argue, ultimately, that the Hegelian and Millian projects are complimentary -
each includes useful elements the other is not opposed to, but simply lacks. 
What I believe I identify by the close of this enquiry is the suggestion of a via 
media between contemporary liberalism and communitarianism that recasts, 
but does not diminish, either of their central concerns as social and political 
theories. 
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Chapter 1 
The individual in Mill 
1.1) Preliminary comments 
It really is of importance, not only what men do, but what manner of men they are 
that do it (Mill 1 : 52 , my italics). 
It is not by wearing down all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and 
calling it forth , within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that 
human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation (Ibid. 55). 
It would have perhaps seemed fitting to the object of our inquiry that he 
remains, over a century after his death, a figure of no small controversy. John 
Stuart Mill has done his time in the intellectual stocks ever since he was first 
publ ished - accused of inconsistency, hypocrisy, eclecticism that borders on 
confusion, of being an unsystematic and messy thinker in general. The 
counter, his greatest praise, seems to be found not simply in the modern 
defenders of his doctrines, but in their widespread application throughout the 
western democracies. Versions of the liberty principle, to be examined at 
length in the coming chapters, have found their way into the practice, policy 
and analysis of the modern democracy. When the Wolfenden commission made 
their landmark recommendations on the repeal of the laws regulating 
homosexual behaviour in England, it was to Mill they appealed in claiming a 
private morality over which the government had neither jurisdiction nor right 
of interference .' 
I Crisp (1 997: 179) sees the Wolfenden report as drawing explicitly on the harm principle in holding that 
the purpose of law is not to protec t citizt:ns from themselves, but from others. In the report's own words: 
[TJhe function [of the criminal l<.I w], as we see it , is to preserve public order and decency, to 
protect the c itizen from what is o ffens ive and injurious and to provide sufticicnt safeguards against 
exploitation of corruption of olhers, particularly those who are particularly vulnerable because 
they arc young, weak in body or mind or inexperienced (Wolfenden , L 959, as quoted in Hart, 
1963: 14). 
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But the value of Mill stretches far beyond issues such as rights of conscience 
that are more obviously his home terrain . The subtlety of his vision of the 
individual and the social order and their sympathies with the Hegelian picture 
of the same are my grand concern here. This chapter is tasked with laying out 
and assessing the "individual" branch of Mill's project. 
My aim here is not to defend Mill to the dying gasps. I will not claim he was 
above certain confusions of his own, or biases of his era. I will not claim his 
system in its entirety deserves sorTie long overdue immediate application. 
Neither he nor Hegel can claim that vast a privilege by modern terms. Rather, 
I follow the lead of Mill himself, when he claimed few great social 
systematisers left their entire blueprint as legacy: 
[Flew of the systems of these systematic writers have any permanent value as systems. 
Their value is the value of some of the fragments . But the fragments (the parts which 
are excellent in wholes which are inadmissible) if published separate would probably 
have attracted little notice. This is a tribute mankind unconsciously pay to the value 
of theory and systematic thought (Mill as quoted in Ryan, 1987: xxvi). 
The fragments I examine have remarkable relevance both to the modern 
moment and to the whirlwind of contempt and praise surrounding Mill. . In the 
coming pages I examine Mill's rationality and various strands of his philosophy 
of science, the implications of his concept of the self, finally leading into an 
examination of the individualist dynamics of On Liberty. Through this I will 
grant the reader a view of the broader intellectual landscape of Mill's ideas, 
foundational to the well· known peak of On Liberty itself. All these point to a 
Mill far more socially concerned and progressive than his detractors have cast 
him, with a substantial love for enlightened self· government in a far deeper 
and broader sense than it is usually claimed he supported. What comes to light 
FUfthl!rmore, Crisp (Ib id .) claims "Han's own famous response is exp licitly based on Mi-II ". See Hart, 
1963: 5. 
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is a definitive teleology in Mill, the telos of which , much like Hegel, was not a 
static point so much as an arena of institutionalised enlightenment. In the 
process, I will show how Mill's social space is neither one of blind atomism, nor 
brute self-interest. I will show how Mill's intellectual battle cry is always a 
humbling respect for particularity - of individuals, of forces, of nations - and 
with that a demand for boundaries and measures that allow said particularity 
to develop in an authentic and rational sense - individually and socially. 
1.2) Background philosophical dynamics to Mill's 
Individualism 
Most slights against Mill suffer from a number of central misgivings and 
misinterpretations, the source of which often seems too shallow an 
examination of Mill's entire body of work, and thus too shallow an examination 
of the architecture of his principles . This is unfortunate, but also unsurprising. 
As Ryan (1987: xxv) claims, Mill is seldom thought of as a systematic thinker, 
even by his defenders. The picture one gets is of a vast rank of detractors, 
most of whom seem to have conveniently forgotten that Mill published any 
works besides On Liberty, On Representative Government, and Utilitarianism. 
A corrective school of authors such as Skorupski and Ryan has arisen ·in recent 
years that traces the provisions laid out in these texts more faithfully to the 
foundational philosophical dynamics laid out in works such as Mill's System of 
Logic and his various treatises on the moral sciences. I see these as conceptual 
backgrounders to Mill's understanding of the interaction between the individual 
and the social space as a zone of progressive rational engagement. The 
dynamics I have focused on are thus those tied most directly to such an inquiry, 
being Mill's understanding of the process of reasoning and his conception of the 
self and its developmental aspect. 
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1.2.1) Mill's Rationalism 
i. Inductivism and deductivism 
For the purposes of this chapter, we are concerned with the individual within 
Mill's system. But for Mill, as for Hegel, the individual was not a static element 
that is simply added to the social mix. The individual, as we shall see, 
progresses through interaction with others, and eventually finds her interest 
bound up within the social interest. Thus what we are concerned with, when 
assessing the nature of individuals and society, is the integration between the 
particular and the general in terms of the theories under discussion, and this 
forms our departure point into Mill's system. 
The first set of issues has to do with Mill's understanding of the nature of 
reasoning itself. 2 The significant philosophical dichotomy at hand is between 
deductive and inductive reasoning. Do we argue towards truth best by the 
syllogistic application of general principles, or can we rely on rules of 
inference/probability which basically amount to glorified guesswork? Ryan 
(1987: 17) sees Mill as striking through the heart of this dichotomy, and 
standing somewhere between the two. Mill believed that the major premise of 
a syllogism - i.e. the general principle, is a formula by which we evaluate our 
conclusions, not the direct evidence from which the conclusion is actually 
drawn . Thus by Mill's terms: 
2 Mi ll' s t!n tire logical system spans the fi rst few chaplers o f Ryan's enquiry, and I feel it is neither useful 
nor possible to sketch oul Ryan's arguments in their enti rety here. The relevant elements are those wh ich 
impact upon the way he understood society and the individual, i.e. the elerncnLS that would survive the fi nal 
pages or the S,rslem of Logic and go on to haunllhe remainder of Mill 's works. Thi s req uires us stepping 
inlO the phi losophical crossfire surrounding the nature of reasoning, ontology, and free will versus 
determinis m. These are grand battles imJt:ed, and to resolve them in any brief space would be neither 
useful nor possible. But I am concerned here not so much with their resolution but how Mi ]]" s take on 
them impacts upon and underpins his approach to soc ial and ethical tht!ory. 
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All inferences are from parti culars to particulars. General propositions are merely 
registers of such inferences already made and the short formulae fo r making more (Mill 
as cited in Ryan, 1987: 25). 
As Mill sees it, we argue deductively, but draw our evidence from observed 
experience, which we thence check according to general principles . Mill's 
problems with pure deductive reasoning have much to do with its rigidi ty. 
As Ryan (Ibid. 14) holds, Mill felt the gulf between the non-empirical 
abstractions that are general principles and the empirical phenomena they 
sought to explain was often far too wide. There was for Mill in a system of 
understanding reality composed purely of generalities and abstractly derived 
laws an insufficient respect for the particular. This is Mill's crux point 
throughout all his works and is something we must return to again and again in 
terms of understanding the foundations of his thought. Pure deductivism bears 
the hazard of dismissing more everyday modes of explanation, of becoming 
dogmatic and stagnant. The laws of science and reason, when applied to 
everyday experience, become a matter of probable inference - their 
universality is too contingent upon a host of factors and elements that are 
either unknown of unpredictable, for it to be universality in the all-consuming 
sense pure deductivism claims . It is, by Mill's terms, too bold, too arrogant, 
too blind to the vast possibilities and variety of an uncertain universe . 
When we step back from the mire of argument and jargon that accompanies 
the centuries old bad blood between deductivists and inductivists, the 
relevance of this all to Mill 's understanding of social and ethical theory 
becomes clearer. Mill sought to remind us that probable inference was the 
best we have when we address reality, and not a realm of abstracts. The grand 
quest of the British empiricists of the enlightenment to secure a scientific and 
universally valid understanding of human society derived from abstract 
principle is to Mill, and to a large extent the modern mind , a fruitless one. At 
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best we are guessing, and must remember that lest, as Mill phrases it in On 
Representative Government, we form societies and governing bodies which 
"perish by the immutability of their maxims" (Mill 4: 179). To claim that we 
stand at the highest vantagepoint in all history is one thing, and even that 
fraught with the dangers our ignorance of the present might present. 3 To claim 
that there will be no higher vantage to come is delusional. This is the warning 
Mill presents to rulers and policy makers in On Liberty. 
A further pOint to be drawn out of Mill's respect for inferential reasoning is 
that it does amount to something of a democraticisation of the intellect. It 
null ifies the copyright on the search for truth the abstract sciences often claim 
they hold, and gives credence to the observations and experience of everyday 
people. This we shall see amplified in On Liberty, where Mill urges us to 
remember that progress can come, and often does, from the most unexpected 
corners when we legislate against certain practices and lifestyles. 
But this is to leave the fray too early. We have not yet seen a thorough 
account of how we do reason , how the relation between the particular and 
general is formed and operates. Mill's idea of inference raises a number of 
issues all its own, and the philosophical quicksand presents its dangers once 
again. So, once more, I draw out the elements I feel are significant to Mill's 
social theory, without diversions allowed for elements to which Ryan, for one, 
devotes entire chapters worth of explanation. 
We have first, to remind ourselves that Mill did see a very clear value in 
general statements. As Ryan (1987: 27) clarifies, he metaphorised them as a 
vantagepoint, a higher ground we could retreat to understand the particular 
dynamics of the everyday world we left down on the plateau. General 
J Bear in mind Mill' s own rather despondent jibe at the prevalence of parochialism in 0" Liberry: "lTlhc 
world, to each indi vidual , means the part of it with whi ch he comeS into con tact; his party, his sect, his 
ch urch, his class of society; the man may be called, by comparison. almost liberal and large-minued to 
whom it means anything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age" (Mill I: l5). 
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principles have a nasty and crucial habit of reminding us what we are 
committed to when we operate by a rule of inference. They act as provisos 
against us accidentally committing ourselves to singular statements we have 
hitherto forgotten to consider. A farmer may claim, based on generations of 
family experience, that his soil will always yield a substantial crop. The 
general principle intervenes to remind him that farmers must always consider 
weather conditions when assessing what makes for a good crop, else his 
inference based statement may have committed him to claiming that his soil 
would yield a powerful crop even in cases of drought. 4 Similarly are the 
general principles at work within On Uberty designed to remind us what we, as 
governments and societies, commit ourselves to when we claim certain 
practices or policies are beneficial or detrimental. The classic free speech 
example of hate groups comes to mind. Activists who wish to ban hate groups 
often fail to remember that they are committing themselves to a precedent by 
which governments may silence dissent , the very precedent that could be 
turned against themselves should the ruling elements suddenly view them with 
disfavour. It was precisely on these grounds that a Jewish leader of the ACLU5 
campaigned for a Neo-Nazi group's right to march in Skokie, Illinois in the late 
70'S.6 
ii. Inference and action 
What then are the further implications (and complications) with inference as a 
tool of understanding and organizing reality? One of the key issues arising is its 
articulation. Ryan (1987: 30) quotes Mill's example of a tailor who knows how 
to achieve a certain colour of fabric with handfuls of certain dyes. The tailor 
could not put this process down on paper for others to follow precisely. Yet it 
is a reasoned process nonetheless. 
4 This particular eXilmp!1! links up with Mill's physics based undl!fstanding of sociology, examinl!d helow. 
5 American Civil Libert ies Union 
6 A brief description of th l:! key issues in this famous case can be found at 
hUf):/Iwww .konsaspress.ku .edu/strwhe.htrnl (Accessed 07/0112003). 
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Inference is both general and particular; a man may thus reason from particulars, 
committing himself to a rule of inference which he may have infinitely greater skill in 
employing than in articulating. To deny that he is inferring something would be 
perverse; to require him to produce his rules of infere nce, hopeless (Ibid. 30). 
Rules of inference that count as argument or motivation for action must be 
communicable. We cannot appeal to sheer instinct or sentiment, or belief 
divorced from an understanding of consequence and application. But this sets 
us on a collision course with a potentially disastrous objection to Mill's system. 
That belief is a key driving force in precipitating action, and the person 
following an inference rule checked against what we describe as a general 
principle may not be doing so at all. They may be acting in a vacuum and not 
give the remotest credence to the generality of what they argue, thus 
nullifying the check and balance function of general principles. If this 
objection holds true, the grand Millian notion of society as a zone of rational 
engagement, in which fallible individual perspectives clash to produce better 
guiding principles becomes highly dubious. Such a social vision is premised on 
the possibility of general principles being a guiding force in the first place. As 
such, the Millian response here is fundamental to the internal coherence of a 
Millian account of the possibility of individually driven social reason. 
The answer to this, Ryan (Ibid.) argues, lies in clarifying further the 
relationship between the general and the particular. Particularity of 
explanation lies in the particularity of the facts used to do the explaining. The 
generality of the explanation is that they are only relevant in certain respects. 
"The commitment to a general principle is thus not a commitment to knowing a 
general principle" (Ibid.) . This, by Ryan's terms, resolves the psychological 
objection about what the inferrer in fact believes he or she is doing. Mill is 
concerned with us being rational by analysing our association of ideas . This can 
only be done if we make our inferential patterns and chains of thought explicit. 
The acid test of these, for Mill, is the deductive syllogism. 
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The upshot of the above points for the Millian understanding of human 
reasoning and its value is what Ryan (Ibid. 31) holds can be referred to the 
logic of consistency - we must make explicit what we are already committed 
to. We cannot hold two inconsistent statements about the same fact . The 
process of reasoning from particular to particular may well lead us to a 
divergent feature of another particular that either is covered by our inference 
rule or falsifies it. Without this borne in mind, superstition may thrive because 
no one recognises the counter-instances to it. Thus we see the pattern arising 
again of particulars feeding into a grander understanding of the universal. 
The logic of consistency point is but one key feature of truth sought through 
rules of inference. The wider point of emphasis, as Ryan (Ibid. 32) points out is 
a caveat to the inductivists: where our inference rules fail , we must recognise 
they fail. General principles must always be dependent on particular cases. 
Mill's marching orders to a society in pursuit of truth , can, if we consider the 
above, be phrased as such: Strike the delicate balance between gathering 
inductive evidence and testing it deductively. Maintain an awareness and 
respect for the particular when forming rules of inference, but where those 
rules fail, admit as much. Achieve the discourse necessary to this by making 
your thoughts and ideas explicit. This goes a long way to explaining many key 
elements of Mill's political thought we shall examine further on - such as his 
mistrust of irrational custom being translated into institutional practice and his 
insistence on a kind of demarcated pluralism for an advanced state of society. 
A key illustration of how these concerns are integrated into his social theory is 
Mill's musings on which methodologies of the physical sciences provide the 
most compelling blueprint for a social SCience, an exposition the next section 
takes up. 
iii. Physical science as a model for social sciences 
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Mill wrote at length on the nature of scientific experiment and procedure. 
Alexander Bain7, in his biographical outline of Mill's philosophy, recalls working 
through the various drafts of Mill's system of logic with him, and helping him 
source out the most advanced ideas on experimentation protocols the day had 
to offer, and acting as Mill's sounding board as he integrated the principles of 
Comte's scientific sociology into the final volume of Logic. 8 This was not to be 
an exercise purely in the philosophy of science. As Ryan (Ibid. 133-147) 
illustrates, Mill develops the claim through the various volumes of the system 
of logic that sociology as science must reflect the methodology of the natural 
science most suited to the task of comprehending human behaviour and 
society, the way individuals operate and come to form associations and 
institutions. This science, for Mill, was physics. The way Mill applies this 
model gives us significant insight into how he understood the inter-relation of 
general and particular. The implications of this methodology for the analysis, 
prediction and amendment of social arrangements, we leave to Chapter 2. 
What is interesting is Mill's choice of which branch of the sciences provided the 
most apt model for sociology. He dismisses, as Ryan (Ibid . 133-137) reveals, 
what he calls "the chemical method", in particular reference to Macauley, 
which makes it an attack on the hard-line empiricists. Chemistry, as a science, 
proceeds by experiment. It generates results based purely on observed 
phenomena, low-level laws specific to certain cases. It continually admits of 
slight alterations in the nature of the compounds under observation producing 
entirely different results. It allows for no general / universal principles. In 
terms of understanding human association , the chemical methodology is for Mill 
far too relativistic an approach. It amounts to throwing up our hands 
philosophically and claiming human beings are as they are , as they are formed 
under the specific conditions of their experience. The individual, under a 
1 See S ain . 1882. 
II Mill and Comte were mutual admirers and enlhusiast ic correspondents, and as such we can tr<lee a 
significant element of Ccmle's thought in Mi ll' s own sod ology. Comtc's ideas on the division between 
The individual in Mill 18 
chemical analysis, subscribes to no fundamental laws of human nature, and no 
patterns can really be distinguished. Alter an individual's circumstances, and 
you have an entirely different compound, so to speak, to which general laws 
cannot apply. 
Mill thence, Ryan (Ibid . 137-147) explains, turns to attack the geometric 
method, and in doing so attacks his own teachers, namely his father, James 
Mill, and Bentham. A geometric understanding of individuals and social 
arrangements begins with a key axiom and premises all arguments from that 
pOint forth upon it. It is such with classical economics, which takes as the key 
formative factor of social relations economic self-interest. It is equally so with 
his father and Bentham's thought, which followed the enlightenment era 
rights-primacy pattern established by Hobbes and Locke in putting forward self 
interest as the driving force of human interaction. Mill felt this left the picture 
of the individual and the society he moves in incomplete and overly reduced. 
Most specifically, it does not allow for the plurality of causes that can feed into 
individual motivation and social formations. Culture, religion, belief and 
various other factors could be as crucial to community formation as self-
interest. Economic prosperity is as easily the result of good soil as sound fiscal 
policy.9 
For Mill, social understanding had to mirror the achievements of Newton in 
science, thus it is not surprising that it was Newtonian physics he turned to as 
his ideal model for social analysis. As Ryan (Ibid. 149-150) explains, it was 
physics, to Mill's thinking, that must be ranked first in the hierarchy of 
sCiences. 1o In sociological terms, the Newtonian model of human association 
Order and Progress in terms of the goals o f state , and Mill 's reworking thereof, is the province of Chapter 
3. 
9 This is not to say Mill did not give credence LO certa in of these "geometric" social sc iences. As we shall 
see further on, he assignt!d economics. for one, the status of an "art", much like medicine. Mill' s notion of 
nn art and its place within the hierarchy of the "art of life" shall be examined iarer in this chapt.er. 
10 Mill 's idea of scientific unity through an interlinked hierarchy, and it's parallel hierarchy in the social 
sciences wi ll be further explained in the next chapter. 
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has profound significance to the discussion at hand. It exists somewhere in the 
ether between the empirical, context-bound nature of the chemical method 
and the abstracted generalities of the geometric. Physics operates by general 
principles that serve as a guideline to understanding specificities. Mill's 
affinity for such an approach is aptly demonstrated by the above discussion on 
his rational system. It furthermore allows for the plurality of causes and forces 
acting on a given situation or phenomenon, but does its best to reduce these to 
a set of fundamental laws of mechanical activity. It does so, ultimately, by 
reducing all activity to the atomic level. This is what Mill aimed to do with the 
social sciences. 
The Newtonian-driven conception that individual human beings can be likened 
to atoms is well documented. It can be understood as one of the key 
influences on the rights primacy thinkers, notably Hobbes and Locke. The 
atomised understanding of the individual remains one of the key issues of 
contention between the modern liberal and the modern communitarian and as 
such is destined to re-appear constantly throughout this enquiry. Mill's 
physics-based sociology entails this atomism , but I believe, in a sense quite 
different from Hobbes and Locke. Mill never lost sight of the fact that the 
atoms eventually form an organism, and through increased interaction begin to 
understand their own interest in terms of the interests of the whole. The 
social contracts of Hobbes and Locke suggest this pattern , but they lack the 
emotional depth and theoretical variety of Mill's model, in that they still 
premise themselves at every turn upon an assumption of human beings as 
brutally self-interested creatures. They thus fall prey to Mill's criticisms of the 
geometric method of social reasoning. There is no sense in classical rights 
primacy of social perfectibility through self-perfectibility and increased 
awareness and education, a principle I will prove in the coming pages and 
chapters Mill firmly believed in. Thus we must be careful when judging too 
quickly Mill's use of the atomic model to understand the movement from 
individual particularity to social generality as standard-issue British empiricist 
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selfish individualism. The atomism here is a starting pOint of explanation. The 
atom , in this case the individual, is the basic unit with which we begin our 
examination of the whole, in this case the social organism. It is not to say the 
atom will remain unchanged by increased interaction with other atoms as we 
examine the nature of the organism. 11 This, I claim, is in fact precisely what 
the Millian social space is all about - progress through rational engagement, 
perspective clashing with perspective. Mill, I believe, puts forward a 
compelling picture of how a social theory can begin with atomistic analysis, but 
nonetheless understand the social structure itself organically or holistically. 
The driving point of the scientific elements of Mill's philosophy as they lead 
into the sociological remains his caveat that we never lose sight of the 
particularity and multiple facets of any phenomenon, especially the human 
being and the society he constructs around himself. This lurks in the shadow of 
all Mill's full·throated defences of individual rights and practices, as well as his 
warnings to us never to attempt to outrightly impose generally derived 
precepts upon particular situations. This for Mill applies as much to states, 
communities and individuals as it does to problems of Newtonian physics. It is 
against the backdrop of such an ambition that the Millian analysis of self and 
society which this enquiry seeks to evaluate is foregrounded . It is to the Millian 
self that I now turn my attention . 
1.2.2) Mill and the self 
i. Phenomenalism and Naturalism in Mill 
We are drawing steadily closer to an examination of the individualistic element 
of On Liberty, but there is a deep and slippery chasm we must cross first. This 
11 This dynamic in Mi\l"s thoughl shall be fUrlhcr examined directly below, as we dt!al with Mill' s 
conception uf Mind and Reality and indi vidual character formation. 
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has to do with Mill's understanding of the individual in terms of the nature of 
perception, the relation of mind to reality, and freedom as rational autonomy. 
The first issue of relevance is Mill's understanding of the nature of ideas and 
perceptions themselves. The philosophical crossfire between the 
phenomenalist and naturalist understanding of reality has run for a good few 
centuries at this stage, and Mill stands somewhere in the centre of it. The 
dynamics of this debate flow from whether or not we grant our perceptions and 
theories the status of truth, or sceptically assign them the humble status of 
being mere subjectivities. Skorupski (1989: 209) sees Mill falling heavily on the 
side of the phenomenalists, believing that the naturalist realist position (i.e. 
the belief that the qualities things have are those we perceive them to have)12 
could be "embedded" within the "deeper metaphysical perspective of 
phenomenalism". Mill's inductivist credentials, as well as his belief in 
subjectivism , lead him to be classed as a phenomenal relatiVist, with a 
subjectivist interpretation of the way humans form perceptions and ideas. In 
more intellectually pedestrian terms: we operate and perceive the qualities of 
the world external to us in subjective terms. This flies against scientific realist 
approaches, which holds that our perceptions are inferences from actuality, 
and provide objective data as such. Under the phenomenalist approach, the 
perception is endemic to the perceiver, and the perceiver must bear this in 
mind when drawing generalised conclusions. 13 
One of Mill's flagship issues when it comes to the nature of perception and 
thought is what Skorupski (Ibid . 213) calls "underdetermination" - the rider 
attached to any hypothesis that another could arise, presently or at a later 
stage, with equal claim to the status of truth. This leads Mill, Skorupski 
extends , to an instrumentalist understanding of the nature of theoretical 
reasoning. Once again cutting through the jargon this translates into the belief 
I::! I accept that this is something or a whistle-stop lour of this particular philosophical issue. Skorupski 
notes (hat Mill was denied the discours(,! of the century to follow , which subjected th is puniciilar Position to 
far more rigid examination. My concern here is more to see how Mill's understanding of t~c issue hdped 
form hi s understanding of ind iv idual perception in the political arena. 
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that theories are merely ways of better training ourselves to comprehend 
reality. They identify uniformities and patterns, and improve our capacity for 
prediction and inference. They are not truths, so much as paths towards it. 
Thus, once more the caveat: truth as propounded by theory is fallible and 
slippery at best. The same approach applies here as with Mill's logic - the use 
of the general is to enable us to make bette r sense of the particular. Taking 
the current point and the above section on Mill's scientific methodology into 
account, we can surmise the following: The world seen through Millian eyes is 
a domain of subjective perceptions struggling against each other and 
intermingling, with the perceivers comparing notes through expression of ideas 
and theories that are understood as instrumental, by no means fundamental , to 
the discovery of objective truths. Applied to individuals in a social context, we 
get a sharp glimpse at the kind of thinking that leads Mill to insist on the higher 
levels of human development being domains amenable to the free-flow of ideas 
and criticism . If we contemplate that Mill's naturalism posits the 
comprehensibility of individuals and social orders through an understanding of 
their context and circumstances , we can understand that one of the crucial14 
and more controversial upshots of such a philosophical project is that social 
entities are ultimately reducible in a fundamental sense to the consciousness 
and activity of the individuals therein . This is a doctrine that finds classical 
expression in Mill, which has by our age acquired a definitive tag -
methodological individualism. 
" Mill . as Skorupski (1989: 240) points out. th roughout his philosophy believed that human minds were 
"nalural entiti ~s and can be stud ied as such". Skorupski mai ntains that this tension in Mill's thought 
borders on unresolvcablc. He is, after all , st:eking to reconcile a view of the universe that entails that all 
perception is re lati ve and parti cul ar with a conviction that human beings are composite of a n:.t tural corllcx l 
that can be studied and understood. While I do cenainly enrich my analys is to suggt::s t how I feci Mi ll does 
th is with some degree of success, I lack the space here to invest igate how M ill resolves the more abS1T:lct 
tensions between a natura list and phenoml!nalist pos ition, something Skroupksi's analys is deals with at 
some length. 
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ii. Methodological individualist dynamics in Mill 
To frame the discussion in scientific terms, the methodological individualist as 
Ryan (1987: 158) explains, holds that all social substances are reducible to 
individual substances, that there is no collective substance generated with its 
own emergent and universal qualities. Popper, ironically (considering his 
antipathy towards Mill) is one of the central modern proponents of this 
doctrine. What the doctrine amounts to in real terms is a refusal to make 
concrete generalisations from the interaction of one group of individuals to 
another. The individual remains the core unit of analysis, tempered with 
circumstance. No social psychological dynamics can be inferred from individual 
ones, at least in no concrete sense. Thus, on Popper's terms : "[t]here is no 
such thing as England, only a lot of Englishmen" (as cited in Ryan, 1987: 158). I 
will briefly outline here the theoretical crossfire between Popper and Mill, as it 
does help to clarify the deeper fundamentals of Mill's understanding of the 
social formation of individual perspective and character. 
Popper, as Ryan (Ibid. 160) outlines, accuses Mill of three key sins, all linked to 
what he sees as "Psychologism" in Mill's theory, which renders the reduction 
of social phenomena to individual components problematic. The first is that 
Mill's approach presupposes a complete understanding of the diversified and 
varied institutions that can influence human mindframes - i.e. account for 
similarities in the varied ways people are educated and socialised . The second 
is that the approach ignores that social science deals with the unintended 
consequences of people's actions, thus what we must examine is not supposed 
laws of psychology but hard facts derived from empirical observation. The 
third objection Popper raises is that to assert fundamental psychological laws is 
to assert a psychological framework that existed before socialisation could 
happen, thus a pre-social psychology that contains the seeds of a historicist 
approach. 
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Ryan (Ibid. 160-162) takes up Mill's cause against Popper on all of these 
charges. The rebuttal to the first objection lies in remembering that it is 
precisely on account of the vast differentiation of human experience and 
culture that Mill asserts the importance of studying these, under the banner of 
the science he calls "ethology" (a science of human nature). He maintains 
simply that certain pre-requisite human capacities are necessary for human 
interaction, few that these may be. This approach does not by any means 
undermine the position that the vast majority of human diversity can be linked 
to diversity of experience. Ryan goes on to point out that this similarly 
answers the objection concerning intended and unintended consequences - only 
the most delusional conspiracy theorist would maintain a position that stated 
that all human social institutions and practice could be directly traced to some 
kind of heavily co-ordinated human intention. Ryan answers the third 
objection by pointing out that Popper has constructed something of a straw 
man. Mill was never concerned with the ability to trace social origins back to 
some grand historical pre-social moment through analyzing general dynamics. 
His concern when analyzing the broad sweep of western social conditions is 
with identifying trends that affected its future_ When Mill looks to the origins 
of society, it is to prove a case that is distinctly Popper's own: that the 
complex interplay of human character and the institutions it forms renders any 
attempt at predicting human historical development from a vision of human 
nature and posited original position impossible. 
This all leads us back to one of the central dynamics of Mill's system, one 
which we must investigate carefully if we are to understand his notion of how 
individual character and belief is formed , and the questions awaiting us of how 
its development must be nurtured and allowed for at a social and legislative 
level. This is the doctrine of the self as simultaneously a rational, self-defining 
entity and something formed by the circumstances around it, a doctrine classed 
by the vocabulary of modern ethical theory as "compatibilism". 
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iii. Compatibilism and rational autonomy in Mill 
The question of the self - as both a natural being formed by circumstance and 
an autonomous, willing agent - is a paradox that plagued Mill throughout his 
earlier years and continues to plague modern political philosophy. The central 
issue of the atomised vs. socially embedded individual, crucial to the liberal-
communitarian debate, flows directly out of this paradox. To quote Skorupski 
directly: 
It was very important to Mill to reconcile free agency with causal determination - if 
that were to turn out to be impossible then the fracture line would go right through his 
entire philosophy. For on the one hand he rested the potential progressiveness of 
human nature on the doctrine of 'formation of character by circumstances'. But on 
the other hand the ideals of rational autonomy and self-culture - the formation of the 
self by the self - were central values of his ethical and political thought (Skorupksi, 
1989: 42). 
Skorupski (Ibid.) traces how Mill recognised this dilemma and found what he 
believed to be its solution. Mill reflects in the autobiography the frustrations 
of countless who have to face up to the possibility that their character is not of 
their own formation, that they are, ultimately, the hapless victim of 
circumstance. His path out comes with a re-wired understanding of the way 
circumstance operates upon us. The distinction is to be made between 
resistible and irresistible causes. A broken limb or geographic location is an 
irresistible cause of not partaking in a fencing match. A pre-disposition 
towards cowardice, or aversion to violence, is not. In the domain of resistible 
causes, we maintain the capacity for free will in our choice to what extent 
these causes affect us. As Skorupski (Ibid. 43) puts it "I am free to the extent 
that I can resist desires when there is no reason to do so - moral freedom is 
rational autonomy". As Skorupksi (Ibid.) clarifies, when we make judgements 
based on experience, assessing rationally the way circumstance affects us - we 
are in effect reconciling our free will with our natural predicament as beings 
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existing within causal chains. If I refuse to sleep with someone in the 
knowledge that they lead a reckless sexual lifestyle and may well be HIY· 
positive, this represents a causal chain of reasoning. My knowledge of their 
lifestyle allows me to be aware that should I sleep with them I could cause 
myself to contract the disease. My understanding of the causal nature of my 
circumstances has allowed me to make a free choice. If my desires overcome 
me in spite of this, only then am I a powerless link in the causal network. 
Those who can understand and place themselves within a context of causal 
circumstance, and choose to what extent the changeable factors - such as 
belief, desire, bias and aversion - affect them, harness their own will in spite 
of their being bound to a causal universe. 
This, Skorupski (Ibid. 250-251) holds, is Mill's "moral freedom", fostered by a 
"habit of willing", i.e. the development of the capacity to bring ones desire 
and inclinations under the regimen of rational self-control. It is thus that Mill 
accedes to Novalis's conception that "[aJ character is a completely fashioned 
will" (as cited in Skorupski, 1989: 251). But in maintaining this strange hybrid 
picture - of human beings as naturally conditioned and comprehensible 
creatures that nonetheless posses the capacity to assess and alter the nature of 
said conditioning - Mill sets himself a daunting task. He must prove how "a 
purely natural being can be morally free". 
Mill does this, Skorupksi (Ibid.) claims, through a sequence of philosophical 
manoeuvres in the Logic. The first is of a profoundly Humean strain . Mill 
strikes at the paradox of believing in a mysterious necessary connexion 
between an antecedent (a motive or inclination) and its consequent (an 
action), whilst rejecting that motives or inclinations automatically compel 
actions "as by a magical spell" (Ibid.). As such , Mill rejects the notion that the 
link between motive and action is causal. But this, as Skorupski (Ibid.) argues, 
is but a first step. Since the doctrine as it stands would only identify an 
actions' freedom in terms of the absence of "mysterious constraint" (Ibid.) - a 
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condition common to all causal sequences - all actions are equally free , and 
thus equally free from distinction. Mill must, to prove his case, provide a 
means of distinguishing when actions are necessitated and when they are not, 
i.e. when the agent could and could not have acted otherwise. 
This, Skorupski (Ibid. 252·253) continues, is where the distinction between 
resistible and irresistible causes becomes crucial. Without it, any naturalism· 
derived determinist picture would be consigned to fatalism, and as such would 
be incapable of including rational autonomy as the highest bulwark of human 
action. Such a fatalist picture of character formation - the conviction . that our 
characters are made for us by external forces and circumstances - was the 
creed of the Owenites, another set of Mill's contemporaries he treated with 
particular disdain. The Owenite position is a more familiarly determinist one, 
and Mill must prove his own position more plausible for his naturalism to elide 
convincingly with the remainder of his doctrine. The charge to be answered is 
that the "will to alter our character" (Ibid.) that Mill posits is a fiction if 
presented as a process of self-formation. Any desire we have to alter 
ourselves or our behaviour is heteronomous - it stems from factors outside the 
self and beyond the self's control. As such the "character formation process" 
Mill points to is, in fact , determined. Mill is charged with proving that though 
the wish in question must indeed be determined by external circumstance, it is 
nonetheless not heteronomous - that the self is still doing the wishing. 
The resistible/irresistible motive distinction will not suffice here. Skorupski 
(Ibid.) gives the example of a cat waiting by a mouse-hole which is distracted 
from the vigil by a saucer of milk. The second motive (the desire for milk) 
trumps the first (the desire to catch the mouse), proving the first is resistible. 
This is not enough to get us to treat the cat as autonomous - it is still trapped 
in a seemingly fatalistic desire·action pattern. There must be a further 
dimension identified that gets us to the idea that an agent actually has the 
The individual in Mill 28 
power to resist motives. This is where Skoruspksi sees rational autonomy 
ascending to the highest stratum of Mill's doctrine of character: 
[Rational autonomy] credits me with the ability to recognise and respond to reasons. I 
act freely if I would have resisted the motive on which I in fact acted had there been 
sood reason to do so ... The difference between a heteronomous agent driven by 
conflicting motives which are capable of checking each other, and an autonomous 
agent who himself resists his motives lies in the fact that the latter responds to, and 
acts on, reasons (Ibid.). 
The key question though, still lingers - does this in fact elide with Mill's 
naturalism? Skorupski (Ibid. 254) feels it does, in that consideration of reasons 
derives from experience. He takes the example of a man who avoids drinking 
based on previous experience of hangovers, or someone who avoids the edge of 
a cliff because they can see it is crumbling and dangerous. Such persons are 
responding neither to irrational desire nor social programming - they are 
making informed decisions based on experience (or observed experience) of an 
external set of conditions. The question, under such an analysis, becomes not 
one of whether or not a motive is causally determined, but a question of the 
manner in which that determination occurs . "It must" Skorupski sets out "be 
so related to the facts as to constitute a good reason" (Ibid.). The question of 
the will which shapes and alters character follows the same pattern: the 
formation of character must be tied to circumstances beyond the individual's 
control, but the formation of character can be understood as autonomous "if it 
results from our grasping that there is reason to change ourselves, and not, 
say, from a puritanical obsession entrenched by childhood indoctrination" 
(Ibid.). It is thus that we can understand Skorupski's contention that for Mill 
freedom is rational autonomy: it is the capacity to resist motives and courses 
of action where there is reason not to pursue them. This retains "the deep 
liberal insight that freedom is rational autonomy, but without Kantian 
transcendentalism" (Ibid.). 
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In this sense, as shall be seen in the coming chapters, Mill and Hegel are indeed 
on the same page. What adds further force to claims for such a sympathy is 
Skorupski ' s (Ibid.) further analysis that Mill's conception of moral freedom is 
Aristotelian: it is no binary, all or nothing condition derived from a 
transcendental rationality - it is a sliding scale of developed capacity. One can 
be more or less free, or more or less autonomous, in accordance with the 
degree to which one subjects one ' s motives, desires and inclinations to rational 
scrutiny. One 's motives and actions are only externally dictated if one exhibits 
no capacity for rational reflection, or allows weakness of will to invalidate such 
a capacity. As such , it is possible to make oneself more free by fostering such 
mental abilities - the capacity to form and shape motives based on reason and 
the strengthening of will to overcome the force of irrational inclination . 
As such, Mill finds his philosophical lot cast in with Hume in concluding that 
"the doctrine of universal causation is compatible with our practical feeling of 
moral freedom ".15 Mill 's doctrine of the self has , as we shall see, profound 
implications for the role of individualism in his social theory. The idea of a self 
locked into a circumstantially determined causal chain that nonetheless is not 
the ultimate determinant of character logically underpins Mill's insistence on 
the social quest for variety in the social space. A variety of circumstances 
forms a variety of perspectives. As these perspectives inevitably clash, it is the 
capacity to examine motives and courses of action with self-reflexive rational 
insight that becomes so socially crucial. The intersubjective development of 
this capacity feeds into the rational convergence that Mill stands convinced 
drives social progress. As individuals learn to rein in their inclinations and 
subject their actions and motives to rational scrutiny, so they provide external 
evidence of alternatives for others. One of the key benefits of the naturalist 
picture is that it firmly suggests that rational convergence on ends is possible . 
As naturally comprehensible entities, it makes sense that human agents can 
reach a state of rational mutual agreement on optimal courses of action 
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through the crossfire of ideas formed by the variety of circumstances and ideas 
between them. Thus, in outline, is individual and social progress linked in Mill. 
This, in the second section of this chapter, will be shown to be one of Mill's key 
parallels with Hegelian thinking. 
Having established some of the philosophical fundamentals that drive Millian 
understanding of the individual within a social context, I now turn to an 
examination of how this relationship is treated in his political and social theory 
proper, focalised by Mill 's treatment of these issues in On Liberty. 
1.3) The individual in On Liberty 
Of all Mill's works, On Liberty is the most widely read and known. Of all his 
political writings, it is the one that graces the reading lists of humanities 
faculties throughout the globe. There is strong evidence that Mill intended it 
to be his piece de resistance. Bain (1882: 104) recalls that Mill, at the time of 
its publication , was convinced it would outlast in social memory all his other 
works . Mill takes care to point out that it is no complex system or blueprint in 
and of itself. It is merely, in Mill's own words , "an essay", but an essay that 
has come to hold the status of being one of the founding texts of modern 
liberalism. 
The principal issues at hand within On Liberty are few in number, but remain 
the most contentious areas of debate within modern democracies. These are 
liberty of thought and expression, the value of individualism as a tool of social 
progress, a balanced and sceptical approach to the dictates of custom and the 
opinions of the mass . Flowing out of these is the famed and controversial 
liberty principle: that individual practice, provided it cause no harm to others 
or trample on their liberties, is an area exempt from legislation, even if it is 
claimed such is for the individual's own good or the good of society at large. 
" Riley, 199\: 22 1, n.1 4. 
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The full arguments that underpin Mill's vision of the social order, as well as 
their implications, are the province of the coming, larger examination of his 
social theory in Chapter 3. At this juncture, I am concerned with a set of ideas 
and dynamics he explores in the earlier chapters of On Uberty, the issue of 
individuality as one of the elements of well being. 
The first issue we must address is made clear by an objection raised by liberal 
feminist writer L. Susan Brown (1993 : 38-59) in reference to Mill 's feminist 
writings . She lambastes Mill for abandoning an existential individualism, which 
considers the autonomy of the individual as a good in itself, in favour of an 
instrumental individualism which is understood as a good only in terms of the 
broader societal good of social perfectibility. This, for Brown, is a betrayal of 
true individualism. 
Brown has , I believe, dramatically oversimplified, but in so doing clarified the 
set of questions we must ask of Mill's doctrine of individuality. Firstly, we 
must know what , for Mill, gives individuality its status as a highest order social 
value. Secondly, we must clarify what picture does this give us of the way Mill 
sees individual's constituting their conceptions of self and the good (this, as 
shall be seen, must be answered in terms of Mill's idea of the "Art of life') and, 
finally , we must understand what place autonomy, as an abstract value, holds 
in Mill's system . Once these are conclusively answered, I will be in a position 
to more roundly assess the role of the individual (and individualism) in Mill's 
social thought. 
1-3.1) The worth of individuality 
i. A post-social right to individual liberty 
Brown's "instrumentalist" argument points to a crucial element in Mill's 
defence of individualism, but it is one I feel strengthens his philosophical 
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credentials as opposed to weakening them. Skorupski is careful to pOint out 
that Mill stands in the centre of the crossfire between the rights primacy 
theorists and the Romantics. He argued for both the negative conception of 
liberty in terms of freedom from coercion, and the romantic sense of liberty as 
necessary to self, and social, perfectibility. 16 Under Mill's approach , the two 
are eminently reconcilable. Noting the patterns of thought inherent within 
Mill's approach to the sciences and the self explained above, we can see that 
Mill understood the self, and the society it operated in, as a life-long work in 
progress. Individualism is understood as valuable because it is crucial to this 
progress, because the stagnant attitudes and arrogance of natural or popular 
moralities are too often obstacles to intellectual forward motion, at both a 
particular and general level. 17 He did not the follow the rights primacy 
tradition beginning with Hobbes in adducing a "natural right" that must be 
valued in and of itself. As Skorupski puts it: 
The priority of Liberty cannot be grounded on any abstract or formal feature of social 
organisation, or rationality, as such . It is not the tautology that each individual is a 
disti nct individual, nor the dubiously meaningful assertion that each individual is 'born 
free', that gives liberty its value: these are mere rhetorical modes of expressing a 
commitment to its value. Whatever value it has must rest on its importance as 
protecting, or constituting, a real human end (Skorupski, 1989: 347). 
But if there is, on this analysis, no pure abstract right as such, why not place 
the reins of social progress surely in the hands of the wise and educated? Why 
not force people to learn from the best minds of their time, and allow social 
progress to be directed by the intellectual aristocracy? Mill's answer is a 
rhetorically powerful, but fairly ponderous one: 
If> This particular feature is quitt:: possibly drawn from Mill 's reverence for tht! German romantic Wilhelm 
Von Humboldt. A quote from Humboldt'S On rhe Spheres and Duties of Governmellt opens 011 Liberty 
itse lf. The MilllVon Humboldt dynamic wi ll be borne out more full y shortly. 
17 W e shall see this expanded when we come to examine the utilitarian cn.:ed in proper detail in the next 
chapter. 
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Where, not the person 's own character, but the traditions or customs of other people 
are rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human 
happi ness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress (Mill 1 : 50). 
What Mill means by this is sketched out throughout the third chapter of On 
Liberty, where we find his key criticisms of a social space dominated by 
entrenched customary practice. 
ii. The individual vs. custom: fallibilism and self-development 
Mill begins with the very question I have just put forward - why should we not 
allow the collected wisdom of social experience to dictate our actions? He 
reminds us that the customary norms held others represent what experience 
has taught them. This, for Mill, presents a three-fold issue. Firstly, their 
experience may be too narrow in scope, or their interpretation of said 
experience might be flawed. Secondly, the experience of others may be 
correctly interpreted , but not suitable to all. "Customs", Mill somewhat glibly 
cautions, "are made for customary circumstance and customary characters" 
(Ibid. 51). The diversity of human character and experience dictates that even 
the most widely held norm must be limited in that applies only to a particular 
range of experience experienced by a particular breed of character. Thirdly 
(and this is Mill's strongest counterthrust), even if the experience is both 
interpreted correctly and suitable to the individual who is being asked to 
conform to it "to conform to custom, merely as custom does not educate or 
develop in him any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a 
human being" (Ibid.). 
What Mill has in mind here is the exercise of the mental faculties that are 
inherent in deciding and choosing the best course of action for oneself. This is 
to him in stark contrast to acting simply according to even true and useful 
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received opinion , which for him requires "no need of any other faculty than the 
ape-l ike one of imitation" (Ibid .). 
The first two objections are vintage Mill fallibilism, a theme that recurs 
throughout his social theory. Mill's concern is that we cannot, frankly, 
guarantee that the best minds of our time will be those in power. In Mill 
passionately displays his distrust of the intellectual capacities of the ruling 
political class, fettered as they are by human weakness, and bounded by the 
fixity of their own protocols: 
[T]he absorption of the principal ability of the country into the governing body is fatal, 
sooner or later, to the mental progressiveness of the body itself. Banded together as 
they are - working a system which, like all systems, necessarily proceeds in a great 
measure by fixed rules - the official body are under constant temptation of sinking into 
indolent routine, or ... of rushing into some half-examined crudity which has struck the 
fancy of some leading member of the corps (Ibid. 102). 
One of the concerns expressed here is one of Mill's more compelling insights 
into the dangers of a ruling body governed by traditional political practice at 
the expense of reasoned insight. Political cultures and political thinkers tend 
to suffer from what Robert Pirsig would describe as "value rigidity" .'8 The 
systematic nature of modern politics tends to produce mindsets that cannot see 
beyond the supposedly realistic boundaries of their transitory protocols . . Itis 
thus left to minds which operate outside the system to criticise and amend 
such. '9 This stands in profound and compelling antagonism to rosier 
exhortations to conservatism such as Oakeshotte's (1962: 181) which holds that 
"the more familiar [routines] become, the more useful they are". Where I feel 
Mill's crucial insight lies is in pointing out that this systematic rigidity is an 
I~ Robert M. Pirsig, Zen aJ/d the Art of Motorcycle Mail/tenance (25 111 Anniversary Edition), 1999, New 
York: Vintage Books, pp 312-3 13 
1<) A prime ex.ample is the running d~bale over the political entrenchment of lobby group politics in the 
American political cu lture, which of Len alien ales the inlert!st<; of ordinary cit izens at the expense of 
corporate entities. So entrenched an aspect is this "corporali sa Li on" of pol itics thaI it is lert to completely 
radica li sed poli tical entities such as Ralph Nader's civil-society birthed party to meaningfully question it. 
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almost inescapable characteristic of ruling bodies, and that it is crucial to a 
healthy social order to maintain powerful critical centres outside of the ruling 
framework, however functional it actually is. Mill's other branch of concern is 
a fairly standard one, but no less compelling for that. This is one he expands 
on in On Representative Government, that rulers often have something of a 
half-cocked understanding of many technical policy areas, and the public have 
no say over the advisors that are selected to guide them. The only real remedy 
to this is the kind of open-forum policy framework that Mill pushes for at 
various levels. Even the ideal social order cannot seek the highest of its social 
wisdom in the rulers alone, and this means maintaining a healthy culture of 
individual critical appraisal towards public policy. 
At the very least, we cannot allow the ruling classes to declare themselves 
infallible and act in the name of a consensus "natural morality"_ On this one, I 
feel history bears Mill out. The last few centuries are riddled with examples of 
regimes that persecuted the most progressive amongst them. The famed 
examples of Socrates and Galileo come to mind, but the courts of Athens and 
the inquisition were not the first nor the last example of a regime that acted 
repugnantly in the name of what it felt were the highest ethics and wisdom of 
its time. They surely felt the rectitude and enlightenment of their actions as 
surely as some presently feel the same concerning modern morality.20 
Mill's third objection to a custom led life is, however, rooted in a very 
different intellectual strand in his social vision. It is no co-incidence that he 
includes near the very beginning of the third chapter the following set of 
quotations from Von Humboldt's On The Spheres and Duties at Government: 
[T]he end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of 
reason , and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most 
10 Th is is by no means the last word on the faJlihilisJ1l iss ue, and it is examined in morc far-reaching detail 
when we come to consider the social context of individuJI rights in Chapler 3. 
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harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole ' ; that, 
therefore, the object 'towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his 
efforts, and on which especially those who design to influence their fellow men must 
ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and development' ; that for this 
there are requisites, 'freedom and variety of situations'; and that from the union of 
these arise 'individual vigour and manifold diversity', which combine themselves in 
'originality' (Ibid: 50-51). 
Whilst Mill never explicitly states it as the case, what he is here concerned 
with is the concept of rational autonomy - the development of a rational 
capacity of critical assessment as a key foundation of both social and individual 
progress. This becomes clearer as he extends his argument throughout the 
chapter. He compares the developmental exercise of mental faculties involved 
in making an informed choice with the developmental power of physical 
exercise on the body's muscles. As such: 
The faculties are called into no exercise by doing a thing merely because others do it, 
no more than by believing a thing only because others believe it. If the grounds of an 
opinion are not conclusive to a person's own reason, his reason cannot be 
strengthened , but is likely to be weakened, by adopting it ... rendering his feelings and 
character inert and torpid, instead of active and energetic (Ibid: 52). 
Mill thence pauses to admit a possibly weaker version of his position for the 
sake of argument: that it can be admitted that an intelligent following of 
custom is preferable to a "blind and simply mechanical adhesion to it" (Ibid.). 
But does this thence imply that our desires and impulses should be given free 
reign in the development of character? Is this not a recipe for a society of 
brutes? 
Mill's answer is an interesting one. He feels (similarly to Hegel) that desire and 
inclination are part and parcel of the human condition, and that "strong 
impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced" (Ibid. 53) . His 
maintains that when people act out their desires wrongly or injuriously, it is 
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not the strength of the desire, but the weakness of their conscience that is at 
fault. He maintains there is no connection between a strong desire and a 
weakness of moral sensibility, but rather "[t]he natural connection is the other 
way" (Ibid.) . What Mill suggests is that terms such as "strong inclination" can 
be re-described in more general terms as "energy" (Ibid.). This energy may be 
turned to bad uses as well as good . Those who exhibit high levels of energy are 
thus capable of both more evil and more good than those who do not. But such 
lacklustre folk are unlikely to be of any real social use: "[M]ore good may 
always be made of an energetic nature than of an indolent and impassive one" 
(Ibid . ). 
It is thus that Mill concludes that such energetic characters must be cultivated 
and not suppressed (whilst, one presumes, cultivating other sensibilities, or 
putting in place other boundaries, that ensure such energy is not to put to ill 
use). Such energy is the source of both the strong passion that underscores 
barbarity as well as the potentially equally strong passion for its opposites: 
virtue and self-control. As Mill contends with a trademark flourish : "It is 
through the cultivation of [strong susceptibilities] that society both does its 
duty and protects its interests: not by rejecting the stuff of which heroes are 
made, because it knows not how to make them" (Ibid., my italics). Impulses 
are thus , for Mill as they are for Hegel , part and parcel of the human condition , 
not to be outrightly repressed so much as counterbalanced by the development 
of "higher" capacities. 
Mill is akin to Hegel in another sense here, in that he does not stipulate this as 
a brute application formula for all forms of societies, but rather sees it as a 
further point of development from a more brutal historical antecedent. In this, 
he also finds the source of the counter-individual forces he identifies in modern 
society. He contrasts the modern social order with more remote periods in 
history when "these forces might be, and were, too much ahead of the power 
which society then possessed of disciplining and controlling them" (Ibid.). 
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What he has in mind are times when the strong individuality of the barbarian 
clashed with any attempt to be controlled by social measures that required 
that impulses be contained. Out of this arose a regimen of law and discipline 
that "asserted power over the whole man , claiming to control all his life in 
order to control his character" (Ibid: 53-54) . This, Mill argues, is how a 
modern social order came to overshoot the mark, and came to stand guilty of 
mental repression and stagnation. We, have, to put it brutely, gone too much 
the other way: 
Things are vastly changed since the passions of those who were strong by station and by 
pe rsonal endowment were in a state of habitual rebellion against laws and ordinances, 
and requi red to be rigorously chained up to enable persons within their reach to enjoy 
any particle of security. In our times , from the highest class of society to the lowest, 
every one lives under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship ... I do not mean that 
they choose what is customary in preference to any inclination. It does not even occur 
to them to have any inclination, except for what is customary. Thus , the mind itself is 
bowed to the yoke (Ibid . 54). 
Mill sees the Calvinist doctrine, which sees human nature as something 
inherently destructive and in need of control ("that the one great offence of 
man is self will") as the extreme outcome of such an intellectual binding. 
Through such a lens, humankind are served best by surrender to the will of G-d, 
and that any other use of the faculty of the will is dangerous, sinful and 
undesirable. What worries Mill is not just this particularly harsh religious 
extreme, so much as what he calls its "mitigated form" - where the same 
pattern is applied in a slightly watered down form. By this he means social 
outlooks that see citizens as being allowed to satisfy some of their inclinations, 
not in the way they desire, but through obedience to the prescriptions of 
authority premised in the supposed will of G-d. This, he feels, instantiates a 
social space of "pinched and hidebound" characters (Ibid. 54-55).21 
1 1 This is by no means an atlack confined to the Christian social reformers Mill so held to account The 
palLem of this argument applies to allY unrellectively enforced communal/moral norm. It remains, to this 
day, a charge the commun itarians must answer in claiming that such norms arc the formati ve basis and 
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What Mill proposes is that such social visions represent a direly narrow view of 
human excellence. What he calls for is a blend of "Pagan self -assertion" and 
"Christian self-denial", tied together in "the Greek ideal of self-development". 
This we could, without injustice to Mill, interpret as a call for a balance 
between progressive individualism and a sense of other-regarding restrain t . 
Thus , Mill is by no means contending that all social frameworks fall by the 
wayside. The basic frameworks that guarantee the rights and interests of 
others he sees as both necessary and (once again distantly echoing Hegel) 
actually of benefit to those restrained: 
The means of development which the individual loses by being prevented from 
gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the expense of 
the development of other people. And even to himself there is a full equivalent in the 
better development of the social part of his nature, rendered possible by the restraint 
put upon the selfish part (Ibid. 56). 
But this is not to throw the gates to social restraint wide open and leave the 
position guilty of concession verging on hypocrisy. Mill immediately qualifies 
this with a crucial rider: 22 
To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and 
capacities which have the good of others for thei r object. But to be restrained in 
things not affecting their good , by their mere displeasure, develops nothing valuable , 
except such force of character as may unfold itself in resisting the restraint (Ibid.). 
Thus Mill's society of self-aware and self-land socially) critical citizens does 
admit of certain limitations. But how widely does he see this ethic of critical 
spontaneity applying? Is it not something of a pipe dream ("a liberal 
framework of any society and must thus blO! adhered to and left largely unchallenged. This shall be 
discussed shorlly in ref~rence to Gray's critiques of Mi ll. 
22 Till:! fuller development and implication of which I discuss at length in Chapter 3. 
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voluntarist utopia" as Gray would put it23 ) to expect a broadscale questioning 
of broadly socially shared values? Mill would indeed stand guilty of severe 
delusion if he honestly expected every citizen to exist in a state of constant 
critical adversity with the social framework. But delusional he is not. His fears 
are that quite the opposite will happen, which is why he seeks to protect the 
critical and useful individual perspective not only from the ravages of state 
practice, but from public practice as well. The danger he sees lurking in the 
masses is a perspective formed by "collective mediocrity". 
iii. Genius and Collective Mediocrity 
Mill does not expect all humankind shall , at any foreseeable stage, be capable 
of what he sees as the proper exercise of the critical faculties. This is, indeed, 
part of what worries him. "[T]he general tendency of things throughout the 
world," he maintains "is to render mediocrity the ascendant power amongst 
mankind" (Ibid. 58). It is the stymieing power of the mass, the "collective 
mediocrity" that leads him to further value the contribution original minds can 
make. He worries that, though it means a very different kind of people in 
different parts of the world, that the mediocre mass, leaving decisions on 
policy to people ostensibly "much like themselves", without proper or deep 
consideration. The power to change this, the power to take point on the 
charge towards progress, resides not with the many, but with the few. This for 
Mill , is the proper role of genius. He holds that no government ever rose above 
the mediocrity he so bemoans "except in so far as the sovereign many have let 
themselves be guided (which in their best times they have always done) by the 
counsels of a more highly gifted and instructed few" (Ibid. 58-59). 
This is, however, no call to oligarchy. He does not countenance genius 
mutating itself into a kind of totalitarianism of the wise. All those of genius 
" Gray, 1989: 229 
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can claim, by Mill's terms, is "freedom to point out the way". (Anything 
beyond this violates the fuller scope of Mill's doctrine, and furthermore 
becomes "corrupting to the great man himself".) This being said , Mill is not 
displaying contempt for the mental capacities of the average man. In his view, 
quite the opposite. "The honour and glory of the average man is that ... he can 
respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to them with his eyes 
open" (Ibid.) . It is thus that Mill comes to maintain that eccentricity and 
genius must be cherished rather than suppressed. He sees the potential for 
such repression not merely in state persecution of perceived social heretic, but 
in the mass disregard for the value of genius and originality. "People think 
genius a fine thing" he scoffs "if it enables a man to write an exciting poem, or 
paint a picture . But in its true sense, that of originality in thought and action 
... nearly all, at heart, think that they can do very well without it" (Ibid.). The 
reason for this he feels, is a tragically logical one: 
Originality is the one thing which unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of. They cannot 
see what it is to do for the m; how should they? If they could see what it would do fo r 
them, it would not be originality. The first service originality has to rende r them is 
that of opening their eyes (Ibid . 58). 
But is Mill not being somewhat optimistic here, or at the very least possibly 
inconsistent? The attitudes and ideas those of genius lead the mass to accept 
may well be those that run counter to liberty, or even be directly harmful to 
one sector of the population? Think of particularly charismatic and eccentric 
racists with eloquent and unusual ways of providing justification for such 
doctrines. Mill admits that liberty and the "spirit of improvement" can have an 
uneasy relationship "for [the spirit of improvement] may aim at forcing such 
improvements on an unwilling people; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it 
resists such attempts, may ally itself locally and temporally with the opponents 
of improvement". But these he sees merely as temporal and transitory 
aberrations, exceptions to the general dynamic that "the only unfailing and 
permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there. are as many 
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possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals" (Ibid . 
62-63) . Beyond this both "spirits" he identifies here can claim a common 
enemy in the "sway of custom" (Ibid.)_ They also both stand opposed to the 
blind, dark side of custom's reign - despotism: 
Even despotism does not produce its worst effects, so long as individuality exists under 
it; and whatever crushes individuality is despotism, by whatever name it may be 
called, and whether it professes to be enforcing the will of G-d or the injunctions of 
men (Ibid. 56)_ 
Here we find the seeds of a dynamic already partially identified in the 
preceding discussion on Mill's background philosophical positions_ With the 
tools of the distanced naturalist at his disposal, Mill displays something akin to 
intellectual Darwinism towards social orders that can survive in no other 
manner but through persecuting dissenters_ He calls for a free-flow of intellect 
and criticism that he is fully aware will often be messy and profoundly 
uncomfortable to traditional mindsets and traditional policy and social 
practice. But, Mill coolly reminds us, if social norms cannot withstand such 
internal criticism, then they are mere dogma - a hindrance to progress, liberty 
and the baseline interests of the developed human mindscape . They must 
either perish or re-invent themselves_ Such is the very nature of human reason 
and human social progress. 24 The question that yet lingers is how realistic this 
understanding of individuality is. In assessing this, we run headlong into one of 
the crux issues in the liberal-communitarian debate. This is the issue of to 
what extent a liberalism such as Mill's posits a radically unsituated rational self 
that cannot be realistically abstracted from the modern social matrix_ It is , 
after all, a key communitarian contention that it is a system designed for such 
abstracted critical entities, and not flesh-and-blood socially embedded citizens 
that leads the modern liberal state to undercut the identity-constituting 
mechanisms through which communities provide social cohesion. I believe 
1~ This position is merely sketched out here. It is examined in much fuller detail in Section 4 of Chapter 3. 
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many of the resources to deal with such a criticism of Millian individualism are 
already laid out above, but it is time to deal with such questions specifically 
and in deeper detail. 
iv. Millian individualism: a voluntarist liberal delusion? 
There is something of both the virtue ethics theorist and the expressivist 
romantic in Mill 's position - a call for courage and spontaneity as the 
redeeming and progressive virtues of human thinking. But what does Mill imply 
here? That we must consistently re-assess and re-discover the entire spectrum 
of social belief at every stage in order to make ourselves more intellectually 
capable? This is not necessarily the direct upshot of Mill's position. He is 
concerned more with the atmosphere that cultivates the kind of character that 
may do so. But this must be chased a fair deal harder, for there is a crux 
question at stake here . How workable, how realistic is Mill's understanding of 
individuality? 
This is a key point at which the Millian system stands or falls. The standard 
communitarian opposition to liberal individualism expressed by critics such as 
Gray (1989: 224-229) sees the Millian understanding of the individual as both 
unrealistic and as the incorrect locus of true social progress (which Gray, for 
one locates institutionally). If this criticism holds , then all of the fine Millian 
notions of individual progress as the locus of social progress, and the necessary 
enshrinement of the right to "experiments in living" , fall away as justifications 
of the caveats entrenched in the Millian social vision. 
Gray (Ibid .) contends that Mill presents a "radically defective" notion of 
individual autonomy at odds with the very cultural and moral framework of any 
civil society, much of which he sees as the very grounding of liberty itself. He 
feels that Mill , in identifying progress as an inherent tendency in the human 
mindscape, its development controlled by individual innovations in the realm of 
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ideas , presents "no extended or systematic discussion of the institutional 
preconditions of the growth of knowledge". This , he maintains, leads Mill to 
paint custom as "falsely hostile to self· realization . " Gray asserts that it is far 
more plausible to see customary practice as fundamental to the preservation of 
liberty and peace , in that it allows for the co·existence of diverse viewpoints 
without having to constantly re·constitute social boundaries through legal 
action. Thus, Gray concludes that Mill' s liberalism is "crippled by voluntaristic 
Utopianism". 25 
I follow Riley (1991: 220) in concluding that such charges would indeed stick -
were they not such a shallow and misconstrl,Jed reading of Mill's position. 
Gray, I feel, has set up a significant straw man on a number of levels. Firstly, 
as Riley convincingly argues (in accord with the discussion of Mill's naturalism 
above), Mill is by no means guilty of the "rationalist metaphysics" that Gray 
saddles him with. The re is no "radically unsituated self" in Mill to which he 
appeals in defending autonomylindividuality as a cardinal social virtue. Mill 
would heartily concede that our very framework of choice is institutional, and 
that our inclinations and judgements are formed by social circumstance. But 
to claim that it follows that social circumstance is the only generator of 
character and inclination is a patent fa lse dichotomy. Thus, Mill can quite 
consistently claim that it is possible and desirable that characters formed 
within a social framework be allowed to make uncommon and unpopular 
choices, without demanding some kind of supra·social , narrowly rational 
"quiddity" be the driving force of such choice. 
~~ Gray ( 1989: 224-229) sees the idea of individua l experiments in li ving as a "rationalistic fic tion", Such 
experimems he feds, if they exist al all , exist collectively and unconsciously, evolving over genc::ralions. 
He rall ies to his cause Spencer and Hayek, in clai ming that such evolutions occur independentl y of 
individual judgements, and that truth is not the ulti mate variable in social progress thal Mill sets it up as . 
False belief systems may give their holders "a competitive edge in the survival stakes". He sees thi s based 
in Mi ll 's assumption of an essen tial indiv idual "quidu ity" impossibly and implausibly abS lractl!d rrolll all 
social and communal attachment - a pre-social and narrowly abstract sl!l f that mus t be fl!ali sed and not 
suffocated. A self, Gray feds, Mill cannot plausibly posit. I stand with Rill;!Y in decrying this posi tion in 
the main text. 
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As Riley (Ibid. 221) argues, individuals (as empirically comprehensible social 
entities) are, on a Millian analysis , sufficiently similar to be capable of coming 
to a state of rational convergence in their judgements. But even where this is 
possible, characters (as with all other natural entities) sufficiently differ by 
circumstance (including natural capacities) to remain diversified. All 
individuals, through a Millian lens, possess different levels of naturally 
endowed capacities (crucially with respect to the strength and exercise of will 
- the self-aware sceptical mind vs. the blind acceptor of custom). Throw into 
this mix the difference in conditions (educational and otherwise) that 
contribute to character formation and we have a sense of the diversity Mill 
speaks of. There is only one crucial respect in which individuals are universally 
alike - they are all to some extent fallible, and their choices to some extent 
imperfect. 
This is where, as Riley (Ibid.) holds, Mill's compatibilism (as discussed above) is 
crucial to understanding his social schema. His framework of ethical 
confrontation in terms of individual choice and lifestyle are premised on the 
capacity to see beyond the edicts handed to us by custom (as well as, in some 
cases, our own brute inclinations) and make moral choices that are not directly 
tied to these, even as we admit we posses them. It is in constant convergence 
that humans overcome the imperfections of their own perspectives. The point 
is, as Riley argues that none of the grounding features of Mill's defence of 
individuality can be tied to a hyper'abstracted self. 
But what of Gray's further criticisms that Millian individualism undermines the 
very shared conditions that make liberty possible? To address those, I follow 
Riley in examining some further elements of Mill's individualism. He identifies, 
in Mill's following of Von Humboldt's social ideals as a call for a "habitual love 
of liberty" (Ibid. 222·223). This is composed of the two requisites of "freedom 
and variety of situations", more explicitly describable as the capacity to make 
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choices premised on one's own wants and judgements, exercised within the 
framework of institutionally pluralist society. "By implication" Riley argues 
"the habitual love of liberty can be acquired only after experiencing liberty 
itself; and can be maintained only if society remains pluralist to some degree" 
(lbid .).26 
Liberty, Riley (Ibid. 225) argues, does not require that our social conditions and 
factors have no influence on our decisions, so much as that such decisions be 
ultimately our own. Where they diverge from the common weal, such must be 
allowed (within the requisite social framework constraints to be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3) in order that individuals have the capacity to shape their 
own characters in accordance with rational self-governance. "Thus" Riley 
continues "a person's character formation is directly related to his disposition 
to govern himself in his cultural milieu" (Ibid.). 
But this is but the first of the two requisites. Individualism , Riley (Ibid.) 
contends, requires a further institutional dimension: an atmosphere of social 
pluralism. The plurality of paths, the multiplicity of possible sources of 
improvement must be enshrined within a culture that can institutionally 
tolerate and manage varied approaches to life. Such, for Mill, are the 
circumstances conducive to progress. Their absence (as we have discussed) is, 
for a Millian, a recipe for social stagnation. The reason , we recall, is that the 
masses and their elected representatives become used to an increaSingly 
uniform way of doing things. With the crushing of non-conformity comes the 
2f> The call for liberty as a constant, often counter-cu llural exercise of the mind is, as Riley argues, by no 
means incommensurate with Mi ll 's compatibiJi st naturalism: 
Mill argues that our feeling of moral freedom is our knowledge that we can employ our given 
power of wi ll ( 0 alter our circumstances in accord with our judgement and inclinations. That our 
endowed wi llpower may ~ determined ullimarcly by ci rcumstances beyond our control does not 
alter the faCl lhat we have such a power and may be held morally responsible for its reasonable use 
(Riley, 1991: 224). 
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crushing of variety, and with it the extended intellectual possibilities that such 
variety allows for Y 
What is interesting here is that such provisions, on the surface, look remarkably 
similar to those laid out by Oakeshott (1962: 182-196) as arguments designed to 
defend what he describes as a brand of political conservatism . He, similarly to 
Mill, sees government taking on the role of managing the clash and flux of 
human activity and perspective, the competing "dreams" of its citizenry, 
without dictating positive moral content itself: 
An 'umpire' who at the same time is one of the players is no umpire; 'rules' about which we are 
not disposed to be conservative are not rules but incitements to disorder; the conjunction of 
dreaming and ruling generates tyranny (Ibid. 194). 
The interesting thing here is that Oakeshott, like Gray, locates this framework 
of free living in a set of shared understandings about the way things operate in 
a peaceable society. "The intimations of government", he holds in stark 
contrast to Mill, "are to be found in ritual, not in religion or philosophy; in the 
enjoyment of orderly or peaceable behaviour, not in the search for truth or 
perfection" (Ibid. 188). 
This could be construed as something of a body blow to the Millian social 
vision. If Oakeshotte's position holds as coherent, then we could justifiably 
claim that none of Mill's grand arguments for the development of the 
capacities of self-development within the citizenry and society as a whole are 
27 As Riley (1991 : 226) po ints out , Mill does not suggest thal it will be poss ible LO dethrone public opinion 
as a reigning social power. nor that such a move would be dcsirablt::. Rather, he idealises a situation in 
which there is a wider popular support for the possibility thal opinions different from the mass have value -
in a sense a social ethic o f open-mindedness. He thus conjoins ind ividual freedom and an atmosphere of 
pluralism as the two separately necessary (bUl only jointly suffic ient ) conditions for tlourishing self-
deve lopment. Mill's famed conclusion that the institutionalised to lerance o f diversity is the crux of an 
in tellectually (and otherwise) flou rishing society is drawn from this . "The mass itself," as Riley puts it "has 
no incent ive 10 depart from existing mass opinions and customs" (Ibid .). If we accept Mill's arguments for 
the value of original thought, and the unlikelihood o f such va lue's recognit ion. we can affirm that diversity 
of lifes tyle and choice must be enshrined within a social framework of demarcated pluralism. 
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in fact conducive to a stable and progressive society. Such a society is better 
established by mere common assent to a ritualistic politics of co-habitation. 
But this is precisely where I see Mill setting up vital conditions for a social 
order dedicated to liberty that theorists such as Gray and Oakeshotte miss. I 
would contend here (and throughout this inquiry) that the Millian social vision 
is indeed a social space dedicated to tolerance and institutional management 
of conflicting perspectives and life-plans. But Mill emphasises as fundamental 
the necessity of enshrining an active and critical mindset within the citizenry, 
something Oakeshott (Ibid. 170) assumes to be at odds with the way everyday 
consciousness operates. "A man's identity (or that of a community)", he 
asserts, "is nothing more than an unbroken rehearsal of contingencies, each at 
the mercy of circumstance and each significant in proportion to its familiarity". 
It is thus that Oakeshott understands the ideal citizen as cautious and sceptical 
of innovation and unfamiliar ways of doing things. This is a disposition I believe 
to be profoundly at odds with the kind of passive cohabitation he sees as the 
profound legacy of modern social ritual. 
Those that cling to what is familiar as the supreme court of appeal are by no 
stretch of the imagination suited to such a co-habitation. New ideas, new 
moral outlooks, new lifestyles , offend and rile them, and are often seen as 
threatening. One only has to look at the conservative religious attitudes to 
personal moral choice issues such as homosexuality and abortion to see that 
those that cling to what is familiar to them, personally and communally, are 
seldom tolerant. The politics Oakeshott praises is a politics of avoidance, not 
engagement. His ritual is a ritual of passivity. It lacks the uncomfortable but 
genuinely progressive element of the Millian zone of ethical engagement 
described in Chapter 3. And it lacks, most relevantly here, the key Millian 
insight that a society of mindsets scraping and scurrying before the familiarity 
of custom and ritual is an intellectually and practically stagnant place. As I see 
Mill arguing, it is being on even-handed terms with the unfamiliar that renders 
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a society genuinely stable and genuinely progressive. Without it, bigots are 
never confronted with proper grounds to reconsider their bigotry, reactionary 
elements remain constant blockades to genuine improvement. The space of 
tolerance Oakeshott insists upon must be a space of managed intersubjective 
ethical confrontation if it is to be ultimately stable, and his position lacks the 
crucial Millian elements that make such a position useful and coherent. If we 
relate to the social order as a constant, it must be as a rational framework 
constantly inviting our scrutiny and ready to prove itself rationally worthy of 
our assent. 
This is by no means to say that there must be a blanket disregard for social 
practice. As Riley (1991: 227), argues, Mill at no stage elevates individualism 
to the point where it "swamps social customs and traditions altogether". The 
e lements Gray is so concerned Mill disregards (i.e . those that embed the 
framework of social pluralism itself) are covered at length in a separate section 
of Mill's doctrine: the liberty principle, of which his doctrine of individualism is 
but one supporting rafter. The social context provisions of Mill's social theory 
and their implications are covered at length in Chapter 3, and as such I leave 
off detailed discussion of them here. I will simply accede, for now, to Riley's 
(Ibid. 228) (to my mind uncontroversial) interpretation that for Mill 
"individuality is rightfully paramount over social norms only with respect to 
purely self-regarding concerns". Furthermore, Mill was by no means entirely 
opposed to all received social wisdom. As he himself states: 
[Ilt would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing whatever had 
been known in the world before they came into it ... Nobody denies that people should 
be so taught and trained in youth as to know and benefit by the ascertained results of 
human experience (Mill 1: 51). 
As Riley (Ibid . 228-230 ) reminds us, Mill's aim is not to dismantle any and all 
received wisdom, but to end the despotism of custom over rational adults. Not 
quite the wholesale replacement of the social order with a utopia of rational 
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beings that Gray accuses him of. The individual's "aesthetic duty to himself" 
to improve his rational and critical capacities in order to make authentic 
choices never trumps the valid moral obligations he holds to others. 28 
As such, I conclude with Riley that Gray's (and with it the standard 
communitarian) attack, on the whole fails. The nature of the liberty-
enshrining institutional framework he misconstrues as missing from the Millian 
doctrines will only be discussed in full detail in Chapter 3, in the course of 
examining the liberty principle. There I feel, it will be conclusively proved 
that this particular charge fails. The charges of radically unsituated selfhood 
do not, I feel , stand in light of Riley 's responses. Mill was no crude atomist, 
and to claim that any concession of social influence on character and choice 
commits one to sanctioning full·blooded social determinism is the most facile 
breed of false dichotomy. As for the charge of undermining the true conditions 
of liberty, I believe I have shown, at least in outline, that a conservative 
position that tries to set itself up as etching out a space of tolerance and co· 
existence as a matter of custom or ritual is internally contradictory. It must 
either impose the majority's conception of the 'familiar ' , or take on the Millian 
conceptions that make such a space intellectually viable. 
There remain, however, certain questions we must yet ask of Mill's doctrine of 
individualism . We must understand at a deeper level how far Mill would push 
autonomy as a baseline social virtue, and we must further understand the 
breed of individualism such autonomy is designed to enshrine and guarantee . 
What in other words, the "aesthetic duty to oneself" just mentioned is meant 
to secure. This is the task of the two following sections. 
111 A lengthy discussion of the nature of said obli gations is lO be found in Chapter 3. 
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1.3.2) The question of autonomy 
Mill's conception of rational autonomy has been discussed at some length in the 
above sections, in reference to his conception of freedom as the capacity to 
rationally control circumstances' effect on the self, and character as an 
ultimately will·forged entity. But this is but a first step into the fray. An 
examination of the role of autonomy in On Liberty must address at least two 
further key questions . Firstly, to what extent is autonomy, in terms of the 
capacity to rationally direct one 's own life, a highest order social principle that 
can trump all others? Secondly, what social conditions can be set up to 
optimally promote autonomy through the rights framework of the social order? 
The second question can only be answered when we come to the social context 
of rights in Chapter 3, but the issue of whether it must be asked at all comes 
down to how we answer the first question, an answer which falls decidedly 
within the scope of the present inquiry. This is because rights, for Mill , are not 
pre-social as they would be for a natural rights theorist. They are, as shall be 
discussed in Chapter 3, side constraints protecting primary utilities (or, to 
phrase it less controversially, vital human interests). The question of 
autonomy as a right at all rests on whether we can, by Millian terms, define it 
as a fundamental interest of all individuals. 
i. Autonomy as capacity and freedom in Mill 
Skorupski's (1989 : 355-360) argument on this is interesting, as he ventures 
somewhat outside the boundaries of Mill's own schema of principles. Instead 
of incorporating autonomy as a component of happiness under the utility 
principle he argues that it in fact functions in Millian terms as a categorical end 
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in its own right. 29 Whether we accept such a re·interpretation or not (and we 
shall consider it further in a moment), we can still usefully attempt to discern 
what role autonomy as a valued end plays in the Millian social order. 
Skorupski (1989: 355) distinguishes between "autonomy as freedom" and 
"autonomy as capacity". The latter we have already discussed at some length 
above. It is the former that interests us here. We can begin with the capacity 
for rational autonomy as a pre·condition. The freedom to be autonomous is 
the freedom to direct one's own actions and life plan according to self· 
discovered and self·imposed rational principles. The capacity for rational 
autonomy is, by Millian lights, an empirical capacity common to all humanity, 
but it does not arise spontaneously in any fully developed form. It must be fed 
on the resources to develop, and freedom is crucial to this. 
What must such a freedom entail? It is not a simplistic freedom to do as one 
likes . As Skorupski (Ibid.) clarifies, the individual's life is her own in a dual 
respect. She does not wish another to direct her courses of actions for her, but 
as a direct flipside she must forego the right to do so for others. The freedom 
to be autonomous here is "sovereignty over my own life, not sovereignty over 
anyone else's ". Thus, at points where life·plans and courses of actions 
intersect (what Skorupksi labels "common space") , the individual has a say, a 
co·directing role with the others that share such a space. 30 
It is thus that Skorupski (Ibid. 356) sees Mill coming to the post· social notion of 
a "private domain". Mill's conception of autonomous action has a social 
compatibility dimension logically built into it. The concept of a private domain 
must be defined against a background of what is not private to make any sense. 
Autonomy is indeed for Mill an individual end, but one which presupposes a 
2<J J alas lack the space h~re to trac~ the:! entire scope of Skorupksi's arguments for aUlOnomy as a primary 
utility. Since I have foregone an in-depth analysis of Mill's utilitarianism overthe course of this thesis, this 
argumen t is interesting in implication, but not relevant here in its full1englh. 
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social context. As such, autonomy as freedom cannot simply be the freedom to 
satisfy one's desires, or to seek one's own happiness. Either of these may well 
include infringing the autonomy of another. This leads us to the critical 
question of how autonomy is to be considered in a Millian welfare calculus. Is 
it a part of welfare that may be sacrificed if circumstances demand , or must it 
be considered a foundational end constitutive of welfare itself? This is the 
question we must address now. 
ii. Autonomy as a categorical human end 
If we can justifiably make the tricky definitional move of setting up autonomy 
as a categorical human end in Mill, Skorupksi (Ibid. 356-357) convincingly 
maintains that we can make sense of a Millian contention that might otherwise 
seem somewhat contradictory. This is that it is possible for a private life-
course that is not objectively best in itself (in that another life-course chosen 
of the individual's own free will would objectively be better) , to in fact qualify 
as best in that it is chosen autonomously. To coercively ensure that the 
individual live the objectively better private life would be to undermine her 
autonomy, and as such diminish her welfare at a crucial level. If the better life 
course is to be taken, the individual must choose it. 
Skorupksi (Ibid.) is quick to point out that there do seem to be consummate 
difficulties (from a Millian perspective) in separating autonomy's value as a 
categorical end in itself from its value as a component of human happiness or 
welfare. Mill certainly does not seem to regard the two as separate. As he 
puts it in The Subjection of Women : 
He who would rightly appreciate the worth of personal independence as an element of 
happiness should consider the value he himself puts on it as an ingredient of his own 
(Mill 3, as cited in Skorupski, 1989: 357). 
30 This schematic or demarcated pluralism, skl.!tched in rough outline here, becomes, om:e' filled oul., the 
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This need not, however, force us to conclude that Mill completely sublimated 
autonomy into happiness. We can concede that having her autonomy 
respected contributes to the individual's happiness and general welfare. But 
where does such a contribution stem from? (Why, in other words, is it so 
valued by individuals so as to constitute a part of their happiness?) The answer 
we are led to is that it is valued as an end in its own right. Thus "the 
consciousness of it makes one happy". Skorupski (Ibid. 357-358) thence 
develops the argument in reference to Mill's notion of the value of developed 
personality, captured in Millian phrases such as "the greater fullness of life." 
Such fullness is achieved by a dual measure of realisation and diversity. As 
Skorupksi succinctly puts it : "A life is fuller the more it realises any categorical 
human end; narrower inasmuch as it fails to realise another" (Ibid.). As such, 
Skorupski holds that to underpin the liberty principle's contention to be 
grounded in the "permanent interests of man as a progressive being" (Mill 1: 
9), autonomy must be understood as a categorical human end in its own right. 
In sanctioning autonomy as a crucial value of its own accord (however 
implicitly) , which the liberty principle underscores and nourishes the capacity 
for, Mill can justifiably make such a claim. 
In fact, as Skorupski continues, if autonomy is not understood to play such a 
part in the Millian system, some fairly severe lacunae open up. Skorupski takes 
the following passage as an indicator that Mill viewed assaults on autonomy as 
harms: 
The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in which one must never 
f orget to include wrongful interference with each other's freedom) are more vital to 
human well-being than any maxims, however important, which only point out the best 
mode of managing some department of human affairs ... the moralities which prevent 
every individual from being harmed by others, either directly or by being hindered in 
his freedom of pursuing his own good, are at once those which he has strongest 
broad blueprint of Mill" s social vision. 
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inte rest in publishing and enforcing by word and deed (Mill 2, as Cited in 5korupksi, 
1989 : 358). 
It is precisely here that Skorupksi (1989: 358-359) identifies an element in Mill's 
thought that he feels his re-definition can correct. If harms through assault on 
autonomy are only indirect, i.e. they are not harms in themselves , but only 
become harmful if they diminish happiness, then the liberty principle is 
severely weakened . It suggests that invasions of autonomy do not constitute 
harms unless the agent is conscious of them, and is thus made unhappy. If 
autonomy of an individual is violated, but she remains unaware of this , society 
has no coercive power to prevent the violation, since it does not count as 
harm . There can then subsequently be no obligation derived from the liberty 
principle to reveal the violation to the agent. This Skorupksi argues (correctly, 
I feel) generates a profoundly un-Millian guiding social principle. If autonomy 
is instead enthroned as an independent categorical end , the liberty principle 
becomes consistently Millian once more, since assaults against autonomy can 
count as harms in their own right. If autonomy is enshrined as a primary 
utility, Mill can justly deploy his rights structure to defend it. This follows 
because, as shall be seen in Chapter 3, rights in a Millian structure are side 
constraints defending vital human interests (or primary utilities). 
Skorupski (Ibid. 359-360) backs up his defence of autonomy as a categorical end 
yet further. He argues that defining it as a crucial human end in its own right 
also has the useful upshot of clarifying Mill's opposition towards paternalism . If 
autonomy is but one desirable element of well being, cast in amongst many, 
then there will be many cases where a consequentalist calculation can override 
the value of autonomy in the name of greater individual or social good . With 
autonomy thus diminished as a crucial human value, it is difficult to see what is 
lost when we allow otherwise benevolent paternalism to govern individuals' 
lives. The only good that is infringed by coercing individuals to be validly 
better people is , in point of fact, their autonomy. 
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Skorupksi (Ibid. 360) continues by contending that there still can be no 
absolute ban on paternalism , since there will come times when the benefit to 
the individual outweighs the benefit of enshrining her autonomy, but he 
qualifies this with a reminder that interference with by, say, family members is 
a very different thing to interference by public officials. It is here that he sees 
Mill's anti-paternalism at its clearest: 
[Mill's] opposition to paternalism is consequentalist; based on a fear of the 'tyranny of 
the majority', and a hi gh estimate of the good consequences of letting people make 
their own decisions (Ibid.). 
Here I feel Skorupski has indeed cut to the heart of the issue. Mill's implicit 
appeals to autonomy as a cardinal human social value will only be brought to 
the fore in Chapter 3. But the same pattern we shall see there applies here. 
Mill is concerned that society's interference in individual lives will often be 
misguided, agenda skewed and fallible. Thus, for Mill, paternalism must be the 
extreme and rare exception rather than the rule. As a guiding social tool it 
risks the grand social stifling Mill (quite justifiably) fears. This crushes both the 
moral freedom of the individual and the social value that the eccentric mind 
may possess. Both of these are fair concerns, and provide strong reasons for 
respecting individuality. 
This seems coherent, but there is a final question yet lingering at this stage of 
the enquiry. That is the issue of what, more precisely, it is that Mill seeks to 
enshrine, to rescue from the claws of collective mediocrity. We must 
understand why, society's fallibalism aside, there is necessarily something of 
value that must "breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom" (Mill 1 : 57). 
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1.3.3) The art of life and the human being as a "noble and beautiful object" 
In Ryan's analysis of On Liberty we find an interesting and not too often 
discussed dynamic of Mill's thought on individualism. This is the notion that 
the rational system set in place is there to safeguard the development of things 
that lie beyond the realm of the rational, in the spaces of the imagination, 
emotions and less-defined aspects of the self. This is the deeper level of 
respect for individual spontaneity and development that underpins much of 
Mill's claim that the liberty principle is "grounded in the permanent interests 
of man as a progressive being". Ryan's conclusion is that: 
Mill's picture of what makes a man happy is not unclear. It is the possession of a 
character which is self· reliant, rational in its assessment of the world, tolerant, wide· 
ranging in its interests and spontaneous in its sympathies. Not merely can we not make 
men like this by coercing them, coercion is logically at odds with the creation of such a 
character (Ryan, 1987: 255). 
Much of this Ryan (Ibid . 214-215) ties in to Mill's schematic of the "art of life", 
the schematic of human action of which morality (or other-regarding rules, as 
shall be seen) are merely a part. Mill's art of life is his teleology, his "general 
premises" forming his "body of doctrine about ends". It is, essentially a 
clarifying structure by which we assess the nature and interplay of the rules 
that govern us as individuals within a social space, in reference to a more all-
encompassing end goal. 
i. The Art of Life 
First, Ryan (Ibid. 214) explains we must understand what Mill meant by "an 
art". He makes the distinction between the body of scientific thinking and 
what he terms an "art". An art does not seek to prove a supreme guiding 
principle - it takes one and investigates the means necessary to reach it. In so 
doing, art forms an interplay with science: Art sets out the goal. Science 
considers it as it would a phenomenon or effect, sends it back . to · art with a 
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theory of the ci rcumstances and practices by which it must be produced, based 
on an understanding of its causes and conditions. Art, finding these directions 
desirable and practicable, forms them into a rule or precept. 31 Just as Mill 
bel ieved there was a unified hierarchy of the sciences, with physics as the 
highest level , and the experimental and abstract sciences underpinning it, so 
too did he believe there was a hierarchy of the arts. The highest level is the 
art of life, into which all the underlying arts - medicine, architecture, 
literature and all motivated forms of human action feed. The point here is 
that none would dispute that the higher principles at work within the specific 
arts are bad things - the issue is one of ranking one over another. To this end, 
the art of life is established as a kind of meta-art, by which all human action 
may be classified and assessed . 
Mill assigns it three divisions32 - the prudential , the moral, and the aesthetic. 
An agent's actions can be assessed prudentially in terms of actions that have an 
effect upon her alone - we avoid fire lest it burn us, avoid poison lest we die. 
Actions may be assessed morally inasmuch as they affect others. The key 
concept here is one of duty. Morality , as be discussed in the third chapter is 
for Mill purely a question of other· regarding action, of the affect certain 
actions have on others welfare. This shall be discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
It is the fina l element of the art of life that is interesting here - the aesthetic. 
This has to do with elements of human activity and character that factor into 
neither a moral nor prudential calculus . They are, as Ryan puts it "a matter 
for the imagination ". In Mill 's terms appeals such those to : 
[TJhe sense of honour, and personal di gnity - that feeling of exaltation and degradation 
whi ch acts independently of other people's opinions, or even in defiance of it; the love 
31 To borrow Ryan's (1 987: 2 14) example, med icine as an art tokes as its supreme guiding principle the 
pu rsui t of better health. It does not seek to prove that this goal is a good thing: it is concerned wi th the 
menns necessary to reach it, which medical science provides it. 
32 T here is another Lri-parLheid division which Mi ll presen ts in an essay on Bentham, where he talks of 
aCl ions having a moral, aesthetic and sympathetic aspect. This melds far less neatl y with the naLun.! of the 
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of beauty, the passion of the artist; the love of order, of congruity , of consistency in 
all things and conformity to their end. J3 
It is this set of elusive and mercurial human ends, Ryan (1987: 216-217) 
maintains, that allow us to make sense of Mill's famed contention that it is 
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied . The difference between 
the actions necessary to secure a man's happiness and a pig's is neither moral 
nor prudential. Were it moral, the best course of action would be to shirk from 
human contact as much as possible . Were it prudential , then a man that 
desired nothing would be optimally well off. It is the susceptibility to the 
virtues of .higher ends and pleasures that makes for a more complete human 
being by Millian terms. The moral, the prudential and the aesthetic all 
underpin actions conducive to individual and social welfare . It is not a case of 
ranking one over another, so much as bringing the three into as much harmony 
as possible that allows for Mill's more complete and worthwhile individual. 34 
ii. The role and implications of the aesthetic dimension 
It is this final aesthetic dimension that Mill feels can never be coercively 
prescribed. Beyond the rules necessary to secure individual safety and the 
interests of others, the question of personal ideals is kept socially open, the 
province of Mill's persons of "genius". It is the widest experience possible that 
makes one the best judge of such matters. As such , the optimal social 
conditions for Mill are those imbued by an open-minded social order. As 
Anderson (1991 : 25) puts it: "[t]o discover a superior conception of the good , 
we must be free to explore different ways of life under conditions of 
arguments set out in 0" Liberty, and as such I follow Ryan in concluding thl:! version presented in the Logic 
is the one to stand by. (See Ryan, 1987: 215.) 
33 Mill. Disser/(I{iolls alld discussions, Vol. I , p. 360 as cited in Ryan, 1987. 
34 Mill's concepti on of the "higher values" is an area of his philosophy 1 have not sufficien t space to 
explore here. [ t is, a~ Andersen argues, (he crux point at which his philosophy breaks from Bentham. in 
implicitly setting up val ues other than happiness as ideals of human life. This plays in to the deeper question 
of lhe exact nilture of MiIr s psychology and phi losophical uti! itarianism, dynamics of his thought I treat 
only indi rect ly in this thesis. For a detailed discussion of the "nonhedonic" d ements of Mill's conception of 
the good, and the relation between these and his theories of human psychology, see Anderson, 199 1. 
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toleration". Thus it is a free realm of "personal aesthetics" Ryan sees Mill 
attempting to secure with the rationalist framework of On Liberty: 
To be a saint or a hero by order is just a nonsensical idea. The whole point of 
saintliness and heroism is that they establish new goals, new standards of what man 
can do when he tries. Without freedom, there can be no such moral progress as this 
leads to ... Mill's concern with self· development and moral progress is a strand in his 
philosophy to which almost everything else is sub· ordinate. And this is why, once we 
have established the rational society, scientifically understood, controlled according to 
utilitarian principles , the goals we aim at transcend these, and can only be understood 
as the freely pursued life of personal nobility - the establishment of the life of the 
individual as a work of art (Ryan, 1987: 255, my italics). 
This is part of what Skorupski (1989: 362) refers to as Mill's "Hellenism" - a 
respect for "spontaneity of consciousness". Values that are spontaneously 
admired or despised do not "overlap cleanly with moral virtues and vices". We 
may, to use Skorupski's example, praise courage as virtue, but we do not judge 
others for their lack of it, except in such cases as harm is caused. Where we 
cannot identify harm , there is no reason to "root out" personal values and 
traits. Rather, we are best served by "the presence of different ideals of 
character", associated with different ways of life" (Ibid.) . 
Thus, Mill's respect for the spontaneity of character can be understood as 
analogous to the demarcated pluralism that vitiates his entire philosophy. We 
may set up boundaries that prevent harm and maintain harmony, but within 
these, individualism and particularity must be allowed to flourish. This is 
because only the perfect society could possibly manufacture ideal characters. 
No such society has ever existed and (given the constant shifts of circumstance 
Mill naturalism cautions us to remember) can never really exist. As such , even 
the most developed social order cannot afford to allow the individual's 
personal, internal quest for the good to be socially directed at the level of 
character itself. Society, for Mill, does not make heroes and visionaries. They 
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most decidedly make it. For them to arise Mill's "atmosphere of freedom" 
(Mill 1: 57) is the only oxygen that will serve. Such will the passionate 
interplay of ideals drive the social order, and such (crucially here) will people 
of passion and character arise to represent these. 
Thus understood Mill's individualism is not all social instrumentality. It is also 
the desire to allow people to bring forth that which makes a human being "a 
noble and beautiful object of contemplation" (Mill 1: 55). It is not that Mill 
would not have us seek to make citizens better people, but rather that we risk 
too much in forcing them to become so in matters regarding themselves alone. 
In understanding these as his aims and principles, we can endorse Skorupski's 
interpretation that Mill implicitly appeals to autonomy as a baseline social 
value to be respected and defended from molestation. For it is only through a 
respect for autonomy as a crucial element of the individual's rights framework 
that Mill can ensure the diversity he so praised, and heed the caveats he so 
eloquently sets out. 
1.3) The Millian individual revisited 
For Mill, the boundless diversity of human intellectual and social thought and 
practice was something to be rigorously ensured. It was towards a vital , 
dynamic and diversified world that the proscriptions of Liberty pointed in Mill's 
mind. As Ryan points out, this telos, this "society of happy men" had to have, 
for Mill, freedom as its central ingredient. The proscriptive rationality, the 
consequentalist system of boundaries and guiding principles at work in Mill's 
thought represent a mere framework. A framework that guarantees people the 
space to develop their character and creativity, which for Mill was something 
too diverse , and necessarily so, to ever be proscribed or limited by some kind 
of positive doctrine of self· regarding action. Mill sought to set people on the 
best path towards self·actualization within a social context. But once we 
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become capable of self·education, of warning ourselves against the fallibility of 
our precepts and beliefs, of becoming aware of both our duties and the 
reasoning behind them, of respecting others in doing so - then does the 
proscriptive element of Millian thought end. Beyond this, we follow only the 
ultimate expert on our wants, our desires and our happiness - ourselves. 
If this seems trite, it is because it remains a theme to which our world of arts 
and letters constantly returns. For those who consider Mill an anachronism, a 
footnote to a darker and more legislatively arrogant period of history, consider 
how much he might have acceded to the lyrics of Bob Dylan: 
Come mothers and fathers 
Throughout the land 
And don't criticize 
What you can't understand 
Your sons and your daughters 
Are beyond your command 
Your old road is 
Rapidly agin·. 
Please get out of the new one 
If you can't lend your hand 
For the times they are a·changin'. " 
We have, I feel substantially outlined the dynamics behind Mill's individualism. 
It is time to find out to what extent Hegel might have agreed with him. 
35 hl tr:l/wwv.: .hohJylan.com/sonf!s/rimes.htJ1li (Accessed 07/0 1I2003) 
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Chapter 2 
The Individual in Hegel 
2.1) Preliminaries 
2.1.1) Introduction - The mismatched legacy of Hegelian thought 
Hegel's legacy, like Mill's, is an exercise is negotiating controversy and 
misinterpretation. As Wood (1990: xiii) puts it,at the close of the 20th century 
and first glimmers of the 21 st "everybody knows that Hegel is an important 
thinker who cannot be easily ignored or dismissed . But the broad outlines of 
Hegel's thought are much oftener discussed with sophistication than his 
writings are read with comprehension". 
A possible reason for this is the aura of complexity that surrounds various 
elements of his overall thought. Wood (Ibid. xiv) bemoans his "pretentious 
style and abstract jargon". Patten (1999: 194) describes crucial sections of his 
Logic as "impossibly dense". Thus it is not surprising that seekers of political 
enlightenment will draw together arguments from assorted fragments of his 
writings and transcribed lectures, claiming him as their intellectual ancestor. 
Archconservatives will draw on his arguments for the enforcement of social 
norms, conveniently forgetting that Hegel was a firm proponent of a 
progressive society. Socialists will laud the tracts on alienation and dialectic 
that influenced his most famed and notorious disciple , Marx, conveniently 
forgetting that Hegel was staunchly committed to the notion of private 
property. 
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I am fully aware that I may stand equally accused of such selective 
appropriation of Hegelian concepts. I maintain, however, that if we wish to 
draw out of these two·century·old texts anything useful for modern purposes, 
there are certain elements we must cut free, or at least radically re·interpret. 
This being said, the grand question of "what is alive and what is dead in 
Hegel", while obviously relevant in certain respects here , is not the central 
pre·occupation of my enquiry into his theory . In chapters to come I will indeed 
present alternate interpretations of such theoretical hallmarks as the notion of 
geist (or absolute spirit) and his conception of the organic whole that is the 
modern state. For the purposes of the current chapter, all I seek to unearth is 
the nature and importance of the individualistic elements within his structure 
of basic principles. 
It must also be noted that what I attempt here is not, and I feel cannot be, a 
broadscale exposition of Hegel's entire system. While relevant details of such 
complex elements as his blueprint for the nation-state and his theory of history 
will be explained where they apply, what I am concerned with here is an 
application and re-examination of his foundational principles of social theory. 
This is by no means to duck the issue, intellectually speaking. It is here, within 
the realm of these foundational notions that the modern communitarian heart 
beats, not in the minutiae of the Hegelian system, or the darker depths of 
Hegel's logic and epistemology. 
2.1.2) The Hegelian project 
The subsistence of the community is its continuous, eternal becoming which is 
grounded in the fact that spirit is an eternal process of self-cognition, dividing itse lf 
into the finite flashes of light of individual consciousness , and then recollecting and 
gathering itself up out of this finitude - inasmuch as it is in the finite consciousness 
that the process of knowing spirit's essence takes place and that the divine self-
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consciousness thus arises. Out of the foaming ferment of finitude, spirit rises up 
fragrantly.' 
Cloaked here in trademark obscurity, is a nutshell exposition of a philosophical 
framework that has influenced a stunning range of modern western thought. 
To understand fully the nature of Hegel's theoretical foundations, it is crucial 
to know first what he understood the driving project of his social theory to be. 
The Hegelian system is complex, but remarkably consistent in terms of its 
proposed outcomes. Hegel seeks to reconcile the modern citizen to the world 
one lives in, to reveal it as rational , accessible and ultimately commensurate 
with one's (fully developed) 2 intentions as an individual. As Hardimon sets it 
out at the inception of his text on the Hegelian social project: 
The central aim of Hegel's social philosophy was to reconcile his contemporaries to the 
modern social world. Hegel sought to enable the people of the nineteenth century to 
overcome their alienation from the central social institutions - the family, civil SOCiety, 
and the state - and to come to 'be at home' with them (Hardimon, 1994: 1). 
Hardimon (Ibid. 2) thus sees the major thematic of the Hegelian philosophy to 
be rational "reconciliation" - between self and society, and even (at a more 
personal level) self and self, in response to the alienation from modernity that 
he saw as so rife around him. This by no means renders any appraisal of Hegel 
a mere act of intellectual archaeology. The concept of 'alienation' - from the 
institutional structures of the social order, from the morality and ethical 
principles of the social space, from self - is the central charge by which 
communitarians in particular hold liberal democracy guilty of having failed to 
address genuine human concerns. Claims of a "spiritual poverty" and resultant 
cries for a reclaiming of "thick" conceptions of community have, at the very 
least, a Hegelian taint to their ancestry. What I aim to prove by a detailed 
examination of Hegel here is that such reconciliation between individual and 
I Hegel. Rdigion III. 2330 as cited in Ermanno Bencivenga, 2000, Hegel's DialeCTical Logi.c, New York: 
Oxford Uni versi ty Press. 
Individualism in Hegel 66 
social reality by no means necessitates the crushing of individuality, or even of 
counter-cultural dissent . 
This is not what might be considered a conventional reading of Hegel. The 
Hegelian system , as shall be shown below, lays out an interlocking progression 
of dialectical development - of individuals , societies , political orders, the very 
course of history itself - through which the human race learns to better shape, 
manage and understand a reality that at first seems alien and hostile. For 
Hegel, unlike Mill , these intermingling marches of progress had a definite end 
point. The task of humanity and history itself is to actualise Geist), to use the 
analytical tools of- the Concept to realise the Idea, a mammoth undertaking, 
but nevertheless one with a finite end .4 
The point here is that for Hegel, unlike Mill, at a certain point history seems to 
stop. Once the telos is reached, Humanity's long and often bloody phases of 
trial and error are at an end. If this is accepted as an inevitable consequence 
of Hegel's principles, then it has profound and dire implications for my 
::! As shall he explained in de tail below. 
3 The. varying in terpretations of Geist would be a lengthy (and I feel unnecessary) divers ion at th is point. 
It is hesl understood as a dri ving colkc ti ve spirit, a concrete objecti ve uni versa l that informs and unde rlies 
the very fabric of human rea lity. Further down the road, r will indeed present the issues relating to geisl in 
grealer detai l. For now, r shall only draw Qu I its implications onl y as they apply to the discuss ion at hand . 
.. T he Concept and The Idea are two mon; weigh ty Hegelian concepts that run the risk of drowning a 
modern scho lar in a quagmire of epis temology. As wi th geist. I wi ll explain each furth~r only as each 
b~comes relevant. For now, let me lay them out in the s impkst fashion I can. The Concept refers to a 
rational mode o f understanding reality which applies throughout hu man experience. It is n capaci ty whic h 
is embryonic within each of us. but must be d~veloped in a social context to be fully realised. T he COllcept 
as Kai nz defines it is : 
[A] concrete Concept characterized by dynam ic un ities-in-disti nct ion. T hese uni ties in disti nct ion 
are exemplifi ed subjective/y by the syllog ism, which captures the rationali ty of reality; objectively 
by the te leology which uni fies part icul ari ty and universali ty ; and absolUTe'.\' in the rmional-rea li ly 
o r panicularized universality of Life, Cognition and Willing (the abso lute Idea). (Kainz, 1996: 28). 
The COllcep' can thus he understood as a scientific, logical and philosophical means of comprehending the 
Idea, which is essentially the rational struc ture underlying all real ity, ul timate ly comprehensible to the 
developed human mind. To follow Ka in z once more: "As life emerges in nature, the Idea becomes expl icit 
tirs t as subject ive Spi rit passing fro m unconsciousness to the 'Phe nomenology' o f consciousness and self-
consciousness, and to the higher stages of cognition and will ; then as Object ive spirit embodied in fami li al 
and po litica l organizations and coro ll ary sys tems of rights and laws" (Ibid. 29). 
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investigation here. It could be argued that at a time when humanity reaches 
this zenith, the tolerance of dissent and fallibilist caveats he seems to share 
with Mill could be done away with. At the end of History, it might be argued, 
we have no need of new ideas. 
But this, I shall contend, is a position that commits a stunning array of 
intellectual sins. It is, first and foremost, a very shallow reading of Hegel's 
teleology. As shall be examined in detail forthwith, tolerance and diversity are 
both crucial tenets of Hegel's ideal framework. The set of rational institutions 
that Hegel feels facil itate the highest in human capacity (and indeed , by his 
terms, realise the divine) are no stone-cast order of elitist codes and practices. 
His telos is, if anything, a place that lets the particular flourish within the 
universal, an organic unity of necessarily different ends and practices bound up 
within an organic whole that itself is a living, breathing embodiment of 
freedom. The further implication I aim to draw out from his position, and one 
which I feel points directly to the commonality of consequence among his and 
Mill's principles, is that this telos is by no means only to be interpreted as a 
static point. Indeed I feel it serves both his principles and their modern 
applicability best to see the telos as a place with a powerful institutional 
framework that is nonetheless in a constant state of flux and self-evaluation. 
Over the course of this enquiry, I shall draw out textual evidence for this 
position, as well as argument for it from Hegel's own principles. 
The concerns covered in this chapter relate to the individual in the Hegel ian 
system - the extent to which individual subjectivity and self-determination play 
a role in the Hegelian framework, philosophically and practically. This can be 
a difficult task if one appreciates the interlocked nature of the Hegelian social 
schema_ Consider the following quotation from the closing sections of The 
Philosophy of Right: 
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The individual, whose duties give him the status of a subject [Untertan], finds that, in 
fulfilling his duties as a citizen, he gains protection for his person and property, 
consideration for his particular welfare, satisfaction of his substantial essence, and the 
consciousness and self-awareness of being a member of the whole (PR §261 , 285). 
This should highlight that, for Hegel, the metaphysical development of the 
individual and the abstract conception of individual freedom are inextricably 
tied in to the structure of the social order. As such, in order for this 
investigation to make any sense, I must map out two distinct yet related areas 
of the Hegelian mindscape - the individual-specific speculative metaphysics in 
which Hegel's social theory is grounded, and the space the individual occupies 
in the social theory itself as codified in The Philosophy of Right. It will then be 
possible to assess to what extent the individual's goods and freedom are 
catered for in the Hegelian system. As I see it, we can understand Hegel's 
commitment to the individual as a crucial locus of his social theory as more 
than mere lip service, or creative window-dressing for conservatism. The 
individual is the driving force of the Hegelian project, even as the social order 
(as discussed in Chapter 4) is understood to embody something beyond her 
(which, crucially, includes and is shaped by her). I contend that we find in 
Hegel a theory of political community that pays heed to concerns of social 
embeddedness, but nonetheless safeguards the essential freedoms of individual 
practice and rights of conscience that permeate the modern liberal discourse. 
2.2) Key metaphysical conceptions underpinning 
Hegel's social theory 
2.2.1) The self and its boundaries in Hegel 
The Hegelian "self" is a difficult entity to discuss in isolation, largely because 
Hegel did not believe that a fully developed self in isolation could exist. For 
Hegel, the nature of freedom and individual development is bound up within 
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the self's reconciliation to its social context. The very capacity for true 
freedom can only be realised in a context of other selves. Thus for Hegel , 
unlike the social contract theorists, the social arrangements individuals enter 
into are not a matter of mere rational choice so much as the constitutive 
conditions of freedom itself. There are several elements to this that bear 
discussion as they, or their intellectual spectres, are destined to haunt the 
remainder of this thesis. As such, the discussion that follows , in addition to 
clarifying the Hegelian conception of the individual, provides a necessary 
conceptual vocabulary for the entire breadth of the Hegelian discourse in this 
thesis. This follows logically, since, as shall be seen, the individual is the 
starting point of an intricately woven vision of social development that is 
consistently threaded throughout the Hegelian system. The areas I have 
highlighted for discussion are those necessary to understanding how Hegel sees 
the self not as static, but as developmental by nature, and why this 
development must be a process driven by the individual herself, as opposed to 
some external coercive social force. Thus I examine the Hegelian doctrines of 
individual development of self-consciousness, the development of the rational 
will , the notion of Bi/dung (or self-education) as it applies to individuals, and 
the understanding of freedom as rational autonomy in Hegel. All of these 
contribute, in one sense or another, to an understanding of the Hegel ian idea 
of "freedom". 
2.2.2) The formation of self-consciousness - the Individual's Dialectic 
i. Of Masters and Slaves 
"Self-consciousness", Hegel claims, "exists in and for itself when, and by the 
fact that, it so exists for another; that is it exists only in being acknowledged" 
(PhG ~178). Thus begins Hegel's famed exposition of what he calls the 
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development of "Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness" (Ibid.), 
known far more widely and conventionally as the master Islave dialectic. 
Its relevance here is in providing a crucial first approximation of how Hegel 
sees the individual's conception of self developing through the intersubjective 
"struggle for recognition" - the process Hegel identifies as formative of self-
consciousness and self-certainty (Ibid. ~179-80). Hegel demonstrates his 
schema of the development of said consciousness through the thought 
experiment of abstracting the self from all contingent properties and tracing its 
process of self-defil)ition. This leads to what Patten (1999 : 127) calls the 
"parable" of the master-slave dialectic. I will briefly sketch out this process 
here . 
The first stage is a brute and immature form of pre-social consciousness. This 
cannot be self-consciousness, as that is impossible without the conscious 
recognition of an "other" against which the boundaries of the self must be 
measured and defined (PhG ~179-180). 
The human being without socio-political bonds is a bizarre creature in Hegelian 
terms - he sees the reality around him , which includes other creatures he does 
not yet truly recognise as similar to himself, as also having boundaries of 
consciousness and intentionality. There is the world on one side of the line, 
and he on the other. Thus he cannot know himself, as a face cannot know its 
appearance without a mirror. To define himself, he must cordon himself off 
mentally from the remainder of humanity, and can only do that with the 
recognition of the "other", i.e. his fellow man. Wood sees Hegel setting out 
the following conceptual pattern: 
I am "recognized" by another when the other self-conscious being has an image of me 
as a being self-conscious like itself, and I am aware of it as having this image. Hegel 
suggests this by saying (both hyperbolically and paradoxically) that the other of which I 
am aware is myself - myself as other ... The point of the hyperbole is that at this stage 
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we are abstracting from all our particular . properties, and so simply as free self-
consciousness we are exactly alike . The re is nothing to dis tinguish one of us from 
another except my awareness of you (and your awareness of me) as other (Wood , 1990: 
86). 
Patten (1999, 125) lays out the reasoning process behind this rather neatly. 
Self-certainty i.e. confirmation of one's freedom, has to be established by 
interacting with one's environment. The simple assertion of freedom is 
ultimately empty. Men , to know themselves as free, must know that their will 
has impetus, that they are capable of directing reality and are not, as Patten 
puts it " a plaything of outside forces and authorities". Thus, the agent 
seeking self-certainty faces three choices. The first is to prove his 
independence of the non-human world by destroying or altering it . This , for 
Hegel , is insufficient. In altering an object, the agent proves nothing more 
than his independence of the object in its present form. He remains uncertain 
that he is not dependent on the matter itself. Destroying the whole of his 
material reality has the rather self-defeating side effect of the agent causing 
his own death. Destroying individual objects leaves only the memory of an 
independent action, and that is far too flimsy a basis on which to build one's 
se lf-certainty. What is required is an external factor that can be negated 
without its own destruction . Patten (Ibid . 126) follows Taylor is labelling this a 
"standing negation". This form of negation only another agent can provide by 
recognising the independence of the agent. 
Thus, the agent's second choice is to "force" other agents to recognise his 
independence. This leads to an impasse. As Wood explains it: 
Each of us wants recognition from the othe r, but sees no reason to recognize the other. 
My recogni tion would only attest to the othe r's indepe ndent existence ... and that 
would be a threat to my self- certainty. Each of us the refore t ries to do away with the 
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other's immediacy, that is, with its bodily life. The struggle for recognition becomes a 
struggle to the death (Wood, 1990: 86). 
But this, Hegel points out, becomes unworkable. The "trial by death", he 
claims, "does away with the truth which was supposed to issue from it, and so 
too with the certainty of self generally" (PhG ~188) . This is because, in simple 
terms, destroying another consciousness is no more a source of standing 
negation than destroying another object. It is thus that the master-slave 
relationship arises. One consciousness submits rather than die, and becomes 
the slave, or servant to the victorious consciousness, the master. These exist 
as two "opposed shapes of consciousness" - a seemingly independent being-for-
itself (bound, for this recognition to a "thinghood" - the slave) and a 
dependent being-for-other (PhG ~189-190). 
ii. Contradictions and implications in the Master-Slave dialectic 
As Patten (1999: 127) points out, the famed reasoning behind Hegel's master 
slave dialectic exposes the forced assent of the slave as an insufficient source 
of self-certainty, and thus contrary to the very nature of freedom. The master 
subdues the slave when two agents clash in their first attempts at primitive 
negation. The one submits rather than die, and becomes subservient. This 
does not, in the long run, provide the master with the recognition he requires, 
confirming his status as a free, self-standing being. He finds himself dependent 
on the slave for the goods and services said slave provides him, and thus has no 
true sense of directing his own existence. The slave has become something of 
an animated object. 
The second, more crucial contradiction in the relationship, Patten (Ibid.) 
maintains, becomes clearer when we realise that the slave's recognition could 
only be worth something if it were given freely. Ordering the slave to maintain 
that he (the master) is free amounts to a deferred assertion on the part of the 
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master. The slave's pleading assent to his master's freedom is thus, by Hegel's 
terms, ultimately worthless . Only the freely given recognition of another agent 
can give the master the standing negation he seeks - and this must, by the 
terms laid out, be a mutual recognition. 
Thus the third choice presented to agents seeking self-confirmation (and with 
this true freedom) is for Hegel ultimately the only choice: a social context of 
mutual recognition of independence and free agency. This, for Hegel , is one of 
the determinate factors of truly free choice - the Hegelian perspective on 
which will become clearer as we discuss the individual will in the Hegelian 
system. 
The key contentions that I feel we draw out of this metaphysical parable are, 
firstly , that the self-consciousness of the individual is developed through an 
intersubjective process. Individuals come to know themselves and their ends 
within the context of other individuals , and do so developmentally, not 
instantaneously. Secondly, it is a society of mutually recognising free agents 
that Hegel quests after. Forced assent to the will of another is ultimately 
fruitless, individually and socially. Thirdly, goods such as the recognition of 
others play a crucial role in the Hegelian social order and , Hegel believes, 
come to be secured in the rights and framework of the rational state. This will 
be discussed in section 2.3. 
Thus, the question at hand is to what extent (given the above discussion of the 
necessity of society as consciousness forming) the individual needs society to 
be free. The answer to this can only come with a deeper understanding of the 
Hegelian notion of the individual (a discussion I continue immediately below) 
and a fuller understanding of precisely how individualistic the provisions of 
Hegel's social freedom in fact are (the task of section 2.3) . 
2.2.3) The Hegelian will 
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The concept of the individual will in Hegelian analysis is one of the features 
that most clearly distinguishes his doctrine of free action from more 
conventional philosophical accounts. Hegel himself states in the introductory 
section of The Philosophy of Right that it is pointless to speak of will and 
thought as separate faculties, even if it does make sense to discuss them as 
separate concepts. Will, inclination and the higher stages of representational 
thought all playa part in the ultimate Hegelian vision of what constitutes free 
agency. To understand the internal dynamics of the will, Hegel instructs us to 
examine both its determinate and indeterminate qualities. In the unity of 
these two "moments" we discover the true nature of the will. 
i. Moments of the Will 
The indeterminate moment is described in §5 of The Philosophy of Right. It is 
the point at which the will attempts to throw off all determinations and 
dissolve all limitations, be these desires, natural inclinations, or limitations set 
in place by some other source (custom and public sentiment, for example). 
This Hegel describes as the will in a state of "absolute abstraction" (PR, §5, 
38). It is the conception of one's own inner experiences as universal and 
unbounded, the point where one's own subjectivity is foregone, forgotten or 
abandoned. It is freedom, certainly, but it is, in Hegel's own memorable terms 
"the freedom of the void" (Ibid .). Confined to its pure theoretical form, it 
becomes the stuff of such religious cultures as "the Hindu fanaticism of pure 
contemplation" (Ibid.). If made action, the result, Hegel warns us can only be 
destruction. For this positing of oneself as the objective universal must crush 
all that differs from itself to prove itself valid. It may think it furthers some 
positive end - such as religious truth or social equality, but in doing so it 
becomes tyrannical and repressive, violently suspicious and hostile towards 
differing particularities. The examples Hegel uses are of religiously fanatical 
regimes and the French Revolution's Reign of Terror. Key examples for our 
own time would be fundamentalist groups and repressive theocratic regimes 
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such as the Taliban. Forgetting to factor in their own subjectivity as a 
limitation, fundamentalists and fanatics consider themselves privy to objective 
truths they feel they personify, and enforce this conception by either violently 
"re·educating" or destroying all opposing perspectives. This is a tendency 
readily recognisable in all examples of fanatical rule. 
Thus Hegel forces us to factor in the "determinate" moment of the will in §6 . 
This second moment is set out with trademark Hegelian reasoning as emanating 
from conditions within the first. Here, "I" establishes itself as something 
definite and determinate , as something particular. This, as we recall from the 
previous section is a process of "negation". The individual wills something, and 
in so doing gives the will its limitation - it is not setting itself the task of doing 
all things, but rather a particular thing. The source of this limitation may be 
internal or external. This is an act of "particularisation". It can be as one· 
sided a determination of will as the first moment, if taken alone. As Hegel 
pOints out further on in §22: 
When understanding regards the infinite as something negative and hence as beyond its 
sphere, it believes that it is doing the infinite all the more honour by pushing it ever 
further away and distancing it as something alien. In the free will, the truly infinite has 
actuality and presence · the will itself is the idea which is present within itself (PR §22, 
54). 
Thus what must be found is reconciliation between the two moments, a process 
Hegel describes in §7 as the development of true individuality (which he 
equates with the "concept" of the will). 
ii. True Individuality and True Intentionality 
Hegel is careful to point out that his understanding of individuality is distinct 
from the more common conception of the word. For him, true individuality is 
Individualism in Hegel 76 
found in the formal will, which Hegel describes in §8 as "self-consciousness 
which finds an external world outside itself". Through the process of rendering 
the subjective aspects of their will objective, individuals come to better 
understand the mediation between the two, and only then do they fully 
comprehend the broader significance of their own particularity within the 
universal. Hegel sees us finding our rational place in the world through 
considering the way we apprehend it (as Inwood (1983: 479) phrases it "by 
thinking about thinking,,) .5 
[F]reedom lies neither in indeterminacy, nor determinacy, but is both at once ... 
Freedom is to will something determinate, yet be with oneself in this determinacy and 
return once more to the universal (PR § 7). 
If we understand these rather speculative underlying dynamics, it becomes 
easier to see why Hegel's conception of individual freedom moves somewhere 
beyond the common sense notions of the term. Freedom is not simply the 
capacity to choose. This is simple willing or wilkur. As Inwood (1983, 482) 
explains, wilkur exhibits part of the pre-requisite of the formal will, in that it 
is "free reflection which abstracts from everything and dependence on content 
and material given from within or without" (PR §15) , but falls short of Hegel's 
requirements of the formal will in that it cannot will itself. 6 What Hegel 
means here is that, as Inwood puts it: 
"Reflection", the capacity for refraining from action on any desire that one has, is not 
sufficient, if one eventually has to act on some desire or other. What is needed is that 
the will should determine its own goals and in that sense have itself as object (Inwood, 
1983: 483). ' 
5 The process by which Hegel understands this happening is complex, and r can but sketch oUl the rough 
dynamics of it here. 
" As Hegel stales it: "On ly when the wi ll has itself as its object is it for itse lf what it is in itself' (PR § I 0). 
7 See PR § 15 for Hegel's fuller exposition. ". 
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For a will to will itself, is, as Plamenatz (in Pelczynski (ed.), 1971 : 37) explains 
not nearly as obscure and ridiculous a concept as it may sound taken out of 
context. A will that wills itself does not merely resist compulsions and desires 
in certain instances. It "aspires to self control" (Ibid. my italics). But this 
cannot merely self·control for its own sake. It is here that we can understand 
Hegel's requirement that a man makes himself his own end comes in. The self-
control in question, Plamenatz (Ibid.) continues, is a tool to shape oneself into 
the kind of person one wants to be, and to direct one's ends accordingly. Such 
a definition of self , as discussed above, is an intersubjective process. 
True intention is ours when we are capable of understanding the broader 
implications of our actions, and the objective barriers and limitations we 
choose, and rationally set out the ends our will seeks, as opposed to merely 
acting on a set of desires. Thus, we intend, rather than simply will an action, 
when we properly understand the interplay between our inclinations and 
desires and the reality they must be realised within, shaping our actions 
according to a will that knows its own objectives, and knows them as self-
affirmed. For only when we act unencumbered by delusions of what is possible 
or ignorance of consequence, within a framework directed by a will that knows 
its own ends, only then are we truly free. To be fully at ease and reconciled 
with the discourse between our reality and ourselves (consciously recognized 
by ourselves as a distinct entity with distinct ends, independent of, though still 
affected by contingent desires) is to be able to make real choices. 
By now, at least a few of the interlocking complexities that feed into Hegelian 
freedom should be coming through with more clarity, as should the underlying 
Hegelian dynamic of reconciliation between particular and universal. The truly 
rational and free being, in Hegel's eyes, is she that recognises herself as a 
necessarily distinctive part of an objective social order, and is willing to accord 
others the same recognition. This is a dynamic that will be subject to 
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examination throughout this thesis. The next immediate step is to understand 
more clearly how Hegel saw the self's developmental process unfolding. 
2.2.4) Bi/dung and the Developmental conception of the Self 
Education, in its absolute determination, is therefore liberation and work towards a 
higher liberation ... Within the subject, this libe ration is the hard work of opposing 
me re subjectivity of conduct, of opposing the immediacy of desire as well as the 
subjective vanity of feeling [Empfindung] and the arbitrariness of carprice ... [I] t is 
through this work of education that the subj ective will attains objectivity even within 
itself, that objectivity in which alone it is for its part worthy of being the actuality of 
the Idea (PR §187, 225). 
Such is Hegel's understanding of Bi/dungB as expressed in The Phi/osophy of 
Right's section on Ethical Life. The basic notions should by now be reasonably 
recognizable. The above discussion has been fraught with terms such as 
"intersubjective development", "self consciousness", and "self realisation". 
Those well versed in philosophical movements will recognise here the common 
vocabulary of German Idealism at work. But to assess the value and 
implications of these ideas, we must know more. To come fully to terms with 
Hegel's concept of the self, we must understand better the way he understood 
the self's development. We must know what he meant by Bi/dung, and 
examine its implications. 
i. Background and aims of dialectical development 
We begin with the very basis of the bi/dung process - what Wood (1990: 1) 
describes as the "lifeblood of the Hegelian system" - the Hegelian dialectic. 
l! The lerm BifduJlg is used pervasively anti in multi-fnceted fashi on in Hegel's theory. As Kelly (l969: 
342) points out it is a word that "means not only education, but maturation, fu ltilment. joy, suffering, a 
drenching in the stream of lime and an c::mergence to lhe plateau of judgment. This occult, fasc inating 
treatise is Hegel's wordy ... paradigm for the acqui sition of all worthwhile knowledge". 
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Wood outlines the broad philosophical move that Hegel made beyond Kant, 
perhaps one of his most significant predecessors: 
Kant argues that when human reason attempts to extend its cognition beyond the bounds 
of possible experience, it is not only tempted to make unwarranted claims to knowledge , 
but also is in danger of contradictions (antinomies); the only way to avoid them is by 
carefully observing the proper limits of its cognitive powers. The part of this account 
Hegel retains is the idea that our thinking has an inherent tendency to go beyond every 
limit , and thus to undermine or overthrow itself. He associates the idea with the human 
self's tendency to change, develop and progress through a process involving a stage of 
self-confli ct followed by its resolution (Ibid. 2) . 
The dialectical method of thinking is crucial to any well-heeled understanding 
of Hegelian concepts.9 This idea of progress through the resolution of internal 
conflicts applies to cultures, regimes, the background history and conditions 
within which they operate and - most importantly for our current purposes - to 
individuals. Only in Chapter 4 will I fully present and assess Hegel's idea on the 
interlinked nature of the aforementioned dialectical processes. For now, I seek 
merely to understand the place of the individual within it all. 
9 Kainz (1996: 1-2) provides a succi nct introduction LO Hegel's dialectical reasoning, beginn ing willl 
Hegel's own statement that: 
Dialectic is the immanent forlhgoing wherein the onesidedness and limitedness of intelieClUil l 
determinations shows itself for what it is - namely, the negation of these same determination s" 
(Hegel, cited in reference), 
Kainz explains Hegel' s thinking thus : 
As we explore a specific determination, we arri ve at its limits and are necessarily drawn into a 
consideration of what it negates. that which is other, especially that which is diametrically other: 
the opposite to which it is conct:ptually related. Then the process continue;:s (Ibid. ). 
The literature on dialectical thinking is vast, and for lack of space and relevance I have not included it here. 
For the purposes of this discussion, I fccl it is sufficient to regard it as signifyi ng a reasoning process driven 
by the necessary resolution of inlt!rnal contradictions, in which lower stages of development are corrected 
and suhlimmed within hi gher stagt!s. 
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ii. Bi/dung as an individually driven social process 
Wood (1990: 18) traces Hegel's ideas on this back to the principal writings of 
Kant and Fichte. The central conception that emerges is that of the human 
self as a rational construct, tied to the culture and circumstances in which it 
finds itself, but mandated by its very nature to discover through what could be 
simplistically labelled as trial and error (both on the part of the self and its 
culture, or political order) a genuine sense of self-knowledge. This vision of 
the rationally constructed self might seem to devalue the individualistic 
elements of selfhood. As Wood (Ibid . ) points out, it is quite the opposite. It 
tends rather to emphasize it. The process by which development happens is 
not an external one. It is certainly influenced and mediated by external 
factors, particularly other selves. But it is ultimately an intensely personal and 
highly individualised process. The agent of final construction, the ultimate 
architect of self, remains the self. As Wood succinctly phrases it: "Our 
fundamental vocation is to make ourselves into what we are" (Ibid.). In 
understanding the bildung process, we further clarify the discussion above on 
the will coming to know itself as its own end. As Plamenatz explains it: 
The essential attribute of the self· conscious being is that it develops its capacities in 
the process of exercising them. By its actions it transforms itself. It is 'self·creative', 
not in the sense that it strives deliberately to recreate itself to a model clear to it 
before the striving begins, but in the sense that it gradually acquires self· knowledge 
and self control as it acts and reflects on its actions and their results (Plamenatz in 
Pelczynski (ed.), 1971: 34-35). 
This is, however, only one element of the bildung process, since such a 
progression, though individually driven, cannot occur in the absence of other 
selves. Patten (1999: 102) identifies bildung as "a process of education and 
socialization" (my italiCS) which develops "the capacities, goals and attitudes 
of a free agent". The capacity in question is more nearly (if metaphysically) 
Individualism in Hegel 81 
defined by Hegel as the capacity to subordinate the particular to the universal 
(PhG ~488) .1O This Wood (1990: 97) argues can be interpreted as the capacity 
to enter into situations of mutual recognition with others. "We have taken 
possession of ourselves," Wood explains, "when we have acquired the capacity 
to think of ourselves as persons by regarding ourselves as members of a 
community of persons" (Ibid.). This is why Patten (1990: 102) further holds 
that recognition is foundational to such a process - the process of becoming a 
free agent requires the recognition by others as such, and , as discussed above, 
this recognition must be uncoerced and mutual to be of any authentic 
significance. 
iii. Emergent principles and dynamics of the Bi/dung process 
As Kelly (1969: 345-346) argues, there is little at first that seems to distinguish 
Hegel's understanding of Bildung from that of Kant and the transcendental 
idealists. In reference to the quote with which I began this section (PR §187), 
he sees Hegel identifying bildung as striving "towards thought and system , 
picking up the essential , kicking over the material traces". Hegel seems, at 
first glance to be claiming, alongside Kant, that man is only free in being 
educated, in developing self-discipline. That education is simply the 
preparation and practice of rational autonomy. 'The difference," Kelly (Ibid. 
346) claims "is that Hegel scorned the infinite human experiment, the sacrifice 
of any present for a future". Hegel did not endorse the right of despots to rein 
in a modern social order, to crack the whips of authority to force the 
uneducated into a communal and obedient mode. Hegel would not see the 
"toiling masses" cast into a "model school that would 'force them to be free' 
on behalf of an infinite endeavour" (Ibid . ). 
Bildung, as the process of eduction, is "the art of making men ethical" (PR 
§151) . The participation in ethical life, with its various institutions and 
\tI Hegel also credits the process of implementing the uni versal by compari son to happiness in PR §20. 
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processes is what provides this education, this cul ture of self-realisation. Not 
for elites, but for all. 
Over the remaining chapters we shall gain further insight into the complex 
system by which Hegel believes the individual self becomes reconciled to its 
social context - the elaborate web of historical, cultural and political 
institutions that serve to mediate and facilitate the self 's development. 
Throughout this process, one constant remains - it is the sum of individual wills 
that forms these institutions, and it is these very wills that they nurture and 
feed. 
As has already been noted, the content of these wills alters in response to 
varying and deve loping social conditions. This brings us to the crucial element 
in the make-up of the Hegelian self - the doctrine that it is in a constant state 
of development. This has various implications. One of the more hazardous is 
that it logically commits us to regard all stages of personal development, even 
those we would regard as base and brutal, as necessary developmental steps 
towards the ultimate, enlightened se lf. What we must remember is that we 
are not casting the self to the winds of chance and hoping it flutters back to us 
fully formed and ready for participating in a society of rationally free beings. 
It is not about leaving the criminal and miscreant to their own devices in the 
hope that the burnt hand will teach best. Rather, the political order is a kind 
of nursery of the self. It provides the correct conditions for survival, growth 
and prosperity.11 In doing so, though , it abides by the principal that one of the 
conditions for said growth , if it is to be lasting and significant, is that the 
plants learn to grow for themselves. 
The idea that a certain period of development is necessary before we accord 
individuals the status of rational agency is not exactly new to us. The fact that 
II We shall exami ne the implications of Hegel 's conviction that the nursery itself has to learn the hard way 
how to improve itself, as wel l of his vis ion of tht! ideal nursery in The Philosophy of Rig/~l in"Chapter 4. 
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we set a legal age marker to the time beyond which an individual may drive a 
car, consume alcohol, absorb certain types of media and engage in sexual 
conduct is premised on very similar reasoning. We assume a period sufficient 
for individuals to acquire the necessary self· discipline and rational capacity to 
undertake such actions responsibly. But this doctrine represents something 
way more far-reaching and significant. When we assess this doctrine's 
implications in modern terms, our conclusions can be varying and controversial. 
One interpretation is that this is a doctrine of positive freedom that allows the 
state to curb choices and free actions, even if their effect on others is not 
perceptible, as the actions of an as yet embryonic self that has not yet 
developed full rational capacity. This is an interpretation towards which 
communitarian thinkers especially, I feel, would be inclined. It would justify, 
for example, legislating on the basis of community norms or "moral" 
principles 12 that the individual in question has not yet fully recognised the 
value of. But I believe it to be an interpretation that largely misses the point. 
As I have argued (and, I feel, proven) thusfar, there is an element of 
individualism that remains the driving force of this endeavour. If these 
processes are completely foisted upon the individual, they become counter-
productive. It is much like Mill's argument against enlightened despotism (see 
above) in On Representative Government - if the education of slaves at the 
hands of a benevolent master were ever truly successful, they would rail 
against the very notion of their slavery as a slight upon the autonomy of 
thought that education granted them (Mill 3: 140) . Hegel , I feel, was in the 
final analysis, an archenemy of submissive and ignorant societies in much the 
same way Mill was . He just had slightly different reasoning and criteria behind 
I::! I must poi nt out to avoid confusion that I am not here referring to Hegel 's own concept of the moral 
which is the major foc lis of C hapter 4. I am using the term "morul" as used by such groups as the 
conservati ve right in the U.S. - as es tablished community standards often premised on \lratcrcd-down 
religious principle. Whether or not Hegel would agree with describing such attitudes as "moral" is onc of 
the key issues to be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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said enmity. Both displayed an inherent distrust of custom rigorously enforced 
- seeing it as a mechanism of stagnation and repression. 
If there is a modern advocacy to be drawn out of bildung as it applies to 
individuals, which, as stated , is an element of the entire process that Hegel 
charges the state and society to bear firmly in mind at the higher stages, I 
believe it is this: 
We should eternally strive in the construction of our institutions and the 
manner in which they operate to have the selfhood of the individual firmly at 
heart. We should seek to contribute to the conditions that create awareness 
rather than enforcing attitudes based on our own particular "enlightened 
perspective" , as valid as these might be. 13 We should seek to promote in our 
educational systems a sense of responsible and rational individual agency, 
allowing learners to internally negotiate the whirlpools of their own 
contradictions, and assisting them in doing so, rather than demanding they 
simply submit to the "higher wisdom" of their elders. We should always, in a 
developed social environment, give citizens credit for intelligent and rational 
capacities, and attempt to educate before blindly enforcing. 
Perhaps, for example, we could curb drunk driving far more effectively if 
offenders were forced to assist in the emergency rooms that treat crash 
victims14, imbuing them with a sense of consequence and context. The notion 
of Bildung as valid self-formation, if accepted, represents not only a more 
humanistic, but also a somehow more complete approach to individuals in the 
social context. It also provides the state with a clear guiding principle against 
which to check its laws and actions. 
J] Comparable, I feel , to Mil l's famous aphori sm that "Truth thus held is but onc superstit ion lhe more" 
(Mill I : 3 1). 
U Thi s is NOT a pract ical policy suggestion, but rather outlines the princi ple of the kind of O:pproach I feel 
Hegel might support. 
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All this presages a claim I will only be able to make conclusively by the fading 
pages of Chapter 4 - that the Hegelian telos is no stagnant space, but rather an 
arena of freeflowing ideas presided over by institutions designed to facilitate 
awareness, tolerance and the capacity for ongoing self-education. For the 
moment though, there is still one significant element missing from our picture 
of the Hegelian individual. I have not yet set out a concrete picture of what 
being a rational and self-aware individual entails in Hegelian terms, and what 
makes this particular brand of self so free, i.e. why the bildung process is 
understood by Hegel as the path to tree agency. To understand this, we must 
assess more deeply why and how Hegel understands freedom as rational 
autonomy. 
2.2.5) Freedom as Rational autonomy in Hegel 
The will which is free as yet only in itself is the immediate or natural wilL The 
determination of the difference which is posited within the will by the self-determining 
concept appear within the immediate will as an immediately present content (PR §11). 
The system of this content as it is already present in its immediacy in the will exists 
only as a multitude of varied drives, each of which is mine in general along with 
others, and at the same time something universal and indeterminate which has all 
kinds of objects [Gegenstande] and can be satisfied in all kinds of ways . Inasmuch as 
the will, in this double indeterminacy, gives itself the form of individuality ... it is a 
resolving will, and only in so far as it makes any resolutions at all is it an actual will (PR 
§12). 
The above quotations layout the beginnings of the Hegelian dialectic of the 
formally free will, as already discussed above. The question at hand in this 
section is that of what makes such a will particularly "free". As evidenced by 
the last few sections, Hegel's idea of what constitutes freedom is somewhat 
different to the general conception thereof in a liberal democracy. Most of our 
common sense, and even our more formally defined notions of freedom tend to 
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equate it with options, with choice, with autonomy. Pelczynski (in Pelczynski, 
1984 (ed.): 62) maintains that Hegel's conception of freedom is best described 
not as a single term but as a theoretical structure composed of Ha whole series 
of separate but related concepts linked together in a systematic way". Hegel's 
conception of individual freedom is indeed premised on autonomy, but a very 
highly developed kind. The Hegelian individual becomes free when he is 
capable of rational self-government. We have to delve deeper into what Hegel 
means by this, if we are to further understand how the individual can be 
understood as free in the Hegelian social order. We can begin by a brief nod to 
the concept's ancestry. As those versed in Liberal political theory will already 
recognise, the concept of freedom as rational autonomy was espoused by 
another long-standing figure of enlightenment era German philosophy: Hegel's 
most famed predecessor - Kant .15 
i. Rational Autonomy: From Kant to Hegel 
Patten (1999: 47), for one, sees a strong Kantian element is Hegel's ideas on 
this issue. For both theorists , individual freedom is more than just a matter of 
following one's desires, but rather, as discussed in the previous section, a 
matter of moving beyond them. For Kant, there exists a profound opposition 
between the human being's rational capacity and her contingent wants and 
desires. A condition of true freedom also includes freedom from the more 
impulsive elements of one's self. The will which is capilble of abstracting itself 
from its own determinations, particularly those in place due to factors beyond 
rational control, such as appetite or circumstance , is the free will. Thus 
rational self-government is intimately tied to the capacity for self·criticism and 
enl i ghtened self-in terest. 
15 Kanlian and Hegdinn thinking exist in a rather bizarre l ove~h i.lte re lationship, and a full investigation o f 
the clashes and affi ni ti es between the two is a thesis unto i tsel f. T hus I treat here only the correlations (or 
lack thereof) that apply to the concept of indi vidual freedom as ralional autonomy. 
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For Hegel, the picture is slightly more complex . Wants and desires are not 
completely cut away, so much as sublimated or aufgehauben. ' 6 As the self 
grows to govern itself rationally , it does not forget that it has desires, 
impulses, so much as realise they must be assessed with enlightened self· 
criticism, with an awareness of their context and consequence. The picture 
that emerges is that of an ideal self that is capable of stepping beyond itself, 
of judging its actions, aims and needs from a cooler, rational angle, with 
sharper understandings of its relation to others and its environment. 
Robert Wallace (2001), in his examination of the Kantian affinities in Hegel's 
Logic gives us a clear picture of the process by which this becomes so. Wallace 
sees Hegel as rescuing the Kantian account of freedom from an untenable 
dualism between thought and nature. The Kantian approach to freedom sees 
thought as an exercise in abstraction. We forego the limitations and 
contingencies of nature by locating freedom in a realm distinct from nature -
our own minds. This is the famed divergence between the "noumenal" realm 
of free mental activity, and the contrasted "phenomenal" realm in which 
nature , and natural determinism is located. The philosophical tagline for this 
breed of thinking is "subjective idealism". Thus it should not surprise readers 
that Hegel as a famed "objective idealist" thought somewhat differently about 
the interplay between thought and reality. Thought and reality are not 
understood as distinct entities, but rather as interlocking dynamics which 
affect each other mutually. As Wallace (Ibid.) phrases it: 
[F]reedom is not radically opposed to nature, but instead it consummates (for lack of a 
better word) aspiration that is inherent in nature, and thus it does not need to be located 
If, This is perhaps ont! of the mOTe con Lroversial phrases in Hegelian terminology. and many texts devote 
entire g lossary pages to clarifying this term alone. It is perhaps bes t captured by terms such as 
··subli mation" or "supercession" (l accede here to Robert Wallace's explanation of it). One tinds the exact 
meani ng becomes clearer upon contemplation of the lerm 's function in the dialectical system. Throughout 
lhe progressive stages, as the inherent potential of a thing - be it person, culture or uni verse - unfolds, 
certain elements are Cu L away and oLhers arc, in a sense carried over. They are included difftrcml y in the 
newly ordered stage of development, but nonetheless fl!cognisilbly present. 
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in a fundamentally different realm from nature; nor does it need to present itself simply 
to a different "standpoint" from that to which nature presents itself. 
In understanding this key difference between Kant and Hegel, we also 
understand why Hegel does not call for the complete abandonment of natural 
inclinations and desires that Kant does. The determinate natural qualities of 
human beings are the starting point that developed selves move beyond, but 
also in a sense drag along with them, sublimating them within their later 
rational systems of self·government. Wallace (Ibid.) ties this in to Hegel's 
concept of the "true infinite", a conception of the infinite no more or less 
transcending than that of the finite. 
ii. Foundations of rational autonomy in Hegel's Logic 
We have already discussed Hegel's application of the above reasoning to the 
Bildung process discussed in The Philosophy of Right. What follows here is 
Wallace's (2001)17 interpretation of the argument for the development of 
rational autonomy as it appears in the Logic, reflecting the same dynamics of 
self· definition at a more fundamental level. 
As Wallace (Ibid.) sets out Hegel's position, the space under which our 
understandings of distinctions between things are organised is conceptual, not 
an act of empirical labelling. The first moment of definition concerns 
separating the thing we seek to describe from what it is not. It is a moment of 
"negation". So the first moment of determinate being is its negation of 
reality. The hard·line split between negation and reality cannot last, though. 
It is, in Hegel's terms, "uncomfortable". The being feels it must be, in some 
way self-determining. Thus follows a further negation of the first negation, the 
being as "something" - i.e. a being that seeks to define itself independently of 
its relation to others. This does not completely cancel out the first negation, 
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but throws it into the now more complicated mix by "by subsuming in higher 
level unity the first , necessary distinction". Labelled "being in itself", this is 
still a very early phase of self·definition and one of the early footfalls on the 
path to rational self-rule. 
As Wallace (Ibid.) continues, the fact that beings-in-themselves still depend 
upon the existence of the other for their determinate qualities leads to what 
seems like a philosophical dead end. A strong element of "being for other" 
remains present in the ongoing process of self-definition. If both types of being 
are meant to be concrete elements of the determinate being, then it seems 
that "being for itself" has amounted to nothing more than different class of 
"being for other", trapped as it is in a dynamic of relating to others. In simpler 
terms, the self struggles with defining itself in and of itself if it must constantly 
do so in reference to other selves. 
As Wallace (Ibid.) notes , Hegel is careful to point out that the way out of this 
quandary is not a simple one. Thus the next phase is a solution which he 
admits is flawed. (Wallace feels he does so in order to be thorough and 
systematic) . This is something he calls "finitude". In this phase, the self 
downplays the relevance of the other - defining itself inasmuch as possible as if 
the other did not exist. This, in effect, collapses the entire system of self-
definition into as many negative spaces as there are selves , leaving each self 
master of his own definition . This becomes immediately problematic "because 
it defends the something's being-in-itself only by limiting its being" (Ibid.) . 
The limit allows the something to exist, but in doing so forces it into a 
definitional relation with others once more. This limit, as Wallace quotes 
Hegel, becomes "the middle between the two in which they cease ... as the 
non-being of each of them it is the other of both". This leads the something to 
17 I make use here of an unpublished manuscript with (he kind permission of Robert W allace himself, as 
secured for me by Dr. Ivor Sarakinsky. I thus cannot provide page numbers or publication detai ls. 
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once again seek beyond itself for its capacity for definition, to direct itself 
towards the point of its non-being and declare this to be its being. This Hegel 
describes as the "contradiction of the finite" . in trying to define itself, the 
self is forced to move beyond its own definitions. This is the process that leads 
the determinate self to seek definition in the infinite. 
The process by which this happens Wallace (Ibid.) argues, does in fact make 
perfectly good sense if we consider it carefully. The self perceives a limit, or 
limitation upon itself, in so doing, there must be an element of the self that is 
doing the perceiving. In perceiving the limitation at all the self is "already 
halfway to actualizing the conception of what it would be like not to be 
constrained by the limitation".18 The self understands that it this "limit" 
represents a blockage, or barrier. Once the self realises it has potential 
efficacy and purpose beyond its finite determinations (what Wallace calls a 
"higher vocation"), it is able to transcend said determinations and "move 
beyond itself". This notion Hegel links with the idea of the "ought" - which is 
where Wallace sees the entire discourse leading directly into the Kantian idea 
of rational self·government. The "ought" is a rescued version of the 
categorical imperative. 19 Only by abstraction and self-criticism can a being 
move beyond the dictates of its inclinations alone. Only in the space beyond 
our finite limitations are we capable of understanding the possibility of a life 
without them. This freedom is acquired speculatively and reflectively, through 
the workings of our internal reason. 
Wallace neatly sums up the virtues of the self·transcending being as the end-
point of this particular dialectic: 
II! T his seems 10 bear an J l least surface affin ity to Sartre's arguments for the radicall y Free mind. A brief 
discussion of the interrelarion between Hegelian and Sartrcan accounts of radi cal autonomy follows shortly. 
19 Brief nOle for those alien to Kanli nn notions - the categorical imperative in Kaolinn terms represents 
freedom through uni versalisable rational ac tion, as opposed to the hypothetical imperative" which simply 
tells lhe agent how 10 satisfy a contingent indination. 
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[AJ "self-transcending" being ... solves the problem that "something" and finite being were 
unable to solve: It has its quality by virtue of itself and thus has the "reality" or "being in 
itself" that something and finite being failed to have ... By going beyond its finite qualities, 
the self transcending being is in charge of whatever qualities it will now have (Wallace , 
Ibid.) . 
Wallace (Ibid.) feels that this line of reasoning rescues the Kantian notion of 
freedom by proving that nature and freedom are not counteractive or opposing 
forces. The free being must, after all, transcend from the contingent and 
determinate elements of nature to the infinite, not abandoning nature 
completely so much as sublimating it within the process of transcendence. For 
now, it is time to leave Wallace and the realm of Hegel's logic, and assess the 
implications of this understanding of individual freedom .20 
As Davis (in Cullen (ed.), 1988: 48-49) illustrates, drawing on Hegel's exposition 
of his psychology in his Philosophy of Mind, Hegel sees the end-point of the 
development of individual will just discussed as a state of "radical autonomy" 
in rough parity with Sartre's conception of radical freedom, in that the agent 
comes to assume total rational responsibility for her actions. As Davis clarifies: 
Fully self-conscious free will is acquired when the agent can fully explain and articulate 
his own activities to himse lf and others. Free will is the refore attained when the 
individual realises that he is radically autonomous. His thought and intentions are 
embodied in his actions ... The agent can abstract himself from anything. The 
substance of thought is practice, practice is articulated in the will and the will implies 
freedom of choice (Ibid.). 
Davis (Ibid.) argues that Hegel departs from Sartre in linking his conception of 
mind with his understanding of the ideal social order. It is his claim that 
certain types of social orders contribute to the development of the faculties 
:!U Wallace's further discussion in the same paper f have om itted, largely for reasons of space. Of particular 
interest to the reader may be his discussion of the clash bet ween "spurious" and " trUt~" in fi nity, a doctrinal 
assess ment I see as not entirdy relevant to OUf presl!nt purposes. 
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that allow for full-blown freedom, rather than representing barriers to them. 
This is foundational to Hegel ' s conviction that an ideal social order is an 
embodiment of freedom, rather than a managed threat to it. This, as shall be 
examined in detail further on, is how we may usefully interpret Hegel's notion 
of a concrete universal or common mind . The success of Hegel ' s position on 
this can only be fully assessed when we come to examine his conception of the 
ideal social order in Chapter 4. But a crucial immediate concern with Hegel's 
understanding of freedom as rational abstraction presents itself here. 
iii. Hegel and the reciprocity thesis 
As Patten (1999 : 82-84) identifies, any account of freedom that premises itself 
on the rational self-determination of the individual must eventually hit upon 
the recurrent social theory clash point of the "reciprocity thesis". This is 
essentially the claim that rational self-government sets citizens up in an 
appropriate relationship to ethical requirements, that freedom and subjection 
to moral law are ultimately reciprocal. This is a burden of proof that Hege l's 
social theory must bear alongside Kant ' s. It stands accused firstly of setting up 
an impossible standard of free action , and secondly of attempting to derive 
ethical requirements from principles of rationality, which the broad sweeps of 
modern philosophical judgement hold as impossible. 
Both of these come down to two more fundamental issues, both of which form 
branches of the "empty formalism" objection. The first is that rational self· 
determination as a measure is essentially vacuous. The categorical imperative, 
Kant 's formula for rationally self·governed action , in that just about any action 
can meet the criteria for universalizeability. This is an objection directed 
against Kant by Hegel himself, and it is one that Patten (Ibid.) contends most 
modern commentators do not hold by. 21 
21 I absolve myself of entc:ring the speci fi cs of thi s debate, as it would be tangemi al 10 my current purposes, 
and sht:!ds no real li ght on Hegelian principle as such. 
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The second issue, however, is one that Patten (Ibid . 87·88) believes strikes at a 
profound weakness in the Kantian system, which the Hegelian system can 
remedy. Rational self·government, as explained above, requires abstraction 
from the contingency of desire and inclination. In so doing, we are meant to 
come to authentic reasons·for·action that do not appeal to some irrational 
desire, which is held in the same intellectual contempt as appealing to some 
irrational and arbitrary authority. This ultimately forms the bedrock of Kant's 
arguments for the categorical imperative. If there are ultimately two forms of 
reason for action, the legitimate form of the maxim (the categorical 
imperative) and action based on desire , and desire is proven to be a limitation, 
then the only standard of free and ethical action is the categorical imperative. 
When we cut through the abstracts and come back to more practical elements 
of this, we can imagine ourselves trying to get an individual to justify her 
reasons for acting. She most likely claims some desire or another. When we 
ask what underlies that , the answer will be some broader desire or inclination , 
and so on and so forth. This is the process of abstracting the individual from 
her contingently given desires. Now the categorical imperative is meant to 
halt this infinite regress. But, the objection runs, why does it? Why should an 
agent not look for some justification or reason for following the categorical 
imperative itself? The answer Patten (Ibid. 92·93) draws out of Kant's 
sympathisers and defenders amounts to a series of assumptions that ultimately 
beg the question. The categorical imperative is assumed to be "intrinsically 
reasonable", thus rendering the argument quite starkly circular: this is 
precisely what Kant and his defenders are trying to prove Y 
This, Patten (Ibid. 93·94) contends, is why Hegel describes the freedom of the 
individual will as a "contradiction,,23 - once abstracted from all particular 
22 There are obviously further suhtlt!lics and sub-iss ues that arise. but I have, for space and clarity, cut 
Pallen' s ace-ounl to the cl:ntrai poi nts. I advise.:: readers inrerested in this dynumic to consu lt the origi nal 
tex t. 
" VPR iv. 11 8 as cited in Patten. 1999: 94. 
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commitme nts, the will seems stripped of any reason for action. To prove that 
there is a sense in which rational self-government ultimately results in a 
commitment to other-regarding action , Hegel must resolve this contradiction 
(explain how content for the self-determined will is in fact generated) and in 
so doing, prove that this content will engender in the individual will a 
commitment to ethical action . 
In assessing Hegel's own contention of how he does so, we are drawn to the 
confusing space of the concrete universal, for it this that Hegel understands as 
key to resolving the contradiction.24 Patten (Ibid. 94) points here to PR §24 
where Hegel distinguishes between the "concept and its object", describing 
the will as "universal because all limitation and particular individuality 
[Einzelheit] are superseded within it" . Hegel claims this is possible as the 
formal will is an embodiment of the concrete universal, as opposed to 
communal universals of reflection, or the abstract universal described in 
reference to the indeterminate will. The universal he has in mind, which he 
feels the will ultimately comes to reflect and embody, is the "universal which 
extends beyond its object" (Ibid.). Hegel thus sees the fully developed will as 
the embodiment of rationality , and thus , by his terms, of freedom itself. 2s 
The concrete universal, Patten (Ibid.) exp.lains, is embodied and made actual 
through teleological structures guided by an "inner purposiveness". As shall be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, the goal and nature of organic structures 
::!4 Palten, like many commentaLOrs, disavows himself of the need to delve in to prec ise interprcw.lions of 
what Geist might menn by modern terms. (This is something I wi ll attempt to resolve towards the end of 
this chapter.) Nonetheless, his ideas on the applicat ion of the concrete uni versal to the problem of the se lf-
determin ing will . as shall be orought out in Chapter 4, lend weight to my final thesis on the matter. 
15 Patten (1999: 95-96) follows H egel'S reasoning. and examines the connecti on betwcl!n the concrete 
uni versal and the teleology of organic structures. He illustrates the H \!geliun notion of te leology further by 
bringing out Hegel 's exposi tion of teleological relalionsh ips from lhe Logic. These two follow a structure 
of H egelian reasoning that is immanently consistent with the remainder of his system. The relati onship can 
be analyzed from three ·'perspectives·' . T he "subjective end", which is groundcd in pure subjectivi ty 
countcrposed to the external world. the "means" which are the fac tors that arrcct the way the subject ive end 
is played ou t in objective rea li ty, and the "realised end" which is the transformed objective sphere wherein 
ends are achieved in reality through the "deploymen t of various means", 
Individualism in Hegel 95 
is to adapt to circumstance to ensure their own self-preservation_ This 
framework, as applied to the concrete universal, suggests simply that it 
generates particular ends as means necessary for its own continued existence_ 
It still qualifies as self-generating since all the particulars deployed, though 
new developments, can be traced back to something that was present from the 
very start, namely the purpose of the entity_ This, once applied to the 
concrete universal at hand, namely the free will, leads Patten to translate this 
dynamic of Hegel's thought into an argument far more recognisable to modern 
sensibilities: 
In some sense, at least, the generation of the content of freedom simply involves the 
application that Kant's famous dictum that "he who wills the end wills (so far as reason 
has dedsive influence on his action) also the means which are indispensably necessary and 
in his power" (Ibid. 97). 
But this, Patten (Ibid_ 97) warns, has only taken us halfway towards resolution _ 
The fact that it sets up a plausible structure of interplay between means and 
ends as parts of a self-generating whole is worthwhile. But this leads nowhere 
without the concept of a given end that can generate particular commitment, 
and thus particular content that does not fall prey to the justification 
requirement highlighted above. There must be some "universal purpose" to 
which the free will as such is necessarily committed . Kant, as we recall, 
attempted to do this with the dubiously defensible conception of the 
categorical imperative_ 
It is here that one of Patten 's (Ibid_ 97-98) more inventive and sensible 
interpretations of the Hegelian system come to the fore_ This is that even once 
it has undergone complete abstraction from all contingent desire and 
circumstance, the free will remains committed to one grand abstract end, and 
that is the sustaining of its own independence and freedom. This resolves the 
issues at hand in a number of key ways. It is exempt from the justification 
requirement, because it is a necessary condition of possessing the capacities by 
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which said requirement arises , i.e. the capacity to abstract the self from 
contingent circumstance it finds itself in , to subject one's desires to critical 
examination_ This is the capacity that Hegel sees as foundational to truly 
ethical conduct, and the great defensive barrier against irrational conviction 
and emotive responses masquerading as such: 
This self- consciousness which comprehends itself as essence through thought and 
thereby divests itself of the contingent and untrue constitutes the principle of right, of 
morality and of all ethics. Those who speak philosophically of right, morality and 
ethics and at the same time seek to exclude thought, appealing instead to feeling, 
heart, emotion and inspi ration, bear witness to the profound contempt into which 
thought and science have fallen; for in their case, science itself, having sunk into 
despair and total lassitude, even adopts barbarism and thoughtlessness as its principle 
(PR §Zl A). 
The "infinite subjectivity" required by the process of self-abstraction pre-
supposes a commitment to sustaining one's own free , independent standpoint 
in reference to the rational realities of the world_ This commitment is thus not 
vulnerable to a further stage of the infinite regress the way the categorical 
imperative is. 
This may seem circular, but it is, upon reflection, rather what Patten (1999 : 
101) terms "recursive". If agents are to be in any position to even contemplate 
the determinate ends of freedom, they must maintain a commitment towards 
their own freedom and independence_ This, as grounding for the concrete 
universal, slots in rather neatly_ In Hegel's own words: 
When the spirit strives towards its centre, it strives to perfect its own freedom, and this 
striving is fundamental to its nature. To say that spirit exists would at first seem to imply 
that it is a completed entity. On the contrary, it is by nature active, and activity is its 
essence; it is its own product , and is therefore its own beginning and own end. Its 
freedom does not consist in static being, but in constant negation of all that threatens to 
destroy freedom (VG: 55 / 48, cited in Patten, 1999: 101). 
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This concept of freedom as a continual state of combating unfreedom makes 
sense as a concrete universal. It amounts, Patten (1999: 101) holds, to an 
inviolable condition that the self-determining will be committed to the 
perpetual struggle against factors that seek to undermine freedom, and thus to 
an ongoing process of self-liberation.26 
But, to return to the grander question at hand, how does this resolve the issues 
inherent in the reciprocity thesis? How, in other words, can this basic abstract 
commitment to the maintenance of one's own freedom result in a commitment 
to ethical conduct? The answer is present in the exposition undertaken above, 
concerning the function of bi/dung in fostering the capacities for true self-
determination. If the capacities for freedom can only be developed within a 
community of mutually recognising agents, then Patten (1999: 103) concludes 
the universal abstract commitment to the maintenance of freedom wills, as 
one of its means, the commitment to participate in the ethical institutional 
structure of the community. This, of course, hinges on the validity of Hegel 's 
concept of social freedom , the viability of which requires substantially more 
interrogation . Such a discussion awaits in Chapter 4. For the moment, it is 
useful to pause and consider the broader implications of the high-concept 
metaphysics discussed in this section for the architecture of Hegelian principle 
as a whole. 
2.2 .6 Implications of Hegel's speculative metaphysics 
Hegel was certainly not the first philosopher to propose that freedom in its 
true sense is rational self-government. Both Kant and Rousseau would accede 
to the broad sense of the sentiment, and following Taylor (1985: 337) it is fair 
26 This, I fed. al so adds signiJicant force to the clos ing arguments of this chapter. in which I shall attempt 
to show that the Hegelian fe/os is a di versi fi ed, non-s tat ic point, commilted LO an ethic of. tolerance and 
diversity. 
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to credit Kant with the first rigid formulation of the idea. He sets Kant and 
Rousseau up as enemies of the idea of reason as an instrumental tool . popular 
amongst enlightenment thinkers. 27 As we have seen, Hegel sees the rational 
figure not as abstracted from her natural self the way Kant did . but rather as 
eventually capable of a higher form of reason that could reconcile that natural 
self to a rational way of life . 
The conditions such a baseline conception of freedom sets upon the remainder 
of Hegel's system are manifold. and often forgotten by those who cast him as a 
conservative or apologist for tyrants. The individual remains a baseline driving 
force of Hegel's social order. The concept of freedom he works towards . 
though developmental and social in nature is tied to individual capacities, and 
premised on individual self-development within a context of a diversified social 
order dedicated to mutual recognition. I will argue over the course of this 
thesis that the fuller coalescence of Hegel's principles cannot be any kind of 
window-dressing for totalitarianism. This, however. is a claim I can only make 
conclusively once we have a clearer picture of how the Hegelian social order 
can, in fact come to represent an embodiment of freedom. 
What has been established thusfar is that the Hegelian self is a life-long work in 
progress. The rational capacities of self-formation that Hegel identifies as 
constitutive of freedom are not contingent features of the individual. but must 
be developed, intersubjectively and through exercise of them. Kelly (1969: 
346) recalls that Hegel "ridiculed the Gascon 'who would not go into the water 
until he could swim·... The will which is truly self-determined and free is not 
something we are born with. so much as something we develop through 
exposure to the reality that surrounds us . through an ever-growing awareness 
and reconciliation to the rationality of the social structure . Of course . for this 
27 Main stream enl ightenment reasoni ng, as ev idenced by the carlier discuss ion of Mill , saw reason as a 
mechanism whic h provided the means for advanci ng ends or goals that were determined .by instinct or 
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to be so, said social structure must indeed be rational. Where it is not, 
experience must allow it to be criticized and amended , in a broader social 
reflection of the process the individual will undertakes. It was with this in 
mind that Hegel constructed the complex social blueprint that is The 
Philosophy of Right. A discussion of Hegel's social theory thus follows on 
perfectly here. The conceptual vocabulary set out by the theoretical 
breakdown of Hegelian self·formation above will be crucial in understanding 
the driving force, structure and aims of what follows . 
2.3)The Role of the Individual in Hegel's Political 
and Social Theory 
2.3 . 1) Outlines and preliminary comments on Hegel's social theory 
The values of individuality and social membership are not to be thought of as 
competing or mutually exclusive ideals. In fact, each of these ideals, properly 
understood, can only be realised in conjunction with the other (Neuhauser, 2000: 15). 
The conclusion Neuhauser puts forward here spells out the basic contention I 
will be defending in this section. His reading of Hegel (from which I have drawn 
much of the structure and echoed much of the substance in my discussion here) 
sees Hegel as holding that "social theory must reflect on the kinds of 
subjective capacities individuals require in order to realise themselves as free 
... and on the role institutions can play in equipping their members with those 
capacities" (Ibid.). 
Hardimon (1994: 257) echoes such sentiments in a slightly narrower sense when 
he claims that one of the central problems that Hegel addresses is "how 
meaningful political participation can be combined with the possibility of 
reeling. Kant was the first major philosophical thinker to put forward the idea that reasop. was what had to 
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leading a private life". It is thus that Hardimon feels that Hegel can be 
understood as laying out in his social theory "the basic ideal of a social world 
that is a home" (Ibid.). 
It is in the identification of the ideals and principles of Hegel's social 
framework that I feel the true value of modern Hegel scholarship lies . 
Anachronisms of policy and attitude abound in the theory, among them Hegel's 
understanding of class , of gender politics and of the supposed viability of a 
massively hierarchical politics . I contend that most of these minutiae refer to 
dusty extensions of his theory that can be cut away without any significant 
damage to the coherence or the viability of the principles that make up the 
whole. Many such cases will be briefly discussed in the coming discussion, but I 
feel to focus on them is to miss the point. In presenting the arguments and 
discussion I do here , I fall amongst a number of modern Hegel scholars 
(Neuhauser, Hardimon , Patten and Wood come to mind) who have distilled 
Hegelian principle through abstraction from the almost suffocating detail of the 
original texts. 
This serves as an introductory to the treatment of Hegel's social theory in this 
thesis . This section is more narrowly concerned with the role and place of the 
individual in Hegel's social schema. Given the comments just made on the aim 
of Hegel's social theory in general, the task of the following discussion is fairly 
straightforward. We must understand how Hegel understands the individual 
progressing in capacity and understanding through the three levels of freedom 
Hegel lays out in The Philosophy of Right. We must thence understand exactly 
how sacrosanct the individual's sphere of private will remains in the social 
order. This I undertake through an examination of Hegel's doctrine of private 
property, and the crucial implication it holds in terms of Hegel's understanding 
of the interrelation of property and personality. I thence examine Neuhauser's 
outline of the Rousseauian "two·fold" (subjective as well as objective) 
ultimately provide said goals. 
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structure of freedom, and present his clarifications of the subjective element. 
Following on from these is a discussion of the extent to which Hegel's social 
order can be understood as methodologically atomistic (whether, in other 
words, it secures the goods and ends of individuals even if these are not the 
only goods and ends it achieves). The discussion that follows establishes a 
reading of Hegel's position that is faithful to the aim of preserving (and 
enriching) individual freedom that his speculative metaphysics commits him to. 
In proving such, as I see it, we are a fair way to identifying a significant respect 
for individual rights of conscience and practice in the Hegelian system. 
2.3 . 2) Levels and divisions in Hegel's theory of Social Freedom 
The basis [baden] of right is the realm af spirit in general and its precise location and 
point of departure is the will; the will is free, so that freedom constitutes its substance 
and destiny [Bestimmung] and the system of right is the realm of actualised freedom, 
the world of spirit produced from within itself as a second nature (PR §4). 
From this introductory quotation we can understand how Hegel's speculative 
metaphysics permeate his social theory. Having discussed these at some 
length, we are now in a position to examine the principles of the social theory 
itself. The Philosophy of Right's three famed divisions - Abstract Right, 
Morality and Ethical Life - correspond to various other tri-partheid divisions in 
Hegel's theory, and the nature of these interconnecting strands shall be laid 
out in further detail as relevance demands. For now I am concerned with the 
three levels of freedom that are addressed in each of the book's sections: 
personal freedom , moral subjectivity and social freedom.28 
As with many elements in the Hegelian picture, there is a dialectical progress 
of individual capacity through these three forms. The individual's increased 
integration into the social space relies on the progressive development of the 
:!~ I have used Neuhauser's tt!rminology here. Patten (1999: 49) idenLiJics the same lhrec::-parr hierarchy, but 
labels the three Sl<lgcs naTura/freedom, rej7t!crl\'e jioeedom and ralional freedom. 
Individualism in Hegel 102 
capacities for the three forms in sequence. I deal only with personhood in 
detail here , as it is the level of freedom primarily concerned with the 
individual as a distinct entity. 
i. Personhood as a lower configuration of freedom 
Each of these three configurations of Hegelian freedom29 comes to represent a 
distinct but interlinked set of conditions that the rational social whole must 
meet in order for it to be affirmed by the individual wills of its members. 3o 
Each configuration represents a form of self·determination . Each is, to Hegel, 
crucial in its own right. The progression through them as Neuhauser (2000: 27) 
points out, reflects a relationship of interdependence between the three stages 
- the higher forms represent a more substantial and developed form 31 of the 
self-determination the lower forms embody, and without these higher forms 
"the lower cannot be actualised in the world in a manner consistent with the 
essential character of a self-determined will" (Ibid.). Though there is indeed 
progression from personhood through to social freedom, this does not mean 
that the final configuration of social institutions may disregard personhood as 
some earlier immature phase of will. The personhood and moral subjectivity of 
all citizens must be catered for and recognised in the rational social order if it 
is, indeed, to be rational (and therefore accessible and comprehensible) at all. 
Neuhauser (lbid.18) explains that personhood, as a concept, represents earliest 
phase of individual free choice. It is driven by Wilkur or mere choosing (as 
already discussed) and basically amounts to the choice between competing 
drives and impulses. It must be noted, as Neuhauser (Ibid. 24·25) illustrates, 
~) Hegel uses the term "shapes' (PR §32). 
30 The crit~rion that the social order as a whole be someth ing commensurale with the indi vidual wi lls of its 
members is a central Hegelian condition . The morc difticult issues of whether the individual wi ll must he 
"re-conditioned" in order for (his to be so will be addressed further down, when we come to examine the 
subjective disposi tion o f ci ti zens to the: soc ial order. 
The question of whether or not the overall good of the social order is reducible without remaindt:f to the 
individual ~!Oods of its members will be addressed in the comin!!. section on methodological tilOmism. 
31 Hegel in .... PR §32 Z uses the term "richer". .... ... 
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that this does not merely encompass the brute physical drives (although Hegel 
does indeed consider the "animalistic" needs of human beings as an essential 
part of human nature that must be catered for) 32 but can include what Hegel 
calls "spiritual" inclinations.33 The dialectic of the will in the social process 
begins here, for though there must be knowledge of external reality there is no 
real sense of another will as an obstacle to individual endeavour. The domain 
of the arbitrary will in the social order, i.e. the delineations of what falls 
exclusively within the individual's jurisdiction, is the individual's life, body and 
her materially owned possessions. 34 
The concept of a delineated space around individual personality, body and 
property will be readily recognisable to rights·primacy theorists and social 
contractarians in general. For them, the debate over legitimate state practice 
centres on how to ensure this kind of "negative" sphere is kept as sacrosanct as 
possible. 35 But, for Hegel, it is merely a starting point. The capacity to 
understand one's self as a discrete individual with particular projects and 
products of arbitrary will is only a lower form of freedom. Hegel, with 
Rousseau, sought to understand how a society composed of distinct wills, with 
projects and expectations that will inevitably clash, can still remain free. The 
question, as Neuhauser (2000: 27) reminds us, is different and slightly more 
complex in Hegel's case. We must remember that his project is not driven by 
concern for enshrining abstract notions of pre-social freedom that drives rights 
32 As shall be seen as we examine more of the conditions Hegel selS upon the rational social order, part of 
the requircmcnlS set down in order for it to be affirmed independently by each indiv idual will is lil !.: 
provision that such basic nCL":ds as sex and food he in some sense catered for. This has interesting 
impliciltions when we pause to consider what kinds of "basic" needs fall into the gamut of those that Hcgd 
is considering here. This in issue LO be addressed further on, when I layout how Hegel sees indi vidual 
interests playing into tht: overall social order. and how he feels clashes between individual and collecti ve 
interest are to be resolved. 
JJ These correspond to a higher level of wi ll devdopment and correspond to one's eth ical duties . They are 
mediated by both reason and social interaction . The exampk Neuhauser gives is the des ire to care for one' s 
children, which is nei ther an animalistic impul se nor an abstractl y determined rat ional end. (Neuhauser, 
2000: 302 n. 1 0) 
;\4 One element of this sphere is more complex than it seems, and th is issue of what Hegel understands by 
r rivute properly. an issue discussed in the section immediately fo llowing . 
. 5 The key con trusts between Hegel and the social contractarians wi ll be brought alit in the section on 
Methodological Atomi sm below. 
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primacy, but rather by concern for the full actualisation of freedom for each 
person through rational reconciliation to social reality. Thus, true freedom· 
i.e. the true capacity for self-determination (being, as noted above, a cocktail 
of the capacity for self-reproduction and freedom from the dictates of 
externality) - can only be realised in the sphere of practicality. This 
practicality is the plurality of diverse ends operating within a common system 
that marks a modern human society. 
ii. Implications of freedom beyond personhood 
It is contact with this particular aspect of social life that Hegel feels 
necessitates the progression from egoistiC personhood to a state in which one 
recognises and accedes to a concept of the "good", i.e. begins to consider the 
ends of others, and thus the collective ends of the society one lives in. 36 This is 
moral subjectivity, the second level of Hegelian freedom. 37 Hegel outlines his 
argument for the necessity of the progression of freedom beyond personhood in 
the opening pages of The Philosophy of Right: 
If we stop our enquiry at arbitrariness, at the human beings ' ability to will this or that, 
this does indeed constitute his freedom; but if we bear firmly in mind that the content 
of what he wills is a given one, it follows that he is determined by it and is in this 
respect no longer free (PR §15 A). 
Thus it is within the sphere of intersubjective social activity that the further 
enrichment of self-determination must occur. It is here that Hegel's account 
)Il H~gel and Rousseau proceed along very s imilar argumen tative lines in provi ng how th is tT<lnsilion 
happens. As ind ividual will s clash agains t each other. it becomes more and more appare nt thallhe plurality 
of ends and complete arbitrary will cannot co-exis t. Through the mediation of social contact, the subjc;ct 
comes to rationally recognise the necessity of social co-operation, and eventually inlem aiises the good of 
o thers Dos part of tht: "general " will that she comes to recognise as representing hoth her own good and the 
good o f all. This is no t a c laim merely that social part icipat ion b..:comes seen as enlightened self-in terest, 
as it is in strictly COnlractarian visions of soc il!ty. In Hegel and Rousseau's eyes, the very mi ndspace of the 
subject is expanded to incl ude the good o f others, and she begins to stri ve for and affirm goods beyond her 
own, not oul of an egoistic agenda, but rather an increased awareness of her role in the social organis m and 
its value to her. . 
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diverges from what is commonly understood as "freedom" in a liberal 
democracy. He identifies as constitutive of freedom the very structures 
natural rights theorists understand as constraining it - these being the state and 
the institutional structures of modern social life. It is such arguments that 
have led to Hegel being cast as a conservative and proto·fascist. It is my 
contention that this is profoundly not the case, but such a claim requires far 
more interpretation and clarification . 
The analysis of this chapter thusfar has provided us with the crucial insight that 
Hegel's freedom is one tied to rational reconciliation between self and 
context, an individually driven process of intersubjective development, which 
has , as its ultimate outcome the individual making herself into her own end. 
We are now faced with examining Hegel's contention that the institutional 
structure of the modern social world reflects and nurtures this very process and 
is thus constitutive of the higher level social freedom he argues for. 
This, at first , seems something of a difficult task. As Wood (1990: 50) puts it, 
the claim that our social duties and roles do not constrain but rather liberate 
us "may seem to go a step beyond paradox, passing over into doublethink". 
But Wood thence immediately points out that it does , upon a fuller 
consideration of the Hegelian system, make sense. The social role·fulfilment 
Hegel describes becomes liberating in that it "allows us to actualise ourselves 
as part of this rational system of co·operation" (Ibid.). 
The further analysis of Hegel in this thesis will be dedicated to making sense of 
and assessing this claim. The discussion of the Hegelian social order will clarify 
and assess how the institutional framework of Sitllichkeit can be understood as 
constitutive of a higher freedom than its members could achieve in isolation. 
The progression and integration of personhood into the broader framework of 
the social order will be dealt with there . The remainder of this chapter, 
37 Moral subjet:tivity, its nalure and its place in ethical lire will form part of the subject maHer of Chapter 4. 
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however, is dedicated to remedying some of the central and immediate 
concerns that arise , namely that Hegel seems to sacrifice the individual upon 
the altar of the social order. While Hegel claims that his system must cater for 
the freedoms of personal space, it is not immediately clear that it in fact does 
so. In order to assess this, it is necessary to understand the role Hegel feels 
the particuiarised individual space has in his enriched idea of freedom. In 
more practical terms, we must know what role the individual as a 
particularised entity occupies in Hegel's political and social framework. A 
clarifying entry point to this can be found in Hegel's doctrine of private 
property. 
2.3.3) Personality as Property and Property as personality 
i. The Hegelian Doctrine of Private Property 
"The person must give himself an external sphere of freedom in order to have 
being as Idea" (PR, §41: 73) . With this typically abstract and bold declaration , 
Hegel begins the discussion of property in the "Abstract Right" section of The 
Philosophy of Right. He goes on to outline a doctrine he credits in part to 
Fichte, of property as an objectified reflection of character, and of private 
. property as a constitutive element of freedom. An added and interesting 
complexity is the way in which the definition of property is expanded to 
include thought and personality. Both these dynamics bear examination if we 
are to fully understand the notion of abstract right in Hegel. 
Let us begin with the first set of dynamics - property as a constitutive element 
of freedom and objectified reflection of character. Patten's (1999 : 139) 
exposition and argument on this issue paint Hegel and Fichte as putting forward 
a fa irly common, if lofty, justification of private property, with some 
interesting philosophical additives . The basic reasoning is that if a concept of 
free agency, and in particular the ability to perceive the effects of one's will 
Individualism in Hegel 107 
and one's will alone, is a necessary feature of individual freedom, and in fact a 
constitutive element thereof, private property must be sacrosanct in order to 
facilitate this. The individual must be able to perceive her own efficacy upon 
the objects with which she labours, the elements and tools with which she 
shapes her world. Objects and material things, which she shares with others, 
cannot grant her this perceptible personal efficacy. Furthermore, in a 
practical sense, others may try to deliberately hinder or obstruct her, by 
claiming, altering or mismanaging the objects upon which she labours, in the 
process of furthering their own ends. If freedom is, as painted thus far, a 
heady cocktail of personal efficacy and options within a social context, then 
the negative spaces of private property must be enforced to allow this. 
The more interesting element of the argument is what Patten (Ibid. 140) 
describes as a developmental thesis within Hegelian notions of property. The 
self grows by interaction with its external environment, but cannot do so 
without interacting with elements of it to which it alone has access, and thus 
understanding the fuller context of the limitation and possibilities that apply to 
it as a self. Property represents both an objective set of elements by which 
the individual objectifies his character and personality, and a tool of bildung or 
(as already discussed) ongoing self·education. 
ii. Implications of Property as Personality 
The latter idea - of property as a reflection of personality, is perhaps one of 
Hegel's more fascinating arguments. Property is understood not simply as 
things humans possess, but an external reflection of our character and the 
objectification of our free personality. It is part of the ways in which we 
declare ourselves to the world. We have affected and altered this object as no 
one else could have, and demand that it be recognised as an extension and 
reflection of us. When the world recognises the things we imbue with the 
trademark touches of our character, it recognises us. It is part of our sphere of 
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freedom as mutually recognised independence. To those to whom this sounds a 
touch too idealistic or over-analytical a doctrine to be applied to mere objects, 
consider the immense symbolism that objects of a personal nature can hold for 
certain persons and social groups, in negative as well as the positive ways. 
Consider that when the campus feminists of the 60's and 70's burned their 
bras, to them it was not simply an act of burning an everyday item. It was the 
destruction of a piece of their personal material sphere they considered an 
imposition, something unreflective of them as individuals. The same dynamic 
applies in reverse to gang colours, sub-cultural fashion trends and other 
concrete symbols of minority ideologies. Admittedly, the preceding examples 
apply to groups , not individuals per se, but there at least two key reasons for 
that. The first is that the individual examples are present, but far too 
numerous to mention. The second is that individuals grow to see their 
objectified selves in correspondence to certain social dynamics, which they 
either accede to or disagree with. In the ideal Hegelian political community, 
these groups co-exist in state of mutually respected particularity, much as 
individuals do within the broader social context. 
In terms of the function of property as a mechanism of self-education Patten 
(1990: 142) follows Waldron38 in asserting that the reasoning behind this is that 
human beings need the institution of private property to develop the discipline 
necessary to be fully functioning and free beings. "Free" here refers to the 
broader Hegelian sense of the term - free not only from the direction of 
another's will, but free also from their own ineptitude and ignorance of their 
own capabilities. The way the individual acts upon objects has certain long-
term consequences she must learn to plan for and foresee. The example used 
in Patten's (Ibid . 141) text is that of a carpenter. Once she has done certain 
things to the wood, she cannot do certain other things. Only if the wood is her 
private property are these implications made apparent to her. Common 
property acted upon by others would give leave her uncertain as to which 
Individualism in Hegel 109 
consequences and implications are the results of her actions, and which are the 
result of the actions of another. Patten remains unconvinced that this is a 
sufficient justification of the institution of private property, as he feels the 
understanding and self·discipline required of free beings could be as viably 
developed within a context of, for example, state owned property allotted to 
individuals for a limited period of time. 
Without delving too heavily into this issue39, I would disagree with Patten on 
the grounds that a sense of consequence, of personal efficacy and 
accountability is what is required, and this is optimally provided by a sphere 
entirely the individual's own. This is a pOint brought to the fore significantly in 
the master·slave dialectic, and it is one that seems to make a fair deal of 
sense. If I myself am responsible for my own cooking and cleaning, I will be far 
more hesitant to waste food or leave dishes unwashed than I would be in the 
kind of situation where I could defer such duties to a maid. Constant 
interaction with a material sphere in which I have efficacy and accountability 
educates me as to my own abilities, the will and far·sighted discipline 
necessary to act with real intention, and the consequences and implications of 
what I do. It makes me more careful, more tolerant, more open·minded and 
(as it gives me a definitive space of self-certainty) more confident. In short, it 
contributes to and facilitates the development of my formal will, and readies 
me for form al freedom. Dudley Knowles summarises rather clearly how 
property functions as mechanism for integrating the individual into the social 
space in a manner that furthers, as opposed to constrains, freedom: 
Freedom would be impossible were men not able to accumulate and dispose of the 
assets required to support the conception of the good life which they adopt. As soon as 
this conception goes beyond a conception of the self as atomistic consumer, men will 
appropriate durable items which can be employed regularly in the satisfaction of 
socially ordered recurrent desires. Property is a social relation akin to language in 
3K Waldron, The RighI 10 Pril'Q(e Property, Chapter 10 . 
. W My task here, aftc:r all , is LO understand the underlying principles beh ind Hegelian individualism. 
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interesting ways, a medium of social transparency, it permits both self-expression and 
public intelligibility,. both self-identification and mutual recognition (Knowles, 1983: 
57). 
iii. The significance of Personality as Property 
Knowles' language analogy is, I feel, far more on the mark than it may seem. 
For what makes this entire picture more interesting is that mind and 
personality themselves (or at least the products thereof) count as a form of 
property. Hegel proceeds very carefully in the early stages of The Philosophy 
of Right, defining his terms at any given stage. In assessing the elements of 
our material sphere that fall within the scope of our ownership, he includes 
this footnote to clarify that this includes the physical manifestation, or 
expressions of internal abstracts: 
Intellectual accomplishments, sciences, arts, even religious observances ... inventions and 
the like become objects of contract ... Knowledge, sciences, talents etc. are of course 
attributes of the free spirit, and are internal rather than external to it; but the spirit is 
equally capable, through expressing them, of giving them an external existence and 
disposing of them ... so that they come under the definition of things (PR, §43). 
Let us then pull together a few strands of Hegelian reasoning. First, take the 
above provision that our intellectual expressions count as objects within the 
sphere of our private property (possibly the most direct expressions of our 
internal free spirit). Take this in conjunction with the Hegelian commitment to 
the respect of private property as central to mutual recognition relations 
outlined above. Then consider that, given the aim of private property as a 
mechanism of bildung, these more ethereal intellectual possessions are 
eminently suited to this aim. They are after all, concretisations of our internal 
will and character that can be tested and amended against others' experience 
of them, allowing us to better develop the capacity for formal freedom . 
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Taken together, this all takes us to a very interesting space. It is one not 
dissimilar to Mill's political community of interacting minds, where the 
expression of one's opinions and ideas is both a property that is respected and 
a concretisation of our selves that can be recognised by others. Said others 
may then emulate or deride such, opening the possibility in the process of us 
reconsidering our positions in the light of new understanding. This all, in my 
mind, points to a Hegelian justification of a Millian vision - a society formed 
around the mutual respect fo r the variety of ideas and expressions within it. 
What the Hegelian doctrine of property clarifies here is the way abstract right 
can be analytically cleaved from the remainder of ethical life, allowing us to 
better understand how the inter·relation between the two operate. As Patten 
(Ibid. 144) argues, one of the grounding assumptions of Abstract Right is that 
the social world is composed of agents (wills) which posess personality.4O This 
is the arena of distinct, or entirely particular activity, where subj ectivity does 
not quite ap ply, for there is nothing to be subject to. It is only in the social 
space described by morality and ethical life that subjectivity and substantiality 
are properties that make sense as applied to agents. Patten (Ibid.) goes on to 
argue that this has both a positive and negative implication. The positive 
aspect of Abstract right is that it enshrines the value of personality and 
property, and we are thus easier reconciled to a social space that allows these 
too flourish unmolested. The negative aspect is the key contention behind 
Hegel's vision of social progression: that a society of utterly distinct individuals 
and ends is insufficient and unworkable if said individuals are to remain truly 
self·determining. It would, in fact , be self· undermining. Without the 
recognised boundaries and frameworks of common institutional practice, these 
private ends would clash, and often be overridden by the arbitrary wills of 
another. 
'II See PR §§33-35. 
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It is the Hegelian contention that agents must both value their particularity and 
be reconciled to the objective institutions which enshrine it - the institutions of 
ethical life. To clarify this complex interlocking of subjective freedom 
enshrined within the objective, I now follow Neuhauser's lead in identifying the 
Rousseauian structure of Hegel's social theory. 
2.3.4) Hegel, Rousseau and the two-fold structure of freedom 
i. Hegel, Rousseau and the paradox of social freedom 
Perhaps one of the more striking features of Neuhauser's (2000: 81) analysis of 
Hegelian social theory foundations is his profound unearthing of the debt Hegel 
owes to another controversial yet highly influential figure of the period -
Rousseau . As Neuhauser (Ibid . 55-73) outlines, Rousseau struggled throughout 
his thought to resolve one central and profound paradox - the very same 
malady to which Hegel feels he has the remedy - how to reconcile the idea of a 
society of free beings with the practicalities of obligation within social 
arrangements. Neuhauser (Ibid.) claims that for Rousseau it is the factor of 
dependence that becomes the crux issue of his social theory. Social 
participation (initially the mere economic give and take of the market·stall, 
later the more complex social arrangement of a law· bound society) exhibits 
dependence as an inalienable feature . The task of a free society is thus not 
the impossible one of ridding itself of all dependence, but rather of managing 
and re-negotiating this dependence so that none is subject to another's 
arbitrary will. This can be achieved if the individual can come to trust and 
depend upon not other individuals, but a procedural system of laws and 
practices that serve the interests of all. This is part of what constitutes 
Rousseau's famed concept of the General Will. 
What we must ask of such a conception is how the individual will can find itself 
reflected and affirmed in the general will. The answer, Neuhauser (Ibid . 66-
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69) claims, lies in an area of his theory where Rousseau parts company with the 
con tractarians and finds himself counted amongst the earliest of the Romantics 
- the concept of Amour Propre or self-love. It translates , in simple terms , into 
a need for status, a need to count, to belong. This is strikingly similar, in many 
regards, to Hegel's great founding ideal of mutual recognition . To Rousseau, 
this is a need that must be served if the will is to be truly free and self-
determined . For otherwise, all action of the will is the frustrated wrangling of 
an outsider, and such a will cannot count itself as free . This brings out another 
crucial dynamic in common with Hegelian thought - a "thick" conception of 
community within which individuals find and define their roles and identities. 
The idea central to such a disposition - of social bonds as an essential locus of 
character formation and individual identity - will bear discussion shortly. 
ii. A Tale of Two Freedoms 
What Neuhauser (Ibid . 78-79) argues is that both Rousseau and Hegel must 
reconcile two distinct types of freedom. The first, what Neuhauser labels the 
freedom-through -personal independence model , holds that freedom is found in 
a set of objective conditions that mitigate and prevent the subjection to the 
arbitrary wills of others. This is a breed of freedom familiar to liberal mindsets 
- a "civil" freedom of negative conditions that stand guard at the clash points 
between individual wills, bringing an objective sense of equality to bear to 
ensure that none is subject to the arbitrary will of another. The second is what 
Neuhauser (Ibid.) calls the social autonomy model, which holds that laws and 
institutions should be an embodiment of precepts assented to by all, as 
recognised foundations of the common good. This is a social space more 
familiar to the communitarian mindset, in which the individual assents to the 
goals and principles of the community as ultimately commensurate with her 
own. This is what Rousseau calls "moral freedom". The personal 
independence model has to do with an objective freedom - it sets out a set of 
objective conditions that function as a prescription for a free society. The 
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social autonomy model , on the other hand , sees freedom as located in the 
subjective affirmation of the general will by the citizens it rules . This might 
seem, at first, to set the two at odds. 
As Neuhauser (Ibid. 80·81) points out, there need be no real conflict in these 
two forms of freedom co· existing in a modern state. Moral freedom cannot 
encompass the entire scope of human life, and thus it is fair and logical to set 
out a social landscape in which moral freedom is confined to certain elements 
of life practice, beyond which civil freedom guarantees the individual exclusive 
jurisdiction over her own actions. 41 Where the two doctrines clash , rather, is 
in terms of how they understand the connection between individual wills and 
the general will. One sees the general will as a kind of management nexus for 
individual freedom; the other sees it as the very embodiment of freedom itself. 
This seems, once again, irreconcilable. 
Neuhauser (Ibid.) resolves this by pointing out that the two are not only 
reconcilable, but in fact mutually dependent. Though the two do represent 
two distinct breeds of freedom, each without the other is an incomplete form 
of freedom. Objective freedom alone falls short of the mark in that citizens 
that do not consciously affirm the principles and proviSions that constrain them 
cannot be said to be truly exercising their free will in obeying said conditions. 
Conversely purely subjective freedom in the sense under discussion here is 
pointless if the principles that the subjects affirm objectively promote 
unfreedom. Individuals that will their own slavery cannot be said to be 
exercising their free will in any complete and meaningful sense. 
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iii. The Two-Fold structure 
Thus what we find on the Rousseauian social drawing board is a two-fold 
structure of freedom which I maintain, following Neuhauser (Ibid.), that Hegel 
shares. True and complete social freedom is a combination of objective 
principles that themselves promote freedom, and the requirement that these 
be affirmed by the subjects as their own. As a framework, this indeed makes 
sense, but much more is required for us to assent to this as a viable picture of 
freedom in a modern state. We must know what this subjective disposition 
entails, how it is commensurate with individual wills, what these objective 
social conditions are, and how empowered the individual is to question (and 
change) them. 
The nature of the subjective disposition and the extent to which Hegelian 
social freedom can be considered individualistic will be examined in the 
sections that immediately follow. The nature of the objective conditions of 
freedom and the extent to which the individual has freedom of conscience in 
objecting to these will be examined in Chapter 4. 
2.3.5) The Subjective Disposition 
The first of the major conditions shared by Hegel and Rousseau, as just 
discussed , concerns the subjective relation individuals must have to the 
rational social order in order for it to qualify as free. This line of enquiry leads 
us further on into the murky terrain of how individual wills may find themselves 
expressed in the collective will, and seeks to answer the question of what 
subjective freedom-promoting value social structures and institutions can be to 
the individual. 
41 This is indt!ed the kind of final social structure I see Hegelian principles leading toward s, but much morc 
discussion and exposi tion is nlXcssary before we may examine where the boundaries o f"each fn::r.!dom 
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Much of this will be concerned with assessing how individuals can come to 
regard the goods and ends of society as their own, and thus obey social dictates 
not out of blind adherence but as a consequence of their enlightened free will. 
In seeking to understand this, I follow Neuhauser (Neuhauser, 2000: 85) once 
more and examine the structure and content of this "subjective disposition". 
At a fundamental level, Hegel sees the individual's ideal relation to the social 
order as one of "trust" (PR §268). This is not however, a blind breed of trust 
that allows the social order to entirely determine individual ends. The trust in 
question is drawn from the belief that the state will do quite the opposite: 
[The political disposition] is in general one of trust (which may pass over into more or 
less educated insight), or the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest 
is preserved and contained in the interest and end of an other (in this case the state), 
and in the latter's relation to me as an individual ... As a result, this other immediately 
ceases to an other for me, and in my consciousness of this, I am free (PR §Z68). 
Thus understood, this trust is thus drawn from the sense of one's ends being 
undifferentiated from those of the social order (see PR §147). This latter 
requirement plays directly into one of the key controversies that plagues 
modern Hegel scholarship. The language of being "undifferentiated" seems 
heavy with freedom crushing tendencies, as it seems to strip the individual of 
any right of criticism or distance towards the social order. As Neuhauser (2000: 
85) takes constant pains to pOint out, the semantics of expression 
notwithstanding, this is a position profoundly at odds with the innate structure 
of the Hegelian social vision. The attitude towards the space of personhood 
that must be preserved in the ideal social order represents but one of many 
strands in Hegelian thought that point towards a complete resistance of blindly 
adhered to social principles. The claim I will strengthen throughout this 
section, and indeed throughout this thesis, is this: that the individual's rights 
to particularity, criticism and rational distance from the social order are 
cherished and necessary elements of the Hegelian social framework, and that 
sphere lie. 
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by modern terms the consequences of these principles paint a far more free-
flowing picture of Hegelian social membership than is usually thought. 
For now, let us begin by examining the content Hegel gives to the subjective 
disposition. In understanding that, we begin to understand what Hegel feels 
must be true of the social order for individuals to feel themselves free in co-
operating with its dictates. Hegel feels the enlightened attitude to the social 
order must exhibit three types of "unity" between one ' s self and the social 
institutions that surround one: a unity of will, a unity of essence and a sense 
that these institutions are products of the subjects own ongoing activity (PR 
§257) . Once we have examined each of these in turn, I will be in a better 
position to discuss the broad principles that underlie the subjective disposition 
as a rafter of Hegel's architecture of principles. 
i. Unity of Will 
Unity of will , as a condition , is premised on two further defining features, 
distinct yet closely related. The first consists in a harmony in content between 
the individual and social will. As Hegel recursively puts it: "In furthering my 
end , I further the universal , and this in turn furthers my end" (PR §184 A). This 
is most apparent in Hegel's sphere of civil society, where Hegel demonstrates 
that individuals only have to pursue their own ends to further the social good of 
productive labour and serving social needs. Neuhauser (2000: 87-88) sees this 
as an explicit incorporation of Adam Smith's vision of a society of self-
interested individuals ultimately producing a social space that serves all. 42 
But, as Neuhauser clarifies, the Smithian vision alone is too limited in scope for 
Hegel. The apparent unity of content in this breed of social interaction 
happens "behind the backs" of the social members . The social will, and the 
4:! This al so bears simii arilY to Kant's doctrines on the issue. but as shall he shown as I examine the fUrlher 
complexit ies o f the Hegc.! li an social space, it is but one level of Hegel' s analysis and prescription. and for 
hi m it does not go far enough. This led Hegel 10 deride and dismiss as incompiell! Kant's final vision of an 
ideal society_ The reasons for this shall be examined shortly. 
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wills of other subjects remain an external factor (and even an obstacle) in the 
minds of the subjects. Hegel's grand quest for the "interpenetrating unity of 
particular and universal" demands that this unity eventually be a voluntative , 
conscious thing. 43 As Wood (1990: 37) illustrates in his enquiry into the nature 
of Hegelian freedom , it make's no sense to use Hegel's principles to speak of 
coercion of will, as the will is always capable of detaching itself from its 
desires , its contingent factors and circumstances. It must assess courses of 
action independent of these.44 Thus, the particular will must (in ways yet to 
be fully discussed) find itself reconciled within the universal of the state, as it 
was within the instinctual common purpose of the family. 
This leads us to a crux point in the Hegelian understanding of the individual. 
What exactly does Hegel mean by "particularity"? Neuhauser (2000: 86) 
maintains that the particular in Hegel is always associated with two key 
conditions: Qualitative determinacy and difference from others. The former 
refers to some kind of determinate quality , a fundamental that defines one as 
a person , which is not shared by all other members of society and humanity in 
general. The latter is concerned, in a much related way, with qualities that 
render the individual different from at least some other individuals. The 
upshot of this extremely open definition of particularity is that the particular is 
not necessarily the unique. Particularities can, and in fact must, be a source 
43 It serves, at this point, to elucidate the three types of unity Hegel feels make up the "moments" of Ihe 
Concept - in other words the tools by which we may assess the rational progression of the indi vidual into 
society. These are, respec ti vely, immediate un ity, difference, and mediated uni ty. As they correspond to 
the three institutions of ethical life - the famil y, civil society and the state - the three moments can be 
defined as follows: 
Immediate unity - typified by the relationships of the wi ll wi th in the family (to be explicated in the main 
text shonly). It is an inst inctual unity. ari sing from an emotional sense of belonging. 
Difference - Typifi ed by the relationshi p of the will within civil society, wherein individual wills are 
unifted by thei r coherence within the system, but are largely unaware of such, pursui ng their own particular 
end. 
Mediated Unity - The highest level of progression, wherein the particularities of indi vidual wills find 
themselves harmon ised within the universal. typified by the State. Indi viduals find both the varied 
particularities of civil society and the sense of belonging and emotive common purpose they know as 
members of the famil y. 
(See Neuhauser, 2000: 135-137). 
44 This relates back to the understanding of the will in Hegel 's speculative metaphysics, as discussed earlier 
Individualism in Hegel 119 
of commonality amongst citizens. The clearest examples of this can be found 
in such determinate qualities as family roles and vocations within civil society. 
Being a father, though a role formative of particularity (in that it is a 
determinate quality not shared by all, and renders one different to at least 
some members of society and humanity) does not render one incapable of 
sympathizing with other fathers . Quite the opposite applies, really. The same 
can be applied to fellow cobblers, stockbrokers, loT. support specialists, actors, 
writers, artists etc. It is, in point of fact, the increasing awareness of these 
commonalties that leads the individuated wills of the social space etched out 
as Civil Society to unify and fuse their interests in trade associations and 
collectives. These, as we will see shortly, are crucial in allowing them to feel 
their will has efficacy at the state level. 
ii. Unity of Essence 
This leads in rather neatly to what Neuhauser (2000: 93·95) sees as the second 
key moment of Hegelian social unity within the subjective disposition - Unity of 
essence. This has to do with individuals finding themselves both confirmed (as 
beings of status) and more importantly formed by the roles they find 
themselves occupying within the social order - as particularised family 
members, workers within civil society and citizens of the state. 45 Hegel sees 
these roles as not just a matter of individual vocation but in fact formative of 
individual identity itself. Thus the "essence" referred to is the abstract nature 
of the individual made practical through an actualised identity. These 
identities do indeed fall within the realm of self-conscious reflection, but they 
exist through a set of objective conditions and precepts already at work within 
the objective social structure. Society recognises the roles of mother, artisan 
and citizen - thus they have an objective, recognised existence within the 
social whole. 
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This must not, Neuhauser (2000: 95) cautions, be understood as a claim that 
individuals are nothing more than the roles they perform . These practical 
identities give individuals expression and social form, and can thus be 
considered practically expressive of who they are. But this by no means 
reduces the individual to some kind of social automaton. These roles can 
basically be seen as a rationally mediated expression of the individual's 
abstract self. They are crucial in that they give said self a framework and 
content. The social roles individuals occupy provide them with not only their 
day·to·day projects, but also their lifelong aims. Their ends, and thus their 
will, become bound up in the fulfilment of these roles. This, in Hegel's terms, 
amounts "to "stepping into determinate particularity" (PR §207).46 Once we 
unpack the language surrounding these "practical roles", it becomes clear that 
we are dealing with a sphere of individual obligation towards the social 
structure. 
If Hegel is correct in asserting that these identities are indeed crucially 
formative of the practical self, then to deny such obligation becomes a case of 
denying selfhood . Hardimon (1994: 157) provides a backing and substantiation 
for Neuhauser's position in arguing that in rejecting social roles, both in 
thought and practically, "one's self-understanding will become abstract and 
impoverished". A lack of a sense of one's context leaves one feeling alienated 
from the practical obligations of the role they occupy, as well as the emotive 
context of one's community. 
This has led us into dangerous territory. Hegel could be interpreted as saying 
that in the name of preserving the authenticity of the individual will that 
Hegelian freedom cherishes, society could be empowered to punish or coerce 
" A key example of this pattern can be found at PR § 162 where Hegel describes how the supposed "self-
limitaLion" of marriage, is not a limitation at all: "lSJincc [individual personalities} attain their substantial 
self-consciousness with in it , it is in fact their liberation", 
,u, Wood (1990: 209) sees this aspect of the "l!thical di sposi tion" as Hegel's response to the KanLian 
dichotomy between duty and inclination. 
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those who do not fulfil their duties and obligations in the manner society 
defines these. Since these roles are objectively structured and recognised , this 
would seem to deny the individual the right to criticise the nature of her social 
roles and obligations. This line of reasoning should sound vaguely familiar. It 
is after all , remarkably similar to one of the threshold communitarian notions -
that the socially embedded nature of individual identity renders any criticism 
of established norms on the part of the individual null and void . 
But, I would argue, this is certainly not Hegel's take on the matte r. First, let 
us recall that these practical identities come about as a mediated unity 
between the . particular self and the social institutions and circumstances 
surrounding it. As Neuhauser (2000: 98-99) clarifies, the particular and the 
universal , as with just about all Hegelian processes, each form a branch of this 
unity. There is indeed an increased reconciliation with the universal , in that 
the same dynamic that applied to the unity of will applies here - the 
commonalties among particular roles lead to an increased awareness of the 
social whole.47 But the particular, as always, is never eliminated . In order for 
the nature of these roles to be individually affirmed, their content and very 
nature must be subject to rational criticism. Individuals must have the 
capacity and space to distance themselves rationally and objectively from 
these obligations and be able to see them as rationally justifiable.48 
In addition, Hegel himself held that there were certainly times when rationality 
may dictate a need to withdraw from the social world : 
When the existing world of freedom has become unfai thful to the better will, this will 
no longer finds itself in the duti es recognised in the world and must seek to recover in 
ideal inwardness alone that harmony which it has lost in actuality (PR §138 R). 
47 These in fact lead to the kind of elect ive associations among, for example, those of s imil ar occupation 
that Hegel sees as performing a crucial mediating ro lt: bdwcen the lower levels of Silllichkei~ and the State. 
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This Hardimon (1994: 158-160) takes as proving that "it is not Hegel's view that 
there is a sort of transhistorical guarantee that people will always be able to 
find meaning in the existing social roles". Hardimon ties this to Hegel 's 
perception of the impoverished conception of freedom in the ancient Greek 
world, where individuals had no consciousness of themselves as distinct from 
their social roles, and were thus "unconsciously united with the universal end" 
(VG, 249/202 as cited in Hardimon, 1994: 160). It does not take a Hegelian 
metaphysical analysis to understand that individuals in such a sphere could not 
be considered self-determined. What is necessary is the "mediated unity" with 
the universal , requiring the capacity for rational reflection that proper bildung 
engenders. Hardimon (Ibid. 167) identifies the crucial step Hegel makes here 
as one of his most enduring insights. Hegel is not calling for an "immediate" 
identification with one's social roles, but for a reflective identification . This, 
Hardimon contends, "is to identify with them as a self" . As such, Hegel's 
account includes the moment of alienation from one's social framework that 
accounts such as Kant's idea of the moral subject describe, but moves beyond 
this to a point where such alienation can be overcome through reflection .49 
This progression of abstraction, reflection and identification , as shall be shown 
numerous times in the inquiry to come, applies to the full breadth of the 
Hegelian social system. Since it implicitly sets out the condition that the ideal 
social order must be rationally affirmable upon reflection by its citizenry, it is 
a dynamic of his thought that contributes, I feel, to the "commonality of 
consequence" I aim to prove his principles share with Mill's. 
iii. The social order as a product of ongoing individual activity 
The mediation between individual and social structure (and the necessity that 
this structure be rationally affirmable) is further clarified by what Neuhauser 
(2000: 102-104) identifies as the third key feature of the subjective disposition 
411 Wood ( 1990: 212) concurs that this Hegel ilpan from contemporary communitarian doctrinl:!s wh ich SCI;! 
tradition and ethos as close to inalienable. . 
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- the condition that individuals feel that the social order and the principles 
that rule it are the products of their own activity. This dynamic of the 
subjective disposition makes the rational status of the social order conditional 
upon individuals understanding themselves as a crucial element in the re-
production of the society they find themselves in. After all, social 
circumstances are not re·made by each new generation - the social substance, 
with its attendant circumstances and objective roles to be fulfilled , is pre-
existent to the individual that is born into it. But, Hegel reminds us, it 
nonetheless cannot exist without the individual wills that make it up, and that 
bear the responsibility for .re-producing it. Thus, for the rational social order 
to be not merely protective, but constitutive of its members' free wills (that 
on which it must rely for its very existence) said members must have a sense of 
efficacy and be capable of shaping the content of the social roles they inhabit. 
Otherwise, even the most coherent and rigid external structure has no hope of 
finding itself reproduced in the long term. 
This presents a profound rejoinder to the accusations of conservatism levelled 
at the Hegelian thought structure. The idea of a social role as something of 
permeable content, premised upon reflective as opposed to immediate 
identification , is not nearly as individuality-crushing as Hegel's critics would 
have us believe. This is best understood, I believe, as the first level of a 
dynamic I see running throughout Hegel's thought structure. This is. that the 
broader framework of Sittlichkeit, once purged of Hegel's less relevant 
minutiae, retains significant space for the (re)shaping of the particular content 
of individual lives and social policies . 50 
Taking all three of the defining elements of Hegel's doctrine of the subjective 
disposition into account, the following key principles emerge. First, it is the 
4'J Hegel describes this recursive structure of reflective identification at PR § 147 R. 
50 My interpretation on th is obviously compliments and agrees with several of the modern Hegelian 
scholars to some extent or another. In particu lar, Neuhauser's contenti on (covered in Chapter 4) that 
reconciliation to the world as if is is nOL reconciliation to the world as it stallds. 
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task of society to construct and manage itself in such a way that the individuals 
who inhabit it may affirm the goods and ends which guide it as their own. 
Thus, in a profoundly Rousseauian sense, the individual obeys the general will 
as an activity of her own freedom. But the second principle relates to issues 
certainly not raised by Rousseau - the doctrine of social roles as crucially 
formative of individual identity. What arises from this is, I feel, one of Hegel's 
more powerful contributions to the discourse of rights. The identity making 
nature of society must be something that is recognised by the social order, as 
well as individuals within it. In other words , social institutions must 
understand that the functions and activities of social members do indeed 
become a practical realisation of who they are, and that individuals occupy a 
multiplicity of these roles at once. 51 This has profound implications for our 
thinking on a number of social issues - most notably issues such as employment 
as basic right and parent's rights in the workplace. At the same time, the third 
element discussed above serves as a caveat to the social order not to attempt 
to define rigidly the nature of social obligation so as to allow no space for the 
determinate particularity that individuals must imbue their social roles with. 52 
Just below the skin of all of this courses Hegel's grander design - the project of 
allowing individuals to see the world as rational place, hospitable and even 
encouraging of their most deeply held principles and desires. The conditions 
that arise from the subjective disposition discussed here demand that the 
rational social order be worthy of its members ' trust. This sets off a number of 
liberal alarm bells , premised largely, as Neuhauser (2000: 112·113) pOints out, 
:'il Modern laws relating to creche facili ties in the workplace. and the concept of parental leave are just two 
examples of social recogniti on of the role of parent as co-existent wi th the equally vi tal definitional role of 
worker. 
52 This is a caveal with profound modern implications, especially in light of recent controversies 
surrounding psychological and legal approaches to the concept of the ideal fam ily environmenL. Much 
family law over the last few decades, in terms of custody banks ~specja lly, has relied on a "community <. 
derived normative account of the hl!ullhy famil y. Such thinking is directly responsible (and remains so) for 
the extreme legal obstacles gay famil ies have ,faced in gain ing legal acceptance. Kaufman cites the 
particularly prcssing example of Bowers vs. HlIrdwick. a 1986 US Supreme Judgement that held that gay 
couple~ were not enti tled to the same pri vacy protection as heterosexual married couples. Legal 
Individualism in Hegel 125 
on our modern day assumption that trust has to be blind and unconditional. 
This need not hold at all. 53 While social freedom can exist for Hegel in an 
atmosphere of unreflective faith , this is neither ultimately be neficial , nor does 
it remove the condition that social institutions and their principles be subject 
to rational criticism and rational affirmation. 54 
Thus, the further condition of the social order's transparency arises . If the 
individual must rationally affirm something, she must have access to the full 
range of evidence available, and must be given the space for rational insight 
into the obj ective conditions of the ideal social order - discussed in Chapter 4. 
The grander question that yet remains for this chapter to answer , though , is 
the one with which it began. This is to what extent the Hegelian thought 
structure can be understood to cater for the freedom and ends of individuals as 
particularised entities, as opposed to practically subsuming these into the ends 
and structure of the whole with some classy conceptual rewiring. More simply 
stated, (to borrow Neuhauser's phrase) to what extent Hegelian freedom is a 
freedom of individuals as individuals . 
2.3.6) Hegelian freedom as a freedom of individuals 
The preceding sections have established that the Hegelian thought structure at 
an abstract and practical level makes significant provision for individual 
particularity. But, at the same time, there has been much talk of integration of 
said individual space into a social whole, the more detailed framework of 
which yet awaits discussion in Chapter 4. Before embarking on such a detailed 
assessment, it is necessary to establish to what extent the grounding principles 
commentators. including the four dissenting judges, held that it was the majority's "obsessive focus on 
homosexual activi ty" and its perct: i v~d ahnormality that led to the judgement being carried. 
53 The discuss ion of trust as set out by Hegel in §268 (ci ted above) adds further force to this i,nterprelation. 
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of Hegel's social theory, with its simultaneous respect for individual 
particularity and intersubjective universality, put forward a doctrine of 
freedom that caters for individuals in their pursuit of their particula r ends, as 
they stand distinct from those of the whole. 
i. Hegel and Methodological Atomism 
Neuhauser (2000: 175·176) introduces a discussion crucial to our purposes here 
when he presents his analysis as to whether Hegel's social theory can be 
commensurate with Methodological Atomism. As Neuhauser himself takes pains 
to explain, Methodological Atomism 
Methodological Individualism, an 
as a doctrine is not to be confused with 
intellectual legacy have already 
demonstrated Mill forms part of. Methodological Atomism does not amount to 
the claim that all elements of the social order are ultimately reducible to the 
states and activities of individuals, but rather that social goods accrue their 
value in the benefits that individuals derive from them as individuals. 55 
It must be noted that Neuhauser (Ibid. 176· 177) does not metamorphose the 
Hegelian position into one of methodological atomism entirely. Rather, his aim 
is similar to mine here: to prove that benefits social goods hold for individuals 
as individuals deserve to playa strong role in the measure of the ideal social 
order. I will stand with Neuhauser in arguing firstly that Hegel's rejection of 
the contractarian tradition do not render his position incompatible with 
methodological atomism, and secondly that many of Hegel's key reasons for 
rejecting contractarianism (and with it strong individualism within the social 
54 The question of whether or not individuals can make qualitative changes in the social order they 
apprehend on the basis of such criticism will only be answered conclusively in Chapler 4. 
;5 This does require some explication - Methodological Atomi sm can best be understood as a vision of 
society that understands individual s entering the soci al space to accrue certain goods collectively they 
could not accrue alone . These goods nonetheless bendillhem as individuals. Neuhauser (2000: 177) gives 
the example of a group of dancers that gather together for mutual benefits such as practice facilities, mutual 
criticism and general improvemenl. The good is achieved collectively, but it is the individuals that beneJit 
severally. 
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space) represent archaic elements of his social theory which require, if not 
dismissal, at least radical re-interpretation .56 
As Neuhauser (Ibid.) reminds us, both Rousseau and Hegel understand the state 
and the institutions of the social order not as traded-off optimums , but as 
formative conditions of complete freedom, and a strong element of this is to 
be found in the notion that individuals achieve a form of freedom co· 
operatively that is more self-enriching, more secure and ultimately more 
expressive of their developed will within a social context. But it is precisely 
here that the application of principle becomes tricky. Are we thus to 
understand social goods and institutions as purely instrumental? In other 
words, we must discern whether or not such a conception of freedom commits 
us to understanding individual self-interest as the driving force of the social 
order, and thus only being able to justify social co-operation on the basis of 
enlightened service of individual ends . 
Hegel's response to this is stated very clearly. He is profoundly opposed to the 
contractarian vision of society precisely because of these instrumental 
tendencies (PR §2S8) . To him this would reflect only a half-formed phase of 
social understanding, appropriate perhaps to the space of civil society in 
Sittlichkeit but profoundly incomplete. 57 The first key reason is that Hegel 
understands the state as embodying a supra-individual "divine" good, as "G-d's 
march on the world" (Ibid .). This is an aspect dealt with conclusively and at 
length in Chapter 4, and as such, I lay it aside for the moment. We are 
concerned for the moment with discerning whether and how individual goods 
are composite of the social good, supra-individual and divine or not. 
5t> Sp~cific:.:ally, as shall be seen shonly, Hegel' s insistence on the div ine majesty of lhe state and his 
differentia tion of rights accordi ng lO social classes. 
$7 The elucidat ion of the difference between the Rechst£lat and the NOlsraat in Chapter 4 wil1.funher clarify 
this. 
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In seeking to understand how collective cO'operation can be premised on 
individual good , Neuhauser (2000: 183·188) points to the possibility of a good 
that accrues to individuals that could only be achieved if said individuals took 
the good of others into account. It is his contention that both Hegel and 
Rousseau are committed to the existence of just such an individual interest and 
that it is, in point of fact, an interest in freedom. He argues for this on the 
basis that both theorists posit a system of institutions that mediate the 
freedom of particular ends, but put forward , as a further stage of social 
development, a model of freedom that finds itself expressed in the recognition 
of such institutions as formative of a deeper, more holistic conception of 
freedom itself. This can only be achieved if the laws of the social order are 
consciously embraced by all as their own. Thus individuals can only be free in 
their subjection to these laws if they can will the common good, which furthers 
the good of all. 
Therefore, Neuhauser (Ibid. 189) concludes, social freedom requires that 
citizens have more than simply private wills . This illustrates that a political 
theory can indeed begin with consideration of individual interests and lead to a 
call for supra· individual goods. An offshoot of this line of reasoning is that 
there must be a constantly maintained and encouraged arena of public debate 
and openness, to ensure the common good is understood as "by its nature a 
joint enterprise". This I feel further indicates a commonality of consequence 
with Millian principles. 
But for now, there is still, as Neuhauser (Ibid . 197) clarifies, a lingering 
paradox of a call for affective social bonds ("we") addressed to self·interested, 
self'maximising beings ("I"s) . Hegel believed he resolved this paradox through 
the integration of particular satisfaction into his conception of an organic social 
whole that in itself embodies the qualities of self determination. (This, too, 
awaits full discussion in Chapter 4.) 
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Unlike the contractarians, Neuhauser (2000: 199) illustrates, Hegel is not 
concerned with constructing the social order from scratch. He is concerned 
with showing elements already existing to be rational. But he still imposes the 
key condition that these institutions be worthy of member's affirmation. The 
Rousseauian structure of the general will as composed of the wills of 
individuals vitiates his theory, and thus of the requirement that social goods be 
reducible to individual affirmation and directed as the satisfaction of individual 
interest remains strong. While Bildung is required to get citizens to see 
themselves as more than purely self-interested, this Bildung points not away 
from indivfdual satisfaction, but beyond it, to a richer sense of social freedom 
yet to be fully discussed . 58 
ii. Hegelian thought as inclusive of strong individualism 
Considering the full breadth of the current discussion we can see that the 
Hegelian system does include catering for fundamental individual interests as a 
founding condition of the social order. The proviso that it be good for 
individuals as individuals is a necessary element of it being rational. Where 
Hegel 's idea of the social order builds on this is the conviction that catering for 
individual interests does not exhaust the range of goods the social order can 
achieve. 
Hardimon (1994: 167-169) clarifies this further by pointing out that various 
elements of Hegel's ideal social order are tasked with fostering strong 
individuality. Through various dynamics that will bear much fuller discussion in 
Chapter 4, civil society becomes a realm predominantly of difference in 
Hegel's theory, where the individual must engage with choices as an individual 
with recourse only to personal reflection . The family and state (as shall also 
be discussed in Chapter 4) underpin the formation of such differences . The 
~K A central e le ment of this is Hegel's further addition to the Rousseauian strategy, the self-determini ng 
social who le, thi s along with the conception o f the state as "divine" will only be discussed in Chapler 4. 
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family by producing individuals who are secure in their particularity, the state 
by maintaining the structure of civil society itself within which such differences 
(and with them strong individuality) is realised. This is why Hegel clearly 
states: 
Particular interests should certainly not be set aside, let alone suppressed; on the 
contrary, they should be harmonized within the universal, so that both they themselves 
and the universal are preserved (PR §261 ). 
Thus understood, a large part of the identification citizens feel with the 
modern state can be traced to them understanding it of a guarantee of their 
particular interests, property and persona being granted space to flourish. 
Hegel's account can thus be understood as including the concerns of a 
contractarian theory, but maintaining that the role of the state does not stop 
there. As Neuhauser (2000: 244) argues, Hegel does not begin from a 
contractarian question of how to best cater for the assumed freedom in a 
hypothetical state of nature, but from the abstract question of what makes a 
will self-determined - his answer is that individual wills can do this only 
imperfectly. Only a rational community can completely erode arbitrary 
determination by another. 
2.4) The Hegelian Individual recast 
Under the analysiS presented, Hegel's doctrine of individuality, I feel , loses 
much of its supposed freedom-crushing menace. If we consider the 
understanding of the role of Abstract Right I presented in section 2.3 .3, and 
bear in mind the discussion immediately above, a fairly clear and intellectually 
attractive picture of the Hegelian doctrine of individual freedom emerges. In 
areas that are firmly the domain of our particularity, our individuality is , and 
must be, ensured . In the domains of our interaction with others, the domain 
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within which we are subjects of one kind or another, some form of 
management of the multiplicity of individual ends is required. This is where 
rights primacy ends, and Hegel extends. The institutional structure must go 
beyond something merely external to the will of the subject. To leave it at 
such a point would render it cold, distant and alienating to those it oversees. 
To be truly self-determined, individuals must understand themselves within the 
context of such a structure, and understand it as a guarantor of their freedom, 
as harmonised as much as possible with the freedom of their fellows. They 
must participate in its formation and function at various levels, constantly 
developing a · wider awareness of their actions and their intersubjective 
implications. Through this, participation in the structures of the social order 
becomes willing co-operation, not hidebound obedience. This is what lies 
behind Hegel's contention that "the destiny of individual is to lead a universal 
life" (PR §2S8). 
Given the Hegelian conceptions of self-development presented in section 2.2, 
the onus is on the structure of the social order to foster the capacities 
necessary for such a "unity and interpenetration of universality and 
individuality". Questions of whether Hegel's structure achieves this, and 
whether such a rationally reconciled citizenry is a theoretical and practical 
possibility, must be addressed in a full discussion of Hegel's understanding of 
the social order itself. This very discussion awaits us in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3 
The social order in Mill 
3.1) Preliminary considerations on the Millian social vision 
On Liberty is an appeal to the Victorian public to reconsider their existing law and 
customary morality in light of the principles of utility and liberty, and thus allow 
individuality to flourish (Crisp, 1997: 189). 
At one level, that is an entirely accurate description of what has become one 
of the grounding works of contemporary liberalism. It has indeed, for us , 
become a great deal more. It was written, as Skorupksi (1989: 337) argues, not 
as an expert-level text designed to clarify higher-order concepts amongst the 
intellectual elite, but to convince a public shackled to a stagnant and dated 
moralism to free themselves from intellectual and moral tyranny, both legal 
and societal. But, in so doing it "gathers together the ruling pre-occupations of 
a life-time": the worth of flourishing individuality (as covered in Chapter 1) , 
the liberty of thought and discussion, and the limits of social authority over the 
individual. 
Mill certainly could have left those who take up his legacy a simpler task if he 
had written up these arguments solely for expert level consumption. We 
might, for example, have had a technical definition of such nebulous concepts 
as 'harm' to work with. We might have had a clear blueprint of how to assess 
when social norms count as tyranny of opinion and when they should be 
defended. We might have had clarity on some highly pertinent issues such as 
where precisely the line lies between acts which inspire distaste (which cannot 
count as harm) and acts that qualify as public nuisance (which seem profoundly 
similar in a technical sense, but are nonetheless explicitly ruled out by Mill) . 
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Taking On Liberty in context, we can understand why these issues arise. There 
are certain actions which, it has been argued, if we take Mill's principles to 
their consistent extreme, we should philosophically allow, but would have 
shocked and alienated his public (as well as many contemporary publics) had he 
supported them. 1 Furthermore, and somewhat ironically, Mill falls prey on 
occasion to high Victorian sensibilities concerning what counts as graceful and 
admissible public conduct. This is not merely an interpretation issue . It strikes 
to the heart of a quandary that On Liberty itself goes a long way to trying to 
resolve. How do we strike the delicate three·way balance between actively 
combating the ignorant and parochial elements within a society, allowing for a 
plurality of perspectives and life·visions, and respecting the deeply held norms 
that permeate a social order? 
It is a set of questions that still cuts deep into public policy issues at a practical 
level and the liberal·communitarian debate at an intellectual one. When we 
come to assess issues such as gay adoption, pornography legislation, policies on 
illegal drugs and numerous other policy thorns that prick at contemporary 
democratic consciousness, these are the questions we ask (or at least should be 
asking). As such, the in· depth discussion of the social space etched out in On 
Liberty that follows ties in directly with the grander aim of this thesis, as these 
are the very questions that haunt the Hegelian picture as well, for all its 
breadth and complexity (Mill, as I argue in my concluding Chapter, trumps 
Hegel in his grasp of practical social sign· posting, but seems to fall somewhat 
short in terms of systematic and structural depth and clarity). The task of this 
Chapter is thus two·fold: to examine the rational implications of the Millian 
social principles which Mill himself (either through lack of intention or lack of 
foresight) sometimes failed to make clear, and to set these against the wider 
background of Mill's social philosophy. In so doing, I will establish what I 
believe to be the purified Millian liberal position on these issues. This position, 
I This, as seen bel ow, is the position argued for by Crisp. It is , as shall be discussed, one I ~o not entirely 
agree with. Nonetheless, bearing in mind 011 Liberty' s aims as a text is crucial to unders {~nding its implied 
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as I will show, is neither entirely content-neutral nor disinterested, and aspires 
to a very similar set of internal goals to those I believe to be ultimately 
expressed by Hegel , specifically, social progress through individual progress, 
rational perfectibility at an individual and social level, and the constant quest 
for social authenticity and truth through (often destabilizing) discourse. 
What I aim for here is a broad sketch of Mill's vision of the ideal social order as 
a set of rational structures designed to manage and allow for healthy ethical 
and logical confrontation. Thus both the principles that Mill would have govern 
the social order and their design and implications are running themes that must 
be addressed. This is largely the province of section 3.3, which forms the bulk 
of the Chapter. Sections 3.2 lays out, as a preliminary measure, my approach 
to Mill's utilitarianism in this enquiry, whilst section 3.4 provides a wider 
context to Mill's principles through an examination of his views on civilization 
and progress. This allows me to layout the relevant architecture of a modern 
Millian position in section 3.5. 
3.2) Liberty & Utility 
Before embarking on any significant inquiry into Mill's social theory and the 
social implications of his political philosophy, I must absolve myself of full 
discussion of one of the more controversial areas of modern Mill scholarship -
the question of Mill's utilitarianism. Crucial as it is to Mill's understanding of 
the social framework, questions of space and relevance demand that it cannot 
be covered at length here. 
For indeed, utilitarianism is a creature he may have originally tamed, inheriting 
it in its more base and brutal form from Bentham, but it grew up wild and 
varied on the plains of 20t h century philosophy. It has stood accused of 
numerous faults, attacked and defended by numerous modern thinkers and 
principles, even though the cxtl.:nl to which Mill sclr-edit~d is indeed debatahle. 
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commentators . An analysis of the applicability and evolution of modern 
utilitarianism alone would require a project perhaps twice the length of this , 
and to leave it at the juncture Mill did would be unjust to any useful discussion 
of the theory. 
This is a massively controversial area in Mill scholarship, and various 
interpretations of the role of utilitarianism in Mill's general political theory 
abound. To give a brief and sweeping outline of some of these , Lyons (1976: 
101-120) holds that Mill's basic theory of morality and justice do not assume 
utilitarianism, and that thence a failure to maximize utility in action is not 
morally wrong. Mandelbaum (1968: 35·46) similarly understands Mill as setting 
out morality and virtue as distinct from utilitarianism as a concept. Hoag 
(1987: 417·431) sees Mill setting up happiness as a higher order inclusive end 
for all life goals. Skorupski (1989: 283-336) concurs with a slight variation, in 
that he sees Mill claiming that all human ends are encapsulated in happiness, 
but in the more practical aspects of his theory treating other categorical ends 
(such as autonomy, as discussed in Chapter 1) as primary utilities in their own 
right. Ryan (1987: 207-211) understands utilitarianism in Mill as an attempt to 
set up a rational ethics appropriate to the inductivists and their attack on the 
intuitionists, with happiness as the summum bonum of the Art of Life. Brink 
(1992: 67-103) sees Mill putting forward a version of happiness whose dominant 
component consists in the exercise of one's rational capacities. Berger (1979: 
115-136) understands utility as tied to considerations of fairness and co-
operation, premised on an enlarged conception of what is of value in human 
life. For Anderson (1991: 4-26), Mill's utilitarianism is tied to the cultivation 
and gratification of the higher sentiments. Crisp (1997: 155-167) understands 
Mill as setting up utilitarianism as valid customary morality for the modern 
society. 
My interpretation , for the purposes of this enquiry is slightly different from all 
of these, even if there are points of commonality. Of all the interpretations 
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just mentioned, Crisp's falls closest to mine in holding that utilitarianism is an 
appropriate ethical framework for a modern society. But I do not see Mill 
treating some specific positive doctrine of human happiness as the ultimate 
court of appeal in matters ethical. Had he done so, to my mind, there would 
be no point in the significant infrastructure of ethical and moral engagement 
he sets up in his theory of post-social rights. I understand utilitarianism in Mill 
operating similarly to true conscience in the Hegelian system - an objective 
ethical framework for the morally diversified modern social space within which 
competing conceptions of the good can co-exist and amend each other through 
confrontation. 
It is indeed utterly unfaithful to Mill to exclude any reference to utility from 
the discussion of his social vision. Nor is the discussion of such impossible 
without discussing the bulk of Mill's utilitarianism in its full form. Many of the 
concepts that emerge in the coming sections make perfect sense in reference 
to the less controversial idea of the general social interest, and the baseline 
requirements of social and individual welfare. I would argue that leaving out 
Mill's ideas on utilitarianism as personal ethical structure does not impoverish 
Mill's conception of general social utility as a guiding factor in managing social 
morality. As a framework of social and legal ethics concerned with the 
negative consequential effects of human action on vital social interests, it is 
aptly suited to the role I have accorded it of a consensus social morality which 
allows for the co-existence of competing conceptions of the good in a 
framework of demarcated value pluralism. This is backed up, I believe, by 
Crisp's (1997: 182) explanation (covered below) that utilitarianism recognises 
no moral "duties to self". It is an ethical framework concerned purely with the 
social implications of individual and state action . Thus questions of personal 
ethicality not premised on utility can exist within it, provided they cannot be 
forced upon those that do not share them (it is , of course, a profound rafter of 
Mill's social vision that completely irrational beliefs are 'natural victims' to 
discourse). That this causes moral distress on the part of those holding to such 
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an ethics is a given, but that is part of an issue that holds for a vast range of 
social theories - the question of how to reconcile numerous and varied moral 
norms within a space of social pluralism. Beyond this, I hold by interpretation I 
aim to prove conclusively in the comings sections - that often uncomfortable 
ethical confrontation is of fundamental value in the Millian social space, within 
certain rational limitations, provided it is overseen by a social order 
institutionally arranged to manage such confrontation as a given. This is the 
'politics of engagement' I put forward embryonically in Chapter 1. To put to 
rest the issue of the moment, I contend that the issues that face utilitarianism 
as a general social ethic face any rational structure that seeks to harmonize 
clashing moral perspectives into demarcated value pluralism, and discuss Mill's 
social provisions in reference to such. 
Another key utilitarian notion that makes a significant appearance is the 
conception of rights as post'social side constraints protecting primary utilities, 
or (more broadly) fundamental elements of human welfare. The 
interpretations put forward by Skorupski, Lyons, Waldron, Wollheim , Reese and 
Wolff all follow Mill's description of his rights structure as coherently acting 
just this way in his theory. This is translatable (without, I feel, any injustice to 
Mill's intentions) into a doctrine of rights as protecting vital social interests in 
terms of foreseeable consequence in a long-term sense. That autonomy is 
included amongst these is by no means a position confined to utilitarianism, 
but is shared by any doctrine that would accede to Mill's arguments for the 
value of autonomy and individualism as individually and socially crucial values, 
as covered in Chapter 1. The issues and implications surrounding such a rights 
doctrine are addressed below. 
Thus, I see no issue with defining the utility principle for the purposes of the 
present discussion as a framework for a pluralistic social ethics that need not 
make any final claim on individual conceptions of the good. The combined 
exposition and analysis presented in the coming sections will, I feel, 
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sufficiently prove that Mill's social vision is indeed intended as a balance-of-
interests model for managing society's destabilizing moral pluralism through 
rationally assessing both the impact of actions and the long term implications 
of measures taken against them_ 
3.3) The individual within society & the social context of rights 
We turn now to what could be justly considered the most memorable practical 
thrust made in On Liberty_ It is epitomised by the following quotation, with 
which just about any account of the principles at work within the text must 
begin_ I include it in its full length here, as it presents a neat Pandora's box of 
the issues to be dealt with in this section: 
The object of this essay is to asse rt one very simple principle, as entitled to govern 
absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and 
control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or 
the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which 
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their number, is self· protection. That the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against 
his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not 
sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it would 
be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion 
of others , to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons for 
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him or entreating him, 
but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To 
justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to dete r him must be calculated to 
produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is 
amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns 
himself, his independence is, of right absolute. Over himself, over his own body and 
mind, the individual is sovereign (Mill 1 : 8-9). 
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What is generated above is what I follow Skorupski (1989: 340) and the vast 
range of secondary literature on Mill in calling the 'liberty principle' - the 
position that only actions which are calculated to cause harm to others are fit 
subjects for legal (or organized social) correction. 
The picture seems, at first, a clear one. Mill is certainly not guilty of the 
charge so often levelled against him , that he is idealizing a society of 
disinterested egoists unconcerned with the welfare of their fellow citizens. His 
ideal social order is , like Hegel's, a realm of constant discourse and flux. What 
stability it has it draws from a framework that can rationally weather the new 
and uncertain .2 Within this , no one can be ultimate expert on anything, but 
there is only one expert on what the practical consequences of self-regarding 
action should be, and that is the self in question. The Millian baseline 
conception of justice, as discussed briefly in Chapter 1, defends welfare by 
enshrining the necessary conditions for it, and Mill's principles ultimately hold 
that interference in the self-regarding domain without just cause (for which 
calculable harm to others is a necessary, but by no means sufficient condition) 
is a threat to both individual and social welfare, and as such must be 
vehemently guarded against. 
The exposition in Chapter 1 of Mill's notions on the worth of individuality and 
give us a strong sense of where the highly individualistic thread that runs 
throughout Mill's theory comes from, but it is by no means the sole source and 
grounding for the liberty principle. The fuller grounding must stand judged by 
its coherence and implications if we are to accord any worth to Mill's position , 
and that judgement is the task of this section . 
Like so much in Mill, we may be swept up in the initial rhetorical force of his 
statements, but must then pause to consider the breadth of implications 
2 This is an aspect (hat shall bear heavy discussion further down, when I come to Mil l's attack on Comte's 
division between societies dedicated to order and those dedicated La progress. 
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inherent. Many of Mill's arguments on this score are well known , and most 
have, at the very least, an intuitive plausibility. But Mill himself would have 
been first to remind us that intuitive plausibilities are the first things we should 
rationally question, and test against all possible alternatives. Thus what 
follows below includes re-statement and examination of Mill's famed key 
arguments, along with a further assessment of their implications as general 
principles. 
Of the above quotation, we must ask some tough questions , some of which we 
cannot turn to Mill's own writing to answer, even if we seek to defend him . 
We must know when and how benevolent concern mutate into moral coercion, 
what the exact boundaries are between self-regarding and other-regarding 
action, what constitutes 'harm' under Mill's analysis and to what extent 
incurring others' distaste for certain classes of behaviour is a form of it. We 
must understand whether, under Mill's analysis, citizens can be positively 
obliged to perform certain actions, socially crucial or merely beneficial. 
Finally, how and with what efficacy does On Uberty's famed defence of 
freedom of expression tie into this? These shall all be dealt with individually 
below. 
3.3.1) Customary morality and the tyranny of the majority 
i. The aims and first grounding of the Liberty Principle 
Perhaps On Uberty's most famed and controversial contribution to the cannon 
of political philosophy and social theory is its highly evocative caveat against a 
concept Mill has made notorious throughout liberal thought - the tyranny of the 
majority. Mill himself clearly lays this out as one of his crucial fears in the 
opening pages of the text, in which he traces the historical context of th reats 
to liberty. In the first tentative breaths of democracy, in the early and shining 
idealisation of elected governments as true reflections of the will of the 
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governed, little precaution seemed needed against the repressive potential of 
elected officials. But it soon became clear to the socially observant that 
[tjhe 'people' who exercise the power are not always the same people over whom it is 
exercised; and the 'self government' spoken of is not the government of each by 
himself, but of each by all the rest (Mill 1 : 3). 
As Mill goes on to point out, this is not a cry for the fundamental checks and 
balances hardwired into the most basic mechanisms of democracy, but for 
something beyond - checks and balances against the possibility of society itself 
becoming a despotic force. 
[Rje flecting persons perceived that when socie ty itself is the tyrant ... its means of 
tyrannising are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of political 
functionaries (Mill 1: 4). 
Mill's fear is thus two fold - that elected officials may brandish the will of the 
majority as backing for paternalistic or unjustified repression of minority 
actions, ideas and lifestyles, and that the forces of public opinion (what Mill 
calls the forces of 'prevailing feeling') may themselves execute these same 
unjustified mandates without the hindrance of due legislative process. 
Mill's prescriptive answer to these flows directly from the liberty principle. We 
must delimit the range of actions (and forms of expression)3 over which any 
possibility of social control is even justifiable (this, as shall be clarified below, 
merely sets the possibility up for debate - it does not immediately sanction it) 
and confine our legislative regimen to these . Furthermore we must attempt as 
fully as possible to ensure that non-legislative forms of social coercion do not 
simply take such unjustified legislation's place. This delimitation for Mill is 
simple - it extends only to other-regarding actions (loosely defined, for the 
3 T he question of the key differences between expression and action in terms of the liberty princi ple will be 
addressed shortly in the discuss ion of the Millinn doctrine or liberty of express ion. 
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moment, as actions which prejudicially affect the interests and welfare of 
others). 
At first sight, this seems yet another case in which history stands firmly on 
Mill's side. We can roll out all the examples once more - from Socrates, to 
Galileo and beyond- to show how often a social order fired up by the wisdom of 
the majority persecuted, tortured and executed persons that would come to be 
recognised as the greatest contributors to the realm of human knowledge and 
understanding. But to assess this long-held liberal creed by the standards of a 
modern context requires far more of even a sympathetic interpreter. This is, 
after all, one of the key areas in which communitarianism holds liberalism to 
account for the social dysfunction of modern society. The accusation runs that 
we so cower in the shadows of fears such as Mill's that we refuse to allow for 
legislative and social action that could preserve the threads of community, and 
by inference identity, which keep social orders ethical and coherent. The key 
attacking figure when it comes to Mill specifically is Devlin , who gets his due 
hearing in a few pages' time. 
As the discussion in this section evolves, we shall unravel some of the more 
complex implications of this doctrine. First , though, we must understand why 
Mill holds it so dear. McCullum suggests that Mill's own time and social context 
provide a key insight into the vehemence with wtiich he held to the provisions 
of the liberty principle as regards the influence of prevailing social sentiment: 
If a young man of this age were to find himself back in the eighteen sixties, provided he 
had some moderate affluence, he would be astounded at the easiness of life and the 
trifling demands of the state upon him ... On the other hand, in many matters affecting his 
private and intellectual life, his love· affairs, his views on religion and science and sex, he 
would find himself bound by a constricting orthodoxy and would have to guard his words 
and actions with a care he might find intolerable (McCallum in Mill 1 : xiv). 
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When we add to this Mill's long-standing issues with the intuitionists and their 
validation of deeply held popular sentiment as proper justification for public 
policy, we can sense that Mill was very much a product of his time in this 
regard. His writing is the natural product of a freethinking and open mind 
writing at a time of widespread and entrenched moral stagnation. 
A case can be made that many of the interpretive difficulties and supposed 
inconstancies that arise out of On Liberty flow from Mill's failure to make a 
firm bridge from his railing against the repressive nature of high Victorian 
sentiment to thoroughly consistent principles by which to oversee future social 
orders. As a clarification , this is perhaps useful. As an objection to his fuller 
doctrine in its entirety, it is fairly piffling and fruitless . Firstly, many of the 
key issues of contention between Mill and the unofficial reign of drawing-room 
social outlooks are still very much with us. A direct analogue can be drawn to 
the battle between American libertarians and the religious Right in the United 
States, where policies and perspectives largely shaped by particular and 
(theoretically personal) religious convictions still vie to be accepted as social 
policy. If they lack the pervasiveness of high Victorian sentiment, it is quite 
possibly because many of the kinds of checks and balances Mill had in mind 
have been set in place, legislatively and socially, within the US context. 
But secondly and more importantly, the deeper philosophical underpinnings of 
Mill's position have a significant general force which even his opponents cannot 
outrightly dismiss as the whinging of an unconventional mind under the yoke of 
a constricting orthodoxy. It is here that we may brand Mill with our 
intellectual support or contempt, for it is here that the valid philosophical 
battle lies. 
ii. The liberty principle as a safeguard for rational autonomy 
One of the first , and most obvious philosophical foundations for the liberty 
principle as regards bounds set against legislation and prevailing sentiment is 
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an aspect of the Millian philosophy that we have already covered at some 
length in Chapter 1 of this thesis - autonomy. Whether we accept Skorupski's 
thesis that autonomy deserves the status of a categorical end (see 1.3.2), or 
the related but slightly different contention that autonomy is a necessary 
condition for any kind of developed conception of happiness , there is a strong 
case to be made that any utilitarian reading of Mill must somehow safeguard 
autonomy as a baseline social right. Even if we read Millon other grounds, the 
romantic strain of his thought sets up rational autonomy as a crucial locus of 
individual and social perfectibility.4 
The implications of this are very similar to the implications a similar contention 
holds for Hegel - that a social order that in any way dedicates itself to the 
improvement of the rational capacities of its members must allow them, once 
their faculties have matured, the space to manage their own lives in matters 
affecting only themselves. We have a simple and highly pejorative phrase for 
policies that do otherwise: paternalism. It is straightforwardly logical that 
there must come a point beyond which even the most benevolent rational 
social order must grant members exclusive jurisdiction over choices which 
affect only themselves. This is the precise point that Mill makes in his chapter 
"On the limits of authority of society over the individual": 
Armed not only with all the powers of education, but with the ascendancy which the 
authority of a received opinion always exerdses over the minds who are least fitted to 
judge for themselves; and aided by the natural penalties which cannot be prevented from 
falling on those who incur the distaste or the contempt of those who know them; let 
society not pretend that it needs, besides all this, the power to enforce obedience in the 
personal concerns of individuals (Mill 1 : 74). 
The point is a well made one, if we take into account the fallibalism with 
which Mill, with admirable scepticism, regards any social initiative. If we 
4 This is an element of Milrs thinking that will be further discussed and explicated in Section 4 of (his 
Chapter. 
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accept that orthodoxies have often been mistaken about even widely held 
conceptions of what counts as individually or socially harmful personal action, 
and we accept the corollary that the orthodox conception may well be 
mistaken on some fairly crucial points in the future, then our commitment to 
social progress (as well as the baseline values of democracy) entails that we 
allow all possibility for orthodoxy to be rationally challenged .5 When it comes 
to choices of personal conduct, rational challenge means granting adults of 
mature and rational mind the right to live them . 
Mill's argument that orthodoxy has ample resources at hand for its own 
perpetuation .is a powerful one. Whilst it is obviously true that education is not 
directly analogous to indoctrination , the dominant values of a society will to a 
large extent inform the particular spin given certain issues when individuals are 
at their most intellectually formative, i.e. at the hands of their teachers. 
Furthermore, unorthodox behaviour on the individual's part will often elicit 
certain natural reactions on the parts of those closest to her . concern and 
worry as much as anger and resentment6• A choice of action or lifestyle that 
weathers these two massive sets of constraints must surely be granted the right 
and space to be lived out if orthodoxy is not to stagnate and become 
intransigent and unchangeable, trapped in the "value rigidity" discussed in 
Chapter 1.7 
Mill's fears extend largely to the "sway of custom" (Mill 1: 62) .8 He sees 
society as duty bound to purify and test every precept at every opportunity, 
lest the often· uncomfortable opportunity to realise a wider truth slip away. A 
new perspective may be a new truth we are unjustifiably unwilling to face, or 
.5 Thi s is an argument that I shall examine in its fu ller implicati ons as applied to liberty of expression. 
~ The issue of "natural" reactions towards individual lifestyle choices will be covered short ly. 
7 The question of whether it always desirahle (0 have so~ieties that prioritise progress at the expense of 
order shall be discussed in Section 4 below. 
R To use the phrase "customary morality" is con fu sing. as Crisp for one (as seen in Section 2 above) sees 
Mill nol as arguing agai nst customary morality per se, but only inval id customary morali ty not tacitly 
affected by utilitarianism. I use the phrase "custom" in this section to refer to a seL of 'non-rationally 
justifiable social norms, usually drawn from a religious ba(;kground. 
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may, more likely, contain some portion of truth or benefit we may unwittingly 
dismiss in dismissing the whole. Furthermore, there is Mill's prevailing concern 
that long accepted (even true) beliefs become dangerous when their grounding 
is forgotten, and the rational justifications for them can no longer be 
summoned Up.9 This is all captured with neat rhetorical force in one of his 
more memorable aphorisms: 
The beliefs which we have most warrant for have no safeguard to rest on , save a 
standing invitation to the entire world to prove them unfounded (Mill 1: 18). 
As Mill takes pains to point out, there will often be no immediately visible 
damage to a society that silences its heretics (or, for our current purposes, 
heretical activities). To many minds, of his time and our own, this is the very 
purpose and duty of the social order - to maintain and safeguard the beliefs 
and modes of life that maintain ordered existence.lO The weight of prevailing 
opinion (or prevailing custom) becomes a kind of silent inquisition . Without the 
necessity of visible and ugly legal measures of persecution, the orthodoxy 
(however flawed) is maintained against the potential onslaught of heretical 
thought and activity. There is no need to burn heretics at the stake if they are 
simply treated as outcasts. This is , as Mill maintains: 
[a] convenient plan for having peace in the intellectual world, and keeping all things 
going on therein very much as they do already. But the price paid for this sort of 
intellectual pacification is the sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the human mind 
(Mill 1: 28). 
This ultimately plays into a far larger and as yet unresolved set of questions . 
As Crisp points out, it is difficult to see how judgement of another's choice of 
lifestyle isn't a moral judgement (Crisp, 1997: 186) and the question of moral 
sentiment is one that looms large not only in Mill, but also throughout this 
9 This is yet another set of ilrgumcnts I forego full discussion of until the sec tion on freedom "o f expression 
10 Mill's rather powerful attack on this conception wi ll be covered below in section 3.4 
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thesis and the entire liberal-communitarian debate_ The principle that self-
regarding action should go unmolested seems at first glance to be somewhat 
uncontroversial, until cast into the midst of modern debates concerning social 
morality and identity. This remains one of the central crux points of the 
communitarian critique of liberal attitudes - that the boundary line drawn 
around individual behaviour leads to a society of disembodied and disinterested 
egoists, denied the capacity or encouragement to take an interest in one 
another's lives. This, it is maintained, denies the identity formative aspect 
that community provides: 
[C]hampions of individual liberty consider the essence of politics to be the defence of 
personal rights and liberties against encroachments emanating from government or the 
public sphere; seen from this vantage, all community standards or shared public bonds 
appear questionable and possibly oppressive ... Countering this liberal focus advocates 
of community are quick to point to the corrosive effects of egotism and possessive 
individualism on moral and political life (Dallmayr, 1993: 4-5). 
There are various answers to this already at hand within the Millian canon_ Mill 
himself took numerous pains to point out that we should not draw a false 
dichotomy between social orders that go to great lengths to enforce their 
moral norms and social orders in which there is no interpenetrating interest in 
the lives of one's fellows: 
It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose that it is one of selfish 
indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with each other's 
conduct in life ... Instead of any diminution, there is a need of a great increase of 
disinterested exertion to promote the good of others. But disinterested benevolence 
can find other instruments to persuade people to their good than whips and scourges, 
either of the literal or metaphorical sort (Mill 1 : 67, my italics). 
We may well ask here precisely what Mill is asking of a social order. He attacks 
the prevailing weight of custom and opinion as a form of unofficial persecution, 
yet maintains a citizenry should still be as interested as possible in each other's 
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lives. He bemoans the fact that possibly valuable heretical activity is 
discouraged by a society of busybodies, yet seems to call on those same 
busybodies to take up the task of interpersonal social improvement. 
The key, I believe, lies in the word persuade. Provided individual rational 
capacity and moral autonomy is respected, benevolent interest can healthily 
maintain its crucial function in social relations. We are once again at a 
juncture in Mill's philosophy where the Romantic strains he shares with Hegel 
can provide more clarity. In understanding individuals as engaged in a life-long 
act of self·education , which extends, through their organic membership in it, 
to the social order as a whole that they participate in, Mill's provisions make a 
fair deal of sense. As elements within a society contend within it to draw it 
closer to authenticity as an entity (this is, after all, the internal goal of a truth· 
seeking community of any kind), virulent interpersonal and public expression of 
concerns for their own welfare can be directed at individuals. But in order to 
be beneficial to either the individuals in question or the social order in general, 
they must be executed from a platform of respect for the individual's own 
choices - persuasion and not coercion. 
If all arguments possible have been presented against a certain self-regarding 
activity, and they remain unpersuaded, adults of rational capacity should be 
allowed to continue in its . practice. The entire scope of Mill's defence of 
liberty of expression (as shall be seen below) as a component of his wider 
defence of the necessity of ethical confrontation, does not presume social 
disinterest. Quite the opposite, really. Nor must it necessarily delimit itself 
entirely to other-regarding action. Coercive forces, for Mill, certainly can 
claim no purchase there, but there is nothing to say that, for example, 
opponents of pornography11 cannot present frequent and virulent rational 
arguments against its consumption. Provided the rational choice to consume it 
11 Excluding of course forms of pornography whose production neccesilates clear harm to unconsenring 
individunls or en tities, such ilS child or bestiality pornography. 
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or not remains open to adults of developed rational capacity. The moment said 
practice spills over into foreseeable social harm of some sort, debate is then 
open as to whether legal (or social) countermeasures need be taken. 12 
iii. The Liberty Principle vs. social disintegration 
But, the communitarian cries back, what of the bonds of social morality we 
feel it crucial to preserve? Can there be NO concrete defence of unifying moral 
sentiments that rule the vast majority of our codes of behaviour, no attempt to 
prevent the ethical disintegration of our longest held principles , as these fall 
prey to crude dissent and reckless, unconsidered immorality? Promote, 
vehemently if necessary, certain modes of life that history has proved socially 
useful? Interestingly and perhaps unsurprisingly, such claims were as present in 
Mill's own time as our own: 
In the present age - which has been described as 'destitute of faith but terrified at 
scepticism' ... the claims of an opinion to be protected from public attack are rested 
not so much on its truth, as on its importance to society. There are, it is alleged, 
certain beliefs so useful, not to say indispensable to well being that it as much the duty 
of governments to uphold these beliefs, as to protect any other of the interests of 
society ... It is also often argued, and oftener thought, that none but bad men would 
desire to weaken these salutary beliefs; and there can be nothing wrong, it is thought, 
in restraining bad men and prohibiting what only such men would wish to practice (Mill 
1: 19). 
Mill's immediate response to this is that it undermines the individual and social 
quest for truth and authenticity. It shirks off the charge of assumed infallibility 
by premising the justifiability of moral norms on their instrumental social worth 
as opposed to their objective truth-value. But, as Mill points out, the 
assumption of such worth is every bit as much an assumption of infallibility. It 
1'2 Issues as to whether certain less immediate forms of harm (such as the supposed propogation of negati ve 
physical stereotypes by pornography) enter th is domain will be covered in the sub-section on distaste vs . 
harm below. 
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assumes certain truths about the nature of the social whole that require 
massive rational justification, which it cannot forego by the simple appeal that 
they are widely and deeply felt . 
There is indeed more to the objection that certain classes of self-regarding 
action can be socially unravelling. Devlin, perhaps Mill's most famed 
detractor, is the most well known fount of such a position, and his ideas on this 
bear some examination. If nothing else, they represent the canonical 
conservative position on the subject, and as such must be coherently dealt with 
if we are to take Mill seriously. 
As Ryan (1987: 248) illustrates, Devlin's signature work The Enforcement of 
Morals attacks the division between public and private morality13 , claiming 
such a line cannot be drawn. By Devlin's terms, it makes no sense to speak of 
a public and private morality "any more than it does to speak of a public or 
private highway" (Ibid.). The realm of "private morality" the Wolfenden 
commission sought to define is, for Devlin, oxymoronic. But Devlin's , like many 
communitarian positions, withers significantly once one cuts away the rhetoric 
and subjects it to more careful analysis. As Ryan pOints out, a clear-headed 
assessment of the arguments presented reveals them to be "embarrassingly 
poor". 
As Ryan (Ibid.) lays it out, Devlin claims that what allows society to function, as 
any kind of community of ideas is a set of commonly held norms concerning 
how its members govern their lives. If these commonly held notions are 
discarded , society as we know it collapses. His claim is that people ' drift 
apart' if their common morals disintegrate and history has proven that 
societies often disintegrate from within. Thus, his argument runs , the fabric of 
D As Ryan poin ts out. what is r~fe rn::d to here as private morality is what Mill would have labelled self-
regarding action of the pruden ti al or <ll!st hclic kind. For further cl arification, see sl:ction" on art of life 
below. 
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norms woven into a social order must be maintained to avoid this, and their 
maintenance, as a matter of social welfare must fall to government, through 
legislative protection for moral norms. To many, it might seem a coherent 
point, until we investigate certain key assumptions and implications of the 
position. Firstly, as Ryan highlights, the position rests on the assumption that 
when we call something 'immoral', we are using a universal set of criteria that 
point to some kind of perceptible social damage. It is in trying to make this 
explicit that Devlin finds himself in very murky terrain. As Ryan memorably 
and jeeringly puts it: 
Does he really mean that we are in imminent danger of civil war, mob violence, or 
foreign domination if we do not share a common horror of, say, masturbation? (Ibid.). 
As Ryan (Ibid. 249) argues, if Devlin's position is not to be this patently 
ridiculous, what precisely does he mean? In defining a society as a set of 
communally held ideas about the way members should govern their lives, he is 
essentially referring to what Mill would define as "the sum of our views on 
prudential, moral and aesthetic matters" (Ibid.). That dissent will cause these 
to collapse is indisputable, but whether this is in fact as terrifying as Devlin 
maintains is highly contentious. The collapse of such norms can only be 
considered dangerous if palpable social harm is done as a result of their 
collapse. Otherwise, there is no real foreshadowing of terror in Devlin's 
caveats. 'Society' in the strange sense here defined collapses all the time -
views on certain practices (private as well as public) are amended and 
reconsidered, often even reversed - without institutional frameworks and social 
structures plummeting into blind and horrible entropy. Devlin tries to pull of a 
neat conceptual card trick here - he defines society in this loose and 
contingent sense, points to the inherent logic that dissent collapses it, and 
then returns furtively to the conventional sense of society (as the sum and 
scope of our institutional and social frameworks) to instil a sense of horror at 
what havoc this dissent might wreak. 
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Ryan (Ibid.) pOints out that Devlin's link between these two senses of society is 
another highly dubious assertion that people will 'drift apart' if their 
background moral norms are not upheld . This seems to suggest that private 
actions that inspire common dislike amongst the majority must be forbidden if 
social integrity is to be maintained. But this paints Devlin into an even 
stranger corner. If the criterion by which actions are to be allowed or 
forbidden is that they are disliked , then even the mere fact of someone 
disliking what one does in private is grounds for coercion. Devlin is smart 
enough to retreat from. such a position, but in so doing drives the final nail into 
his own conceptual coffin. He moves from maintaining that an action is wrong 
in that it upsets other people, to maintaining this upset can only be considered 
grounds for coercion if it is "an upset caused by the judgement that social 
damage will be caused by the action" (Ibid.). He is now left with two purified 
streams of argument: either an action is wrong if someone thinks it wrong , or it 
is wrong because it causes foreseeable social damage (damage, in other words, 
to the interests or welfare of others), in which case the dislike for it is an 
irrelevance. The former position is logically, philosophically and practically 
untenable. The latter is an utter concession of defeat to Mill. 14 
iv. Practical considerations on the Tyranny of the Majority 
What this all does reveal, though is how tricky Mill's provisions against non-
legal forms of coercion can become. Much of the crossfire in this section has 
concerned the question of legislating to protect background moral norms. 
While it is certainly a key part of Mill's area of concern, we have yet to resolve 
14 Of course, there is still a further case to be made thut inspi ring hroadscale di sraste can CQunl as a form of 
social harm, but this is quite different from Devlin 's position. Tl is premi sed on whether cenain types of 
offence can in fact be considered intokrable infringements on the welfare of others, i.e., as a form of 
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what could practically be done about the other branch of social repression -
the tyranny of prevailing opinion. This is indeed one of Mill's greyer areas. It 
is difficult to see what can concretely be done at an institutional level to 
prevent it. It is possible that Mill did not intend to give a clear answer to this. 
If we take On Liberty as an appeal to an educated public of his own time and 
times to come, rather than an expert-level blueprint for future social orders, it 
would be consistent to suppose that he leaves the resistance to tyranny of 
opinion in the hands of the same rational, autonomous adults whom he lauds 
and seeks to defend. 
Attempting to in some way police expression and thought to ensure said 
resistance would be a blatant violation of Mill's own extensive caveats. As 
Crisp (1997: 186-187) points out, it can be argued that Mill's own principles 
leave him legislatively powerless against those he seeks to undercut: "What 
form of coercive action - by Mill's own principles - could actually alter 
opinions?" 
This does not necessarily leave, for example, racist or homophobic mindsets, in 
the clear. It is still entirely possible to police other-regarding actions based 
upon discrimination, even if it is not possible to legally eradicate the 
discrimination itself. 15 If I, for example, refuse to hire a qualified and 
competent gay man , refuse to rent him an apartment or deny him some service 
it is optional for me to bestow for no other reason than a personal judgement 
of his self-regarding practice, then I stand guilty of interfering with or limiting 
another' s life plan on a paternalistic and rationally non-justifiable basis (since 
there is no way in which his homosexuality affects my welfare directly). It is a 
reverse corollary, in a sense, of Mill's example of the drunken soldier (Mill 1: 
socially harmful orher regarding action. Th is shall be discussed below in the subsection on distas te vs. 
harm. 
I~ Il is diffi cult to imagi ne anything short of an Orwelli an legal and li nguislic nssault on the possibility of 
thought itself 1hil l could concretely achieve this. T here can well be valid argumen ts made at a moral 
philosophy leve l that the very mindset is itself a danger, but , especi:l ll y if we accept the fo rce of Mi lr s 
autonomy arguments, it must be left to the forces of discourse to eradicate this. 
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73). When we punish a soldier or official for being drunk on duty, we punish 
the breach of duty and potential harm caused to others as a result, not the 
drunkenness itself. It would be the same if he had exhausted himself studying 
to put himself through night school and had fallen asleep. It is the breach of 
other-regarding obligation we punish, not the attitude that underlies it. Since 
an opinion that never expresses itself in other-regarding fashion never enters 
the domain of legal concern Mill has defined, it seems it must remain similarly 
unmolested. 16 
Of course, to return to the example of the gay man , there are multiple ways in 
which the opinion can still do other-regarding damage, regardless of legislation 
set up to prevent this. I can simply hire an equally competent candidate over 
the gay man or find some other reason to refuse to rent him the apartment. 
Mill's doctrine exhibits a painful awareness of just this possibility, and this is 
precisely where the tyranny of the majority can be least visible but most 
threatening. 
This is a breach in Mill that is not easily covered . But it is also one that haunts 
the entire liberal cannon of social thought. It is difficult to find any practical 
methodology that could eradicate unjustified discrimination that is not 
rendered into action, without becoming that which liberalism most hates and 
fears in this sense. As such , we are perhaps better served by an allegiance to 
principle . We can see the fear of the tyranny of the majority as a call for a 
more tolerant social mindscape. The task of governments is to help it along 
wherever they can, through attempts to encourage social dialogue and 
constant efforts to eradicate prejudice at an educational and public policy 
level. 17 The task of the educated populace is constant constructive 
Hi Thi s is furlh~r backed up, as Wt! shall see in Sl.::clions 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, by Mill's notion lhat social truths 
benefit by constan t testing against strongly held opposing viewpoi nts, which seems to suggest that a liberal 
society benefits by constantly testing itself aga inst bigots that remain in it' s midst The fUrLhcr implications 
of this shall be discussed further bdow, but it does suggest that it is socially necessary that such opinions 
remain un coerced provided they do not result in direct h:l fm of some sort to others. 
17 This, as shall be seen in Section 3.3.4, lIndl!rpins the arguments in fa vour of liberty of expression. 
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engagement with new ideas and new possibilities. This shall all be expanded 
upon further when we come to the issues and implications surrounding Mill's 
arguments for liberty of expression. 
For the moment though, we have the next difficult set of questions to answer 
on Mill's behalf. These relate to the issue of where the precise boundaries of 
the self-regarding and other-regarding spheres we have discussed in very 
general terms so far lie, and the further questions of how the harm principle 
applies to these. 
3.3.2) Boundaries of self-regarding vs. other regarding actions 
We are thus at juncture where we must assess what to make of the idea of the 
terminology "self-regarding" and "other-regarding", in their fuller implication 
and with the subtleties of more grey-area cases considered. In so doing, we 
can begin to assess two other controversial areas of Millian philosophy: his 
concept of harm and his doctrine of social obligation . Thus, the task of this (as 
well as 3.3.3 and 3.3.4) is to meld the discussion so far with the second branch 
of the liberty principle, which demands decisive legal coercion against actions 
which do unjustifiably violate the welfare of others . 
i. Natural vs. Legal penalties 
An interesting entry point to this comes through understanding the Millian 
doctrine of punishment. As Ryan (1987: 240-244) reminds us, Mill draws a 
strange and often fuzzy line between actions that are subject to some form of 
organised punishment and actions that incur certain "natural" penalties in the 
form of others' voluntary ostracism of the perpetrator. Mill's (Mill 1: 72) 
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signature cases in On Liberty are those that ·of the drunkard and debtor. Even 
though such individual's habits qualify as self-regarding, it will, Mill feels, be a 
logical off-shoot of such behaviour that higher-minded and cultivated intellects 
shall choose to avoid their company. This avoidance does not count as 
coercion, since it is, ultimately, a by-product of others exercising their 
freedom. It would be a different case indeed were the avoidance an organized 
or legally concretized phenomenon (in Mill's terms 'parading the avoidance') 
for this points not to a mere contingent reality of others' exercising their 
choices, but to something beyond - an organised intention to control the self-
regarding sphere of a rationally autonomous agent. To highlight something as 
harmful to self, and point this out to the perpetrator in the hope she shall 
change her behaviour is a natural feature of human society. To interfere in any 
organized fashion is to run against the full gamut of Mill's caveats concerning 
fallibalism , the compromising of autonomy and the inherent risk of 
instantiating a stagnation of orthodoxy. Punishment is inflicted upon 
individuals because they have done something that harms or infringes upon the 
interests of others. Not because the punishment is a natural causal offshoot of 
the action. This would, as Ryan (1987: 240-244) points out, put society in a 
profoundly illogical position. A social order that punishes things it considers 
merely imprudent (as opposed to wrong), is in the odd position of proving it's 
judgements by making them come true - it becomes a policy equivalent of 
begging the question. 
Ryan (Ibid. 244) thence points us to a question many might ask. What is the 
point in drawing this distinction? The avoidance Mill speaks of is likely, in many 
cases of socially condemned behaviour to be rather broadscale. Is this not 
ultimately equivalent to an organised form of social punishment? 
The answer, from Mill's corner is that the distinction is paramount in the way it 
affects both the direct conduct and attitude of social detractors: 
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It makes a vast diffe rence both in our feelings and our conduct towards him , whe ther 
he displeases us in things in which we have a right to control him or in things in which 
we know we have not (Mill 1 : 70). 
Mill is once again calling on the social order to make a difficult but necessary 
distinction between benevolent concern and social persecution, thus once 
again striking a line between the self-regarding and other-regarding spheres of 
action . The picture that is steadily emerging crystallises the more we thresh 
out Mill's principles is that the concept of "duty" plays a central role. Where 
there is some justifiable positive or negative expectation upon us, legal and 
social penalties have a valid role in ensuring that expectation is met. Ensuring, 
in other words , that we do our duty. It is on the breaches of these 
expectations , these duties, we must focus in administering penalty and 
punishment of any sort, for this is the "moral" dimension of the art of life (as 
discussed in 1.3.3) . 
Thus, we can understand some of the canonical Millian examples already 
illustrated in section 3.1.1 . The soldier on duty example remains one of the 
clearest. It is the breach of duty we punish in such cases, not the self-
regarding 'fault'. Thus , under a Millian analysis, the term "duty to self" is 
illogical. Where there is no breach of social obligation (negative as well as 
positive, as we shall see shortly), the term 'duty' makes no sense. Mill 
carefully reminds us to distinguish between actions which we may socially 
classify as wrong and those which merely offend prudence or aesthetics. The 
former are the fit and proper subjects of legal penalty, the latter are liable for 
no more than concerned exhortation and entreaties on the part of concerned 
fellows. 18 
There is much yet to be cleared up here , specifically as regards what precisely 
constitutes the positive duties a Millian social outlook might expect of a 
II! Th~ fuller implications of this shall be assessed in section 3.3.3, immediately below. 
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citizenry. Ryan (Ibid.) points to a potentially dangerous ambiguity here. He 
sees Mill as not giving sufficient clarity to the difference between conduct 
which is right, and conduct which is morally obligatory (by his terms), because 
others have a right against us to expect it. Certain actions are certainly 
benevolent and 'right' in the abstract moral sense , but cannot be considered a 
matter of social obligation . Ryan uses the example of a man donating a large 
portion of his wealth to charity. It is certainly socially be neficial other-
regarding behaviour, but while virtuous it is not obligatory: 
Men are not blamed for not being saintly or he roi c. We punish people for not doing 
what is obligatory , for doing what is .disobligatory ; but not for merely not doing what it 
would be vir tuous to do (Ryan, 1987: 242 , my italics). 
This being said, how far would Mill have our obligations extend? At various 
points he makes this at least somewhat clear. We have an obligation to refrain 
from damaging the interests of others (as already covered at some length 
above), and a positive obligation to perform certain actions necessary to the 
very function and maintenance of society and social relations. Mill's two key 
examples here are bearing one's share in the common defence and the 
performance of jury duty .19 Thus an action can be wrong by virtue of infringing 
on another's welfare (theft, assault) or by virtue of defaulting on socially 
necessary obligations (taxation , shirking of crucial social responsibilities) . Such 
actions are offences not against individuals, but against the very system that 
guarantees the framework within which welfare is possible, and is thus 
punished on behalf of the entire membership of said system, namely society 
through the empowered (and publicly mediated) arm of legislation .2o 
1'1 There are furtht!f argumt.:nls for the positive social bcneli ls of ob li g~ll i on5 such as jury duly which wi ll be 
covered below in Section 3.3.5. 
:w This hears a cerLai n parity to Hege J" s understanding of the stale as the su m of the very conditions that 
make freedom possible. T ht!re are also parallels to be drawn [0 the Kan linn notion of categorical 
imperatives, even though the Mill inn doctrine as a whole di sjoints from the Kantian in terms of i ts 
consequential ism. 
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In a sense this may seem to undercut Mill's by now much discussed caveats 
concerning paternalism, fallibalism and autonomy. But this would, I feel, be a 
rather shallow reading of his doctrine. There will always be certain positive 
actions necessary to the very maintenance (and sometimes the very survival) of 
the base framework that is the social order. Mill's dangers only arise if 
unconsidered and ultimately transient moral norms are wrongly cast in this 
mould, as they are by Devlin.21 
ii. The harm principle and beneficial collective obligation 
I would contend that there is no necessary clash between the cannon of Mill ian 
principles and the obligation to assist in maintaining the very basis of the 
enlightened social order he seeks. But to contend this I must deal with a 
powerful criticism levelled at Mill by critics such as D.G. Brown . Brown (1972: 
133-158) argues that the liberty principle as a sole grounding for interference 
with individual action is too impoverished a guideline to allow for social 
requirements that maximize overall social welfare, and as such is in conflict 
with Mill's own moral commitments as a utilitarian as well as a range of 
practices that seem socially necessary, such as taxation for welfare. Brown 
further claims that this renders Mill's own examples of positive obligation 
inconsistent. This is a fairly crucial aspect to be cleared up . If resolved , it 
clears Mill (and liberalisms such as his) of one of the stronger charges levelled 
against him - that of his being a framework for an institutionally callous and 
disinterested society, blinded to human suffering and the true welfare of 
individuals as human beings. As Brown lays out the charge : 
21 Extreme cases such as times of defensive war were, to Mill, obvious inslan CCg in which positive 
obligations on the part of the c iti zenry could be stepped up. His logic here paralle ls hath Hegel' s - s ince 
the social order is very guarantor of the framework of social pro tection and obligation withou{ whi ch ri ghts 
are formed and enshrined. it is rational to expect members to defend it from outri ght destruction. An 
interes ti ng aven ue which I lack the space to t!xplore here is the Millian take on conscientious objectors. 
Theoretically, Mill would have to ho ld thm only in cases where lhe Slate or society was h:gilimale ly in 
danger of destruction can the emergency provisions of cri sis be called into effecl. This becomes interesting 
in cases like the US offc.::nsivc in V ietnam. \\ hich was understood by many as a maHer of national security, 
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It seems to me that we have duties to he lp other people that go beyond the avoidance 
of harming them; that the performance of such duties can legitimately be extracted 
from us, very commonly in our roles as citizens and taxpayers; and that such exactions 
are not permitted by Mill's main principle. I conclude that the gene ral ruin of Mill's 
impressive synthesis carries with it the principle of liberty itself (Brown, 1972: 158). 
The thrust of Brown's argument is that the concerns raised in Mill's moral 
theory about the interests of society at large are undercut at a fatal level by 
the Liberty principle's insistence that the only justifiable reason for 
interference with individual action is the prevention of harmful action Y 
At first sight, Brown does seem to have struck at a major breach in the liberty 
principle's implication. What of callous or disinterested action that fails to 
prevent harm even though it does not directly cause it? What of justice and 
fairness? Are provisions that would interfere with individual action in the name 
of these ideals to be scrapped because they do not apply to directly harmful 
action? 
But for all Brown's careful and systematic reading of Millian doctrine, he falls 
prey to a fairly common error in Mill scholarship which David Lyons (1979: 1-19) 
highlights to powerful effect. This is an unfairly narrow reading of the liberty 
principle itself. Lyons' contention is that, on a deeper reading of the liberty 
principle, we find that it is not exclusively tied to the prevention of harmful 
action , nor is that its sole guideline and criterion . If we focus on the idea of 
preventing harm , as opposed to merely harmful action (this is , after all, the 
way Mill states his case) then the scope of the liberty principle widens 
considerably. Conduct may be limited or controlled only for the purposes of 
and many more, especially in hindsight, as a horri fic extremity of national paranoia. I shall briefly consider 
this and other cases of civil di sobt!dience in sec tion 3.3.5 . 
22 This is a claim that is threaded deep into the modern communi tarian position, namely that liberalism's 
hyper-individualism leaves it mor~\ lI y impovt!rished and guilty of abandoning the du ti es we owe to fellow 
human beings. 
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preventing harm , but the conduct itself need not be harmful or dangerous . 
This is a move from what Lyons calls a "harmful conduct prevention principle" 
to a "general harm prevention principle " (Ibid. 3-4). 
Under this analysis , actions can be required of individuals that prevent harm to 
others on either an individual or social basis even though those actions 
themselves are not the sole or direct cause of the harm in question . These can 
be split into what Lyons labels "good samaritan requirements" (for example, 
the obligation to save a drowning man) and "co· operation requirements" 
(participation in socially necessary joint works). Lyons (Ibid .) claims his 
expanded reading of the principle can allow Mill to sanction both of these 
under the justificatory regimen of harm prevention . 
The easier case, Lyons (Ibid . 3·7) argues is that of the Good Samaritan 
requirements. If it is the case that a citizen's action is not the cause of harm , 
but nonetheless could have prevented it , then the class of what we might 
follow Mill in calling "evils through inaction" is dragged into the class of actions 
liable for social sanction. This goes beyond simple negligence (which is , after 
all a punishable breach of duty from which harm has resulted) and extends the 
same pattern of reasoning to a wider set of actions.13 Co-operation 
requirements, Lyons (Ibid .) admits , are more complex, but a carefu l reading of 
the nature and implication of the general harm prevention principle can still 
sanction them, without the need for appeal to any independent doctrine of 
:!J Of course we must remember that, under the analysis I present here, harm remains a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for social or legal sanclion hc ing cast agains t an action. Mill , in bringing up the 
possible case of harm through inaclion, adds the immediate warning (hm th is is a far morc difficuh chargt:: 
to pin down than harm through direct action. The warn ing stands if we consider the di fficu lties inherent in 
ass igning cause to an action that was not committed. when numerous other causes can be held responsible. 
I fo llow a s imilar stratt:gy to Lyons here in not attempting to unrave l the complexi ties o f th is issue here, but 
simply aiming to provc that what might ordinarily be descrihed as a "duty" of benevolent human ac tion to 
preven t harm to a fel low citi zen can in facl be descriol:d as a duty under the harm principle. The question of 
whether it is enforced must fall prey to the same set of social oenefi t calculations as a direct action harm 
does, most notably the question of whl:lher enforcemcn t will generate more evils than it is designed to 
prevenl. 
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obligation.24 The harms dealt with are societal, not specific to anyone 
individual - key examples are social issues such as pollution and poverty - and 
no single individual action can prevent them. Rather, the harm prevention is a 
function of the co-operation requirements themselves and the patterns of 
behaviour they create. Pollution is not prevented by a single driver choosing 
to drive less , but by a legally required shift in social behaviour that prevents 
harms at a broader social level: 
For the point of such a rule is not to interfere with conduct, but is rathe r to redirect 
behaviour so as to he lp create a social practice that will prevent harm (Ibid. 7). 
Under such an analysis, single acts of non-compliance indeed become harm 
generating. This justification also runs to a deeper institutional level, to Mill's 
own examples the jury system and emergency conscription. Non-compliance 
here helps generate widespread social harm in that it contributes to disabling a 
system designed to prevent it, and thus interference with individual action to 
ensure compliance is justified. In point of fact , as Lyons (Ibid . 7) points out, a 
harm preventing institutional framework that generates individual obligation is 
often the only way to prevent certain types of widespread harms - higher 
taxation to fund welfare systems that combat homelessness is a prime 
example. 
To those who would claim such a position seems profoundly un-Millian , there is 
ample evidence to suggest that Mill himself recognised the validity of such 
institutional obligations: 
:N Lyons ( 1979: 3-7) takes the debate out of the one-un-one heuristic examples or drowning men to rhe 
proper crucible by whic.:h we must lest implicat ions - the more complex and sophi sticated instilUt ional 
struClUfl! that characterises legal and social systems as we know them. Hae the harm pre vention is naLIhe 
product of any single indi vidual action, and cannot be. 
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[E]ach person bearing his fair share (to be fixed upon some equitable principle) of the 
labours and practices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury or 
molestation (Mill Z, as cited in Lyons , 1979: 14) . 
This, Lyons (Ibid . 7-16) concedes, may appear to clash with the clear lines that 
the liberty principle sets out for legal sanction of individual activity, but 
consider two key clarifying points that he brings out. Firstly, this not an 
attempt to form citizens into better people by force of law. True, individual 
citizens will benefit from the positive social results of their participation in 
such joint works. But the benefits to self are irrelevant under this justification 
regimen - the key issue is widespread social harm , which, under any analysis, 
affects distinct individuals other than the participant, and can thus be readily 
labelled harm to others. Secondly, this not an attempt to limit freedoms or 
other values for the sake of greater benefit, but for the sake of harm 
prevention. Trading off freedoms for others' benefit alone would indeed 
offend the cannon of Millian principle, as the liberty principle cannot sanction 
trade-offs not based on harm-prevention . If Lyons' analysis stands, though, it 
is harm-prevention that drives the justification regimen of the coercion 
required . 
The question of fairness and justice considerations is more difficult. Mill's 
utilitarian conceptions of justice and fairness are hard-wired into his political 
positions. Could they not provide independent reason for coercion in the 
absence of harm being caused? Could Mill not, in other words, be forced to 
endorse a course of action that produces greater distributions of burdens and 
benefits at the cost of liberty? 
We must separate this into its composite issues. Fairness (and for that matter 
dessert and merit) considerations, as Lyons (Ibid . 14) points out, are not 
justifications of actions so much as conditions set on actions undertaken. Thus, 
we may discern, on a Millian basis, between various equally effective 
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alternatives to social harm-prevention on the basis of which distributes burdens 
and benefits most equitably (or some cases in terms of merit) and which 
safeguard other crucial va lues such as individual rights. 
This cuts to the heart of a further crucial point that Lyons (Ibid. 17-18) makes 
concerning the Millian doctrine of justice, of which fairness is an element_ 
Consider the following broad definition that Mill offers in Utilitarianism: 
Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules which concern the essentials of 
human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation than any 
other rules for the guidance of life (Mill 2: 33). 
As such, under the analytical framework emerging, we can readily identify 
assaults on justice and fairness as assaults on baseline human interests, and as 
such as harms. 25 Justice and fairness can thus be understood as rooted in, not 
independent 0[, harm prevention _ 
To tie the th reads together, justice considerations would only be problematic 
for the libe rty principle if they provided independent reasons for coercion . 
But, this cannot happen if we consider as Mill's ultimate position that assaults 
on justice and fairness are harms. 26 The further we dig , it seems, the firmer 
25 The possibk imerprctation o f harm as harm against interests wi ll be discussed in reference to J.C. 
Reese's famed case for it in the fo llowing section. 
26 Lyons ( l 979: 18) points out that conventional in terpretat ions of Mill o ften sec him striving towards 
welfare-maximizati on with experience dc:rived and evolving "ru les of thumb" as guidelines. Fairness and 
just ice are understood as such porous axiomata media. Under such an interpretation, there would indeed be 
issues justifyi ng coercion based on fa irness and justice under the liberty principle, hut as Lyons points out 
thi s is someth ing of a "caricature" of Mill' s doctrinal structure, as the discussion in the main tC!xl bC!ars oul. 
Lyons (Ibid. 18-19) reading docs indeC!d seem to do more justi ce to Milrs doctrinal structure. He sees 
Mill' s morality as concerned with moral rights and obligations, his doctrine of justice as laying down 
obligations necessary to a system of correlating rights. As Lyons succi nctly pUIS it: "To be moral is to 
perform our ob ligations, to be just is to respect others ' rights". We can, ulti mately discern no gel1eral 
obligatioll in Mill to maxi mize utility. Whilst welfare and interests, al an individual and societal level. are 
the guiding factor in moral considt!rat ions, moral obligmion is neither reducible nor equivnlent to 
maximi zing utility. Milrs social calculations are n fair deal more complex and wider in scope than this. 
The principles of justice and fairness are founded on long-term considerations relating to the vital interests 
of human beings and the social order they inhabit - interests such as personal security, rational autonomy 
and individual freedom from others' intervention. As such they "exert independent weight in moral 
argument'". They can, in the final analysis, veto considerations based on harm-prevention' alone at the level 
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and wider the Liberty Principle 's foundations stand in Mill's system . If Lyon's 
interpretation stands (and I believe it does), it adds an interesting dimension to 
my argument for the Millian principle architecture as a "politics of 
engagement" analogous with Hegel's . The Millian social infrastructure is one 
that is by no means blind to suffering in its midst, but simultaneously cautious 
of the cure being somehow worse than the disease. Systemic issues such as 
poverty are indeed harms, but like all harms the costs of various courses of 
actions against them must be weighed up against what other crucial social 
interests these violate. What Lyon's interpretation does is , I believe, to 
justifiably extend the concept · of "harm" to recognise harms that individuals 
incur not as a result of individual action per se , but as a result of the syste mic 
consequences of the infrastructure they participate in . Such a holistic 
conception of the social order is indeed very Hegelian, but it is also highly 
logical. The further benefit of such an interpretation is that it presents a 
liberalism not so trapped by its own phobias of paternalistic action that it 
cannot act to reduce dangers to individuals within it that are not direct 
offshoots of other individuals ' actions . This, to my mind, closes off the 
objection that a Millian social vision is a socially disinterested one. What 
remains , though , is a more thorough examination of what 'harm' actually is, a 
question that, until this point has been treated fairly broadly and vaguely. 
iii. What counts as harm? 
What yet lingers, more precisely, is the question of what counts as harmful 
action and what does not. Ryan strikes a first path through this by highlighting 
of the wider considerations we must employ when dec idin g whether or not to deploy legal or social 
sanction against an action that causes (or fails to prevent) harm. T his would seem to concede Brown's 
attack that the liberty principle is eitht:r inconsistent or socially irresponsible, un ti l we consider that the 
status accrued to j ustice and fairness is premi sed on the protection of certain vi tal human interests, and thus 
ultimately on harm-prevention. Lyons does add the caveat that this reading does not sanction the ul timate 
va lidi ty of Mill's syslCm unless one accepts Mill's utilitarian doctrine of jus lice. 
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intention as one of Mill's key criteria. To test whether an action counts as self 
or other rega rding we consider the intentions and calculations of the agent (or 
agents) involved. Mill lays this out fairly clearly in stating that in order to 
qualify for punishment an action must "be calculated to produce evil to 
someone else" (Mill 1: 9) . 
Thus to assess actions as other· regarding we must be able to describe them in a 
certain fashion. So, to paraphrase Ryan's example (1987: 248), to say that Mr. 
Orange lied to Mr. White must, to have moral force , be to say that Mr. Orange 
intended for Mr. White to be deceived. To recognise how crucial intention is to 
this scenario, imagine that Mr. Orange was reciting the lines to a script to 
himself, one of which informs another character his wife has been raped , and 
Mr. White mistakenly interprets this as applying to him. Mr. White has the 
temporary perception that something horrific has happened, and has, 
objectively been lied to. But the 'deception' here is purely contingent. If we 
examine this in the light of classes of actions we can actually legally police by 
Mill 's doctrines , we see that intention remains a crucial guiding factor Y A 
prime example is Mill's support for regulating the sale of certain poisons . 
Because it is likely that such substances will be employed in a harmful 
enterprise, the rights of the seller and buyer to freedom of commercial activity 
are overruled, and a case made for heavily regulating or banning such 
substances entirely (Mill 1: 87). 28 
27 Mill , as Ryan poin ts out, adds an interest ing ri d~ r to the concept o f sclr- rcg~m.li ng action by claiming that 
actions involvi ng others remai n sel f-regarding if their in volvement is premised on their "free, voluntary and 
undeceived consent and part icipation". One of the key ways in which thi s ridl!f appl ies practically will be 
examined shortly in terms of Mill 's understandi ng of contracts. 
211 This particular example has some interesting conceptual fa llout that I cannot, for reasons of space, 
in vestigate at length here. Whi le it is of course li kely that such suhstances will be employed with 
mu rderous intent to others, it is also possible that they might be used for the purposes of suicide. T his 
would present an interesting problem for M ill . He contended that rational adu lts willingly sell ing 
themselvl.!s into slavery did not count as rree action in th al such a decision countermanded the very capacity 
for freedom (See Crisp, 1997 for a fu ller discussion of this). One would assume that suicide wou ld fa ll into 
the same category for Mi ll , as it is an aClion that undennincs one of the crucial factors' for rationally 
autonomous aClion, i.e. one's own lire. 
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But, given his criteria, it cannot be the only factor. Ryan shows that a rather 
strong objection presents itself. This is that any action can have multiple 
descriptions. To take Ryan's (Ibid. 249) example , we can describe a man who 
regularly drinks himself into insolvency in multiple ways . In one sense it is 
purely self· regarding (he could, after all , have gotten to the same point 
through bad investments), but once we expand the scope of the action to 
include the detrimental effects on his dependents , palpable other·regarding 
harm enters the equation. There is no intention to cause other· regarding harm 
here, but it is nonethe less caused . Millian doctrine would certainly hold that 
there should be some intervention to protect the rights of the family members. 
Thus, if we consider that many actions can be simultaneously described in both 
self-regarding and other· regarding terms, even in cases where intention to 
cause harm is not present, then the great line between self· regarding and 
other· regarding action has yet to be struck. 
Ryan's (Ibid.) answer is that intention remains a primary and vital element, if 
not the only, in assessing to what extent actions can represent punishable 
other·regarding harm. One of his strongest arguments to this effect is that for 
punishment as a deterrent to make any sense, intention must remain at the 
core of our doctrine of penalty since" a man can only be deterred from what 
he knows how to avoid doing". He thus amends Mill's principle so that: 
it requires us to leave alone those actions of other persons where they intend. no harm 
to others and where it is not readily foreseeable such harm will foll ow (Ibid.) . 
Ryan's interpretation is certainly useful. It allows us to make sense of Mill's 
claims that even unthinking negligence can be a punishable act, whilst 
maintaining intention as the highest cordon of accountability, as legal systems 
throughout the world do. It underpins the Lyons interpretation rather well, as 
it is indeed a social breed of unthinking negligence in terms of individual 
behaviour that is identified as harm· laden. But it does throw the door open to 
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a whole new set of grey areas. We are left temporarily bemused as to what 
can count as self-regarding action at all, under the terms described. Until , 
that is, we remind ourselves that it is the breach of duty we punish and deal 
with, not the supposed immorality of the self-regarding activity that underpins 
it. Thus, for example, the fact that alcoholism can be a cause of unintentional 
negligence is not sufficient cause to ban the sale of alcohol outright. What Mill 
is ever reminding us to do is to distil our own aversions and objections to 
certain actions down to what is a breach of rationally justifiable social 
obligation, and what simply offends our prudential or aesthetic norms. 
iv. Problems of application to public practice 
This can, as Mill admits, get problematic in the cases of certain activities that 
would be self-regarding if practiced in the context of one's private sphere, but 
are thence organised by enterprising individuals into a public commercial 
enterprise. The two cases which most worried Mill were two of the more 
morally heated topics of his own time - prostitution and gambling: 
Ought this to be interfered with or not? Fornication, for example, must be tolerated , 
and so must gambling; but should a person be free to be a pimp, or keep a gambling 
house? The case is one of those which lie on the exact boundary line between two 
principles and it is not at once apparent to which of the two it properly belongs (Mill 1: 
89). 
Mill, in admirable devil's advocate fashion, threshes out the arguments for both 
sides here. In favour of tolerance, he notes that there should be some 
consistency of principle. If we accept his arguments that self· regarding acts 
should go unmolested, and we accept the autonomous right to follow an 
occupation and profit by the practice of it, it seems inconsistent to "make that 
criminal which would otherwise be admissible" (Ibid.). But Mill retreats from 
this in an interesting fashion. 
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He points out that even when society suspends judgement on a self· regarding 
action, exercising the wise sense of restrained judgement he has advocated, it 
does not take itself to a point of outrightly supporting it. The social order has 
merely refused to intervene lest it intervene wrongly and rob a rational citizen 
of their capacity to manage their own lives in things affecting only themselves. 
The rightness or wrongness of the action itself remains disputable. As such, he 
feels perhaps society fails it's citizenry by allowing broadscale persuasion to a 
course of action at the hands of those who have a commercial interest in 
seeing it followed through . Such persons are not, ultimately, the kind of 
impartial rational force Mill has in mind as a persuasive factor in social 
dynamics (lbid.).z9 
These provisions seem rather shaky, and it is difficult to see how this is not a 
retreat from Mill's own principles. His own argument for why such practices 
must be tolerated seems to stand stronger than his own final arguments against 
it. The worries already discussed about the difference in attitude between 
natural penalty and legal punishment would suggest that banning the public 
provision for privately permissible activity would be cow towing to the very 
forces of prevailing opinion he seems to find so nefarious in other contexts. 
This being said, the concept of allowing only if the consumer acts in full 
awareness is interesting. The provision that people be forewarned of possible 
negative effects of engaging the services of a prostitute or smoking cigarettes 
is a socially healthy measure that simultaneously respects the rational 
capacities of the citizenry. But short of banning the practice of advertising 
altogether, it is difficult to see how we could make any marketing strategy 
rationally impartial. 3o 
2') What Ryan (1987: 252) sees Mill ::;aying here is that on ly when the provider of such morally questionable 
goods and services represents the full er implications of what she is se lling in their fullest sense can the 
provision be socially pcrmissibk. And, as Ryan points out "it is difficult to imagine many pimps remaining 
in business under such condit ions". 
:\0 The example of cigarette advertising is interest ing here, since in many countries the step of banning it 
outrigh t has indeed heen laken. It is. however, a very different case to something like prostitution, since lhe 
range of in fections thaI arise from secondary smoking render it a breach of other- regarding conduct unless 
non-smokers voluntarily choose smokers company in full awareness of the possible effects. This 
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What this brings to the fore is that Mill is not so clearly an advocate of hyper-
permissiveness as he is often made out to be (whether his own principles 
should drive him there if applied consistently is something we shall consider 
when I assess Crisp's interpretations shortly)_ But I feel on this particular score 
that Mill's worries about unbiased persuasion are not a particularly strong case 
against the widespread proliferation of brothels and gambling dens_ For one 
thing, the terrain becomes shaky when we consider his own added caveat that 
to make something extremely difficult to obtain is often a watered down form 
of banning it, and Mill would have society make a clearer-cut decision in such a 
case _ Such half-hearted bans should, after all, stand the trial of his other 
cautionary principles as much as fuller bans must (odd exceptions such as the 
poisons case excluded). 
There is , however, another possible Millian argument against allowing 
industries to form around questionable self-regarding activity, which highlights 
a subtler (and far more profound) dynamic at work here. That is the argument 
that sometimes the social conditions surrounding the industries that promote 
alleged individual vice instantiate other-regarding harm . The violent criminal 
culture that surrounds the drug industry is a prime example of this, and it is 
often served up as a key non-paternalistic argument for drug enforcement. Of 
course, as long-standing pro-legalisation arguments run, it is often the banning 
itself that spawns the criminality. 
The most oft used example here is the Falstead act that banned the sale and 
consumption of alcohol in early 20th century America (a latter day version of 
requirement heing laid down. the constant tu ssle between tobacco and anti -tobacco advertising along with 
the long legislated practice of health warnings on tobacco products should provide the necessary array of 
social discourse required for a rational citizenry to make an informed decision. The counter-claim can be 
made that then~ is a large possibility for detrimental effect upon minors who lack the rational capaci ty or 
developed social perspective to heed the warnings as we ll as the fanfare. The counter-thrust can then be 
made lh:ll this could be remedied by restricting such advertisi ng to venues that should on ly be legally 
frequented by adu lts, such as bars and nightclubs. I lack space to thresh out this issue fU rlher here, but thi s 
brief discussion does highlight that Millian principles do not immediately entail a hyper-permissive society. 
The social order in Mill 171 
the Maine laws that Mill so castigated). In many senses, the act created Al 
Capone - the exponential demand for illegal alcohol in speakeasies was the 
lifeblood of his criminal empire. The same dynamics apply to the debate 
surrounding criminality and drugs, with an added sinister dimension. The 
Guardian newspaper, in a series of features on the heroin problem in the UK, 
identified that many of the harmful side·effects of popularly available illegal 
drugs were functions of the unregulated agents used to cut the drugs on the 
black market, not the drugs themselves.31 
The above collectively considered casts a dark shadow over Mill's concluding 
thoughts on brothels and gambling dens, namely that it is beneficial that they 
be forced to operate with a degree of secrecy and "more than this society 
ought not to aim at" (Mill 1: 90). Mill was referring here to the possibility of 
further enforcement, but the statement seems to cut both ways. It smacks of 
a cease·fire between his sense of social practicality and his refusal to push his 
principles to the point of supporting the kind of proto·permissiveness that 
would have alienated his Victorian audience. 
It leaves us at an odd juncture, though , in terms of the ongoing question of 
how we apply Millian principle in this particularly tricky area of social policy. 
When the international current affairs journal The Economist ran a special 
feature advocating the legalisation of drugs, it was to Mill they appealed in 
setting up the social principle of self· regarding action going unmolested . They 
thence applied his principles further to possible legalization of commercial 
trade in said drugs subject to regulatory standards .32 Is Mill inconsistent if not 
pushed to this boundary? The discussion of autonomy in Chapter 1, as well as 
the above discussion on the fears of a stagnant orthodoxy and the tyranny of 
prevailing opinion would seem to suggest that actions that we accept as self· 
Jl Nick Davics.'Make heroin kga!' Gllu rdiun U"'imiled .Thursday Ju ne 14. 200 I . 
J:! Frances Cairncross, 'Stumbl ing in the Dark: A survey on illegal drugs', Th e Ecollomist, July 26th 200 1. 
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regarding should not be chased to dark corners. This would be to give a sense 
of organised righteous indignation to those who would wish such actions 
disallowed and it precisely against organised righteous indignation that many of 
Mill's arguments are deployed. Mill's practical reminders that social interest 
necessitates certain precautions at least (the poisons example once more) 
counter-balance this slightly. We are not bound by Millian principles to let the 
sale of anything go completely unmolested if we can find justified cause to 
suspect it may cause social harm if used wrongly or in public excess . The 
culture of noise and occasional violence that can surround drinking 
establishments allows the harm principle to prevent us placing them on every 
street corner. But many cases of self-regarding activity publicly practiced will 
cause more offence than they will damage. Mill allows for these, in conceding 
in the' Applications' chapter that certain cases of "offence against decency" 
and public nuisance can be justifiably penalized (Mill 1: 88) . Thus, the purified 
question that underpins the issue under discussion is one we have been 
gradually edging towards all along: When , for Mill , does provoking distaste 
become other-regarding harm? 
3.3.3) Offence vs_ Harm 
i. Framing the ambiguity between harm and offence in Mill 
The issue at hand can be traced to an ambiguity Crisp (1997: 183) identifies in 
laying out the maxims that emerge from On Liberty. He distinguishes four 
classes of actions that the text ultimately considers: 33 
:U Crisp's imcrpret;}tion, sets up the liberty principle as safeguarding whm he calls '''valid customary 
moral ity" based upon utili tarianism. As argued in section 3.2, I fee l this and non-utili tarian accounts are 
conseq uentially eq uivalent in their setting a boundary line around self-regarding action, and the goal of 
general social welfare as a Slfmmum bOl1um is no t restricted to util itariani sm. Th us I have etched out 
Crisp's argu ments in less strictly utilitarian terms here. 
The social order in Mill 173 
1) Actions ruled out by the harm principle on the grounds that they are 
tangibly harmful to others, the clearest exam ples being actions such as 
theft, murder and fraud. 
2) Actions not ruled out by the harm principle that nonetheless do cause some 
degree of harm. Mill's most well worn example of this is succeeding in a 
competitive examination. As an action, it harms the interests of others, but 
it is socially crucial that such harm be permissible. Thus, though as an act 
of other-regarding harm it is a candidate for interference by legal or social 
sanction, the harm wrought is not sufficient to warrant interference . 
3) Actions not ruled out by the harm principle on the grounds that they do not 
affect others directly , even though the performance of them does provoke 
distaste in others_ The legality of homosexual activity is a key example of 
this. 
4) Actions not ruled out by the harm principle that do not affect othe rs at all. 
Some interesting issues of clarity arise from this. The first is the idea that 
harm does not immediately justify interference . All we can say, by Millian 
principles, of an action that affects others (even in a tangibly harmful sense) is 
that it enters the realm of possible legal and/or social sanction. Harm is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for an action actually being subject to 
enforcement. This is something Mill lays out most clearly in the final Chapter 
of On Liberty: 
[I]t must by no means be supposed that because damage, or probability of damage, to 
the interests of others, can alone justify the interference of society, that therefore it 
always does justify such interference. In many cases, an individual in pursuing a 
legitimate object, necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others 
(Mill 1 : 84, my italics). 
Mill's own examples of professional competition and examinations (Mill 1 :84) 
seem fairly benign , but we can nonetheless see how the principle can extend to 
less clear-cut cases. In its distilled form, it holds that we have to apply two 
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phases of judgement - we must first assess whether an action counts as 
harmful , and thence assess to what extent it is in the social interest (which, as 
we have discussed , includes certain provisions safeguarding individual interest) 
for legal and social sanction to be deployed against it. 
This being said, there is an ambiguity to be resolved between classes (2) and 
(3) above. As we have just seen in the previous section, Mill does indeed 
retreat from what he calls "offence against decency" (Mill 1 :88). Thus Mill 
opens up the possibility that public distaste can be turned into legitimate 
coercion when self-regarding actions are publicly practiced. We are left with 
two key possibilities here . . The first is that provoking distaste is in fact a harm 
of sorts, interference with which, at a private level, is not socially justifiable 
for the various reasons we have discussed, but is justifiable at a public level. 
The second is that class (3) admits exceptions on some unspecified basis yet to 
be established. 
Crisp (1997: 185) suggests that Mill might have been more consistent to 
collapse classes (2) and (3) into one, and "rule out any interference based on 
feelings of offence". Crisp retreats from this on the grounds that it takes On 
Liberty too far out of context. If we consider that it is a work of political 
persuasion as much as anything else, all good effect of his work may have been 
lost had it been too shocking or radical in what it claimed should be 
permissible. This is a fair point on context, but for the purposes of present 
discussion leaves us nowhere. To assess the durability of Mill's principles, and 
to fully comprehend his social vision, we must see this ambiguity cleared up. 
To do so we must dig deeper into the architecture of Mill's principles and 
answer two rather tough questions. Do feelings of offence count as harm, and 
what are the implications thereof for the public performance of privately 
permissible acts? 
ii. The question of offence as harm 
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This is indeed a set of issues that has sparked widespread debate in Mill 
scholarship . A good first point of entry into the issue is Reese ' s (1960: 113-129) 
position of harm as harm against interests. He re-frames the criteria of the 
harm principle to the question not of whether A's actions affect B at all, but 
rather of whether A's actions affect B in certain specified regards which are 
dependant on social recognition for their status as harms. Wollheim (1973 : 5) 
attacks Reese's analysis as too conservative and too relativistic as it leaves the 
question of which "interests" are at stake open to some kind of transitory 
social convergence. His attack does seem to stick - the idea of harm as an 
attack on "standards and values" runs up against the charge . of being 
profoundly illiberal, and profoundly un-Millian. Such "standards", if employed, 
must be tied to something more durable and vital to the interests of the 
individual and the social order. On this score, Wollheim (Ibid. 8-9) is not keen 
to divorce Mill from his utilitarian background. He sees Reese's reading in the 
term "prejudicial to interests" must be socially identified and defined, which 
does not cater for Mill's adherence to certain baseline social values. 
Wollheim's (Ibid. 8-12) interpretation is rather different and key to the issue at 
stake: We must make distinctions between actions that have an actual effect 
on others, and those that only have an effect in that others hold certain beliefs 
about said action being right or wrong. 34 In seeking a more utilitarian 
underpinning for the liberty principle's concept of harm, he must contend with 
the issue that widespread emotional distress at the performance of certain 
actions looks very much like widespread pain. If accepted, this could lead us 
into remarkably dangerous territory, much of it already familiar from the above 
discussion on Devlin's objections. Are we then to credit the distaste caused to 
racists by the sight of multi-racial couples as grounds for banning said couples 
34 This, Wollheim (1973: 8-9) holds, like Reese's in terpretation, answers the crude objection to the 
sel f/other regarding action sp lit that no action is without some effect on another, but does so without 
appeals to the traditi onalist mindset and is morc open to deri valion from utili tarian principles. 
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holding hands or kissing in public? A horrific laundry list of parallel examples 
can be rolled out - gay couples, obese couples, older men with younger women 
and vice versa. Some of these offend subjective religious sensibilities, others 
personal aesthetics. Neither of these would be grounds I can see Mill could 
allow for interference, for reasons we have discussed at length, the most 
notable being the infringements on autonomy and the propagation of a 
stagnant and narrow-minded orthodoxy. 
Wollheim (Ibid.) sees two possible ways to discredit offence-based of feelings 
of distaste as a harm. The first is to limit the harm principle's scope to 
physical pain alone. This must be dismissed immediately, since Mill was far too 
sophisticated a thinker to completely discredit the notion that mental pain can 
be a harm, and to do so would undercut vast portions of his defence of 
individuality and freedom of thought. Thus Wollheim elects to proceed by 
another strategy: discrediting the pain caused by specific beliefs about right 
and wrong that emanate from individual feeling about the "right" way of life, 
under a utilitarian standard. 
We can do this, Wollheim (Ibid. 11-1 Z) claims, if we cut away the idea that 
such beliefs are in fact justified moral objections on a consequentalist reading. 
If we can prove that, when A's action distresses B, were it not for the beliefs 
of B, B would not be harmed, this serves. For utilitarian calculations must be 
made from a standpoint prior to the adoption of moral attitudes, lest said 
attitudes frame the morality of the action. Thus an action that causes pain 
simply because others think it wrong cannot be said to have painful 
consequences in a utilitarian calculation. 35 
This seems systematically neat, but is it valid? Is the mental distress felt no 
less real for emanating from beliefs that can be described as false on the 
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grounds of consequentalist rational assessment? Wollheim contends that it is 
Mill's hope that such beliefs will fade to nothingness once exposed to wider 
social context and argument: 
Moral associations which are wholly of artificial creation, when inte llectual culture 
goes on, yield by degrees to the dissolving force of analysis (Mill 2, as cited in 
Wollheim, 1973: 14). 
If accepted , this places a heavy premium on Mill's notions of the value of 
ethical confrontation. Much of Mill's defence of the freedom of thought and 
discussion (and by extension, with conditions, actions) hinges on the idea that 
ethical conflict within society is in fact desirable. 
This is Waldron's (1987: 415) contention as to why moral distress cannot count 
as harm in the Millian system. Ethical confrontation plays a crucial role in 
facilitating social progress, in that it both brings to light new ideas and affects 
the way ideas are held in society itself. By its very nature, such confrontation 
makes people uncomfortable and leads to emotional distress - in fact high 
leve ls of distress are necessary for the clash of passionate viewpoints through 
which perspectives are either affirmed, amended or discarded . As Mill himself 
puts it with his standard rhetorical flourish: 
Truth in the great practical concerns of life is so much a question of the reconci ling 
and combining of opposites that very few have minds sufficiently capacious to make 
the adjustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough 
process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners (Mill 1: 42) . 
Thus, to use Waldron's (Ibid . 417) illustration , the homophobe confronted with 
a homosexual couple in plain sight undergoes a socially crucial process . He 
faces up to people who, like him, take their sexuality seriously. He is forced to 
3~ Thi s does not simply apply lO ,1 utilitarian account. My own argumenl in Section 2 that Mill' s moral 
stand represents a kind of moral demarcated plurali sm can also concur with sllch an objection whl!n 
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at least reconsider his mental notion of homosexuals in light of the living 
instantiations of the lifestyle standing before him. As such, his capacity for 
rational appraisal should lead him to realise that sexuality is the province of 
neither the religious establishment, nor its heretical counterpoint. This leads 
to more balanced and sober social appraisal of the issues. 
This may seem a rather rose· tinted approximation of how society operates, but 
Waldron's argument, at the abstract level, strikes deep. Ethical confrontation 
is indeed, as Mill consistently argues, a hallmark and indicator of an 
intellectually vital society. Without the sparks of such a convergence and clash 
of perspectives, complacency and orthodoxy slowly erode the critical and 
progressive faculties of the social order. For Mill, moral beliefs must stand or 
whither by the harsh terms of this crucible. As Wollheim (1973:14) puts it: 
"[T]o such discussion false moral beliefs, Mill believed, are natural victims". 
As such , Waldron cautions us about the dangers of including moral distress in 
the catalogue of harms liable for legal sanction: 
Think, then, what would be entailed by an interpretation which regarded moral distress 
as sufficient to cross the threshold established by the harm principle. What ought to 
be taken as evidence of freedom of thought and lifestyle as promoting progress would 
be invoked instead as a prima facie reason for interfering with that freedom (Waldron, 
1987: 417). 
This is all convincing enough, and certainly has a profound Millian pedigree, but 
we must deal with a running assumption threaded throughout such a defence. 
If we refuse to certify morality-dependent harms, to use Honderich's (1982: 
504-514) phrase, on the basis that they will face the crossfire of social 
discourse and be judged a falsehood (or at the very least amended), we are 
working under the assumption that non-rational moral perspectives are 
inherently false. If so, we have taken a fairly bold step that we have yet to 
justify. 
J!)sessing whether certain actions should be legally sanctioned. 
The social order in Mill 179 
Wollheim (1973: 15-16) feels Mill has an answer for this lurking in a corner of 
his doctrinal structure oft ignored - namely the distinction between moral 
beliefs and preferences. Wollheim suggests we can , in the Millian conceptual 
vocabulary distinguish between positions on what others ought to do which are 
validly moral expectations, and those which are merely personal lifestyle 
preferences which the offended individual is unjustifiably holding others to 
account for not living up to. Preferences emanate purely from feelings or 
emotions, while for Mill moral beliefs are of a utilitarian character and have to 
do with consequences. It is, in Wollheim's view, a difference in scope. 
Offence drawn from emotive sources is not really a position about what all 
ought to do with reference to the broadscale social consequences involved, but 
rather positions based on what the offended individual would like to see done. 
When such preferences are confused for moral precepts society "improperly 
invests its own preferences with the character of moral laws" (Ibid.). The key 
argument that Wollheim draws out of this is that the harms involved in B's 
distress at A's action are ultimately self-generated. The action is the occasion 
of B's distress, but not the cause. The cause is the belief. 
Wollheim (Ibid. 16-20) backs this up by a further clarification of the difference 
between a belief and a preference in Millian terms. A preference is personally 
generated on two fronts - it stems from individual feeling or emotion and 
relates to the individual and her chosen / adopted way of life. These two 
criteria Wollheim sees as linked. If a belief fulfils the first condition, it by 
definition fulfils the second . This is drawn from Mill's theory of the "moral 
feelings", composed of "conscience" and the "sentiment of justice". These 
provide the sanction for moral principles, but not their proof. That must be 
drawn from consequence. On a weak reading, this means that reference to 
social / other regarding consequences independent of the belief are necessary to 
support it. On a stronger reading (which Wollheim attributes to Mill), 
reference to consequences is necessary for the belief to qualify as moral at all. 
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Thus "moral" is a social term in Mill, concerned with the rational identification 
of harmful consequences to others' vital interests. A "harm" drawn from non-
rational emotive attitudes, without identification of such consequences, is self-
generated by the holder of the attitude . If we accept this , we are better 
placed to contend that B is not pained by the action to which she objects. B is 
pained by a belief stemming from individual feeling - thus the link to second 
criterion, refers only to what B would like to see done and sees herself doing . 
As such, A's action itself falls outside the scope of B's belief. There being no 
other harm assignable to A's action, it must be classed as self-regarding. It is 
B's belief, not A's action that is the cause of the pain. "A's.action may be the 
occasion of B's pain, but it is not, in any relevant sense, the cause of B's pain". 
Furthermore, interfering with A's action, above and beyond its being 
unjustifiable on this analysis, also reinforces B's predisposition towards pain . 
Would not the state be doing a disservice to B by pandering to him and getting 
A to 'tone down' thus decreasing the possibility of his learning to deal with A? 
Honderich (1982: 504), for one, objects to Wollheim's line of reasoning on two 
counts . The first is that Wollheim has not offered any account of how we can 
assign beliefs truth value, in other words no way to declare them true or false . 
My response to this would be to endorse Waldron's line that truth , in Mill , is an 
internal goal of the entire social order. A great deal of Mill's doctrine on 
freedom of thought and discussion is , after all, premised on his fallibilist 
caveats. The whole point of a free social discourse is that no viewpoint on any 
issue can have a claim to the ultimate truth , and thus it is only through the 
clashing and melding of intersubjective social experience and exposure that we 
draw ever closer to it. What is at stake is not whether the truth or untruth of 
what we conventionally call moral beliefs can be assessed, but rather whether 
distress sourced in such beliefs counts as harm. 
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And this leads us squarely to Honderich's (Ibid. 508) second objection - that A's 
action and 6's belief are both necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for 
the mental pain caused. The pain can be removed by the subtraction of either, 
yet Wollheim has only chosen the one. This, Honderich 's claim seems to run, is 
either arbitrary or unfairly loaded as an approach. My response here is that the 
occasion for moral distress to occur does not have to be an action. The 
occasion for such distress can be the very knowledge that such things exist. 
The removal of the belief will remove the harm , removal of the action may 
not. In fact, given 6's primary belief that the action is wrong, actual 
knowledge of the action's performance may not even be necessary. There is a 
lurking secondary belief on 6 's part that the action is being performed by 
someone which can occasion the same harm as 6 witnessing the action being 
performed. 36 This, to my mind, lends force to Wollheim's contention that we 
have, in a sense, failed 6 if we do not allow for the kind of social discourse 
that will allow him to be reconciled to A's action happening. 
What is interesting is that Honderich (Ibid. 509-510) does not see Mill as 
supporting social or legal sanction being deployed against actions that are 
contentious merely by their causing feelings of distress. His position is merely 
that they are in fact harms (and as such in the class of actions liable to social 
sanction) but that deployment of particularly legal force against them is 
dismissed by Mill in terms of the costs such enforcement would have for other 
vital social interests (examples would presumably be autonomy, freedom of 
lifestyle and the positive outcomes of ethical confrontation). He feels that in 
most of the key examples in support of freedom of conscience from On Uberty, 
Mill is not undermining the value of moral distress, but bemoaning the blind 
authoritarianism with which social norms are applied. 
This, I feel, is a dubious claim. For Honderich's distinction to hold, either 
there must exist forms of coercive action against moral-distress causing 
36 I must thank Michaela Baker for her significant help in clarifying and formalising thi s j'ssue. 
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behaviour that are not blindly enforced social norms, or there are blindly 
enforced social norms that are not premised on countering forms of moral 
distress. Separation becomes technically impossible. All blindly enforced 
intersubjective social norms include preferences about the way people ought to 
act - else there would be no need to enforce them, as there would be no 
resistance to them. If the distinction fails, it only serves to highlight 
Wollheim's contention that preferences are often misdescribed as moral norms. 
Honderich's contention that the mental pain caused by distress must feature in 
a utilitarian calculus also ' smacks of oversimplification. Waldron (1987: 421-
422), for one, takes him heavily to task on this. He claims (with some validity I 
feel) that N,ill could not have accorded such distress the status Honderich 
claims he does. If it were so, his arguments in defence of minorities that 
undertake otherwise self-regarding actions that disgust the majority would be 
untenable (think of the pork-eater in a Muslim land, the Protestant in Catholic 
Spain). 
Waldron (Ibid.) ascribes this error to a fairly common misinterpretation of Mill's 
utilitarianism and how it plays into the liberty principle. As Waldron puts it: 
"Mill's utilitarianism is not a Benthamite calculus of pleasures and pains, or of 
satisfactions and dissatisfactions of all sorts". He takes Mill, in stating the 
liberty principle to be grounded in the "permanent utility of man as a 
progressive being" is on about something more than simply long term rather 
than short term calculations. He sees Mill making a broad statement here 
about the nature of the utilitarian values he seeks to promote. We may, he 
claims, find a lengthy exposition of such values in On Liberty: individual 
freedom, spontaneity, tolerance, progressiveness and a passionate yet open-
minded approach to social discourse . 
Whilst I agree with the tenets of Waldron's analysis, I would not go as far as 
completely sanctioning his interpretation that Mill would have us throw the 
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gateways to all distress causing action wide open. Though I feel Honderich's 
argument fails as it is presented , I feel his general strategy might well have 
some validity. Let us consider what Wollheim's interpretation does. He takes 
a situation in which mental distress arises. In seeking ways of eliminating such 
distress, he contrasts the two candidates for its primary source, evaluating 
which of the two sets of freedoms (B's freedom from distress, A' s freedom to 
action) once curtailed is most likely to reduce the pain. Given his concession 
that it is unsophisticated and brutely simplistic to treat only physical pain as a 
harm, it seems to me that he has treated the distress as a harm. But he has 
argued that, on a balance of social interests, this harm is ·best dealt with, as a 
rule, by forcing the primary source of this harm (B's belief) into situations of 
ethical confrontation which will , in the long term , reduce the harm potential 
best, by allowing B the opportunity to rationally reconcile himself to A's way of 
life. 
I argue that we can class A's action as other-regarding, and even grant it the 
status of a harm, but contend that the balance of social interests dictates it is 
better for B to be exposed to A's action than for B's irrational preference to be 
sanctioned. As such the distress is considered a harm, but one for which the 
balance of social interests cannot allow us to use legal or social sanction to 
prevent. 
This, as I see it, in effect transforms all issues surrounding moral distress into 
balance of rights calculations (including B's right to full exposure to contrary 
evidence to his irrational preference as a means of furthering his right to 
rational autonomy) . This, in combination with autonomy, equality and justice 
rights considerations (along with the calculation of the benefits accrued from 
ethical confrontation) loads the equation quite heavily against preferences (or, 
to be fair , non-rational , non consequentalist moral norms) being enforceable 
on the grounds of causing distress. I would claim we could, on this analysis, 
load it to the extent that the burden of proof lies with advocates ' of certain 
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cases of moral distress as a socially sanction-worthy harm to prove said cases 
the exception to the rule Wollheim's interpretation sets up. If we cast Mill's 
utilitarian calculus in the light that Waldron's interpretation does, I believe we 
have a powerful set of counterweights to the possibility of Mill's principles 
sanctioning an ill-considered moral totalitarianism, even if we do accord 
distress the status of a potential harm. 
iii. The question of offensive public action 
This is not simply a question of interpretative strategy. Whether or not we 
assign feelings of distress the status of harm in the Millian system has profound 
implications that become evident as we assess the second tough question with 
which this strand of enquiry began. This is the issue of whether we can 
legislate against the public performance of privately permissible acts on the 
grounds that they cause offence. I believe we have a far easier time dealing 
with this, one of the more thorny issues of any social theory, if we frame the 
Millian treatment of it as, at base, a balance of rights issue and not the abject 
dismissal of distress-dependent harm that Wollheim would have us set in place. 
Observe. 
Why is sex in public places so wrong? It does not seem there is any definite 
other-regarding harm being caused. Think about sex in a public park as 
opposed to setting fires (potentially dangerous) or abluting in the open 
(unsanitary). It can be said that it is an example of attempting to privatise 
public space, comparable to playing a radio extremely loudly on a subway (in 
that it causes noise pollution and infringes upon others' rights to comfort, 
conversation etc.) but the two aren't necessarily directly analogous. Playing 
the radio extremely loudly is impossible to ignore unless others clamp their 
ears shut or move to another part of the train. While it is true that the 
individual who finds the sight in the park distasteful can simply look away, it 
could be argued that the offence caused would be a barrier to, for example, 
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others wishing to have family picnics. This still remains problematic. Noise 
pollution is unavoidable by virtue of having the sense of hearing, and as such 
can be a barrier to, for example, others' right to have conversations, listen to 
their own walkmans, and have as much comfort as shared public space can 
allow. There seems to be a parallel in terms of the latter condition - sex in 
parks would certainly make a large proportion of current publics 
uncomfortable. Especially conSidering it would include breaking the long-
standing social taboo of exposing sexual activity to children. But it is when we 
unpack it further, to the source of the discomfort in question, that we come to 
the true meat and bones of the issue - society's issues with sex in general. In 
trying to pinpoint the source of such offence, we can throw up various 
candidates. Aesthetics would be a contender, but it is an area so subjective 
that any calculable distaste wanes to inconsequence if we are on a quest for 
principle. Why not then, for example, prevent overweight or tastelessly 
dressed people from going out in public at all? Social convention is another 
possibility, but we are thence quickly led to ask what dynamics it is based on. 
Ultimately, in just about any area in which sex and offence are linked, we are 
led to traditional religious perspectives as the dealbreaker. 
Thus the running dynamic that rears up throughout this debate, and possibly 
any modern dispute of the nature of background morals. This is the constant 
face off between religious and non-religious perspectives. We have to accept 
that many of the long-standing aversions to disputed self-regarding practices -
such as prostitution, pornography, and homosexuality - have a strong basis in 
traditional religious values. As such, we are back in territory endemically 
familiar to Mill, and can make a more useful assessment of how he saw his own 
principles applying to matters in which distaste based on religious perspectives 
is an issue. Examples of these abound in Mill. One of these is his attempt to 
assess to what an extent societies with a majoritive religious population are 
justified in legislating religious practice, he considers the example of 19th 
century Catholic Spain. At that time the practice of any other variant of 
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Christianity (let alone other religions) was not permitted on Spanish soil. Mill's 
analysis is predictably scathing: 
No stronge r case can be shown for prohibiting anything which is rega rded as personal 
immorali ty, than is made out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those who 
regard them as impie ties; and unless we are willing to adopt the logic of pe rsecutors, 
and to say that we may persecute others because we are right, and that they must not 
persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a principle which 
we should resent as a gross injustice the application to ourselves (Mill 1 ; 77) . 
This is vintage Mill , and premised as much on common sense as upon arguments 
already discussed . What it does hint at though, is that tolerance implies an 
attitude of mutual respect and recognition. Thus we might ask that the couple 
in the park respect that the public parading of an action many consider morally 
questionable offends the pluralism of a tolerant society, and as such would be 
better practiced in private where it more firmly affects only themselves. 
The obvious problem with this is the question of why we hold the religious 
perspective has more claims to a space of tolerant distance than, for example, 
the racist. Both can stand accused of being premised on an irrational set of 
assumptions about the nature of humanity. The difference I feel , from a 
Millian perspective, is that racism , at a fundamental level, is laden with far 
more potential for social damage than theism . It has in built assumptions that 
demand that rights accrued to one portion of the human race be denied to 
another. If enacted into legislation it infringes not only social equity and 
individual autonomy but also the whole fabric of social welfare - it causes 
massive divisiveness and hatred and is fraught with the potential for tangible 
social harm . Theism enacted into legislation is equally problematic if it, as in 
Mill's example of Catholic Spain, dehumanizes and denies rights to certain 
sections of the population . The difference of course is that religion can be 
changed by human action , race cannot. One can convert to Catholicism , one 
cannot change the colour of one's skin. So we are back to the question of 
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whether and when personal religious choice can be enforced by even a 
majority upon a minority. By the terms of the tolerant social mindscape Mill 
has etched out, the legal status of irreligious (but not directly harmful) private 
practice is fairly straightforward . . It is the public display - the private action 
turned social - on which we are still firmly stuck. 
Mill brings up a key example in reference to the habit of empowered puritan 
social elites to ban the practice of public amusements - particularly theatre 
and dance: 
How will the remaining portion of the community like to have the amusements that 
shall be permitted to them regulated by the religious and moral sentiments of the 
stricter Calvinists and Methodists? Would they not, with considerable peremptoriness, 
desire these intrusively pious members of society to mind their own business? This is 
precisely what should be said to every government and every public, who have the 
pretension that no person shall enjoy any pleasure which they think wrong (Mill 1: 78). 
This principle can be applied more widely to , say, the availability of 
pornography and in particular the existence of adult cinemas and strip clubs. 
And this , finally, sheds some light on how we might keep conflicting social 
moralities in balance. We allow these practices since their moral status is, at a 
personal level left permanently undecided. Not because society immediately 
assumes the religious position on them is objectively wrong. Thus, while we 
cannot, by Mill's principles, outlaw the existence of strip-clubs as a public 
amusement on grounds of religious objection, it is not necessary to safeguard 
the rights of their patrons that strip shows be performed in public parks, or 
that we open them to children who have not quite formed the capacity for 
their own judgements quite yet. 37 This might well be to infringe as heavily 
?7 This is by no means an argument for banning practical and balanced discourse tools such as the teaching 
of sexual education syllabi in schools. To merely present children coming in to pUberty with the hard and 
fast facts and implications of sexual activity to ass ist in their informed decision making is very di fferent 
from allowing them access to places wh\!rc sexuality is. to many minds, cheapened. commod ified and 
unhealthily represented. Whether it is indeed thl!se thi ngs is a question Idt to ind ividual adu lt minds to 
decide as a matter of self-regarding practice. 
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upon the conservative element of society as the conservative elements once 
infringed upon the permissive. )8 
This being said, there remains what Wolff (1998: 2-6) calls a "notorious" 
paragraph slipped into the final chapter of On Liberty that suggests Mill does 
indeed recognise public distaste for an action as a valid reason to prevent its 
public performance. This is where Mill states, rather hurriedly and almost as 
an aside , that "offences against decency" and actions that offend "good 
manners" must be privately permissible, but may be justifiably prohibited from 
being performed in public (Mill 1: 88). 
It goes without saying that this all sounds rather un-Millian , given the broader 
schematic of his thought. Wolff (1998: 6) identifies four key routes marked out 
by the cannon of Mill scholarship to explaining the presence of what looks very 
much like a concession to legitimizing social penalties based on moral distress. 
The first two have to do with how we may manipulate the concept of "harm" 
so as to render such provisions consistent with the liberty principle. We may 
generate a concept of harm as a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
enforcement of legal/social penalty and somehow define it to fit the remainder 
of Mill's structure, or we may take the necessary condition interpretation 
already outlined above, whereby harm delimits the range of actions liable for 
social sanction, and the question of their enforcement is settled by assessing 
such a measure's impact on the broader range of social interests. The latter 
seems to fit Mill's principle structure far more coherently than the former (it 
JlI This is does not necessaril y commit us lO respecting the pref~rences of racists nnd homophobes. Racism, 
as I have mentioned, is an att itude Inden with the potential for tangible damage that we can safely 
disregard. Homophobia is a more difficu lt casco On one hand, the obj ec tions 10 public displays of 
homosexual behaviour fall inlo the same category as the objections currently under discussion to allY 
display of public sexuality. The ohjections to two gay men performing oral sex in public would be the 
same on a balanced perspecti ve to a straight couplc doing the sume thing. As to persons who feel offended 
at the prospect of gay couple's holding hands in public, we must remind ourselves that they would not deny 
straight couples the same ri ghts, and thus stand in lhe same corner as the racists in denying social equity 
between two ohjectively equal classes of the population. So, we can ultimately, discliss moral objections to 
public di splays of sexual behaviour that are not directl y analogous LO clear bigotry. 
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is, after all, the way Mill explicitly states it). But the re are two more 
possibilities that Wolff considers - both relating to the idea that the provisions 
in question are inconsistent: the issue thence becomes whether Mill was 
unaware of the inconsistency (Waldron's view, for one), or was aware of it and 
felt the liberty principle admitted certain exceptions (Skorupksi's position) . 
This latter position would require a return to an interpretation of harm along 
the line of either Reese or Wollheim, but more broadly and with certain 
exceptional cases. 
It is, ultimately, the harm-as-necessary-condition strategy that Wolff (Ibid_ 6-7) 
adopts and, I feel, makes a strong case for how we may, under such an 
analysis, clarify and resolve the disjunct the "indecency policy" seems to 
represent in Mill. The first avenue open to us is the suggestion that public 
indecency (our by now recurrent sex in parks example will serve) represents a 
misuse of common space. This position, as put forward by Ten (1980: 105), 
suggests there is a distinction to be drawn between acts of public expression 
and "public nuisances". These Ten would define as actions that cause offence, 
and thus force others to unnecessarily alter their activities in order to avoid 
such sights, and this represents an unjustified sleight against their autonomy of 
action (think, for example, of families wishing to have picnics in the park in 
question). The problem of course, is that the grand question of whether we 
must thus sanction racist and homophobic offence arises immediately here. 
Wolff (1998 : 6-7) does concede that Ten is able to find independent reasons for 
denying socially harmful attitudes the same privilege, but Wolff feels that a 
more encompassing doctrine (and one drawn more directly from the Millian 
cannon39) would be preferable . 40 
:W There is, afLcr alt , aside from the reference to the phrase, no expli cit doctrine of "public nui san~es" in 
Mill. 
40 Beyond this, if we consider Waldron 's points about the value of moral distress in Mill , it is diffi cult to 
set! how a Millian social schema could sanction a society walking on eggshells around its more emotionally 
contentious issues. This wi ll be discussed in terms of W aldron' s issue with the "behind 'closed doors" 
interpretation, helow. 
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Wolff's (Ibid. 8) exposition of an explicitly Millian defence of the indecency 
policy follows fairly simple lines. He begins with an echo of Waldron's 
contention that Mill's doctrine of rights is neither natural nor contractual, but 
rather a set of constraints safeguarding certain vital human interests. He adds 
to this the argument brought forward by Riley and Conway that distress-
dependent harms in Mill are not a question of the nature of the offence, nor its 
source, but rather a question of the rights related consequences of prohibiting 
certain actions. Prohibiting homosexuality has dire implications for the 
individual (and by extension social) interest in safeguarding autonomy, the 
right to experiments in living (as discussed at length in the Chapter 1). It 
furthermore, as the discussion above has brought out, runs against the rights to 
equality before the law (we do not, for example, deny the right to sex before 
marriage to straight couples, even though this would be an equal source of 
distress to members of the religious sector), and runs the charge of being 
irrationally paternalistic (recall my discussion of Devlin's objections). 
But, as Wolff (Ibid. 9-10) points out, the prohibition of the public, whilst not 
the private, practice of offensive acts doesn't necessarily incur such costs. 
Prohibiting the public performance of an action that remains privately 
permissible does not have the same dire and sweeping social consequences 
outlined above. The public prohibition can stand whilst the private lifestyle 
continues. The public version is "unnecessary". 
This is, as Wolff intended, a neat way of tying up a fairly controversial policy 
point in On Uberty, but it is perhaps a little too neat. While I would support 
Wolff's interpretative strategy (with the same cautions which I applied in 
Honderich's case), I feel his case, as stated has certain pitfalls which must be 
negotiated. One of these is Waldron's crucial reminder that ethical 
confrontation loses all progressive force unless the manner of a viewpoint's 
expression is passionate, direct and public, in a manner that the viewpoint's 
opponents cannot ignore. He traces this to Mill's belief that vehemence and 
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toleration are ultimately compatible. Mill certainly does accept that the 
manner of assertion may be objectionable and subject to censure by public 
opinion - he specifically mentions sarcasm, invective and "vituperative 
language" (Mill 1: 47-48). But he immediately makes it clear that he feels law 
has no business censoring these, and besides which they are more likely to be 
used as repressive tools on the side of orthodoxy, hence Mill's famed 
contention that there is "more need to discourage offensive attacks on 
infidelity than on religion" (Ibid.). What this brings out is the crucial pOint that 
any form of protest activity or challenge to orthodoxy is likely to cause 
offence. Orthodoxies are not known to shake gently, and the most effective 
weapons at the activist's disposal are those most likely to incite passionate 
discussion - often, in other words , the most shocking. Offence is thus part and 
parcel of social progress, and it is easy to see how trying to balance in offence 
as a harm liable to legal sanction in rights calculations may have dire 
implications for what Mill (validly, I feel) sees as a socially crucial activity, 
namely heretical thinking and expression. 
Wolff (1998: 11-16) does consider this issue, and responds with an interesting 
triad of classification for actions which cause offence, and by their very nature 
and intention can only be public. His three divisions are based upon the 
intention of the action: exhibitionism (roaming naked through the 
neighbourhood supermarket with "KISS MY WIGGLY BITS" painted on one's 
back) educative va lue (actions which broaden and enlighten the public 
perspective on an issue) and protest value (protest marches and other forms of 
public issue-based activism).41 On a balance of rights approach, Wolff 
contends, we can distinguish offensive actions which are socially useful from 
those which are simply offensive. He admits that distinctions between the 
three may blur, but we at least have a framework of interpretation within 
which to assess such application issues . 
41 The latter twO do seem to blur into each other somewhat. A gay pride march in a modern democracy is an 
example that falls into both categories. 
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I remain convinced that certain unseen dangers yet lurk at the edges of Wolff's 
position . One of these are issues with "permissible, but behind closed doors" 
distinctions that Mill scholarship of Wolff's shade often throws up. Waldron 
expresses what I must take a genuine Millian concern here - that lifestyles that 
exhibit novelty, eccentricity or some heretic strain will be driven by public 
opinion into the inscrutable private lives of those that live them, without even 
entering the social discourse with any significance . Requirements that moral 
distress be sanctioned as harm seem to Waldron an unfortunate parallel to the 
"transmitter shields" in Bruce Ackerman's "liberal" utopia, which allow 
citizens to immediately screen out any material they find offensive. These, 
Waldron (1987: 420-421) contends , would have horrified Mill, as they would 
short-circuit the very process that he feels ensures any form of social and 
moral progress, namely constant exposure and rational confrontation . 
iv. A viable Millian ' indecency' policy 
So, we must decide where the final force of argument lies. What do we do 
with the couple in the park? Do we go with Wollheim and Waldron in dismissing 
moral distress-dependent harms as alien to the Millian system, or can we 
calculate into a balance of rights approach that Honderich and Wolff might 
recommend? In a fashion I feel Mill himself would find ironically appropriate , 
the correct approach seems to strike somewhere at the centre, somewhere 
between these two ranks of scholars fighting under "hostile banners" (Mill 
1 :42). 
I still maintain that neither Wollheim nor Waldron have conclusively proven 
that moral (or at the very least mental) distress cannot, unde r any 
circumstances be a sole generator of harm under Mill's analysis . There may, 
after all , be various mental harms that have no socially progressive value 
whatsoever - that drag society towards no ethical re-evaluation, nor provide 
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any launch point for progressive ethical confrontation (the "KISS MY WIGGLY 
BITS" example can only in a very distant sense be said to usefully question 
social morality). But there is disorder in the opposite ranks as well. The 
advocates of the balance of rights approach covered here seem to err on the 
opposite side by providing insignificant caveats that safeguard the foundational 
principles of the Millian social vision, most notably the confrontational social 
ethics just discussed. 
I would thus advocate that my earlier suggested interpretation stands. We 
allow for the possibility of moral distress to count as a harm, but weight 
several values against it - all the hallmark Millian liberal interests already 
discussed at length as well the concern that such a calculation is not used to 
scare exemplars of potentially useful new life practices to the dark and barely 
visible fringe that is purely private action. Only distress that offends none of 
these significantly can be said to count as a counter-enforceable harm in our 
rights calculations. 
The attitude this engenders is a kind of demarcated pluralism, but one which 
ultimately preserves the "politics of engagement" I ascribe to Mill. If we 
accept a principle of mutual social respect for moral perspectives, essentially 
an agreement to disagree, we can justifiably ban sex in the parks not in the 
name of morality, but in the name of furthering tolerance. We have not 
outlawed fornication (nor for that matter erotic adult entertainment, provided 
it is not set up on every street corner). Have we undercut ethical 
confrontation? I think not. We have simply insisted that in the context of an 
avowedly public space, actions that we allow on the basis of their moral status 
being permanently undecided should not be shoved down the throats of those 
who have decided against them, unless there is some grander social educative 
or protest value at stake, or a useful clash point of ethical confrontation. Have 
we crushed autonomy or outlawed the possibility of a socially significant and 
potentially beneficial lifestyle practice? Not really. The autonomy of those 
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involved is not significantly hampered by asking of them that they practice 
such activities in private, or at least not in a space so completely foresworn to 
pluralism as a public park. Sexual activity as a lifestyle ethic remains freely 
practiced and unhampered. In the name of a tolerant society, we can ask the 
couple in the park to find a room. 
This is by no means a retreat to a politics of avoidance, if we consider that one 
of the rafters of the Millian architecture I am constructing insists that ethical 
engagement be something rationally managed and institutionally stabilised. 
This requires, at certain junctures , a broadened sensitivity on the part of the 
citizenry to the mercurial nature of common environments, and this , on a 
balance of interests, must sometimes be legislatively enforced. This leads us 
to the rather tricky question of how Mill would frame the rules of such a 
common discourse. The best way to answer such queries, I believe, is to 
examine and evaluate the Millian provisions for the clearest realm of ethical 
confrontation , namely that of spoken and written discourse. Thus we are led 
to Mill's most famed philosophical war cry, what Skorupski calls his "Glittering 
paean for liberty of expression" (1989: 369). 
3.3.4) Liberty of expression 
i. Context and framing of the arguments for liberty of expression 
Freedom of expression as a liberal social conviction owes perhaps its greatest 
debt to On Liberty. It is neither necessary nor useful to list the various ways in 
which the tenets of Mill's position on such matters have influenced both 
analysis and policy. Mill is understood as an advocate of (almost) unlimited 
free speech and expression, and On Liberty has indeed gone on to become 
something of a handbook for defenders of such freedoms. The text's 
eloquence, however, can sometimes mask some of the trickier background 
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issues that present themselves in this particularly volatile area of social theory. 
As Skorupksi (1989: 369) points out "these august pages persuade rather by 
inspiration than reasoning. As cold philosophical argument they can easily stick 
in the throat". 
What an excavation of Mill's famed argumentation here can help crystallize is 
how far, and to what level, Mill is willing to push perhaps the grandest aim of 
his social vision: ethical and intellectual confrontation leading ever closer to 
rational convergence. For the question of what latitude individuals are given in 
the name of pursuing truth , and with what implications, gives us a quasi -final 
assessment of how viable Mill's adversarial community of ideas actually is. As 
such, my aim in this section is to grind down Mill's rhetorical prowess to a 
harder, finer grain in an attempt to gain a clearer conception of what his 
discourse·driven society might entail. 
Mill's three-fold justification for why we cannot constrain opinion is well 
known, some of it readily familiar from the discussion above. Firstly, the 
opinion/expression being subjected to suppression might well be true. To 
suppress it is to assume an infallibalism beyond human faculties. Secondly, 
even broadly false opinions often contain elements of truth that we may well 
risk disregarding if expression of such opinions is suppressed. That most views , 
especially on any issue of common public concern, contain a rough mix of truth 
and falsehood is a common-sense observation. It is only through the trial by 
social fire that is the clash between warring perspectives that the full truth 
emerges. Thirdly, even positions that were originally premised on truth risk 
losing their vigour, vitality and rational grounding if not confronted with people 
that truly believe the converse (Mill 1: 30). There are certain issues of 
clarification with all of these (and I shall deal with them in short order), but 
first , to frame any useful assessment, we must understand what the argument 
for freedom of expression aims to achieve, and what few limitations Mill does 
give it. 
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ii. The dialogue model 
Skorupski (1989: 369-370) sees the principle not as a wide-open rhetorical orgy 
that must go on unabated regardless of consequence, but rather as an attempt 
to strike down certain types of reasons for prohibiting expression _ These 
reasons are any agenda that seeks to limit or constrain what he labels 
"dialogue". This "dialogue model", as Skorupski calls it, works by assessing the 
flow of rational responsibility for effects that flow from acts of expression. If 
Bob imparts certain opinions or information to Leonard , and Leonard then takes 
harmful action based on said information, said action cannot, on a rational 
analysis, be Bob's responsibility. The information had to pass the checkpoints 
of Leonard's rational capacity, and as such the actions that Leonard performs 
remain his responsibility. Bob has simply presented a viewpoint to an agent 
capable of rational judgement. But Skorupski realizes this is too simplistic a 
description of the way expression operates in a social context. One key 
exception here is when there is a definite foreseeable harm that the act of 
expression causes. Skorupski brings out Scanlon's example of a professor that 
discovers a simple home recipe for a lethal nerve gas, using easily available 
ingredients, and wishes to distribute it on flyers. Such an expression can be 
forbidden on the grounds that there is a readily recognisable possibility that 
such information would give persons of harmful intent simple and handy means 
to carry out indubitably harmful acts. A would-be terrorist that uses the recipe 
is following an instrumentally rational process in applying the information to 
objectives already possessed. The rational responsibility still accords to the 
professor in that he can reasonably deduce that such effects will follow from 
the information that he imparts. 42 
42 This particular example is taken fi rmly out of the realm of extreme theoretical possibility and placed 
directly in the context of contemporary social reality when we consider the widespread dissemination of rhe 
Anarchist 's Cookbook on the internet. The text, long banned from traditional pub lishing. instructs lhe 
curious how to perform a whole range of socially hos(i lt: activity, from mi sdemeanour level phont!-fraud to 
the construction of homc-made napalm and fertilizer bombs. ] remain unconvinced .. though, that 
distributing such a publication has as direcl a line of responsibility 1O the dislribulOr as Mill's rabble-rouser 
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As such, Skorupksi distils his position further. "Dialogue" he claims, is 
"unconstrained discourse between rational people" (Ibid. 371, my italics). 
This, he (Ibid.) argues, puts us in a position to distinguish between dialogue 
and non-dialogue effects of an expression . Dialogue effects are responses 
routed through the autonomous rational faculties of someone who "engages 
with the act of expression critically, as an act of dialogue" (Ibid . ) An action 
can fail to be a dialogue effect by a failure or defect in the recipient's rational 
capacity to interpret such as dialogue (setting limits on , for example, what acts 
of expression we mayor may not expose to children), by dialogue not being the 
expresser's intention, or by the recipient not being in any state to use their 
rational powers of assessment (enraged mobs, as we shall see shortly, are a 
good example of this) . We can under this analysis, be held responsible for the 
foreseeable , harmful non-dialogue effects of our expressions. Skorupski is 
quick to point out that the model does not end by affirming the principle that 
likely dialogue effects should always go unmolested. There are provisions that 
the expresser must follow , for example not telling known untruths . 
Intentionally misleading statements re-instate rationa l responsibility for 
dialogue effects, and such the general requirement that Skorupksi brings out is 
reliability. The significance of this, must, he feels be judged against 
dialogue's highest internal goal , namely truth seeking: 
The fact of unconstrained convergence on an opinion or attitude carri es its distinctive 
authenticating weight only to the extent that each discussant responds individually to 
the requirements of right reason as they honestly appear to him. When we respond to 
evidence and reasons , we must have our eye on the evidence and the reasons, not on 
the other respondents. Only unde r that condition can convergence be regarded as a 
mark of correspondence to truth (Ibid. 372). 
speaking to the mob outside the corn-dealers house. T here is certainly curiosi ty value in such material for 
people who have no intention whatsoever of using it. There is even potenti al cou nter-~arnifu l use in the 
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As such, the dialogue model translates the principle of liberty of expression 
into a position that honest dialogue effects should go unmolested. We are 
answerable only for the foreseeable, harmful non-dialogue effects of our 
expressions. 43 Furthermore, Skorupski maintains that all effects of expression 
are assumed to be dialogue effects until proven otherwise. 44 
iii. Harmful non-dialogue effects and hate speech 
Skorupski (Ibid.) thus sees the principle of liberty of expression supplementing 
the liberty principle, rather than presenting a special case of it. Once the 
liberty principle has set out the range of actions to which legal sanction can be 
applied (harm causing), the principle of liberty of expression must be called in 
to see when harm that can be tied to an act of expression. This is a 
straightforward case of assessing whether the responsibility for harm lies with 
the expression that aided or inspired it, or the agent that performed the 
harmful activity that results. That line is drawn at the harmful and foreseeable 
non-dialogue effects. This, Skorupski holds, clarifies Mill's own famed 
limitation example of the rabble-rouser outside the corn-dealers' house: 
No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, 
Even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which they are expressed 
are such to constitute thei r expressions a positive instigation of some mischievous act. 
An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is 
material (as an ah;:rt. for example, 1O potential vic tims of credit card fraud). 
43 I would add the provision that this should apply only if th e.! harmful non-dialogue effects were the OIl!.V 
foresc\!uble resull of an expression. If the principle of liberlY of express ion is indeed, as Skorupksi claims, 
a subset of the liberty principit!, then an expression thut presents the possibil ity of a variety of non-dialogue 
effects, some of which are harmful and some of which are nOl, must be assessed according to the balance of 
rights model set oul in the previous section. 
44 Skorupksi (1989: 386) does set out that this is a profoundly liberal assumption, and one that seems at 
odds with the often ignorant and irrational nalure of society, but this is not really a concern if we 
understand the principle of liberty of expression as part of a more general ri ghts framework that includes 
principles of justice and restraint of violent activity. Besides which, as discussed, foreseeably harn1ful nun-
dialogue effect as might be caused by ignorant and irrational behaviour (inflamed mubs once more) are 
li able for legal counter-sanction unda the Millian analysis presented here. 
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robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may 
justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the 
house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about the same mob in the form of a placard 
(Mill 1 : 49). 
It is thus that we come to a Millian framework for dealing with what bills of 
rights the world over describe as "incitement to violence" as a limitation on 
freedom of speech. But Mill's own example here has brought out the grey-area 
difficulties of this approach_ Mill seems to feel that in the more remote 
dialogue forum of publications such sentiments should not be suppressed, even 
though they might inspire mobs to assemble before the corn-dealers house. Is 
this not the same pattern at one remove? Skorupski would hold that opinions 
expressed in publication, provided they are not deliberately misleading, fall 
under the heading of honest dialogue effects, and are thus defended by the 
liberty principle_ But, it must be noted that we do have a highly controversial 
name for expressions of this kind - hate speech_ 
It is here, then, that we must cast a harsher light on some of Mill's arguments 
for allowing unconstrained dialogue_ Need we really sanction the opinions of 
racists and neo-Nazis in the name of greater freedom? Crisp (1997: 194-195), 
for one, takes issue with this_ He holds that Mill exhibits too nai've a faith in 
human rationality_ He takes the example of Goebbels' notorious anti-Semitic 
propaganda campaigns as something that he feels the principle of utility would 
have to see silenced whatever the consequences for liberalism: 
Nor is it at all plausible to argue that those who believed Jews and other minority 
groups to be morally equal to other human beings would have been led by the silencing 
of the Nazis into holding their beliefs as dead dogma ... The long term interests of 
humanity will be better served by encouraging the end of racism rather than allowing it 
to have its day. That particular list is better closed (Crisp, 1997: 195)_ 
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While Crisp (Ibid.) does concede that certain comparisons can be drawn 
between the Nazis and their public, and the rabble-rouser and his mob outside 
the corn-dealers' house, he still feels that discounting the prohibition on 
certain forms of speech that represent attitudes loaded with social-harm 
potential is a major lacuna in Mill's doctrine. 
I can't help but feel Crisp has made a crucial misstep here. The Nazi state 
machine was geared in multiple ways to prop up a system of subordination 
eventually resulting in genocide. The propaganda campaign was an aspect of 
this machinery, dedicated to winning over the support of the wider German 
population for policies that gradually extended to being harmful in the worst 
possible degree. Many things Goebbels' machinations were, but they were not 
an act of dialogue performed in a context of democratic ethical confrontation. 
Only through the callous and calculated wreckage of the very institutional 
structure of a liberal democracy were the Nazis able to perpetrate the vast 
majority of their social harms. We must also bear in mind that the worst of 
Nazi hate-speech was an act of state propaganda, which runs counter to the 
very tenets of Mill's society of dialogue. It is a profound disanalogy to compare 
the Nazi campaigns occurring in such a context to a racist or Neo-Nazi group 
casting its message of hate into the adversarial plurality of voices that is a 
modern democracy. 
This being said - does Mill honestly maintain that in a society in search of truth 
needs racists and neo-Nazis to keep its belief in non-discrimination alive? Mill 
feels he proves his case for this by way of example and common sense. One of 
his key examples is the separation the Catholic Church strikes between the 
clergy and the laity - the former may read heretical texts for the purposes of 
being able to better strike them down in argument, whereas the latter may 
not. This Mill sees as a powerful analogy for the way developed social orders 
can dangerously preside over their citizenry by delimiting and denying a range 
of "untrue" beliefs from entering general discussion (Mill 1: 33-34). Even if the 
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beliefs are, as in the case of racism, socially tried and tested as false and 
dangerous prejudice. Chasing such expression for all time from the public 
forum can have a dangerous effect on the true beliefs in tolerance and equality 
that are such a doctrine's necessary and established social counterpoint. This 
is that: 
[NJot only the grounds of the opinion are forgotten in the absence of diSCUSSion, but 
too often the meaning of the opinion itself. The words which convey it cease to suggest 
ideas, or suggest only a small portion of those were originally employed to 
communicate. Instead of vivid conception and living belief there remain only a few 
phrases learnt by rote; or, if any part, the shell and husk only of the meaning is 
retained, the finer essence being lost (Mill 1 : 34) . 
The danger is see Mill painting here is a theoretical extreme, but I feel this is a 
point too seldom or too shallowly discussed when it comes to issues surrounding 
freedom of expression. Blanket bans on discourses or opinions deemed to be 
racist are dangerous for a number of reasons. The first, obvious, one is that 
such labels become dangerous tools in the hands of censors and states in 
general, leading us back to the endemically Millian claim that state 
interference has a nasty tendency to perpetrate more evils than it seeks to 
outlaw. But the issue Mill has just brought out is an equally interesting reason 
to allow hate-based doctrines access to public discourse_ Such doctrines often 
arise from adverse social circumstances, and often as a scapegoat for larger 
social problems. The link between hate-groups and populations in economic or 
social confusion is almost a given in the modern social order. The rise of neo-
Nazi movements amongst working class youth in Europe during the economic 
confusion that accompanied the birth of the EU bears this out. If our own 
noble liberal attitudes take upon themselves the status of sacred edicts, to be 
obeyed and never questioned, a crucial opportunity to cut such hate group 
activity off at the root is lost. Only by allowing each new hate manifestation to 
foolishly expose itself, and be shown, as all others have, that the concerns it 
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points to have to do with a vast range of factors that have nothing at all to do 
with race, can such hate be successfully picked apart in the minds of the 
average citizenry facing the everyday concerns (unemployment, economic 
strife) that modern racists often roll out as "proof" of the 
"Jewish " / "Black" / "foreign " source of the "cancer" / "conspiracy" / "insidious 
influe nce" in society. 
Banning anti·Semitic marches and outlawing the word "nigger" from 
publications does not end racism . Dictating a liberal ten commandments does 
nothing to disable it either. It must be engaged with and struck down as false , 
not blankly denied access.45 This represents real confrontation with beliefs and 
social dynamics that could be far more dangerous if driven underground and 
allowed the delusion that the "establishment" is "afraid" of their "truth". 
Such attitudes can be the birthplace of a lethal breed of extremism. In the 
more common grey·area cases where right and wrong seem less rationally 
definitive, such an approach is even more crucial. There is something of Mill's 
naturalism at work here - the battle of beliefs becomes a kind of survival of the 
intellectually fittest. Outlawing whatever goes against "commonly held " truth 
runs the various risks that all of Mill's fallibalist caveats warn of, in addition to 
allowing the possibility that the proper grounding of our true and necessary 
beliefs will grow shakier, and leave them more open to attack from those we 
seek to eliminate by rational conquest - such as racists. Liberalism, forsworn 
as it is to rational scrutiny on the part of citizens, cannot allow its own positive 
precepts to become mere dogma. 46 This I see as the heart of Mill's politics of 
45 An interes ti ng case of how th is can be done is demonstrated by the website http://www,hatewatch.org 
that co ll ects and itemises various types of hate s ites according to region and category fo r just such a social 
p(iu~~~e;e l alcs (0 what Skorupski (1989: 38 1) follows Tcn in labelli ng the "avoidance of mistake" argument 
( th is Ten distinguishes from the "assumption of in fallibil ity" argumenl lhat we shall consider short ly), The 
mi stake-avoidance argument identifies an all too frequently occurring social dynam ic - that a bel ief so 
repeatedly withstands counter-evidence that the urgency of seeking out such counterpoints fades. It is thus 
that many social ly entrenched ~liefs came to he entrenched for centuries, only LO be later corrected hy new 
evidence and argumt!nl that was finally recognised. Tht! only way to avoid such long-standing error is to 
have as much argumen t and discussion as possible ci rcul ating within the social order. M ilt knocks down 
lhe possible objecti on thaL truth will al ways ul timately triumph over error in the long run (and lhe follow-on 
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engagement - a social vision where the best and worst is always out front, 
socially speaking, as opposed to lurking in da rk corners . Mill would have, I 
feel, applauded Henry Kissinger's oft·quoted dictum that "there is no 
disinfectant like sunlight". This is not, however, a call to social anarchy. The 
limitations Mill sets out, as I see it, represent a rational framework for the 
management of such conflicts as do arise, preserving the viable intellectual 
and ethical conflict necessary to progress without fomenting physical chaos. 
Mill is ultimately asking us to institutionally and educationally frame the social 
space as a realm of dialogue - of ideas as well as lifestyles. This social vision, 
as I see it, can be credited in roughly equal parts to Mill's developmental idea 
of individual and social perfectibility (as discussed in Section 3.4) and his 
fallibilist caveats. Though I believe the two are intricately linked, it is the 
latter we must now subject to more rigorous assessment. 
iv. The Plausibility of Mill's fallibilism 
This ultimately leads us to consider a question that Skorupski presents -
namely, how intuitive is the fallibalism argument? Mill ' s argument turns on 
censors assuming their certainty is the same as absolute certainty. The natural 
objection to be made here is that any action is based on a belief that mayor 
may not be true , and thus falls short of absolute certainty. Are we to cease all 
activity on the grounds of our own infallibility? Mill admits this as an issue, and 
admits that there is, indeed, no such thing as absolute certainty, but there is 
"assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life" (Mill 1: 17) . Mill thence 
sets up and knocks out a ghost objection to this: Is not the censor who cuts off 
argument thai it is not necessary to he as cautious of censorship as he would li ke us to he) wi th two key 
rejoinders. Firstly, to reward those who attempt to provide insights of lasting benefit to mankind with 
martyrdom is neither fair nor wise, in that it inst.antiates a social mindscape of cautious charac ters prone to 
accept falsehood. (Mill I: 24-25). Secondly, true insights may well he ··thrown back for centuries ... the 
Reformat ion broke out at leas t twenty times be fo re Luther, and was put down" (Ibid.). 
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public access to beliefs he sincerely feels to be false acting with such 
assurance? Mill's response is that the censor's actions go beyond this: 
There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true , because, 
with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth 
for the purpose of not permitting its refutation (Mill 1 : 17). 
Skorupski (1989: 378-380) accepts that this is not as intuitively plausible as it 
may at first appear. When we consider our framework of justified belief, a 
paradox arises. That which we are justified in believing, we must be justified 
in discounting. But the fatal error such an approach makes is to see justified 
belief as a static state. If we accept that we are only justified in believing 
something relevant to the evidence and argument available at present then 
the dynamic changes somewhat. Under such an analysis, we can see that Mill's 
point stands. In disregarding the possibility of new evidence and argument, the 
censor commits the dual sin of prematurely shoring up her own position, and 
more crucial to our current discussion deciding such matters for others without 
allowing them access to the contrary viewpoint to decide such matters for 
themselves. This is the assumption of infallibility Mill fears - the intellectual 
paternalism that he sees so sadly exemplified by the Catholic attitude towards 
the laity. This leads Skorupski to an overall vision of Mill's doctrine that is 
relevant both to this section and to the object of this thesis as a whole: 
Arguing and assessing evidence is a collective pursuit. This is the deepest stratum of 
Mill's discussion, and at this level a link between the two themes, the theme of 
fallibilism and the theme that dialogue is necessarily communal, can indeed be found ... 
I can have confidence in the objectivity of my reasoning only so long as I can 
reasonably hold that in ideal dialogue others would freely converge on it (Ibid. 380). 
The idea of ethical confrontation as a collective social pursuit is a further 
manifestation of the Millian conception of progress through the often 
adversarial clash of perspectives and attitudes. This is also, on a Millian 
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analysis, the authentic means of resolving and removing the socially harmful 
attitudes that underlie hate speech. Mill's discourse-driven society is not 
geared to be mentally comfortable. There is much to be said for his conviction 
that no social order short of utopia can be. Progress and advancement come at 
a cost, and that cost is precisely such an atmosphere of constant intellectual 
destabilisationY What we must address now is what further application of 
these principles, at an institutional level, Mill would enshrine as provisions for 
such a discourse-driven social space. 
3.3.5) The limits of positive state action 
Towards the end of the final chapter of On Liberty, Mill brings out an 
interesting and very revealing dimension of his grander social theory. In 
reference to the lines he has drawn throughout the body of the text, Mill 
ponders to what extent a government is mandated to act for citizens' benefit, 
acting in their best interests, supposedly on behalf of the citizens themselves. 
He is careful to point out that he is dealing with cases in which individual 
liberty is not infringed in the process.48 His concerns extend here to the 
slightly more general question of how far the state is mandated in pro-actively 
enhancing their citizenry's lives and affairs. To this he brings three objections. 
The first is both familiar territory, and to a large extent already dealt with. 
This is where the government takes a pronounced interest in managing of, for 
example, citizens' financial affairs for them. The arguments from autonomy 
and fallibalism have already dealt with the management of their moral affairs, 
47 Whether progress is worth such a price is the ques tion to be addressed in sect ion 3.4. 
4K There is an ambiguity here that req ui res some clarification. Mill has deployed sign ifienn! argumenlaLi ve 
force against the idea of a state intervening in what it supposes to be the self-regarding interes t of ci ti zens. 
Tht! arguments from rational autonomy and fallibili sm already cover the ground of Mill's first objec tion to 
government interference in the affa irs of citizenry_ What Mill seems 10 be refl!:rring to here are cases that 
arise in the other 2 objections - cases in which the performance or management of personal affairs are nOl 
subjects of interference. These are cases in which citizens are positi ve ly obligated to the performance of 
socia lly necessary actions outside tht! scope of thei r own affai rs. and cases in which the govern ment takes a 
pronounced role in managing a wide scope of social affai rs (for example where the slate is respons ible for a 
large portion or employment). 
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and Mill obviously feels the same applies to, for example, inter-citizen financial 
dealings _ He feels that "there is no one so fit to conduct any business, or to 
determine how or by whom it shall be conducted, as those who are personally 
interested in it" {Mill 1 : 98). 49 
It is Mill's second objection that brings out an interesting dimension of his 
social vision that bears close sympathy with Hegel 's. These are cases in which 
it is held that certain social functions would be better handled by government 
than the public themselves, and thus should not fall to private citizens. The 
prime example here is perhaps Mill's sole clear peacetime positive obligation 
example - jury duty. Whereas officers of government may well be better 
suited, on the whole , to such a task, Mill feels it is crucial the citizenry" as a 
means to their own mental education - a mode of strengthening their active 
faculties, exercising their judgement, and giving them a familiar knowledge of 
the subjects with which they are thus left to deal" {lbid.).5o 
Mill is careful to point out that this is not an issue of liberty (it would indeed be 
for Hegel, but that is only under the specific Hegelian doctrine of freedom) but 
an issue of social development. Mill is here making the long-standing civic 
virtue/republican argument that social participation at an institutional level 
has a crucial formative effect in the civic development of a population. He 
describes them as: 
41,1 This is a very interesting and controversial area which 1, like Mill , forego discussing on the basis that it is 
not stric tly related to the key issues of this thesis. It is not directly analogous with Mill 's argumen ts for 
rights of conscience, for wh il e moral issues often break down to irreconcilable antipathies. rational 
convergence on an issue such as corporate independence and trade practices shou ld be theoretically 
possible. Th is is a hot-button issue in lhe early 21 Sl century, especiall y considering the dehates surrounding 
government interference in corporate governance in the wake of the EnrOll scandal and the resulting crisis 
of confidence in US financial inst itutions. Un like the issues of liberty and moral norms, in rc:gards to 
whi ch the arguments for and against remain I!ssemiaJly unchanged since Mill's time, quest ions o f trade 
practice have developed radically si nce the high Victorian industrial age Mill in which Mill wrole. Thus, 
for want or space and direct relevance, I have foregone further discussion of this issue here. 
~ Mi ll does point out thalthis is not the sok recommendation of jury [rial. One presutnl!s, especiall y given 
the third objection to positive stale action, that he is concerned wiLh the repressive pOLel)Lial of overly 
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[I]n truth, the peculiar training of a citizen, the practical part of the political 
education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and family 
selfishness, and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint interests, the 
management of joint conce rns - habituating them to act from public or semi-public 
motives, and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them from 
one another (Ibid. 99). 
Stylistic differences aside (most notably brevity and accessibility), Hegel could 
have written the above paragraph. 
Mill's sympathies with continental Romanticism have already shown up in our 
identification of the Aristotelian/Humboldtian roots of his individualism, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, and here we find a further manifestation. It bears out 
even further Mill's claim that a social order foresworn to his caveats and 
precautions is by no means a realm of hopelessly atomized and disinterested 
citizens. When we consider the full cannon of Millian principle thusfar 
discussed, this doesn't seem nearly the disjunction some might make it out to 
be. We can form laws that respect citizens' autonomy (as well as the cautions 
of fallibilism) and still justifiably involve them in the process of enforcing said 
laws for interlinked individual and social benefit. Especially considering the 
virtue that such a process is designed to enhance, tolerance and a wider 
understanding of our social context, is the very virtue that fuels much of Mill's 
argument for the liberty principle in the firstplace. What this also hints at is 
that the Millian social vision can be allied to more enriched accounts of social 
progress and virtue. This shall be addressed in terms of Hegel's thought in the 
concluding chapter of this thesis, so I thus forestall further discussion of it 
here . 
Mill's third objection to positive state action is one endemically familiar to 
mainstream liberalism - that the greater the power and role of the state is 
enlargc.:::d slale participation in the social prol,;css. To what extent thi s is countered by the liberal doctrine of 
separation of powers remains an interest ing, but separate issue. 
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enlarged the greater the potential for repression, instantiating "the great evil 
of adding unnecessarily to its power" (Ibid.). Mill's argument is that the more 
social institutions are branches of state control, the more people tend to 
regard and fear the state as an employer and benefactor, and are thus less 
likely to treat it with the critical approach so crucial to the citizenry of a 
democracy: 
If the roads, the railways, the great jOint stock companies, the universities, the public 
charities, were all of them branches of government ... [I]f the employees of all these 
different enterprises were appointed and paid by the government, and looked to the 
government for every rise in life; not all the freedom of the press and popular 
constitution of the legislature would make this or any other country free otherwise 
than in name (Ibid . 99·1 00). 
Mill's further point is that if the most able amongst the population were to aim 
at government service, and this became the key focus of professional ambition, 
the result would be an en-pedestaled bureaucracy of the most stagnant kind. 
These are well made and to a certain extent familiar arguments, but to what 
extent do they contradict the call in the second objection for increased 
participation in public institutions? We must remind ourselves the two are not 
necessarily the same thing. There is a difference between jury trials that 
involve private citizens and a government staffing jury panels with permanent 
officials chosen by them for the task. A difference, in more general terms 
between certain duties that promote discourse as a SOCially useful side-effect 
(but do not look to it for their sole justification) is very different from an 
institutional framework that allows a state to become a multi -tentacled social 
patron that citizens tiptoe around. We do not censure a government only at 
times of election, but on ongoing basis as members of a public and as activists 
within civil society. A state that held too many of the vital strings of life could 
indeed too easily rule a society of puppets.51 
51 This must all obviously be counlcrbalanced by concerns as to the levels of poverty within the social 
framework. A profound consequenlia li sl such as Mill would not, I feel, push this line to-the point or mass 
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What this also reminds us of is that, for all his reverence for reasoned 
intelligence, Mill is no supporter of oligarchy. He would concede that societies 
might indeed be more efficient if ruled by the best and the best alone, but he 
would remind us they would be less vital, and ultimately less progressive. This 
all gives us a stronger sense of where the boundary lines in Mill's politics of 
engagement lie. He is concerned that the citizenry develop inasmuch as 
possible a broader awareness of their social context and the functionality of 
the system they participate in. It is the role of the institutions that oversee 
them not to dictate to them how to be better people, but to provide the 
conditions for them becoming so on their own accord. 
This being said, he is equally concerned that the transitory rulers of such 
systems be subject to broad critical scrutiny on the part of the citizenry. It is 
the stability of the system that I see Mill advocating as worthy of the citizen's 
trust and rational sanction, not the sanctity of any particular government. 
Once again, we have the image of Mill advocating an institutional framework 
that exposes and manages internal social conflict, and thus contributes to its 
. citizenry's self·development, but never appeals to its own authority as the 
source of some kind of final truth on any issue. Having sketched out Mill's 
position thus, I now tie up the various ways in which I have discussed the 
liberty principle underpinning such an aim. 
3.3.6) The Liberty principle distilled 
What is still missing from the account, though, is a technical account of harm. 
It is possible that we cannot find one, and it is not entirely clear one is 
necessary. Offence-based harm , as dealt with on the balance of rights 
approach, is a constantly shifting social boundary. Actions that cause public 
starvation as a const;qucnce. But [ fed he wou ld encourJ.ge that the slac.k, where possibk , be taken up by 
the private sector as opposed to the public authority. 
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outrage now will not do so in a decade's time. 52 As the prejudice-dissolving 
process of ethical confrontation continues , Mill's provision that ill-considered 
moral positions are natural victims to dialogue seems to constantly prove itself 
correct. What the rights framework of the liberty principle does is ensure that 
the structurally vital social values are kept in place, whilst setting out a 
framework within which principle and action can be melded in the crucible of 
intellectual and ethical confrontation. Such is the nature and intention of 
Mill's demarcated pluralism. 
Mill has, I believe, admirably proven his case that the policing of self-regarding 
action is neither rational nor prudent. As regards the more controversial area 
of what counts as a breach of other-regarding duty, Mill has left the game a 
little more open. What Mill has essentially done is set up a set of value 
constraints that any society that seeks to be internally authentic and 
progressive should rationally accede to. With the full breadth of the discussion 
above considered, we can sense that it is left to a given society to decide for 
itself (beyond obvious cases of assault on others' welfare) to what extent 
certain other-regarding actions offend individual and social welfare to the 
point where they should be policed. Mill would have a social order judge such 
on a utilitarian basis, but as established in section 3.2 , this is not the only 
background against which Mill's principles can apply. Even if it were, the 
concept of interlinked individual and social welfare as something to be 
safeguarded is hardly as philosophically controversial as it might seem. Mill 
leaves the rational concept of the general good fairly open, provided such a 
conception respects the hallmark principles that he feels must underpin any 
rational and progressive social order. This means , in many regards, that Mill 
52 An interesting and amusing illustration of this was pres~nled to me whilst wri ting up the arguments 
around the issue of sex in parks. Thi s came: in the form of a newspaper article announci ng that a certain 
European cily had actuall y des ignared a park cordoned off for the purposes of sexual activity in ordt:r to 
encourage it's younger ci ti zens to procreate and start families in the area. The park chosen was one that was 
common ly used by lovers for just such purposes, though without legal sanction on their side. See 'Sex park 
boosts birth rate' , Th e SUllday Times (South Africa) 13 October. 2002. 
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feels a rational society is charged with constant and onerous task of managing a 
constantly destabilizing moral pluralism. As the next section will , I believe, 
bear out, it is difficult to see how anything but a deliberately repressive and 
stagnant society could be anything but. 
3.4) Mill's relevant ethology and sociology 
i. The unwritten' ethology' 
Upon the completion of his Logic , Mill confided in Alexander Bain that he had a 
grand further project in mind - a work dedicated to laying out the principles of 
what he labelled "ethology", defined by Mill as: 
[T)he science which corresponds to the art of education; in the widest sense of the 
term , including the formation of national or collective character as we ll as individual 
(Mill 5, as cited by Robson in Skorupksi (ed.), 1998: 338). 
Mill never wrote the work in question , but there is sufficient evidence of its 
composite elements lurking in the pages of his published texts to allow modern 
scholars to piece together what a Millian ethology would look like. In the 
course of such an expedition in intellectual archaeology, John Robson (in 
Skorupski (ed.), 1998: 338-395) presents some key tenets of the Millian social 
vision that are largely ignored by the bulk of Mill scholarship, namely those 
derived from his account of civilisation and culture. This is not, for fairly 
obvious reasons, thought to be Mill's proper terrain. The pervasive influence of 
On Liberty has carved out Mill ' s place in modern political philosophy as a 
scholar and champion of the individual. But his views of the nature of 
civilisation present us with some interesting additional background to Mill as a 
general social theorist. More importantly for the purposes of this thesis , they 
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reveal what I see as strong echoes of the Hegelian understanding of historical 
and cultural development, and thus of the social order itself. 53 
ii. Mill on the Phases of History 
Mill's wide study of history and culture, Robson (in Skorupski (ed.), 1998: 344) 
argues, led him to marvel at "the astonishing pliability of out nature, and the 
vast effects which may under good guidance be produced upon it by honest 
endeavour. ,,54 Thus did Mill draw from historical study a dynamic that 
underpinned his social theory - the analysis of social circumstance as formative 
not only of individual but also of national character in order to make concrete 
recommendations on how both of these might be improved. 
As Robson (Ibid . 347) argues, Mill shared with Matthew Arnold, otherwise one 
of his theoretical nemeses, a commonality in the aims and nature of his 
programme for social improvement. They both held that improvement in 
individual culture was essential in improving society, both held by the vital 
importance of education and both believed in what can be referred to as 
"organic" and "critical" periods in history. This latter dynamic is what holds 
our interest for the moment. 
Robson (Ibid. 345) clarifies that Mill's understanding of historical progress 
originally began with his following the lead of Thomas Carlyle and the Saint-
Simonians . He shared their belief that there could be discerned in the 1830's 
"a 'Spirit of the Age' , different from but also inheriting the 'spirits' of past 
ages, and containing the seeds of the coming one"(lbid . ). This led Mill to 
identify a "cyclical pattern", discerning in the historical process three 
5J Considerations of space and re levance preven t me from including a sketch of Robson's full account of 
M ill ' s ethology, interesting as it is. The elements I have included have a more direct reference to the scope 
of materi al already covered - Mill 's concerns with diversity, improvement and the necessary destabil isation 
of the social order. Further discussion of hi s understanding or the specificities of national character, as 
Robson undertakes, is indeed intert!sting but nol strictly relevant here. 
" "Civilisati on" , as cited in Robson in Skorupski (cd.), 1998: 344. 
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successive periods55: the organic, the transitional and the critical. The organic 
is characterised by a social structure in which the members are united by a set 
of common positive beliefs that bind their sympathies and actions into a 
mutual consensus. The collapse of such shared beliefs induces the birth of the 
critical period "marked by negativism, scepticism and selfishness". Linking 
these was the transitional period, of which Mill saw his own time as a prime 
example. What is interesting is that Mill did not thus damn critical periods as 
low points of civilisation , but rather held that humanity had to nurture the 
better elements of both the organic and the critical. The sense of order 
inherent in the organic periods is crucial to the preservation of the social 
infrastructure, but (as argued at length above) Mill believed advancement 
requires the diversity and upheaval characteristic of the critical periods. Thus, 
his conviction was that humanity is tasked with nurturing the positive 
dimensions of the critical period within the harmonizing context of the organic 
state. 
Two interesting dimensions flow immediately out of this . One is the seemingly 
curious attitude that Mill held about the value of order in grander social 
structures . The other is the cool and distant "intellectual Darwinism" I have 
already alluded to. I shall briefly discuss each of these. 
iii. Order vs. Progress 
Mill's understanding of order is certainly not loaded with the usual conservative 
overtones of the term. Mill understood change in circumstances (and with 
them change in perspectives, mindsets and intellectual culture) as an 
inevitability. This did not, as Ryan (1987: 184) argues, mean he saw this 
change as necessarily positive. Whilst Popper accuses him of a nai've faith in 
mankind's capacity for improvement, such a charge misfires . Mill never 
5; This pallern cl osely fo llows the schematic outlined by CornIe. but draws radically di fferent conclusions. 
Comlc's ultimate insistence was on a "pedantocracy" that could preserve both critical capaci ty and social 
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directly elides change with improvement. We find this clearly qualified in the 
Logic: 
The words Progress and Progressiveness, are not here to be understood as synonymous 
with improvement and tendency to improvement. It is conceivable that the laws of 
human nature might determine, and even neccesitate, a certain series of changes in 
man and society, which might not in every case, or which might not on the whole, be 
improvements (Mill 5: VI, x, 3. as cited in Ryan, 1987: 184). 
He does not on the final analysis exhibit some kind of "cheerful belief in the 
inevitability of progress" as Ryan (Ibid.) puts it. Change is indeed cumulative, 
but it must be managed and dealt with correctly in order to be positive. Thus 
does Mill reply to those who seek to maintain order at the expense of change 
that they are ultimately delusional. Even "order" (in the sense of 
institutionally overseen, cohesive social unity) requires a great deal of 
progressive thinking to maintain itself in the face of changing circumstance. 
"[Ilt is impossible" Mill maintains, "to point to any contrivance in politics, or 
arrangement of social affairs which conduces to Order only, or to Progress only; 
whatever tends to either promotes both" (Mill 3: 122). What Mill means here is 
compellingly clear. For progress to be possible in a healthy sense, a stable and 
ordered framework is a pre-requisite. But for such a stability to be 
maintained, it must be open to revision, correction and evolution in step with 
emergent changes in social circumstance and thinking. The nature of the 
ethical and rational confrontation this requires is necessarily dynamic, often 
adversarial, but it need not be hostile: 
The release of the individual from the cares and anxieties of a state of imperfect 
protection , sets his faculties free to be employed in any new effort for improving his 
own state and that of others; while the same cause, by attaching him to social 
existence, and making him no longer see present or prospective enemies in his fellow 
creatures, fosters all those feelings of kindness and fellowship towards others, and 
order, a breed of oligarchy that Mill could never sanction. 
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interest in the general well being of the community, which are such important parts of 
social improvement (Ibid.). 
Thus, Mill maintains, to blindly enforce some form of surface order through 
repression is to run against not only the very current of history, but the very 
current of humanity, and is ultimately to short-circuit the very social process 
that guarantees both order and healthy progress, which is the flourishing of a 
new and better ideas within a context of stable confrontation. What Mill would 
have us set in place is not a social order that merely worships a set of static 
central values, so much as one that provides a framework for managing change. 
Those that cannot are doomed to failure. As he memorably puts it in 
Representative Government: "The disease that most affects bureaucracies, 
that which they die of, is routine. They perish by the immutability of their 
maxims" (Mill 3: 179). The central values he would have enshrined we have 
already examined at length. The essential elements of human well being that 
the Liberty principle and the baseline conception of rights enshrine are 
foundational to any social order that would not have itself regress to barbarism 
or the darker and intransigent narrow·mindedness that fuelled the inquisitions 
and repressive regimes of yore. And even this structure must be perpetuated 
not through heavy-handed indoctrination, but through inculcation in the 
populace, at both an educative and policy level. Otherwise we just have a 
modern and more palatable version of a society of educated slaves that revert 
to an uneducated state the moment the master's back is turned. This is no 
easy task that Mill sets a social order, but it is difficult to see how else a 
rational social order can preserve itself through the changing fortunes of 
circumstance without collapse. 
iv. The Inevitability of Progress and the Fate of Dogmatism 
In fact, if we recall the "intellectual Darwinism" I alluded to in the previous 
section, Mill is convinced that social structures that fail to meet such criteria 
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must fail. If they cannot manage change and win the assent of their citizens, if 
they resort to the whips and scourges of authority as a sale means of 
preservation , then Mill stands convinced their days are numbered . An example 
of this we find in his discussion of whether the developed communities of the 
world have the right to take on a civilisade against what they see as retrograde 
forms of civilisation. 56 In the course of this, he muses that the crushing of 
similar doctrines amongst their own people, lest the retrograde form infect and 
dismantle civilisation itself, is a patently ridiculous measure: 
If civilisation has got the better of barbarism when barbarism had the world to itself, it 
is too much to profess to be afraid lest barbarism, having been fairly got ·under, should 
revive and conquer civilisation. A civili sation that can thus succumb to its · vanquished 
enemy, must first have become so degenerate, that neither its apPointed priests and 
teache rs, nor anybody else , has the capacity or will take the trouble to stand up for it. 
If this be so, the sooner such a civilisation receives notice to quit the better. It can 
only go from bad to worse, until it is destroyed and regenerated (like the Western 
Empire) by energetic barbarians (Mill 1 : 83). 
Societies where dogma has replaced wisdom, where indoctrination has 
replaced education are natural victims to the march of progress . This applies 
at all levels in Mill's theory - from the "encrustation" of mindsets within a 
society all the way through to its very cannon of principles. Beyond the 
schooling and persuasive influence the current orthodoxy can provide, the 
chips must fall where they may. Circumstance and intellectual culture must 
thence determine a society's fortunes. Circumstance can be governed to a 
certain extent by policy, but intellectual culture must be managed by the 
habits of rationality and liberty to produce a society of progressive beings 
committed to the more durable and better principles that guide human action. 
Society must internalize and manage change at an individual and social level, 
56 Incidentally, he concludes they do not, unless the repressed popu lace of such societi es cry out for their 
assistance. Otherwise, all he would sanction would be the sending of "missionaries" to persuade and 
convince. 
The social order in Mill 217 
not do all in its power to resist it. Such is Mill's position, and it is difficult, on 
this, to see how either history or logic might prove him wrong. 
3.5) Concluding considerations on the Millian social vision 
I have, I feel , in the course of Chapter 1 and this chapter thusfar, outlined 
Mill's vision of flourishing individuality within a tolerant intersubjective social 
mindscape. This is the 'politics of engagement' I have attributed to Mill. 
Hegel, in many senses was after the same thing. He may have done this more 
systematically, and with more conceptual grace, but I remain convinced (as I 
shall show in Chapter 4) that these two supposed arch -nemeses respect and 
value many of the same elements within a rational social order, and demand 
similar things from both the members and overseers of a civilised community. 
Mill's sympathies with the Hegelian social vision are , I feel, profound. Both 
saw conflict and confrontation at a social level as an inevitability to be 
managed and rationally reconciled to the social space, not as something at 
odds with the social structure itself. Social orders can let change wreck them, 
or they can develop in step with it, but they cannot ignore it . Both understood 
that institutions that can inculcate a rational awareness and habit of tolerance 
and open-mindedness are necessary. Both understood that mere dogma, 
however loudly and forcefully screamed across the social space, must perish . 
Both understood that individual capacity is the first locus of social capacity, 
and that a loss of respect for this - through repression or indoctrination - is 
dangerous, unethical and counter-productive. And both , I feel , understood 
that the social order is a rational framework within in which competing 
conceptions of the good must clash, meld and intersubjectively improve each 
other. The fuller and more considered comparison of their approaches I now 
leave to my concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
The social order in Hegel 
4.1) Preliminary comments on the Hegelian social 
order 
The discussion thusfar should not be seen as yet another modern attempt to 
"liberalise" Hegel. Not just yet, anyhow. All I have really demonstrated in the 
earlier chapters is that there exists a definitive individual space in the Hegelian 
picture. It is now time to examine how this individual space is reconciled to 
the social space and with what implications, in terms of both institutional 
practice and the principles that inform it. This is a theoretical territory in 
Hegel scholarship in which we may unearth the foundations of both his fame 
and infamy. When it comes to understanding political community and its 
obligations, thinkers of the communitarian school have appropriated his 
analytical framework and, to my mind , the shallow sense of his conclusions, 
but I feel they have failed to fully consider the profound consequences of his 
principles in this regard. 
This is difficult and broad territory to navigate, and as such, I have limited my 
inquiry to what I consider the key issues in the Hegelian analysis of community 
and the objective social order in general. The first section of this chapter is 
devoted to a broad examination of the principles and architecture of Hegel's 
rational social order as an embodiment of freedom . Following this is a critical 
examination of the emergent dynamics of Hegel's social theory, considering to 
what extent it can be understood as such an embodiment. By the close of the 
latter inquiry, I will be in a position to re·assess two of the more contentiously 
objective elements of Hegel's objective idealism as social theory . . The first will 
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concern how the concept of Geist may be plausibly amended or replaced within 
the Hegelian framework, followed by the second, interlinked question of what 
to make of the Hegelian telas .1 By the close of this chapter, I hope to 
illustrate, with the aid of some established Hegel scholars as well as my own 
interpretive analysis, that a rigidly defined social arrangement, above the 
rational reproach of its members, is profoundly at odds with Hegelian principle, 
and that a Hegelian position comprehensible to modernity might well benefit 
from a few Millian caveats. 
4.2) Principles and architecture of Sittlichkeit as 
an embodiment of freedom 
To recognise reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to delight in the 
present - this rational insight is the reconciliation with actuality which philosophy 
grants to those who have received the inner call to comprehend, to preserve their 
subjective freedom in the realm of the substantial, and at the same time to stand with 
their subjective freedom not in a particular and contingent situation, but in what has 
being in and for itself (PR §14). 
This is indeed the grander aim of Hegel's social theory. As Kaufman (1997: 
811) discusses in his treatise on the modern applicability of Hegelian principle, 
Hegel himself described The Philosophy af Right as his most ambitious work, in 
that it represents a massive confluence in his thought: it is his attempt to 
scientifically construct a political theory capable of allowing individuals to 
realise the identification relations necessary to achieve the concrete, enriched 
freedom they are rationally destined for, but not naturally pre-disposed 
I This particular controversy concerns the argument as to whether there is a rigid ''t::nd of history" in Hegel. 
As shall be secn once this discussion begins in full , I am not heavily interested here in resolv ing this issue 
in terms of the more abstract depths of Hegel's epistemology and theory of history. Though such 
discussions might indeed prove prolitable. my purpose here is to investigatt! the institutional applicability 
of Hegelian principk, and thus I aim to question whether a fin ite principle is a necessary req uirement of the 
system at al l. This is one of the key areas where I feel a Hegelian position could be prolitubly amended 
with Millian caveats, concerning fallibili sm and catering for the shifting nature of social circumstance. S\!e 
Chapter 3 for the full body of said discussion. 
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towards. As discussed at some length in Chapter 2, this enriched sense of 
freedom sets conditions for both individuals and the social order itself. The 
latter sets our field of discussion in this section. 
In chapter 2, I briefly discussed how the · contact with other ends and other 
wills forces the individual will out of its arbitrary cocoon and forces the 
individual to comprehend a social space with varied and diversified ends. 
Within such a space, one 's capacity to rationally discern one's own conception 
of the good becomes crucial as what Neuhauser (2000: 26) identifies as the 
freedom of moral subjectivity. The "moral subject" knows her actions to be 
self-determined in that she recognizes that they are conditioned by a 
conception of the good that she rationally affirms, and that permeates the 
structures she participates in. This is why Hegel sees the most important right 
associated with moral subjectivity (in his terms, the "subjective will") is "that 
whatever it is to recognize as valid should be perceived by it as good" (PR 
§132) . Furthermore, the actions said will can be held responsible for must be 
decided according to "its cognizance of the value which that action has in this 
objectivity" (Ibid.) . The ethics and moral practice of any given set of 
institutions must be subject to the rational scrutiny of those they serve and 
oversee. Their concept of the "good" must be accountable to public discussion 
and debate. Only in this way can it be guaranteed that subjects will affirm 
said institutions as commensurate with their own wills. 2 
Moral subjectivity is a key milestone on the road to fully actualised freedom. 
But it is by no means the end of the journey. As Neuhauser (2000: 32) notes, 
there are certain criteria for the full actualisation of Hegelian freedom it does 
not yet fulfil. It sets up the correct capacities for social freedom , but does not 
give it form and content. In other words, it allows the interests of other wills 
to be taken into account, but fails to provide a universally affirmed structure, 
::! A far more detailed exposiLion of moral subjecti vity and ilS place in the structure of Sitrlichkeit follows in 
sect ion 4.2.4. 
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within which particularity and diversity are harmonised within the universal of 
a common set of institutions and practices. It is, in Hegel's words "abstract" 
and "empty" (PR §§134-137) . These deficiencies, Hegel believes, are remedied 
by social freedom, the end point of the dialectical progression by which the 
individual fully actualises freedom, by coming to understand the rational 
nature of the system that rules her, and understanding the value and nature of 
her unique and particular place within the whole. This is the end-point of the 
progression of the fully determined will described in Chapter 2_ Thus, social 
freedom is to be a distinct individual who rationally affirms the structure, 
framework and principles of the social order that surrounds one, as one's own. 
The social order itself is thus understood, in Hegelian terms, as the structural 
embodiment of fully developed freedom. The capacity to recognise it as such 
and participate in it as a rational social member (the ethical disposition 
discussed in Chapter 2) is the highest stratum of self-determination. 
In order to understand fully Hegel's vision of the ideal social order, we must 
understand the principles which underscore his intricate descriptions and 
provisions for these objective aspects of social freedom , i.e. what properties 
the social order itself must exhibit if it is to promote (and embody) the rational 
freedom of its members. Here I once again follow Neuhauser's expository 
architecture and divide this into 2 key elements: the self-determining social 
whole and the social conditions of individual freedom. This is followed by an 
expository discussion on the decisive modern question of the role Moral 
Subjectivity in ethical life. This latter section , as shall be seen, cuts to one of 
(perhaps the) key divisive issues in the liberal communitarian debate: the 
extent to which the individual is mandated to dissent from the dictates of the 
social order, and through what channels such dissent may be possible within a 
system foresworn to a space of harmony between members and their 
community. 
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4.2.1) The objective component of social freedom 
Bearing in mind the grander Hegelian project, the question we address in 
seeking to understand the objective conditions of social freedom is ultimately 
this: in what sense may we regard social institutions themselves as exhibiting a 
rational structure, independently of how their constitutive members conceive 
them? What makes them objectively rational? 
In considering this , we must first understand the various senses in which Hegel 
uses the term "objective freedom". Neuhauser (2000: 117) outlines three 
distinct senses in which it applies: actual freedom (as opposed to merely 
perceived freedom), freedom that has existence in the external world as an 
institutional force (as opposed to as a prevailing attitude amongst members of 
society) and, most importantly for our current purposes, freedom that exists 
independently of the consciousness of it on the part of the members of the 
social order. 
Bearing these in mind, and recalling the affinities in structure between Hegel 
and Rousseau's understandings of the general will, as well as the Hegelian 
emphasis on the organic nature of the social whole, two key versions of the 
objective nature of social freedom emerge. 
The first, as Neuhauser (Ibid. 118) maintains, is inherently Rousseauian, and 
has already been alluded to in Chapter 2. It sees the objective social order as 
tasked with restructuring the dependence inherent to human interaction in 
such a way that individuals avoid subjection to the arbitrary will of others, and 
embrace the general will as their own. In so doing, the paradox of reconciling 
free individuals to a society that must, of necessity, limit their natural 
freedoms is resolved. The structure of ethical life, as shall be seen, comes to 
represent a higher and richer form of freedom that the individual could not 
achieve outside the social structure. 
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The second version Neuhauser (Ibid. 119-120) identifies as distinctively 
Hegelian , and diverges quite significantly from the main canon of social theory. 
The social whole itself is, for Hegel, a more complete re presentation of the 
qualities of a self·determined will than any individual social member could ever 
be. He sees the ideal structure of the will embodied in the social "substance" 
itself), above and beyond the structure of the will of its members . This, as 
shall be seen shortly, by no means discounts the importance of individual 
freedoms, but rather (as already discussed briefly in Chapter 2) includes them 
as a lower level and goes a step further . This is the step of ascribing the 
property of freedom to the system itself. The subjective disposition is the 
process by which individuals identify with it, and thus themselves become fully 
free as self-determined beings to a level not possible as distinct individuals. 
Both of these "versions" of the objective social sphere playa part in the 
Hegelian vision of the social order, and to fully comprehend them, their 
implications and their interplay, it serves to examine each in turn, beginning 
with the latter. 
4.2.2)The Self-determining social whole 
Ethical mind constructs for itself a world of institutions in which individual selves lead 
a common life, and in which they find their highest and fullest freedom to be possible 
only by the whole· hearted acceptance of the e nds of the community as their own 
(Reyburn, 1921: 120). 
The concept of the social whole itself as an embodiment of freedom is one that 
is not, in substance, familiar to modern sensibilities . Like many peculiarly 
Hegelian notions, it makes sense in the context of a very specified set of ideas 
concerning the nature of societies' goals and definitive features . By this stage 
3 The signi licance of term "substance" shall only be examined in the final sect ion of this c'hapter when I 
come to address poss ible modern interpretati ons of Hegel's thcodicy. 
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in my enquiry, the "obscure metaphysics,,4 that set up a social system as an 
organic embodiment of freedom should be at least somewhat familiar. This is 
an advanced point in the Hegelian notion of social progression that flows into 
and out of notions already discussed - the interpenetrating unity of universal 
and particular, the organic conception of social organisation, the dialectical 
progression that harmonizes originally alien (even hostile) elements. In 
reference to the broad thematics, its place in the Hegelian system is not that 
difficult to discern . But there are many specifics that must be addressed if we 
are to gather what exactly is entailed in the position that the social system 
itself embodies the ideal of self-determination. 
i. Features of the social whole as an embodiment of freedom 
Neuhauser (Ibid. 122-128) lays out 4 key features of the social whole that allow 
it to qualify as self-determining by Hegelian terms. It is teleologically 
organised , self-reproducing, articulated into semi-autonomous functioning 
components, which in turn exhibit specific relationships with each other that 
mirror the structure of the Concept. 
Upon careful examination, as Neuhauser (Ibid.) illustrates, these conditions 
merge and coalesce into architecture of principle. The ideal social order works 
towards a definite telos or end-point of development. The social order must 
be self-organizing in the sense that all of the various parts must contribute to 
the production and re-production of all the other parts: each member 
individually makes the whole possible, while the whole determines each 
member. The nature of this interrelation of mutual dependence is the 
province of the remaining three conditions. To be self-reproducing the social 
order must ensure that its various elements (in their differentiated capacities, 
as shall be seen shortly) contribute to and have as a common end the material 
continuation and reproduction of the social order itself. This is one of the key 
4 As Neuhauser (2000: 120) puts it. 
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ways that the whole qualifies as more capable of full self-determination than 
any single individual. With an organised system of labour, for instance, society 
can better provide for the material needs of citizens than citizens could as, 
say, individual farmers trading on an unstructured basis with individual 
artisans. The social order is thus more resistant to shifting circumstance and 
therefore more self sufficient as an entity than the singular individuals who 
compose it. 
But, Neuhauser (Ibid.) continues, there is a fu rther dimension to this. For what 
must be reproduced , if the social order to be truly self-standing and self-
perpetuating, is not merely a set of physical circumstances, but also a state of 
common consciousness, in Hegel's terminology both "substance and subject" 
(PhG ~17) .5 
As Brod (1992: 133) argues, this is one of the fundamental insights that is both 
distinctive and useful in the Hegelian political vision. "What Hegel's political 
idealism successfully captures about the modern state", he claims, "is that 
modern politics, like no other political system or theory earlier, is founded on 
the consciousness of the citizens". Brod (Ibid.) sees Hegel echoing the social 
contractarian notion of basing political legitimacy on the will, but improves the 
position in recognising that the will it is based on should not be a private, 
individualised one. Such a conception "fails to do justice to the need for this 
will to be an internal part of political system in which it finds recognition of its 
efficacy" (Ibid.). It is thus that Brod sees Hegel arguing for a social or co-
operative public version of the political will that can serve as a foundation for 
"an integrated, satisfying, political system that is subject neither to anarchy 
nor alienation" (Ibid.). 
5 This essential ly refers 10 the interplay betwc~n memal stales of the citizens and the reality they find 
themselves in. Sittlichkeit is a realm of what Hegel ca ll s "objecti ve spirit", an embodiment of the world 
spiri t or Geis t, How this particular dimension of Hegelian thought may be usefull y interpreted by modan 
terms is examined in the second half of this chapter. 
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This is , ultimately, as I see it, not a call for a unified common end, so much as 
a commonly understood framework. If the ideal social order, as a social 
whole, reproduces itself as "the kind of being it essentially is", the individual 
elements must be capable of carrying out the functions that sustain the tenets 
of the social order as an internal project. In other words , if the citizens do not 
consciously affirm within themselves that what they are doing is necessary and 
good, the fundamentals of their social space will eventually crumble. This 
makes sense of Hegel's claims that concrete freedom must include the freedom 
of individuals, even as it surpasses and enriches it. As Hegel outlines in the 
'Ethical Life' section of The Philosophy of Right: 
The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But concrete f reedom requires that 
personal individuality [Einzelheitj and its particular interests should reach th eir full 
development and gain recognition of their right for itself (within the system of the 
family and of civil society) , and also that they should, on the one hand, pass over of 
thei r own accord into the interest of the universa l, and on the other, knowingly and 
willingly acknowledge this universal interest even as their own substantial spirit and 
actively pursue it as their ultimate end(PR §260). 
Thus , as Neuhauser (2000: 129) argues, contrary to certain far right 
interpretations of Hegelian community theory, brute coercion in any form 
renders the system dysfunctional. 6 If the reproducers of social institutions are 
to be reliable?, if the social orde r is to progress, the social order must in some 
way produce the kind of citizens who willingly propagate, continue and 
improve on both the institutional structure and the social mindset of the 
whole. What this amounts to is a call for political education , or bildung, of the 
to As already alluded to in earlier chapters, this is a dynamic in Hegelian thinking which runs in parity with 
Mill 's thought on the suhjective disposition of citizenry, most notably the idea that a social system imposed 
apd not internal to its members will be cilsl aside lhe moment the imposition lapses. Thus, withou t internal 
affirmation of the social system on the part of the citizenry. there can ~ no true progress. 
7 The use of the term "rel iable" (Neuhauser's, as well as mine) does point to a fundamental of all this [hat 
can only be addressed fu lly in the closing half o f the chapter. "Reliable, by whose termsT it migh t be 
asked. Reliabl!! bearers of the consciousness of the obj ecti ve spiri t, is the short answer. The nature of what 
the members of Sittlichkeit must be relied upon to realise at the level s of a social and instilu ti onal rnindsct 
can on ly be addressed once we come Lo the examination of Geist. 
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citizens.8 The subjective disposition of the citizenry, as already examined in 
the previous chapter, must be realised by objective mechanisms within the 
social order that allow citizens to find their identities within the society around 
them. They may thus understand themselves as socially constituted, socially 
embedded and socially responsible at a personal level. 
The question of the content of these identities is covered by the condition that 
the social order be articulated into semi-autonomous functioning components . 
The idea of the social order as a holistic embodiment of self-determination 
leads us to query, in more precise terms, who or what is being self-determined. 
How, in other words, can we understand the private wills and ends of 
individuals playing into the grander social whole? Must diversity amongst 
individuals be somehow re-configured to fit a generalised social bromide? The 
answer, from Hegel's side, is most definitively not. 
ii. Hegel's Organicism 
As Neuhauser (2000: 123) clarifies, there is certainly a sense in which 
Sittlichkeit does, in a decidedly Rousseauian sense, refer to a rational system 
for the effective and harmonious co-ordination of private ends. But the 
position that this is the final end of the social order is one that Hegel stands 
profoundly against, and is in fact the very approach for which he chastises the 
social contract theorists. No , for Hegel the social whole must have an end in 
itself, into which individual ends are sublimated. This has to do, once more, 
with the organic conception of society at work within the Hegel ian system. If 
we return once more to the analogy of an organism, we can discern that 
organic systems work at multiple levels of organisation . In a biological 
organism, various individuated parts are organised into "relatively autonomous 
H This asp~cl wi ll be fe-addressed short ly, when I examine Patten 's thesis that the Hegelian sodal space 
has key affi nities with what is now labeled ·'civic humanism" , Poli tical, or civic, education as a 
funda mental of pol itical systems would be one aspect that fits ncaliy into such a modd. 
The social order in Hegel 229 
subsystems" (Ibid. 124), each of which can be described as pursuing their own 
end, or function. These subsystems, in turn, collectively contribute to the 
functioning of the whole. Thus, If we assess society as if it were a living 
creature, we can discern various types of ends, working at multiple and 
integrated levels. Individuals have their private ends, collectively realised in 
their family units and in the associations and corporations of civil society, 
which are in turn collectively organised under the broader universal of the 
state, all of which in combination co-operate as the still broader system of 
Sittlichkeit. 
For Hegel , Neuhauser (2000: 125) maintains, it is not merely a matter of 
individuals and their associations and institutions being found in the same 
social space. This, after all , is hardly revelatory. It is more the notion that 
these elements are interconnected, and in fact mutually dependent. The fuller 
details of this position will be fleshed out in the coming sections. For now, the 
point to be discerned is that Hegel understands the social whole as composed 
of necessarily differentiated parts, which, though they possess private ends in 
themselves , nonetheless contribute to the overall end of the whole. Diversity 
is not to be crushed, under this analysis , but allowed (and encouraged) to 
flourish. The diverse elements are to be brought into harmony. Thus, the 
organic unity of differentiated elements does not merely make the social order 
more efficient (as in the division of labour within civil society), but allows the 
individual elements to more completely determine themselves by participating 
in a system in which their particularity is a crucial factor, and thus safeguarded 
and recognised . 
As Westphal (in Beiser (ed.) 1993: 236) argues, Hegel's organicism in this 
regard is a response to what he saw as a false dichotomy in social theory, still 
prevalent in some senses today - that "[e]ither individuals are more 
fundamental than or are in principle independent of society, or vice versa: 
society is more basic than or 'prior to' human individuals". The pursuit of 
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individual ends has a profoundly social context that "provides specific objects 
that meet those ends" and "specifies procedures for obtaining them" (Ibid .). 
This social context of individual action, however, should not, on a rational 
analysis, leave individuals subservient to the social order. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the social order cannot exist without them , as "there are no social 
practices without social practitioners - without individuals that learn, 
participate in, perpetuate, and who modify those social practices as needed to 
meet their changing needs, aims and circumstances" (Ibid.). The question of 
whether the individual or her social order is of more importance to Hegel is , in 
Westphal's (Ibid . 237) word's "bogus". 
This is why Neuhauser (2000: 129-130) reminds us it is a mistake to understand 
the general social end , or the Hegelian telos as a universal , as one distinct, 
grand end to which the ends of individuals and their associations must be 
reconciled . Rather, the realisation of these particular ends is part of the end 
of the whole itself. If the self-determination of the whole is located in its 
capacity to reproduce itself as the "kind of being it essentially is", then this is 
not possible without enshrining the particulari ties of its constituent elements . 
This, for Hegel, is one of the key reasons why the freedoms of personhood and 
moral subjectivity must be safeguarded . Individual freedom and freedom of 
conscience are ultimately part of the ends of the social whole properly 
unde rstood. 9 
iii. Sittlichkeit as a rational mirror of The Concept 
This allows us to better understand the final condition, that the relationships 
between the components mirror the structure of the Concept - the framework 
of rational understanding that Hegel sees as underlying all reality. This , as was 
9 This notion of integrated di versi ty as the driving conception behind the social whole is one of the 
foundational reasons for my thesis that Geist as a theoretical enti ty may be intcrpn::h.:d as a social ani tude of 
progressive tolerance. 
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explained in the footnotes to earlier chapters, is a three-phase analytical 
structure that makes · sense of the process by which particularity and 
universality come to be reconciled_ The phases or moments are, in Hegel's 
terms: immediate unity, difference and mediated unity_ They represent 
together the process by which instinctual or affective particularity comes to 
amend itself through increased interaction with originally alien other 
particulars, and thence comes to be reconciled as a necessarily particular 
element of the universal. 1o 
The focus in The Philosophy of Right is on how the three institutions of modern 
ethical life - the family, civil society and the state - can be understood to 
represent such a framework. As Neuhauser (2000: 135-137) clarifies, the family 
represents immediate unity, in that members of the family, though they 
maintain and pursue private ends, also act in accordance with a common end, 
motivated by an immediate emotional attachment to their fellow family 
members (the emotion of familial love and trust is the driving force here). 
Civil society, in contrast, represents the moment of difference: vast 
multiplicities of private ends are pursued in this space. There are indeed 
general ends that are achieved, but these are an unconscious general effect of 
combined egoistic activity. A key example is the way in which the market, 
with its ultra-differentiated labour force, serves the general good of providing 
the elements of material well-being, even though the motivations of the 
providers are profit orientated and egoistic. It is the state that reconciles the 
substantial unity of the family with the hyper-differentiated sphere of civil 
society, as the moment of mediated unity. The particularised individuals 
understand their private pursuits in the context of a rationally harmonised 
10 I join Neuhauser in swearing off the need {Q mine the darker depths of Hegel's metaphysics to understand 
and defend the Concept as an ahstract entity. I feel it serves our purposes Ilt:~re to understand it in terms of 
it 's practical implication in Hegel's system: as an underlying uni versal pultl!m of social interaction that 
repealS in some form through all soc ial systems. and comes to be recognised as such. and thus objectivdy 
actual ised, in the ideal social order. 
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system, and thus come to trust and feel at home in the state as they do in the 
context of the family.1 1 
The important thing to note here, as Neuhauser (Ibid . 137) reminds us, is that 
"unity" within the state is not simply a larger scale version of the affective 
emotional attachment individuals within the family feel. It is, to Hegel's eyes, 
a different though complementary breed of attachment. It is a conscious, 
rationally considered and affirmed dedication to an inclusive common ideal. 
This process demands that individual citizens must progress from a state of 
immediate emotional attachment to a stage where they recognise the 
multiplicity of ends within SOCiety and understand them as co-ordinated within 
a rational system that legislates on the basis of deliberation amongst the 
diverse elements of society over the collective good. 
iv. Sittlichkeit as inclusive pluralism 
Individuals, in other words, have to understand and relate to the state as a 
realm in which their personal interests and needs have efficacy, if the organic 
unity sketched out so far is to function as Hegel envisions: 
The principle of modern states has enormous strength and depth because it allows the 
principle of subjectivity to attain fulfilment in the self·sufficient.extreme of personal 
particularity, while at the same time bringing it back to substantial unity and so 
preserving this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself (PR §260). 
In practical terms, Neuhauser (2000: 138 - 140) lays out, this is achieved 
through a process of forming public policy that is transparent and inclusive in 
nature. The mechanisms of policy-making must be both visible and 
representative. One of the crucial means by which Sittlichkeit achieves this is 
11 The controversial clement o f "trust" in the Hegelian system, especiall y at a patriotic levd, will come 
under heavy examination when I come LO assess "strong" vs. "weak" identification in Hegel's 
understanding of community. 
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the representation of interests through the associations and corporate 
collectives of civil society. By modern terms we might call these lobby groups, 
professional associations and trade unions. Citizens come to understand 
themselves as included in the legislative process through the inclusion of 
groups and associations to which they belong. As Hegel reminds us: "[T]he 
state is essentially an organization whose members constitute circles in their 
own right [fur sichj12, and no moment within should appear as an unorganized 
crowd" (PR §303 A). 
The activity of such "corporations" in . civil society is what Hardimon (1994: 
201-202) sees as Hegel's corrective to the alienation of the everyday citizen 
from the process of managing public ends. Lacking the capacity the ancient 
Athenian citizen was granted of direct participation in the machinery of 
government, modern citizens can still, by Hegel's terms, understand 
themselves as active and powerful in the social order by direct participation in 
the structures that manage public ends at lower levels. This is how Hardimon 
(Ibid.) sees the corporation playing a "quasi political" role in public life. This, 
in combination with the provision that the legislative process be, in Hegel's 
own terms, a public "spectacle"ll, allows the citizen to see the legislation that 
governs her emerging from public deliberation over the common good. Hegel 
believes that "such pUblicity is the most important means of education as far 
as the interests of the state are concerned" for such a public convergence on 
policy at the hands of ministers and representatives are where it "becomes 
evident that a man's imaginings at home in the company of his wife or friends 
are very different from events in a great assembly, where one ingenious idea 
[Gescheitheit] devours another" (PR § 315). 
12 Neuhauser does make the point in his footnotes that the formation of these groups, and their function as a 
source of feelings of indusion, does pre~suppose some form of pri or affective auachment in terms of 
community. This is an issue [ will deal wilh in the section on strong vs. weak identification . 
13 PR §3 15. . 
The social order in Hegel 234 
It is Hegel 's contention that Sittlichkeit allows for a public engagement and 
management of common concerns that lends weight to the notion that the 
social whole is more capable of constituting and safeguarding freedom than its 
component individuals . Beyond this, of key concern to this thesis is that 
Hegel's ideas on public opinion within the social whole are intriguing, in that 
many of the concerns he expresses almost directly echo Mill's. 
iv. The Role of Public Opinion 
Hegel accords public opinion a significant role in the structure of the ideal 
social order, describing it as the sphere in which "formal subjective freedom" 
(broadly defined as the realm of individual judgements on matters of universal 
concern) "makes its collective appearance" (PR §316). As a massive force 
however, it is something of a contradiction , being a sphere where the 
"substantial and true is linked with its opposite, with what is distinct within 
itself as the particular opinions of the many". It is thus a dangerous terrain, 
where the "essential is just as immediately present as the inessential." Hegel 
thus reflects on the dangers of such a disorganised force being such a driving 
feature of the modern state (Ibid.). Lacking the capacity for rational 
discrimination, the tide of public opinion is to be "respected as well as 
despised - despised for its concrete consciousness and expression, and 
respected for its essential basis" (PR §318). 
What I see Hegel claiming here is that, While the essential elements of the 
ethical consciousness are present in public opinion (in terms of the concern for 
the universal). it is prone to fits of irrationality and over-emphasis of particular 
points of view. In his words, it "lacks the ability to raise its own substantial 
aspect to [the level of] determinate knowledge" (Ibid . ). This task is left to the 
great thinkers and philosophers of an age. As Brad (1992: 133) interprets: 
"Public opinion is the repository of valid truths , yet these truths are lost in a 
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mass of scattered opinion. It is the task of philosophy to set out what is true 
and deserving of being preserved from what is not". 
As such, Hegel surmises, "the first formal condition of achieving anything great 
or rational, either in actuality or in science, is to be independent of public 
opinion. Great achievement may in turn be assured that public opinion will 
subsequently accept it" (PR §318). The truly progressive mind, or the "great 
man", in order to achieve anything of gravity and lasting worth must be "able 
to despise public opinion as he here and there encounters it" (Ibid. A). This is 
an eerily faithful echo of Mill's fears of the "tyranny of the majority" (see 
Chapter 3) stifling the genius of the individual social visionary. 
Hegel's ideas on the press and freedom of expression, though only briefly 
sketched out in The Philosophy of Right, are also pregnant with Millian 
sentiments, even if Hegel does not sufficiently spell out their implications, 
making his treatment of them appear condescending and dismissive. He feels 
the rational social order must be able to handle a freeflow of communication. 
This is because he understands the right to freedom of expression as 
structurally guaranteed by the ethical framework. These structural guarantees 
are most obviously present in the measures set up to curb expression's 
'excesses" (which he seems to see as direct incitement to violent or harmful 
action) (PR §319). 
He does, incidentally, warn that such laws must be cautiously applied due to 
the indeterminate nature of the connections between exhortation and action 
(Ibid.). Furthermore, he suggests that a rationally functional social order 
should have nothing to fear from obviously irrational perspectives. Hegel 
understands the assemblies of the estates and public nature of policy formation 
as rendering misguided opinion "innocuous", in that they provide a public and 
deliberative counterpoint to such "shallow and malicious talk" (Ibid.). His 
ideal social communicative floodgates are not, at first sight, as open as Mill's. 
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He does hold that, while the possession of an opinion is indeed the spiritual 
property of the individual (an argument I provided backing for in Chapter 2), 
"all injuries to the honour of the individual, slander, abuse, vilification of the 
government, of its official bodies and civil servants, and in particular the 
sovereign in person, contempt for the laws, incitement to rebellion, etc., are 
crimes and misdemeanours of varying degrees of gravity" (Ibid.). 
I am tempted to dismiss the conservative overtones of this position, on the 
grounds that a framework of ethical confrontation is central to Hegel's entire 
understanding of the sphere of public opinion. As Brod outlines: 
[T]his confrontation between philosophy and ordinary language can take place 
successfully only when the encounter is mediated through established institutional 
recognition of public opinion. This recognition brings articulated public opinion into 
the light of the public forum. The forum itself then plays a pedagogical role in further 
refining public opinion (Brod, 1992: 133). 
Thus, I would argue, archaic notions such as describing insult to the sovereign 
as a crime can be safely distilled out of the Hegelian position. 14 Such 
provisions, it seems to me, are conditioned by Hegel's notion of the state as 
"divine", a notion I argue below can be justifiably re'interpreted in a modern 
assessment of Hegel. What remains consistent and prevalent in Hegel's 
discussion of public opinion is his contention that the institutional structure of 
Sittlichkeit guarantees a zone of rational public engagement, and as such 
qualifies as a constitutive embodiment of social freedom. 15 
I~ A possibly strong explanati on for such inconsistency cou ld well have been the dangerous political 
atmosphere that followed the French Revolution, in the form of repressive measures such as the Carlsbad 
Decrees of 1819 (See Dallmayr, 1993: 92). Academia of the era existed in the shadow of reactionary 
paranoia on the part of the ruling classes. Hl:!gcJ may well just have been playing it safe. 
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vi. Sittlichkeit as a framework of enriched social freedom 
Once all these threads are pulled together, Hegel's vision of the social whole 
becomes clearer. Neuhauser sums it up particularly well: 
Political life most clearly approximates the ideal of self·sufficient subjectivity (which is 
to say, spirituality) because it is the arena within which citizens, as a body, determine 
themselves in accord with principles arrived at through the exercise of their own 
socially constituted public reason (Neuhauser, 2000: 144). 
This may not seem highly controversial at first sight, but there are difficult 
questions yet to be answered. The most contentious of these arises from the 
basic principle of holding that the social order as a whole more perfectly 
embodies freedom (or Hegel's version thereof) than the individual does. It 
follows from this that there may well be occasions in which the whole trumps 
its collective parts in terms of social priority, thus leading to an attitude and 
practice of paternalism and repression of individual freedoms. While the 
individualistic elements of his theory elucidated so far go some way to clearing 
Hegel of this charge , and Westphal's contention that Hegel's organicism 
considers neither the individual nor the state as prior or more important seems 
to hold, we cannot hope to resolve this issue one way or the other until we 
have considered the totality of Hegel's doctrine of objective freedom. 
The above exposition, while it clears up some instinctive concerns as to how 
abstract metaphysical concepts such as organic unity and self-determining 
embodiments of the will can translate into a viable modern picture of social 
freedom, is still a touch to ethereal for any real assessment. What is lacking is 
a further fleshing out of the conceptual details ; the actual conditions Hegel 
believes contribute to and maintain freedom for individuals in an objective 
social sense. This is the task of the following section. 
1.'1 Th t: idea of Sittlichkeir as a rcalm of objec ti ve rational ethicali ty that allows ror the in termingling of 
subjccti vi lit:s is discussed in section 4.2.4. 
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4.2.3) The Social Conditions of Individual freedom 
U[E]thicallife", Wood (1990: 196) maintains, "is Hegel's name for an entire set 
of institutions - the ones anatomised under that heading in The Philosophy of 
Right: the family, civil society and the state." Later in his discussion, Wood 
concludes that: 
[n its objective aspect, ethical life is unified in the political state. Through the state, 
people decide how they will live together and this gives explicit rationality to the 
whole ethical community (Wood, 1990: 219). 
The task of this section is to understand how Hegel understood the institutional 
structure of Sittlichkeit to be conducive to, and ultimately formative of, social 
freedom, as he understood it. 
Let us recall some of the key structural points concerning the development of 
freedom in Sittlichkeit and its enshrinement in institutional practice. The 
social order is not only tasked with safeguarding the freedoms of personhood, 
moral subjectivity (as well as embodying the higher phase of social freedom). 
It is also incumbent upon it to condition citizens to be able to realise these 
freedoms, and embrace the final system that co-ordinates and harmonizes 
them, as their own. Hegel, as we have seen, feels this latter condition can be 
satisfied by a social space that allows its citizens to find their identities within 
it, and which allows them to feel their particularity is accounted for and 
encouraged. To fully comprehend the normative power of Hegelian principles, 
we must understand how the expanded political space of Sittlichkeit is meant 
to achieve these aims. 
i. Conditioning the citizenry for Freedom 
We can begin with the conditioning of members' freedoms. Neuhauser (2000: 
147-148) divides the mechanisms by which this is possible into the internal and 
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external means 16 the social order must use to allow members' to realise their 
freedoms. The external mechanisms are simpler, and do not require lengthy 
description and analysis. The safeguarding of personhood and moral 
subjectivity are, as Neuhauser points out, the more straightforward and 
uncontentious elements of the objective social order. Through the action of 
the courts and the justice system, laws are enacted that enshrine certain basic 
rights of personhood (such as the ownership of private property) and of moral 
subjectivity (allow citizens to act according to their own conceptions of the 
good, provided this does not conflict with the freedoms of others, of the 
freedom of the state as a whole).17 
The internal conditioning of social freedom is a different matter altogether. It 
is here that we enter distinctively Hegelian and contentious territory, for, as 
already explicated above, it is in securing social freedom that the social order 
must focus its efforts on the internal dynamics of its members' wills. The 
internal conditioning of freedom must occur, Neuhauser (Ibid. 148) holds, in 
two key respects. Firstly, the state is responsible for the safeguarding and 
encouraging of elements that allow for the formation of citizens capable of 
self-determination, i.e. it is responsible for the Bi/dung of its citizenry. 
Secondly, it must ensure that individual particularity is satisfied such that the 
already much discussed embracing of the social order may take place. 
The concept of Bildung in general terms has already been laid out in the first 
Hegel chapter. But it is only when it is brought out in its specific application to 
Sittlichkeit that the rather ominous sounding concept of Hegelian "subjective 
reconditioning" makes sense. For the reasons why subjects must be 
16 I.e. external and internal to the activity of the individual will. 
17 Wh ile these provisions might bear a surface resemblance to Mill's harm principle, bear in mind they arc 
subsumed within the broader system of Sittlichkeit and thus must be reconciled with a ··subjective 
reconditioning" of th'! subject that seems (at least for now) at odds with Mill's social vision. While I aim to 
prove this is profoundly not the case, I will only grant myself the space to do so in the final chapter of this 
thesis. 
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conditioned, as opposed to merely educated or instructed, we must look back 
to the Hegelian conception of human nature. Here, Neuhauser (Ibid. 149) 
explains, we find a strange paradox. Through Hegelian eyes, even though the 
aspiration to freedom (or at least its preceding conditions) is an essential 
element of human nature, humans are not, by instinctual disposition, suited to 
being free. This is a dynamic we find throughout the elements of the Hegelian 
system discussed so far - the freeing of individuals from the contingent desires 
and limited self·conception that hinder the realisation of their fully self-
determined wills. The profound implications this has in terms of the way 
Bildung operates in Sittlichkeit, is that it must operate unconsciously and even 
involuntarily upon the members of the social order. Before we are scared off 
by the potentially dark and controlling overtones of this position, we must be 
clear on what exactly Hegel means by this. 
ii. Human Need as Reason's catalyst 
Hegel is not suggesting that we adopt a strategy like Huxley's subliminal 
suggestion sleep therapy in Brave New World. 18 He is rather maintaining an 
eminently reasonable position: that individuals are drawn into the social space 
by basic needs, and thence find themselves subconsciously more aware of their 
social context and the viability of a rational social order. As he outlines: 
Spirit attains its actuality only through internal division, by imposing this limitation and 
finitude upon itself in [the shape of] natural needs and the continuum [Zusammenhang] 
of this external necessity, and in the very process of adapting itself to these 
limitations, by overcoming them and gaining its objective existence (PR §187 A). 
HI Strangely enough, an analysis of Brave New World from a Hegelian perspective does follow towards the 
end of this chapter. 
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This dynamic repeats itself throughout the two lower levels of Sittlichkeit. In 
Hegel's view the family and civil society unconsciously give the individual the 
emotional and intellectual resources for the conscious embracing of the state. 
iii. Need as catalyst in the Family and Civil Society 
As Neuhauser (2000: 151-157) points out the family in Sittlichkeit fulfils the 
larger task of preparing its children for social freedom by imbuing them with 
the capacities to participate in a rational social order. It represents the first 
social space individuals experience in which brute desires must be sublimllted 
within the context of a collective, mutually beneficial social union that is built 
on affective emotional trust. The family imbues children with an affirmative 
attitude towards their own particularity. In being loved unconditionally for 
who they essentially are (or come to be) they learn to affirm these as 
intrinsically valuable, so that they are better capable of celebrating their own 
particularity in later life as individual members of the rational social order. 
Thus, they are prepared through family life for the freedoms of moral 
subjectivity as well as personhood. 19 The modern family, unlike the ancient 
clan or tribe, is designed to dissolve. Children are prepared throughout their 
family life for the point where they reach the age of majority and leave to 
establish themselves as entities of their own. As Hegel states it: "Every 
marriage leads to the renunciation of previous family relationships and the 
establishment of a new and self-sufficient family" (PR §178) .2Q 
I') This dOt:s sland in a certain conlra..."llo what many perceive as the realities of modem family existence. 
There are, after all , countless shelves of psychotherapy texts auesting to the manner in wh ich fami lies 
render their chi ldren socially dysrunctionaL This lends credence, I feel, to the argument I make in the 
coming sections - thal Sitflic:hkei{ ultimately represents more a set of normative standards that are 
constantly worked towards, but perhaps never uni versa lly achieved. I shall discuss this in detai l in the 
section on the tenets and implications of the doctrine of objective freedom. 
20 This, for Hegel , also fi nds expression in the realm of law, where parents can claim no right over the 
property their children acquire once they kave the fami ly at the age of majority. He also speaks out against 
inheritance practices that discrimi nate in the favour of male or eldest children. This is interesting in terms 
of an element of Hegel' s theory thatl have not dealt wi th yet, nor intend to deal with at any length: the 
strong and archaic gender bias in Hegel's theory. This is discussed brietly in the coming section on 
objections and impl ications of the social order. 
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As Hardimon (1994: 176) argues, Hegel's conception of the family as distinctly 
modern applies in another sense that links it inextricably with civil society. 
Unlike the families of antiquity and the middle ages, it is not a self-sufficient 
subsistence unit of production. It is, rather, a unit of consumption. Whereas 
in times past it may have been the locus of productive activity (agrarian 
farming communities are the clearest example), the family now consumes the 
commodities produced by the economic activity of civil society. The two can 
be recognised as interdependent in that the family must produce new 
consumers and economic agents for civil society, whilst civil society relies on 
the family to imbue children with the necessary capacities (just discussed) to 
participate therein. Hegel in fact even sees the family's economic reliance on 
civil society as part of what drives the Bildung process of the individual: 
[Civil society] substitutes its own soil for external inorganic nature and paternal soil 
from which the individual [der Einzelne] gained his livelihood and subjects the 
existence of the whole family itself to depe nde nce on civil society and to contingency. 
Thus the individual [Individuum] becomes a son of civil society. which has as many 
claims on him as he has rights in relation to it (PR §238). 
Following the pattern of the Concept, as just discussed above, whereas the 
family represents affective emotional unity, civil society is characterised by 
vastly diversified particularity. "As [members of civil society]", Hegel claims, 
"[i]ndividuals are private persons who have their own interest as their end" . 
To realise these ends, however, they must come to terms with a system 
"mediated by the universal". Thus, they learn to operate by "determining 
their knowledge, will and activity in a universal way and making themselves 
into a link of this social chain" (PR §187). 
Neuhauser (2000: 158-165) sees the description of civil society as one of the 
clearest instantiations of Hegel's contention that individuals are drawn into the 
web of relations that will result in Bildung through a condition of natural need. 
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They cannot, quite simply, survive without the goods that participation in the 
system of exchange and production provides for them. The Bildung aspect, 
Neuhauser maintains, comes as an unconscious result of socially productive 
labour.21 The individual learns that she is bounded by material circumstance, 
as well as the wills and needs of others. One cannot give in to caprice and use 
raw materials whimsically. If one is to survive, one must produce things that 
have value to others, that address their needs, and take their desires into 
consideration . The labourer gives her ends objective expression , and thus, in 
Hegel's more dramatic terms becomes "master" of her "own destiny". The 
sole economic agent in civil society comes to understand herself as a person 
amongst others. She is conscious of her own determinate particularity, but 
simultaneously conscious of herself as an abstract universal subjectY In terms 
of the latter, she realises she is identical to all others as regards the rights and 
obligations of the common system. These two moments of awareness provide 
part of the rational groundwork for embracing the state, as the objective 
guarantor of the rationality of such a common system. 
Wallace summarises Hegel's views on this fittingly: 
11 Loosely deti ned by Hegel himself as labour that somehow addresses the needs o f o thers as opposed to 
being the mere product of incl ination, or, in more strictly H egelian terms, "conduct ... dictated by the . .. 
~,'operli es of i ls object" ' CPR § 187 Z). . ..... . . 
-- Neuhauser (2000: 158-165) deepens the Hegelian understand ing of CIv il society wah a dI SCUSSio n of the 
relations of the diversified modem market as underscored by constant reference not to distinct individuals 
but (0 the "propertyless universal" of money or the market. Though I support and understand the principle 
at hand here, I remain slightl y sceptical about this pnrl iculnr argument. I feel it ho lds true if one is sell ing 
washing powder, but not if one is se ll ing des igner clo thing or tlavoured condoms. Certainl y, it would bl;! 
unfair to have cxpect~d Hegel to anticipate the idiosynrac ics of modl;!rn branding and ni che marketing. 
But , si nce I am bound here to examine the more durable of his principles. I feel I should hi ghlight that 
modem products are oft en des igned with a determinate class of people in mind. This can run counter to the 
princ ipks of Sittlichkeil in promoting certain prejudices of it 's own. For example, the producers of 
des igner clo thi ng may well become dismissive of those who do not follow high fas hion. But thl! po int 
remains that there is a constant awareness that anyone may buy the goods that are produced. Thus, I will 
support Neuhauser to a point - in conceding that a modern system of exchange re lation, in broad terms, 
es tablishes a mindset by which people become abstract buyers and sellers in the eyes of the system and its 
members. 
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[A]lthough [Bildung in civil society] is experienced as the operation of (economic) 
necessi ty upon the individual (§186), it is in itself a process of liberation, because it 
makes it increasingly clear that what the individual experiences as needs in fact reflect 
social attitudes and expectations, rather than brute nature, thus opening up the 
possibility of reflecting on them and seeking a higher unity - what makes sense as a 
whole (Wallace, 1999: 419-434) . 
This gives us a sense of how Hegel sees the individual becoming reconciled to 
the co-operative structure of the social order, but it doesn't yet explain how 
Hegel sees the individual remaining necessarily particularised the process. In 
seeking to understand how individual particularity is satisfied in the objective 
social order, what we ask of Hegel is what features institutions must possess in 
order to make the subjective component of freedom, as already discussed, 
possible. What, in other words, must the institutional framework of 
Sittlichkeit do to ensure its members find their identities through participating 
in the social space, in order that they do so as free beings? 
iv. Conditions of Sittlichkeit as worthy of Citizens' Affirmation 
Neuhauser (2000: 166-169) claims that for Hegel the answer to the above 
question is, once again, bound up with the concept of human need. In order to 
stand as "good ,,23, the social order must have mechanisms for the satisfaction 
of the material needs of each individual built into its foundations. Both Hegel 
and Rousseau maintain (and just about any social theorist would agree) that a 
society that fails to cater for the basic material welfare of its members, 
regardless of how well or fairly it instils and reflects spiritual or emotional 
unity in its populace, will be neither enduring nor legitimate. Hegel wishes to 
prove that material (or welfare) needs and freedom are not simply compatible, 
but in fact mutually dependent. 24 
" By Hegelian terms, to exhibit a unity of right and welfare (Neuhauser, 2000: \65). 
24 Nl!uhauser does take pains to explain that welfare, in the Hl!gelian sense, does indeed refl!f to spiritual 
needs as well as physical. The need for recognition would be the most prominent exalTIple~ These needs 
are, however, largely catered for in terms of the subjective disposition already discussed in the first Hegel 
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Neuhauser (Ibid. 169·70, n 41) presents a powerful illustration of how Hegel 
sees base needs and desires as a powerful incentive to participation in the 
freedom ·concretizing structures of Sittlichkeit. In the family, one the most 
powerful examples of the interdependence of need and freedom is seen in the 
satisfaction of the sexual drive, as a binding force between two adults. Need 
here fuels the activities that allow for substantial "ethical engagement", and 
thus is even something as instinctual as sex is elevated to the level of the 
ethical. This, Hegel feels, is appropriate, as it embraces the "totality" of the 
person - "mind, sentiment and sensible being" (VPR1, 253, as cited in 
Neuhauser, 2000: 170). One's natural desires and the ethical demands of one's 
environment are united in a mutually re-enforcing sense. 
In terms of civil society, Neuhauser (2000: 170-172) contends this same 
relationship of mutual re-enforcement applies in a more obvious sense. The 
system of production and exchange produces the basic necessities of survival, 
and furthermore allows for the procurement of luxuries and additional material 
comforts. Hegel follows Smith to a large extent in maintaining that the 
unregulated market is the most effective maximiser of social goods. 25 In broad 
principle at the very least, it harnesses the driving force of self-interest to 
provide for the material well being of society.26 This can be understood as a 
profound contribution to the rational social order. Members are given material 
incentive to participate in an institutional framework that, as discussed above, 
engenders members with the foundational capacities of realising social 
freedom . Mutual dependence amongst members becomes, through co-
operation in civil society, a concrete and inescapable feature of the social 
chapter. Thus, we may conclude that spi ritual welfare of members is something that is allowed for, as 
opposed to directly instilled, by the objec ti ve mechanisms of Sittlichkeil. 
:!~ I unfortunately have no space here to digress into the highly interesting (and controversial) theoretical 
crossfire concerning Hegel and capitalism. There arc numerous interesting dimensions to this , including 
the question of whether or not the Hegelian civ il society cou ld be interpreted in a socialist or market 
socialist manner. 
2h Hardimon (1994 : 192) concurs here, identi fyi ng affinit ies with a "Smithian hidden hand" in Hegel's 
conception of the market. 
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space. This is not, as Hardimon (1994: 192) claims, an accidental arrangement, 
so much as a function of the institution if rationally understood. Hegel claims 
it may appear anarchic and unstructured, until one realises it in fact conforms 
to the inherent rationality of classical economics (PR §189) . 
v. Sitttichkeit as both description and ideal 
One issue here continues to mire the Hegelian system. Without stepping too 
blindly into the vast and virulent modern controversy surrounding capitalism 
and poverty, the question of the poor in Hegel's social structure points to a 
crucial defect in his structure. Hegel is, as Neuhauser (2000: 171-174) 
maintains, not as blind as Smith was to the negative fallout of unregulated 
capitalism, but nonetheless failed to find a satisfactory solution (by his own 
terms), to the problem of poverty. He rejected poorhouses as a concept as he 
felt they denied the poor the necessary spiritual satisfaction of the need for 
recognition as effective social agents . Assigning the task of caring for their 
unemployed members to the trade guilds , or corporations, falls by the 
objection that many of the unemployed will not belong to such an association. 
After considering various alternatives (including state issued begging licenses27 ) 
Hegel never, by the end of his writing days, managed to successfully decide 
what to do about poverty in Sitttichkeit. 28 
There are various options one may eke out of Hegelian principle (making 
smaller community units responsible for their poor could be one interesting 
avenue of exploration) but I have no intention of attempting to amend the 
archaic elements of Hegel's economics. I bring this issue to light as preliminary 
17 This is amusingly remi niscenr of the system devised by Terry Pratchett for his satirical Discworld books. 
T he di fference being, in PratchcU's world, the beggars in fact form a gui ld, very similar to the kind of 
structure Hegel lauds as the ··corporation". In the spirit of true words often spoken in jest, a representative 
body for the poor is not an en tirely un-Hegelian policy option. 
2R The closest he came to a sol ution is a hopelessly archaic conception that colonizing the undeveloped 
world in order to expand markets could resolve capitalist issut;!s of overproduction. T hi s is dismi ssed by 
Neuhauser fo r not onl y its dated sensibili(ies, but its blatant violation of the condition of Sirr/ichkeil as a 
self-sulTicicnt social whole. 
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proof of an argument I will make at various levels in this enquiry: that we are 
best served in interpreting Sittlichkeit , for modern purposes, as a set of 
normative prinCiples and standards to be worked towards, and which may never 
be universally achieved. If the Hegelian system, with all its complexity and 
coherence , can find no defin itive rational mechanism for dealing with an issue 
as profoundly "of the real world" as poverty, then we must seriously reconsider 
its status as a description of the world "as it really is". 
Hardimon (1994: 174) provides some key argumentative grounds for such an 
interpretation . In commenting on the Hegelian analysis of the modern 
institutional structure, Hardimon argues that Hegel's intention is neither pure 
description , nor setting up a purely normative set of standards by which to 
judge the social whole: 
[Hegel] presents [his theory of the modern social world], on the one hand as an 
account of the essences of these institutions, insofar as their essences are realised in 
existi ng institutions and groups, and , on the othe r hand, as an account of existing 
insti tutions and groups, insofar as they realise their essences (Ibid . ). 
Hegel is thus, on Hardimon's reading, attempting what seems at first like an 
odd synthesis between articulating the structure of the social system as it 
stands , and setting up the normative standards such a structure should accede 
to . This seems a great deal less odd, though , if we recall the intentions 
inherent in the grander project of Hegelian social theory. If Hegel is indeed 
concerned with allowing individuals to be reconciled to the inherent rationality 
of their social context, to view their social order as, in Hardimon's (Ibid.) 
words "a home", then it makes sense for him to describe a system that is 
rational in its construction , but in present reality fails to meet the standards he 
sets out for it. This, as Hardimon (Ibid. 133) argues, makes reconciliation more 
viable, as one is less troubled by the defects of the institutional structure that 
surrounds one if it is seen as only an imperfect realisation of an inherently 
rational social blueprint. 
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The interpretation I argue for at various levels of this enquiry is that a viable 
modern Hegelian analysis sees the social order as a rationally assembled, if 
somewhat dysfunctiona l, machine. The Philosophy of Right is the technician's 
manual. Hegel, in laying out the rational interconnectedness of the structure 
of Sittlichkeit, I see as laying out the fundamental structure of the ethical, 
allowing the enlightened modern individual to feel reconciled to such a 
structure, and understanding herself as part of a community of rational agents 
that accede to the framework that oversees their lives as the best means of 
managing a common reality, even if there are profound disagreements as to 
the manner in which this management is carried out. As such, Hegel is not 
describing the interconnected structure of family , civil society and state as 
they are so much as how they could be if understood in the interlocking 
rational fashion that they essentially already exist in .29 This reconciliation, as 
discussed, is foundational to social freedom. 
The key issue that arises immediately is an intuitive concern as to what must 
be done when competing conceptions of the good do clash. Harmony is a 
useful concept in bad poetry or greeting cards, but it is a dishearteningly 
distant goal to apply to social reality. Even as we draw nearer the ideal and 
interconnected structure Hegel lays out, the kind of engagement he envisions is 
bound to be rather messy. Above and beyond this, if my interpretation holds, 
no social order will ever be entirely free of such conflict. Ethical and practical 
engagement is the ideal social orders raison d' etre , a fundamental of its 
design . As such, it is critical to understand how Hegel would have us preserve 
the freedom of each citizen to seek out their own conception of the good. In 
more distinctively Hegelian terminology , we must understand how the freedom 
of Moral Subjectivity is included in Sittlichkeit. 
29 This is what underscores Hegel's famed contention that what is aClual is rational and what is rational is 
aClual. As Weslphal (i n Beiser (cd. ), 1993: 234) poinls oUl, Ihi s dec laration has of len been mislakenly 
misin terpreted as "a bl anket endorsement of the status quo". 
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4.2.4) Moral subjectivity in Sitttichkeit 
The question of moral subjectivity in Sittlichkeit is a substrate of a broader 
question in all Hegel interpretation: how exactly are preceding elements of 
the dialectic aufgehauben into later parts. For our present purposes, how is 
the lower level freedom of moral subjectivity preserved in the overall rational 
social order? 
The short answer is that moral subjectivity is catered for as a portion of the 
formal will's self·determination. The moral subject becomes reconciled to an 
objective harmony that she understands as a structural guarantor of her 
freedom. But, as with most "short" answers in Hegel, this remains too vague. 
i. Background and Implications of a Reflective Unity 
Neuhauser (2000: 252) holds that Hegel's key concern is whether and how all of 
the conditions he has set out can be compatible in a single social space. The 
central tension Hegel foresees is between the provision that conceptions of the 
good be individually endorseable, and that their "goodness" is derived from a 
"true" ethicality. This tension, Neuhauser (Ibid . 229-232) feels, arises out of 
what Hegel understood as a profoundly modern dilemma . His own 
understanding of the subjective disposition, as covered in Chapter 2, allows us 
to understand the mechanisms by which individuals may identify the social 
order as the craftsman of their identities and roles , and the guarantor of the 
space and freedom for their ends to be pursued. 
But this alone does not, by Hegel's standards, guarantee the rationality of the 
social order. Hegel's analysis of ancient Greece illustrates how members can 
find their identities in their social order and still fall short of realizing the 
freedoms of personhood and moral subjectivity. This is because, as already 
covered in Hardimon's discussion of Hegelian social roles in Chapter 2, the 
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Greek social space was permeated by a sense of immediate unity with the 
social whole that resulted in an attitude of un reflectively accepting social 
practice. The criteria set by the subjective disposition are incomplete because 
they are, alone, compatible with such an unreflective immediacy. Moral 
subjects, for Hegel, must have the capacity to distance themselves from their 
social norms and assess them rationally. 
This, Neuhauser (Ibid . 236-237) maintains, allows Hegel to overcome what he 
saw as one of the crucial shortcomings of historical social orders. Prior social 
orders located the source of moral authority in the communal whole, be it polis 
or church canon, and accorded communal leaders the final imprimatur on 
moral decisions. The mediaeval distinction between priests and laymen is a 
prime example. The system sketched out in The Philosophy of Right is partially 
a reaction to this . It democratises moral authority to each individual, 
regardless of communal station_ In doing so, it essentially "universalises" 
moral authority, in that all have access to the "absolute" which governs the 
scope of human conduct. Since this "absolute", as discussed, is an abstraction 
from particular perspectives, it is universal in a further, more abstract sense . 
The question here is how thorough this universalisation of moral authority 
actually is. As Neuhauser (Ibid.) frames it, can we make sense of ethical 
standards as something internal to every human being? 
This is certainly, as Neuhauser (Ibid.) sees it, the Hegelian intention - to reveal 
participation in social order as rational by showing it to be necessary to the full 
self-determination of the will , and thus of fully realised freedom . This can be 
understood as internal because freedom is understood as the essence of the 
fully developed human being. Hegel saw such a process of reconciliation as 
realising the grand enlightenment ideal of rescuing ethical standards from the 
charge of mere externality. 
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The key contention that Neuhauser (Ibid.) draws out of this is that, even the 
self·determination in The Philosophy of Right extends beyond individuals to the 
social order as a whole, this does not mean the self·determination of the whole 
is more profound or valuable the self-determination of the individuals that 
compose it. One cannot sacrifice the one in the name of the other, for the two 
are intrinsically linked. A key element of social freedom is that it secures the 
freedom of individuals. Moreover, the locus of said social freedom is not 
ultimately an obscure transcende ntal. It is intimately bound up in the flesh 
and blood world of human activity, and as such is inseparable, in concept and 
realisation , from the freedom of individuals. 
Neuhauser (Ibid.) sees this as one of the key improvements of Hegel's account 
over Kant's duality between desire and duty. Hegel argues, rather 
compellingly, that humans as sensuous beings, could never fully endorse a 
morality that made no real provisions for their well-being, yet made supreme 
claim over their wills . Thus the construction of social morality in Hegel is not a 
question of abstract universality (as it was for Kant) but rather a question of 
what beings entering the social space with needs and inclinations could 
embrace as their highest principle without completely disregarding or 
countermanding their sensuous nature. The discussion above on the interplay 
of reason and nature in the construction of the social order in Hegel illustrates 
just such a reconciliation. 
ii. True vs. Formal Conscience 
This is indeed a difficult balance to strike, and in seeking to understand the 
possibility of such a reconciliation, we must address Hegel's concept of the 
. moral conscience, or more precisely, Hegel's distinction between "true" and 
"formal" conscience. "True conscience" Hegel claims, "is the disposition to 
will what is good in and for itself" (PR §137) . Wood (1990: 187) explains this as 
conscience which "relates to a system of objective principles and duties, 
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founded in ethical life" and that is "nothing but the awareness of them by the 
moral subject". The formal conscience on the other hand is "nothing but the 
'infinite formal self-certainty of this subject"'. Wood (Ibid . 188) sees it 
operating "at the fringes of the system, where ethical standards are 
indeterminate, conflicting or disputable". Appeals to conscience, to have 
binding validity for others in the social order, must refer to "true" and not 
merely formal conscience. This dual-vision of individual conscience helps 
explain why Hegel, in The Philosophy of Right separates out the "moral" from 
the "ethical" (PR §137) . "The true conscience", he claims, "is contained in the 
ethical disposition ._. the religious conscience, however, lies completely outside 
this sphere" (Ibid.). 
This is where I see Hegel marking out the boundaries of a value pluralism 
overseen by the objective rational framework of the social order. Subjective 
conceptions of the good are merely formal, whereas objective conceptions of 
the good are true. This is not to dispute the right to these individual 
conceptions, but rather to grant the power of sanction and control only to 
those conceptions that are objectively valid. This for Hegel is the framework 
of Ethical Life. As discussed in Chapter 2, the right to persona and belief is a 
sacrosanct area in the Hegelian structure. Ethical life is concerned with 
subjectivity made action , and this is to be concerned with what the social 
order can rationally demand of members in their dealings with each other. The 
demands of formal conscience alone, which would include religious moralities 
and what Wood (1990: 185) labels an "ethics of conviction" (roughly 
comparable to the intuitionist moralities that Mill so vehemently opposed), are 
not fit conditions for the rational social order to objectively ensure. It is only 
the true conscience, the rational structure acceded to by all, which is granted 
such broadscale institutional preservation. 
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iii. Conditions for the Development of True Conscience 
What, then, informs the possibility of a "true", or rational conscience on the 
part of the citizenry? As Neuhauser (2000: 253-254) outlines the rational social 
order must be "capable of withstanding the rational scrutiny of its members". 
This criterion is met when social orders exhibit the features of objective 
freedom , as outlined above. A second criterion flows out of the requirement of 
individual endorsability . The rationality of the social order must not only be 
rational, but must make such rationality transparent to its members . 30 One of 
the key mechanisms of this rational transparency has already been discussed in 
reference to the structure of the legislative structure in sittlichkeit and its 
public, deliberative nature, as discussed above. But Hegel's ultimate 
requirements move beyond these mere understandings of the functions of 
various institutions. The citizen must, at the very least, have access to means 
of comprehending the inter-related nature of the entire system, and the 
interlocking function of the spheres of ethical life. 31 
As Neuhauser (2000: 227-229) contends, it is here that we find a key point of 
divergence between the Hegelian and mainstream liberal conception of the 
social order. The liberal tradition is concerned with the question of how to 
accommodate divergent conceptions of the good, with the most efficient and 
principled way of managing a value pluralism within the modern social order, 
JD It must be no ted [hat Hegel does grant some credence to more limited form s of theoret ical understanding 
. lhar rationally comprehend portions of the social system. hut are incomplete in that they do not make 
expl icit the ir place in the overall freedom-fosteri ng structure of the system of eth ical life entire. Neuhauser 
takes theories of political economy, with their capacity to highlighllhe rational s tructure of the market, as a 
prime example hert! . In order for such approaches to function at a subordinate level within the Hegelian 
sys tem. though, they must be conti nuous with the princ iples of the hroader philosophical perspective, even 
if they lack its completeness. They can, upon n:nection, function this way, if one considers the way 
conventional understand ings of such social elemen ts as the market and the system of managing private ends 
in a social framework are subsumed and preserved in the Hegelian s tate, as discussed above. This suggests 
that the Hegelian structure , understood ;1/ toto. represents a higher order understanding that other, less 
wide-ranging, theoretical lenses may rationally affirm, albeit incompletely. 
31 Thi s does seem to sugges t that there should be some means of making the study of soc ial philosophy 
open to all in some manner or another, or pahnps that di scussion of such principles shou ld be included in 
mainstream education and sphaes of public delibe ration, such as the media. 
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usually by limits to the state's coercive power. Hegel is more concerned with 
making the inherent . rationality of the social order transparent to its 
members. 32 
But the claim I aim to further over the remainder of this chapter is that this 
rationality in fact refers to an objective framework for the management of 
practical and ethical confrontation, and the fostering of increased awareness 
and tolerance. I do not believe what Hegel had in mind is a strictly value-laden 
body of communal precepts and positive moral notions. I see Hegel etching out 
a social vision in which the true conscience oversees the clashes and conflicts 
occasioned by the merely formal , and the rational of structure of ethical life as 
something to be acceded to on the basis that it negotiates such better than 
mere individuals can , and is thus more enduring and worthy of assent than any 
merely particularised notion of justifiable action . 
But there is a way yet to go before I can make this claim concretely, and there 
are further issues that must be cleared up beforehand . This exposition of the 
structure of Hegel's principles has yet to answer certain questions central to 
this enquiry as a whole. We must understand how Hegel's idealised structure 
may function in human reality. We must establish to what extent Hegel's 
principles truly represent a structure that ensures freedom. We must 
understand just how deeply the "trust" he sees citizens bestowing must run, 
and we must understand the related and crucial question of when and how 
dissent to the social order is possible. Beyond all this, we must know what to 
make of Hegel 's central claim that the social order is the realisation of the 
objective universal, the world spirit that is Geist. Only then will I be equipped 
to set out a modern Hegelian position. 
]2 The queslion of the possibili ty of va lue plural is m in Hegel is addressed helow in Seclion 4".3.4. 
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4.3) Emergent dynamics and critical assessment of 
the Hegelian social order 
What we find laid out in the first part of this chapter is certainly intriguing as a 
vision of the modern social order, but the grander, and far more difficult, 
question to be answered is whether it has any value or validity for our 
conception of the interplay of individuals and institutions in a modern 
democracy. 
If we take this as a guiding project, we can see Sittlichkeit as a kind of owner's 
manual or study· guide to the ideal social order. But this is complexified by the 
grander Hegelian project of allowing individuals to see their world "as it really 
is". Individuals are, after all, to be reconciled to the social space surrounding 
them , not "some world beyond" (Patten , 1999: 176). What, ultimately is the 
objective dimension of Sittlichkeit? Is it a means of reconciling ourselves to at 
least the abstract principles that govern our modern social lives, or a set of 
normative standards institutions should continually strive towards, but perhaps 
never achieve completely? My interpretation lies with the latter (though 
elements of the former certainly must playa part). 
The issues that come to the fore here are those I have already raised in 
footnotes and sidelines to the above exposition. Families are by no means 
universally greenhouses for the independent and other·regarding self. Civil 
Society, as Hegel himself was forced to admit, has its citizen-forming capacity 
marred by the realistic fallout of poverty, and the modern state certainly does 
not, across the board , exhibit the features Hegel felt made it the locus of 
concretized freedom. It is both tempting, and seemingly sensible, to interpret 
Sittlichkeit as a set of interlocking normative standards. 33 This is, however, a 
:n We must be! careful here, no t to fa ll into the confusion outlined in Chapter 2. It could he argued thaL the 
modan social order fits into the historical dialectic of all social orders, and thus must be tolerated and 
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call I will only be in a position to make conclusively once I come to assess the 
broad sweep of a modern Hegelian position at the close of this chapter. 
For now, there are more immediate questions to be answered. Whether its 
force is primarily normative or explanatory, we must assess to what extent we 
may endorse the architecture of principle in Sittlichkeit as rational and useful. 
A good means of doing this is to contrast it, as Patten does, with the more 
prevalent justification and set of guiding principles for the modern state, the 
contractarian perspective. We have already addressed in Chapter 2 the clashes 
and commonalties between Hegel and the contractarians as . regards the 
elements of Methodological Atomism in their respective approaches. We are 
now in a far better position to evaluate the full scope of this long-standing 
philosophical standoff. In so doing, we may evaluate what issues, abstract and 
otherwise, the Hegelian structure resolves, and what problems it creates in 
doing so. 
4.3.1) Critical assessment of the Hegelian conception of social freedom 
As we move from the comfortable ether of abstract principle and nearer the 
realm of practicality, we gain a clearer sense of how the Hegelian doctrine of 
freedom stands in relation to both our common-sense notions of the word, and 
the context of practical implications that surround it. This is especially so 
when we contrast the Hegelian understanding of institutional principle and 
structure with that of the contractarians. 
As Patten (1999: 106) illustrates (and as should be clear from the discussion 
thusfar), the central clash between the two approaches concerns the very 
understood as a work in progress. T his is. ultimately. at odds w ith Hegel's conviction' that the modern 
social world is, in po int of fac t, the realisation o f the telos, and if so the cavelll against confus ing Hegel' s 
attempts lO reconcile citizens LO the past with his prescriptions for the present and future sland . 
Even if we do reconfi gure the Hegelian system, and sel up the present as a stage of the incomplete dialectic 
of social orders, we must s tili know the nature o f the felos to make sense o f this pas iLi an. Thus, I lay as ide 
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conception of freedom itself. To a contractarian with a notion of pre-socially 
free beings, the state is an imposition at the first, and the preservation of 
individual freedom thus the guiding principle of state practice. Now it must be 
noted, as has been and will continue to be contended in this thesis, that 
provisions that safeguard individual freedom are by no means alien to the 
Hegelian social structure, but quite the opposite. Patten , in support of this, 
concedes that the requirement of affirmation by individual social members 
hints at a reconciliatory note in this crossfire. 
i. Hegelian vs. Contractarian freedom 
This is something that requires far more interpretation if we are to understand 
its practical implications. As Patten (1999: 106-114) highlights, for all the talk 
of freedom , actualisation and the intricate processes discussed at length so far 
that promote individual self-government, membership of the state is not, under 
Hegelian terms , consensual. It is here that the most vehement clash between 
the two approaches arises. Hegel criticises the contractarians for taking as 
their central analogue a system of mutually optional exchange relations - the 
contract - that ultimately reduce duty, obligation and state membership to a 
matter of choice. 
While it is not true of the higher pantheon of contract theorists (notably Locke, 
Rousseau, and Fichte) that they place no rational constraints on the kind of 
state individuals must form to meet the criteria of a free society, Hegel's 
central claim that there remains , in each of them, the requirement of ultimate 
consent still stands .34 This sets up the theoretical possibility that individuals 
may dissent from entering the state at all, or might form highly irrational and 
repressive states. This is considered highly unlikely, considering the highly 
discussion of this admittedly compl~x dynamic until I am in a position to set out what I feel are va lid 
modern intcrpretarions of Geist and the Hegelian telos. 
34 Elements of the above exposition might well dispute Patten's claims on behalf of Rousseau, but this is 
not strictly relevant to the discussion at hand 
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adverse conditions of the state of nature and the experience of history, but is 
nonetheless present as a possibility, and thus sets up individual freedom as the 
highest principle of normative justice. For Hegel, membership of the state is 
not voluntary. Furthermore, as examined at length above, the Hegelian state 
is not understood as a limit to freedom, but rather its concrete source and 
guarantor. 
The battle lines seem somewhat too clearly drawn here, until, Patten (Ibid. 
114-119) reflects, we recall that Hegel puts forward a richer doctrine of 
institutional principle and structure that in fact includes and accounts for the 
contractarian position. Hegel does indeed "limit" individual freedom if 
freedom is confined purely to the concept of choice or Wilkur_ 35 The above 
exposition has borne ample witness to the manner in which citizenship is 
founded on the capacity to seek one's ends beyond mere caprice and 
contingent desire. This is an element of citizenship that the social 
contractarians have difficulty accounting for . As the state has no formative 
role in encouraging self-governance, these capacities must be found in the 
state of nature itself, as part of the impetus, one would presume, that leads to 
the formation of the social order in the first place. 
But the very conditions of the state of nature as a realm of brute egoism, 
Patten (Ibid.) contends, make this unlikely. Certainly, it is the awareness of 
competition with others that leads to the formation of the state, but if the 
state itself simply manages egoistic ends, then all that can be objectively 
guaranteed is a society of constrained egoists. It is difficult to see how a 
radical, or even more balanced, contractarian could point to the objective 
mechanisms that develop citizens that are ever more aware of their context 
and the needs of others. If they cannot do so, then the contractarian state is, 
objectively at least, nothing more than a referee of whims and inclinations. 
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Thus Hegel's criticism is that contractarianism ignores certain key elements of 
the state - notably its freedom- and identity-forming elements. 
ii. The Necessity of Self-Interested Behaviour 
Wallace (1999: 419-434) adds force to this with his exposition of the Hegelian 
melding of private liberty and citizenship. He holds that insufficient attention 
is paid to Hegel's conception of the operation of civil society, with the common 
assumption being that he has simply appropriated the model directly from 
classical political economists. Wallace reminds us that, as per the discussion of 
civil society above, the operation of the mechanism may echo political 
economy, but its function in ethical life does not. If we examine the 
progression of concepts of ethical life, the sections on abstract right and 
morality (as discussed) see freedom as a move beyond, yet still including, self-
interest, it makes no sense to suddenly have an entire dimension of the system 
that functions purely in the service of self interest. As we have discussed, it 
does not. Need and Sittlichkeit support each other at every step. Thus, the 
intersubjective awareness of freedom is driven forward by the actions of 
private liberty. It is the activity of serving our own ends in the sphere of civil 
society that allows us to comprehend the freedom-concretizing necessity of a 
rational and impartial structure that allows us to safeguard and foster our 
capacities for formal freedom. It is thus that Wallace concludes: 
If Hegel is right, the choice between the activities of private liberty and those of 
citizenship is not between two incommensurable sui generis goods, between which only 
random "preference" can determine one's choice, but between one aspect and another 
aspect of the same good. To have the whole good (once we understand it), we will 
naturally seek to combine both aspects (Ibid. ). 
]~ And, as shall be seen shortly, even accounls for and indudcs the contractarian understanding of the state, 
the No/staat of c ivil society. 
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The one interesting and possibly powerful objection from the contractarian 
side is Fichte's (cited in Patten, 1999: 120) - that surely once the capacities for 
self-governance have been established membership in the state should be 
voluntary. Patten's (Ibid. 120) response on Hegel's behalf is that there is a 
responsibility , if we are to maintain the conditions of freedom, to ensure these 
conditions for future generations. 
I believe, however, there is a much more powerful response to this particular 
attack. If we consider the doctrine of Hegelian freedom that has emerged over 
the course of this discussion, I feel it is fair to conclude that a crucial part of 
the Hegelian conception of what it is to be free is the capacity for a balance of 
trust and rational distance towards the stabilising mechanisms of freedom, 
most notably the State. Thus, some kind of philosophical opt-out clause for 
fully formed citizens is both academic and unnecessary. One of the key things 
that makes citizens free is their capacity to trust in an objective structure that 
harmonizes diversity in an ongoing manner. A fully free person is, in Hegelian 
terms, thus also possessed of a remarkable rational attitude towards her social 
structure. She will not leave the state in some childish huff, but will 
endeavour to alter the policy elements she dislikes through, one would 
presume, either direct participation in the institutional structure or through 
the civil society associations that represent her interests. The objective, 
freedom -concretizing structure that surrounds her is an ongoing and crucial 
element of her freedom , not some developmental chrysalis that can be cast 
aside at a later stage. 36 
iii. The State as the Locus for Mutual Recognition 
Not surprisingly, it is mutual recognition that Patten (1999: 121-122) posits as 
Hegel's foundational alternative to contractarian justifications of the state. 
36 The exact nature of the Hegelian position on individuals making subsw.n ti ve changes to thlti r social order 
wi ll be examined shortly in the sect ions on strong VS. weak identification and dissent in Silflichkeil. 
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This can be seen as following a Platonic! Aristotelian account, in that it sets up 
an account of justice in the polis as prior to an account of justice in its 
members. In other words, it is a position sensitive to the "social and political 
basis of the capacity for freedom". 37 
I have already outlined in previous chapters the various levels at which mutual 
recognition functions in the Hegelian system. Chapter 2 examined the impact 
of recognition and negation of self on the dialectic of self-formation. In that 
same chapter we examined the doctrine of private property, and the 
recognition thereof, as a founding institution of practical social engagement 
and development of the capacity for self-rule. Furthermore, in our 
investigation of the subjective disposition, we noted the individually formative 
effects of recognition in fostering and stabilizing a sense of self-certainty 
necessary for full -blown freedom. The exposition of the objective social order 
above highlighted the various intricate mechanisms by which the institutional 
framework of Sittlichkeit can rationally nurture recognition relations . 
The question that remains to be answered conclusively and explicitly is why the 
state is a necessary locus for all this . This is crucial to validating its status as 
the locus of ultimate freedom . Patten's (1999: 129-134) answer can be found 
in following through the thought behind a few of the dynamics just laid out. 
Consider the constant reminders throughout the Hegelian system that 
recognition must be mediated and expressed. At each stage of the dialectic of 
individual wills, a mediating mechanism and objective form of expression is 
present. Patten brings this out in reference to the violent combat that results 
37 This does include a certa in a priorism in Hegel's accounl that Patten sees as a weakness. Hegel does 
take hi s conception of freedom as a grounding for the nature of the institutions and practices that foll ow 
from it. This, OTl(;C again . leads to questions concerning the nature o f Geist si nce it is the doctrine of the 
world spirit that answers this objection to a large extent. If we can fe-interpret Geist into something that 
does not make indefensible II priori assumptions, then this is not proble matic. This is what I attempt in the 
clos ing pages of thi s chapter. 
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in the master-slave dynamic, which m turn results in the community of 
mutually recognising agents. 38 
The state , in the final analysis , takes the place of these crude mechanisms of 
mediating and expressing recognition , through an objective system that 
accords respect and recognition to all citizens. The state can thus be 
understood as playing a vital role in mediating recognition relations , and it 
makes perfectly good sense, under this analysis, to accord it the status Hegel 
does. Once we pull all of these threads together, it becomes clear that 
Sittlichkeit represents for Hegel the minimum infrastructure that makes 
freedom possible. If we accept the concept of freedom as rational self-
determination, and recognise Hegel ' s version of such an abstracting capacity to 
be free from the worries that plague Kant's (see Chapter 2), the Hegelian 
position seems both coherent and compelling. 
iv. The "Common Mind" Recast 
It is a position that certainly seems more sophisticated than the contractarian, 
and in certain sense more grounded in socio-political realities . What, then, 
could still be held against it by advocates of a more common understanding of 
freedom? The most prominent answer is the attack hurled at almost any 
approach that could be labelled "communitarian", and it is one that has 
haunted the entire scope of this enquiry. 
This is the charge that systematic approaches that accord the social order 
priority over the individual engender an uncritical stance that renders society 
stagnant and unprogressive. One of the key attractions of the social contract 
model is that, for all its higher-order intellectual sins, it does offer an 
objective standpoint from which to criticise social orders and even justify 
JR The sam<! dynamic could be said to apply, in a Jess dramatic sense, Lo the progression of individual wills 
through the various s tages o f Sitflichkeir. 
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active resistance. But I contend, with Patten (Ibid. 136-137), that this is by no 
means a capacity lacking in the Hegelian position. A social order, for instance, 
that trampled on the freedoms of personhood and moral subjectivity, but failed 
in fostering the inclusive mechanisms of civil society associations, could be 
quite severely held to account by Hegelian terms. 39 
This is by no means an issue specific to Hegel. As Vincent (in Cullen (ed.), 
1988: 50-53) pOints out, such issues are endemic to any account that links up 
individual wills with the common will, or individual good with the common 
good. Vincent clarifies that the use of the term "common" in the idealist 
account is a lot more mundane than is usually thought. It implies merely "that 
which is shared or characteristic of a group". This does not have to extend to 
definitive content at all, but can be quite harmlessly understood as the more 
obvious descriptive point that communities share common infrastructure and 
resources , allied to the normative point that the common structure in question 
must harmonise the conditions for individual self-development. The 
institutions of social life are not to be understood as a rigid and objectified 
code of behaviour. They are, rather, to be understood as the ongoing product 
of human activity and thus "embody substantively the same content as 
individual minds" (Ibid. 50). Such a conception sets up a seemingly tricky two-
way feedback situation in which "[h]uman praxis has established the 
institutions, yet the rules form the substance of rational human praxis". The 
39 What remai ns unresolved at this stage is how this is affected by the teleology and the relati vism of the 
historical dialectic in the Hegelian system, issues resolved in the concluding seclion of the chapter. What 
does remain true is that, as Patten (Patten, 1990: 136- 137) concedes , Hl!gd did harbour a deep mistrust of a 
culture of dissent and criticism within the social order. But. one must remember this mistrust is directed at 
profoundly undemocratic excesses such as the Reign of Terror in revolutionary France. I feel (his is one of 
the scores on which it is fair to disregard certain anachronistic attitudes that lurk within the Hegdian canon. 
Living at a time when dissent meant guillOlines, it is understandable that a culture in a constant stance of 
critici sm towards its social order would be worryi ng. BUL we have only to turn to the implications of 
Hr.:gelian principle already brought out in this enquiry to see that a profound clement of rational distance 
runs throughout his concept of free citizenship, as well as a variety of mechanisms for representing and 
stabilizing the interests of various social groups ilnd enclaves. This, practically, PULS lhl! slate in a fairl y 
consLanl position of managing rational dissent. 
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"common" or "objective" mind in such a situation is simply an understanding 
of said institutions as (in Muirhead's terms) "objectified purpose" (Ibid. 52·53). 
This purpose, for the Idealist, is found in the "implicit teleology" of institutions 
as instrumental to the "self development of all individuals in the society". As 
such, Vincent clarifies, the Idealist conception of the social order sets up a 
complex but ultimately coherent picture of the way a rational institutional 
structure nurtures and safeguards the self·determination of its citizenry: 
By maturing within institutions the individual rises from pupillage to critical 
participation. This creates a double function in institutional life and overcomes the 
potential charge of conservatism, since individuals do not simply accept the status quo, 
but also actually criticise it. When the individual is mature and self· reflective, he can 
then apply his powers to criticise the institutions and make them more adequate 
embodiments of ethical purpose. The fundamental norms sustain and are sustained by 
individual critical praxis (Ibid. 53). 
The idea of institutions as an ongoing product of individual mental activity, but 
still something beyond the individual is in no way implausible. It is, as I see it, 
precisely what we often forget when addressing modern social problems. An 
avowed dedication to "the way things are done" can be dangerous, as equally 
can be a blanket disregard for rational common practice. It is the Idealists in 
general (and Hegel in particular) that serve as a compelling reminder that 
institutions live and breathe not in their rule· books and procedures, but in the 
participation of the individual wills that make them up. Wills that are capable 
of rational and critical insight that can, through rational channels re·configure 
institutional structures to be better suited to the demands of progress. To 
forget this is to open oneself up to the "value rigidity" I see Mill castigating in 
conservative social orders. (See Chapter 3.) This is where I see my reading of 
Hegel as having modern significance. A . social realm designed as an 
infrastructure dedicated to rational engagement ensures that individuals 
perform both of the functions Davis sets out. They ensure the coherence of a 
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common life , but do so by marking out a space of clashing and mingling 
diversity, within which rational self-development is furthered. These, as I 
understand it, are the very aims we find in Mill. 
v. Positive Freedom Reconsidered 
This all plays into a more general standoff between hard-line liberals and 
communitarians_ Hegel often stands accused, with all other defenders of 
conceptions of positive freedom, of opening up the floodgates to 
totalitarianism _ As Wood (1990: 41-42) points out, much of this is drawn from 
Isaiah Berlin's proclamation that the link between an ethics of positive freedom 
and totalitarian conclusions, while logically dubious , is nonetheless 
"psychologically and historically intelligible". Wood goes on to highlight that 
the qualities that Berlin believes render positive freedom advocates fanatics 
tend to be somewhat divorced from whether they hold an ethics of positive 
freedom, or not. Parochialism , blind paternalism and the conviction that there 
is only one rational answer to any given social question, not to mention the 
further conviction that such an answer will be reached only under the firm 
guiding hand of those doing the said assuming, are disastrous qualities for the 
formers of any social order to possess. 
The fact that such people might espouse an ethics of positive freedom might 
well provide them with a covering excuse for their behaviour (one they might 
well believe), but it does not condemn positive freedom per se. "Hence", 
Wood (Ibid . ) jibes, "Berlin has to make his positive freedom fanatics extremely 
absent minded as well as paranoid . They see no advantage in education over 
coercion except that education is an easier way of controlling people". These 
fanatics of positive freedom would have to be so misdirected in pursuit of their 
creed that they are willing to completely undermine it through their own 
action. Wood (Ibid .) feels Berlin 's only useful point is a sadly incontestable 
one: That often-good doctrines fall into bad hands. This, however, is as 
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historically true of liberalism as it is of more positive ethics of state. 
America's McCarthyism was a prime example of the kind of misdirected and 
self-undermining madness Berlin describes, in that it represented blatant 
violations of rights and heavy-handed state practice undertaken in the name of 
combating "totalitarianism". History will, I feel , judge certain elements of 
U.S. domestic policy and practice in the wake of the September 11 th attacks 
the same way.40 
What we have yet to understand, though , is how appropriate the modern state 
is to the role of providing this positive freedom. As attractive as the argument 
for a framework of rational engagement might seem, it remains unclear that 
the state fulfils such a role. This is, ultimately , a clarification issue in Hegel. 
The state as a political entity is conceptually distinct, by modern terms, from 
the broad sweep of social institutions Hegel seems to be describing, and terms 
such as "political community" leave the boundary lines far too vague to be 
really useful. What is thus necessary, at this point, is a more conclusive 
clarification and assessment of the role of the state in the Hegelian system. 
4.3.2) Critical assessment of the Hegelian conception of The State 
As Pelczynski (1971: 26) points out, many of the traditional misconceptions of 
Hegel stem from the fact that he does use the term "state" in a manner not 
conventional either in common usage or political theory. The state is for 
Hegel, not merely a political entity, but a form of ethical community. This is 
why, for example , he clarifies that he does not understand patriotism merely 
40 This attack on Berlin' s suppositions is by no means included lO clear H t!geJ of all charges of fostering 
totalitarianism. That has been , and will be done we ll enough by the deta iled analysis of his pri nci ples and 
their implications. It is simply to c lear the discourse of any prejudiced readings of a pos it ive e th ics that I 
have brought W ood "s arguments on this (0 light al all. The issue of rational dissent in the H egelian 
structure remains, however, one of the final stumbling hlocks to understand ing the Hegelian space as a 
space of pracTical as well as theoretica l se lf-determinalion. 
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as the performance of "extraordinary sacrifices and actions", but rather as 
"that disposition which, in the normal conditions and circumstance of life, 
habitually knows that the community is the substantial basis and end" (PR 
§268) . Given the above discussion of the heuristic functions of Sittlichkeit as 
simultaneously descriptive and prescriptive, it is not too difficult to understand 
how Hegel could comprehend , simultaneously, the state as an actual political 
entity, and the state as it should ideally function. 
i. The Rechstaat and the Notstaat 
Patten (1999: 167-169), in his final meditations upon the Hegelian state, brings 
to light the oft undiscussed Hegelian distinction between the Rechstaat and the 
Notstaat . The former is the legitimate, freedom concretizing form of the state 
that has been discussed as the pinnacle of Sittlichkeit. The latter is one of 
several other kinds of state structure discussed by Hegel, peculiar because it in 
fact is sublimated at the lower levels of ethical life. The Notstaat or "state of 
need" is , in structure and principle, remarkably similar to what contractarians 
would class as the state proper - a set of institutions designed to oversee and 
regulate the egoistic ends of citizens. Thus Hegel in fact refers to the 
institutional structure of civil society as the Notstaat. 
This leads to further complications in what is already a controversial Hegelian 
terrain: the division between the functions of state and civil society. By 20th 
century conceptions, the divisions already discussed seem recognisable. Civil 
society is the differentiated and egoistically driven structure of voluntary 
groups and associations, the state is the involuntary stabilizing system that 
oversees it. But, Patten (Ibid. 170) maintains, this fails to explain at least two 
fundamental peculiarities in Hegel's account: why Hegel feels that civil SOCiety 
can be easily confused with the state, and why the public authority and 
administration of justice (conventionally state functions) appear in civil society 
(and then, confoundingly, once more in the state) . 
The social order in Hegel 268 
What this highlights is that our exposition thusfar of the relationship between 
civil society and the state is incomplete . Patten (Ibid . 170-171) begins by 
examining Hegel's primary distinctions between the two spheres. Firstly, civil 
society, as noted above, has the particular as object, and the universal as an 
unconscious consequence. The state, on the other hand, is designated as a 
conscious universal. It is universal both "in itself" (it is the consequence of the 
actions of all) and "for itself" (the universal is its object of reflection, and the 
intended consequence of its actions). One way Patten feels this could be 
interpreted is to see civil society as a realm of partiality (driven by centres of 
decision making organised around particulars) and the state as impartial 
(decisions made with the interest of the whole in mind). This, he feels, heads 
towards a resolution, but it is not enough . It does not fully explain the 
confusing elements highlighted above . 
There are , Patten (Ibid. 171-172) believes, two further distinctions that make 
sense of Hegel's claims. The first is the distinction between the kinds of goods 
that direct each sphere. Civil society is concerned with particular goods -
those grounded in the need and welfare of particular individuals and groups_ 
The State is concerned with universal goods - notions of what is good for 
rational agents in general. The second concerns the kind of actions undertaken 
in and by each sphere. Civil society is marked by what could be referred to as 
self-regarding action , actions that serve individual or particular interests. The 
state, on the other hand, is concerned with other-regarding actions, actions 
that promote the welfare of the community at large. These two distinctions 
ultimately converge, in that self- regarding actions are liable to be driven by 
particular goods and other-regarding actions by universal ones. 
What Patten (Ibid. 172-175) deduces from this, is that the distribution in 
functions between the state and civil society in the Hegelian structure is 
decided according to the nature of the relationships specific functions or 
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institutions facilitate and oversee. If the · relationships are concerned with 
particular ends and particular utility maximizing, then the functions are 
assigned to civil society. If the relationships to be overseen are concerned with 
promoting the general freedom of individuals , as opposed to their welfare, this 
becomes a function assigned to the state. In running this line of analysis, 
Patten clears up the confusions alluded to earlier. It is now possible, for one 
thing, to understand how the public authority (whose jurisdiction encompasses 
both the types of relationships described above) can appear in the structure of 
both civil society and the state. It also explains how the state and civil society 
might be confused, for the Notstaat is almost an exact analogue to the 
contractarian conception of state. It is only when social orders exhibit the 
freedom concretizing features of Hegelian statehood, including provision for 
the bildung of citizens, that the social order may claim to be a Rechstaat, an 
ethically sound and legitimate state. This, I feel, clinches the status of 
Sittlichkeit as a set of normative standards which the standard issue modern 
democracy must work towards. 
ii. The Hegelian State as a Civic Humanist Conception 
A further element leading on from this is Patten's (Ibid. 176-180) contention 
that the Hegelian state represents a "civic humanist" understanding of 
freedom. 41 He sees the Hegelian state as making a crucial improvement on the 
contractarian position in remedying a key defect therein . It includes the 
contractarian defences of property and abstract right, but goes on to show how 
other-regarding action as a social ethos commensurate with freedom arises out 
of this, and forms a higher institutional level where self-interest is eradicated. 
As shown already, a community based on contract and property relations alone 
does not qualify as self-sufficient and sustainable in the long term. It is marred 
by severe internal contradictions, in that agents pursue highly egoistic ends, 
41 This can be hroadly understood as a position that understands citizens' engagement as. crucial to the 
social order, and understands policy as a publicly threshed OLlt, commonly consti lUtl!d pursui t. 
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but are still expected to abide by the dictates of a system that must eventually 
demand some form of sacrifice from them. Thus, the culture of independent 
subjectivity that defines a sphere of exchange relations, such as the market, 
can have severely destabilizing consequences at a state level. The quest is not 
for some individual-crushing Platonic measure, but rather for a means of 
stabilizing this subjectivity in community of mutually recognizing agents. 
Hegel's Moralitat, the sense of wider social context and other-regarding sense 
of the good it engenders as traced above, is certainly one answer to this 
problem. But the idea of a socially produced sense of conscience does not go 
far enough. There is still no guarantee that individuals will obey this, as 
opposed to the dictates of their desires, as a guiding principle of action. Thus, 
Patten (Ibid. 185-186) echoes Neuhauser's contention that the state, the third 
phase of Sittlichkeit , arises as a necessary stabilizing and harmonizing 
framework that oversees an institutional landscape in which citizens can 
develop the capacities for personhood and moral subjectivity: 
Hegel's response to the ancients' worries about the destabilizing effects of subjectivity 
is thus to argue that the social order can tolerate a high degree of independent 
personality and subjectivity, but only if a crucial condition is met. Its citizens must be 
members of ethical institutions that imbue them with goals, values, convictions, and so 
forth, such that, when they consult their own opinions and consciences about what to 
do, the answers they arrive at reinforce that order, rather than ripping it apart, as 
happened (in Hegel's view) in the ancient world and as recently as the French 
Revolution (Ibid. 185-186). 
Thus, Patten (1999: 186-192) echoes the framework of analysis provided by 
Neuhauser above. What Sittlichkeit essentially achieves through this is the 
eradication of brute self-interest at the highest institutional level, such that 
the state is understood as a legitimate and substantial system that oversees 
distinct and intermingling subjectivities. The "universal interest" becomes the 
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interest all have in living in a mutually recognizing, self-reproducing 
community_ The state is thus, in Sittlichkeit , recognised as the locus of 
substantial general and particular interest- The individual's subjectivity is 
gained and re-affirmed through participation in the objective. This reverses 
the common conception of the state as a domain of coercion and force, and 
sees it rather as a sphere of "other regarding virtue and disposition". The 
extent to which it falls short of this requirement, is the extent to which it 
remains a Notstaat, rather than a Rechstaat. 
Hardimon (1994: 208-209) echoes this line of argument in his analysis of the 
Hegelian state, having identified a similar problem to Patten in discerning 
where the institutional line between civil society and the (strictly political) 
state is drawn. He argues that "Hegel holds that the institutional overlap 
exhibited by the administration of justice and the public authority is one of the 
crucial points of connection between the political state and civil society". 
Hardimon further clarifies (once again, in agreement with Patten) that the 
spheres of civil society and the state can be separately understood inasmuch as 
"their respective determinations are distinct" (Ibid.). Civil society can be 
understood as the social stratum wherein particularity is allowed "the right to 
develop and express itself in all directions" (PR §182), and as such as 
concerned with private ends, the state with the "common good of the 
community" (Ibid. 209). By this, Hardimon (Ibid.) claims Hegel means "a good 
that is separate from the separate and particular ends of its members". 
iii. The State as Objectively Rational 
The question that remains is why the state is an objectively rational locus of 
freedom. Patten (Ibid. 194) here is concerned with Hegel's claim, alluded to 
earlier, that there is an intrinsic reasonableness in being a citizen of a modern 
state. If we abstract from the identity forming nature of membership in the 
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social order42 , what precisely is rational in the idea of citizenship? To what 
end is membership in the state prescribed by objective reason? 
It is here that Patten (Ibid.) recalls and builds on the arguments I have already 
cited in Chapter 2 concerning rational self-government and the reciprocity 
thesis. Objective freedom must have its basis in abstraction from contingent 
desire and circumstance. But most of the ends we pursue and choices we make 
in day-to-day situations are not "endorseable all the way down" in the manner 
described. We do not choose our life partners or our careers by the criteria of 
preserving and promoting our own freedom, but by the criteria of our 
contingent passions and desires. A life of citizenship, on the other hand, meets 
the latter criteria admirably. It is citizenship that partially constitutes our 
capacity to deliberate about freedom in the first place. 
Why and how is this so? The answer, Patten (Ibid. 195 - 198) believes, lies in 
the civic humanist take on the conditions of liberty, as just discussed. An 
agent can only develop these capacities in a community of mutually recognising 
agents. If such a community is to be safeguarded in a sustainable institutional 
framework, then some variant of the Hegelian state is the only valid way 
forward. An individual can thus endorse citizenship as fulfilling the end of 
establishing and maintaining her own freedom . The organic structure of citizen 
and state prevails as a two-way flow of dependence: the individuals' interest in 
freedom maintains the whole, which in turn maintains their freedom. Thus, we 
find once more the confluence of objective and subjective freedom in the 
state. Citizens are ultimately and objectively free in engaging in an activity 
(state membership) that, unlike their private ends, has the objectively rational 
imprimatur of being "endorseable all the way down". 
-I::! W hich is, after all , a means of reconcil ing citizens to the obj ecti ve reason that is meant· to guide both 
them and their instituti ons 
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What remains unclear is precisely how strongly a citizen must identify with the 
social order in question in order for this sophisticated but rather abstract 
interlocking of individual and social ends to be viable. Such a compatibility is, 
after all , seems a very far cry from the institutional realities of modern 
political life. If what Hegel ultimately asks of us is that we knuckle down and 
trust the social order as merely superior to going it alone in terms of furthering 
our freedom (despite its manifest and numerous shortcomings) then the 
Hegelian system becomes merely a more abstract version of social contract 
theory. Moreover, a less desirable version in that it hinges on the possibility of 
an actualised rational framework that seems incredibly distant from present 
possibility. The next two sections thus examine how far, abstractly and 
practically, the right of rational dissent stretches in the Hegelian thought 
structure. 
4.3.3) Strong vs. weak identification 
This discussion has played into the midst of an ongoing drama between liberals 
and communitarians, in which Hegel is a star player. This concerns the 
communitarian call for "strong" identification as a grounding factor of social 
systems, and the related assault on deontological liberalism. Alexander 
Kaufman thrashes out this debate in reference to the foundational principles of 
ethical life in Hegelian theory. 
First, let us review the terms of the crossfire, as Kaufman (1997: 807) lays it 
out. Communitarians claim that a proper basis for the shared sacrifice and co-
operative mechanisms that social orders require can only be found through 
members' identification with the social order. They draw the distinction 
between identifying "convergently" and identifying "immediately". 
Convergent identification refers merely to a system of co-operation for a 
collective good , whilst immediate identification is present when members 
regard the process itself as joint venture . A mere instrumental rationality, 
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such as liberalism puts forward, cannot, by the communitarians' terms, provide 
the shared sense of identity found in a society that is understood by its 
members as a shared conception of the self. This is the source of the long-
standing communitarian claim that liberalism, with its methodology of 
abstraction, ignores the fundamental link between identification and social 
cohesion, thus providing and impoverished and incomplete account of ethical 
life. This, Kaufman argues, is an objection based on the assumption that only 
strong identification can achieve this, and uses Hegel's approach and structure 
to argue that a weaker form of identification , one that commits to an abstract 
set of normative principles, can achieve this end more coherently. 
i. Questioning the Role of Background Moral Norms 
Kaufman (Ibid. 808) finds a key practical locus of all this in modern US 
jurisprudence, most notably the entrenched stand off between Hart, and one 
of Mill's most famed nemeses, Devlin.43 This clash highlights a long-standing 
divide in legal theory concerning the enforcement of moral norms in 
legislation. This is particularly evident in the various landmark cases 
concerning the legal status of homosexual marriages. Kaufman (Ibid.) brings 
out the example of a US Supreme Court decision in the mid 80 's that held that 
homosexual couples did not enjoy the ·same privacy rights as heterosexuals, and 
appealed to the immediacy of majority moral norms as justification. Kaufman 
points out that communitarians are bound by their edicts to support the 
principle if not the substance of this decision . It comes down, he feels, to 
Sandel's call for the recognition of "the essential role of background moral 
norms in generating and sustaining the legitimacy of law and policy". 44 This 
Kaufman sees as a profound threat to the capacities of positive law to enshrine 
4] The key texts that outline this clash are: 
Devlin, Patrick, 1965011 the enjorcemellf of Morals, Oxford: Oxford Uni vers ity Press, and Hart , H.L.A, 
1963 L(Hv. Liberty Qnd Morality, Stanford University Press. 
44 See Sandel, Michael J., 1996. Democracy's Discolltent: America ill. Sean;" of a Public Philosophy, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
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the rights of smaller ethnic and cultural enclaves against the coercive 
application of majority norms to their lives. 
It is Kaufman's (Ibid.) contention that strong identification of this kind is 
neither necessary within, nor entirely consistent with, the ends of an ethical 
community. He brings out the increasingly recurring contention that 
contemporary communitarians profoundly misinterpret Hegel; yet claim him as 
their intellectual ancestor. As he pOints OLlt, if one can understand Hegel's 
ethics in terms of the ontological standoff just highlighted, and these prove to 
require merely weak identification , then we are presented with a far more 
viable remedy to the concerns of modern communitarians in this regard . 
ii. Hegel's Ontology as a Model for Weak Identification 
Kaufman (Ibid. 809-811) begins with an analysis of Hegel's own ontology. 
Hegel , as he sees it, grounds ontological inquiry in terms not of discovering the 
nature of what exists, but in terms of which "forms of thought" have the 
capacity for describing truth. "Thought", Hegel claims, "is the constitutive 
structure of external things" (as cited in Kaufman, 1997: 810). This amounts to 
the claim that objective thought literally determines the reality around it 
through dialectical movement. This describes thought as establishing and re-
establishing determinate boundaries through the process of negation, as 
already discussed in Chapter 2. Through answering some of Taylor's45 
. interpretive objections to what he sees as an "equivocation" between the 
qualitative and quantitative sense of "negation", Kaufman demonstrates that 
Hegel's frame of reference here is indeed qualitative. 4b Thus, he concludes, 
Hegel intends to limit his ontological querying to "the relationship between 
spontaneous human thought and objectivity" . 
.I:; See Taylor C., 1975, Hegel , Ca~lbridge : Cambridge UniversilY Press. 
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Hegel is thus not claiming that our thought makes the existence of the 
objective world possible, but allows us to understand the exte rnal world in a 
determinate fashion . In Hegel's own words : "Take a way from the dog its 
animality, and it becomes impossible to say what it is" (as cited in Kaufman, 
1997: 810). If we follow Hegel's reasoning here, then we see that determinate 
objects are always the extensions of some subject. This , Kaufman (Ibid . ) 
argues, is the heart of Hegel's claim to have dissolved the ordinary division 
between subjective and objective thought, a claim that features centrally in 
his account of the interplay between individuals and their community. 
Individual desire and objective moral obligation have to be part of the same 
determinate structure. 
Kaufman (Ibid. 811) thus brings out Hegel's famed position, by now familiar to 
us , that a community that must "express rather than constrain the identities of 
the individuals who are the subject of ethics". Objective thought is ultimately 
the tool by which the divisions between citizen and community must be 
dissolved, just as the divisions between subjective and objective were in the 
above dynamic from the Encyclopaedia. Objective thought is not directly 
responsible for this identification. Rather the objective scientific methodology 
it instantiates is. The ambitious project of The Philosophy of Right is to 
construct a scientific approach, a social theory, which can make such 
identification possible. 
iii. On the possibility and implications of a rational ethics 
Kaufman (Ibid. 812), in assessing Hegel's position , echoes arguments already 
brought forward above. The ethics of a community must be a rational ethics, if 
the needs and desires of its members are to be satisfied . Moreover, each 
46 1 have nOl incl uded Kaufman's full analys is o f Taylor' s argumenls, and his rebutlais, for reasons of 
space. 
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individual is mandated, and in fact required, to evaluate the rationality of her 
social institutions.47 
This cuts to the quick of the debate over strong identification in the social 
system . If identification must be grounded in reflective choice, then it seems 
that the communitarian ideal of strong identification (consistent, I believe, 
with what Hegel terms "immediate unity") between citizen and community is 
not the answer. This form of identification is grounded in unreflective , 
affective unity between self and environment. For reasons, spelled out at 
length already, this countermands Hegel's requirement of · rational freedom as 
"mediated unity" i.e. a unity which is reflectively affirmed . 48 
Kaufman (Ibid . 812-813) contends that strong identification as a source of 
social ethics is ultimately incompatible with some of the key provisions of 
Hegel's system (the provision of preserving particularity as an objection to this 
interpretation of Hegelian thinking is already famil iar to us). But Kaufman 
makes his strongest case by examining the possible mechanisms for the 
fostering of strong identification, and assessing how Hegel might respond to 
these. 
iv. The inapplicability of Strong Identification 
There are roughly two distinct ways in which strong identification might arise : 
47 Kaufman ( 1997: 8 13-8 13) maintains this is not a case of tes ting against an ahs trac t sel of principles . 
Hegel, he argues, rejects the capaci ty of abstract reasoning to undermine a communally held legal tradi tion. 
This amoun ts to rejection of abstractions such as Kant's fi xed universal rule o f Ihe categorical imperati ve. 
It is not, Kaufman feels, an assault on the role o f principles per se as the grounding o f an ethical trad iti on, 
provided such principles "embody ohjec(ive thought and further thl! real isati on of rational freedom". What 
is rejected here is the privilege of abstract reason as a standard for evaluaring the content of a community's 
ethics. Yet, memhc,;:rs art:: sti ll called upon to discover their iden ti ti es in comrnunilies through a process of 
reflection that requires them to emfuate it in terms of broader social fundamen tals. Kaufman holds that 
this is a paradox which H~gel's doctrine of patrio tic trust resol ves, but docs so through a form of weak 
identification. 
41'1 This, to large extent, echoes the clash between M ill and the intuitionists concern ing the appeals to ethical 
standards th:lt are merely emot ively endorsed and not rationally grounded or proven. 
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Individuals might identify un reflectively with the "jointly constituted ethical 
tradition of their community" or they may reflectively identify with said 
tradition because it is jOintly constituted and communal. Hegel's rejection of 
the first mechanism, by this stage, requires no further explanation . So we are 
left with reflective strong identification. Here again, Kaufman (Ibid. ) feels 
there are two possible mechanisms that apply. The first possibility is that 
process of jOint constitution eradicates particular differences, generating a 
unified perspective with which all may identify. The second is that the process 
may instantiate some form of imposed solidarity, a collective identification 
with the end product, despite the continued presence of particular differences. 
Hegel, Kaufman (Ibid.) argues, would straightforwardly dismiss the first 
mechanism, as it fails in one of the key tasks of Sittlichkeit, the preservation 
of the particular within the universal. The second suggests a common 
communitarian contention - that a people induced into a state of solidarity will 
as a result gain a more universal perspective and thus identify with the 
legislative norms that govern them. This holds with certain dynamics in 
Hegel's theoretical structure, but, in its failure to assert the value of citizen's 
particularity, stands profoundly at variance with what Kaufman (Ibid.) holds to 
be Hegel's most explicit (and most valuable) depiction of the citizen's ideal 
disposition towards the state - that of trust. 
As discussed in reference to the ethical disposition in Chapter 2, "trust" in the 
Hegelian system is a product of both sentiment and reflection. It thus, by 
Kaufman's (Ibid. 814) interpretation, resolves the tension between the 
requirements for identification and reflection. It is here that Kaufman sees 
Hegel playing into a highly promising modern discourse that sees trust as a 
highly valuable form of social capital. 
Hegelian trust is, as discussed in the section on the subjective disposition of 
social members , grounded in a recognition by members that their own 
The social order in Hegel 279 
particular desires, and own capacity for freedom, are best realised in unity 
through the state. In straightforward terms, citizens find their interests 
represented and bound up in the state. Kaufman cycles through the various 
forms this might take: citizens might understand the interests of the state as 
identical to theirs, they might find the two sets of interests fully consistent and 
mutually reinforcing, or regard the two as distinct but hold that their interests 
are best realised when the state's are. Kaufman feels the first two are ruled 
out by "Hegel's concession that conflict over the specific nature of right is 
intrinsic to the nature of right in the state" (Ibid.). In other words, Kaufman 
sees Hegel as maintaining that there shall always be some conflict between 
individual and collective interest - the two will never be seamlessly 
commensurate. He therefore takes the third alternative as the viable one: that 
the individual understands her ends as distinct from the state, but still feels 
that said ends are best realised, and even only possible, within the state. 
As such, Kaufman (Ibid. 814-815) contends, Hegelian trust is not a product of 
spontaneous affinity, nor does it result from some kind of "induced solidarity" 
based straightforwardly on the notion that the ethical consensus is jointly 
constituted. It includes the capacity for reflection and is thus at odds with the 
communitarian demand for strong identification. But to what extent, Kaufman 
asks , is this trust truly reflective? 
Hegel himself draws an analogue with interpersonal trust. I trust another in 
that "I believe he has sufficient insight to treat my cause as if it were his own, 
and deal with it in light of his own best knowledge and conscience" (PR §309). 
Kaufman (1997: 816) holds that the relationship between the state and 
individuals follows a similar pattern . The state is accorded the role of 
representative of the individual's interests, not through direct consultation 
with every citizen , but through the understanding that their interests are borne 
in mind and considered at every stage. Thus the fact that this relationship is 
never made explicit is not the point, it is that it could be justified should the 
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citizen ever have the occasion to ask. Thus, the reflective capacity is always 
there in potentia, even if it is never expressed. It remains forever possible in 
that the ends of citizens remain essentially their own , even though they place 
their faith in the state to represent and manage said ends. 
It is on this more realistic basis of "unarticulated but potentially specifiable" 
justification that Kaufman (Ibid. 814-815) believes trust between the citizen 
and the state is based. We trust the state to be committed to the best possible 
means of realising the ends of each individual within the community, with the 
understanding that it is committed to a more general set of rational norms. 
Here again the distinction between contingent and rational willing comes to 
light. The individual's undeveloped will may locate her interests in her brute 
desires, but her fully developed will locates them in a set of rational and 
fundamental principles that manage and maintain the political order, in which 
the interests of all are considered. This, ultimately, represents a form of 
"weak" as opposed to "strong" identification. 
v. Reflective Trust as Modern Social Capital 
As Kaufman (Ibid. 816-817) extends, the idea of trust as a crucial form of social 
capital is by no means limited to Hegel , and now finds expression in a variety 
of modern theories. Kaufman contrasts a few of these to Hegel's: Fukiyama 's 
understanding of trust as arising from habituation and convention falls short in 
that it does not include the reflective capacity just discussed . Hardin 's 
concept of trust as a kind of enlightened rational self-interest, based on the 
expectations of others' behaviour, seems to fall into the Kantian dualism 
between abstract principle and subjective desire. Kaufman rather sees Hegel 
standing with Dunn (1990: 26) in describing trust as an emotive undertaking 
that is nonetheless chosen "more or less consciously". Under this account , the 
social conditions that foster trust are many that we have already seen Hegel 
(along with every theorist of a modern democracy) advocating - freedoms of 
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speech and association , the right to choose representatives, and political 
parties dedicated to the fostering, stabilising and maintenance of "structures 
of well founded mutual trust" (Ibid. 42) . 
Thus, Kaufman's contention indeed stands. Hegelian principle seems to 
support a form of weak identification, in the form of commitment to principles 
of universal welfare that benefit all and with which all may identify. This , as a 
vision of a state inclined to social integration, is far less dangerous a brew than 
the communitarian notion of unreflective background cultural or moral norms 
as the basis of legislation. What Kaufman, using Hegel, has basically proven 
against Devlin and his legacy is that it is not necessary to cater to every 
conservative majority moral instinct for the possibility of an integrated and 
coherent society with which citizens can identify to exist. But this has been to 
merely resolve the issue at an abstract theoretical level. It remains to be 
clarified what practical space of rational dissent exists in Sittlichkeit. 
4.3.4) The Issue of Rational Dissent in Sitttichkeit 
As Pelczynski (1971: 27) highlights, one of the more common critiques of Hegel, 
is the "misconception that Hegel's view of the state involves an unconditional 
duty to do whatever the government demands". Pelczynski rejects this , but in 
a fairly short·shrift fashion. He simply reminds us that "Hegel frequently 
stresses that the rationality of positive laws should not be taken for granted 
and may in fact often be lacking" (Ibid.). This has been highlighted and reo 
affirmed at various levels in the discussion thusfar, but it does not deflect a 
critical stance that Hegel's theory does not allow for this at a deeper structural 
level. 
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The key charge levelled by such critics is that individual conscience is entirely 
negated in Sittlichkeit. One such analysis is that of Ernst Tugendhat49 , who 
maintains that by Hegelian principle laws have absolute moral authority and 
there is no philosophical or political possibility of an individual critical 
standpoint. Much of this is drawn from a famed discussion in The Philosophy of 
Right that individual consciousness disappears in Sittlichkeit . These worries 
are seemingly compounded by Hegel ' s assertion that "trust", not strictly 
reflection, is the hallmark of the subjective disposition of citizens. Kaufman's 
arguments in the above section go some way to resolving this, but not 
conclusively. Trust in a general framework of principles, even in a weak, 
reflective sense, does not tell us what can be done by those who either dissent 
from standardised moral norms, rationally reject the entirety of the social 
order's institutional structure, or feel it requires reworking at a deeper 
structural level. 
i. Rights of Conscience in Sittlichkeit 
The only way these queries can be answered is through a final and thorough 
analysis of the role that moral subjectivity, or, in more modern terms, rights of 
conscience, plays in Sittlichkeit . Neuhauser (2000: 241·242) maintains that 
positions such as Tungendhat's represent a critical misinterpretation. His first 
concern is the issue of reflection. Hegel continually asserts that an attitude of 
rational distance and reflective evaluation of the state plays a crucial role in 
the ideal social order, and must be preserved. A significant number of 
arguments have been put forward thusfar in exposition and support of this 
feature of Hegelian thought. If the sanctity of reflection is so broadly 
documented in his system, why is Hegel so often accused of holding the 
opposite view? 
49 Tugendhat, Self-consciousness alld Selj-detennillafioll, 31 1, 3 15-316 as cited in Neuhauser, 2000: 327 n 
25. 
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What Neuhauser (Ibid. 247-248) sees as the source of such claims is a passage 
often used as proof by commentators such as Tugendhat. This is a claim in the 
Encyclopaedia5o that citizens perform their duty without reflection or free 
choice, and the claim in The Philosophy of Right that independent 
consciousness disappears from Sittlichkeit51• This, as Neuhauser points out, 
represents an incomplete reading. The free choice referred to there is the 
"reflecting will" which is equated with Wilkur_ The reflection of free choice is 
reflection amongst arbitrary ends concerning which one to choose. The point 
being made is one about the everyday experience of ethical action. It is not 
experienced as a choice, but so bound up with identity that it seems a 
necessity. This does not preclude the capacity to step back and rationally 
assess whether social institutions are worthy of allegiance. Thus, Hegel is 
elevating moral choices beyond the realm of arbitrary deliberation over 
inclinations, but by no means advocating mindless compliance. 
What, then, Neuhauser (Ibid. 248-249) asks , disappears from Sittlichkeit with 
the "independent conscience of the individual" (PR §152)? The full text of the 
passage in question does not attack individual conscience per se, but rather 
something Hegel describes as "wilfulness" - striving to be self-sufficient in 
opposition to ethical substantiality. This refers to a will that naively assumes 
that its own conception of the good is always superior to others, and grants 
insufficient credence to the moral authority of other individuals and the ethics 
of the society in which one lives. This Hegel describes as a kind of moral 
arrogance, "the subject taking itself, in its singularity, to be deciding on the 
good" (E §511 as cited in Neuhauser, 2000: 248) thus setting one's own 
conception of the good up as immune to possible revision in light of the 
conceptions of others and the collective. 
'" E § 5 14 as cited in Neuhauser, 2000: 246 . 
. "PR§ 152. 
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In so doing, the particular 
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consciousness also voids any claims to rational insight, as it has shut out any 
competing notions of the good. 52 
But how, then, is the individual "sovereign" over their own moral affairs? 
"Sovereign" here, Neuhauser (Ibid.) argues, makes perfect sense if it is 
understood in a Rousseauian rather than Hobbesian sense. It does not 
represent the capacity to make one's arbitrary moral edicts into general law, 
but rather to participate in the collective formation of principle and recognise 
the inherent rationality therein that arises from the just and civically overseen 
exchange of reasoned insight. On this view, each citizen is accountable to 
herself in her conception of the good, in that she agrees to allow herself to 
participate in an exchange of reasoning with others over the collective 
principles they all must abide by. "Thinking for oneself" is by no means the 
same as "thinking by oneself". To insist one's private assertions are true, 
regardless of reaction and reasoned argument against them from one's fellow 
citizens is not to have true freedom of conscience at all, but to stand in 
opposition to the factors that make said freedom possible for all. 
ii. Sittlichkeit as an ordered zone of Ethical Engagement 
It is, in point of fact, precisely this understanding of the Hegelian social order 
as an ordered zone of ethical engagement that Engelhardt (in Engelhardt and 
Pinkard (eds.), 1994: 211) sees in Hegel. He sees Hegel allowing for an "escape 
from the cacophony of competing moral visions though a categorically account 
of objective moral volition in the state ". Engelhardt holds that Hegel 
recognised that the content of secular morality is not universal. Specific moral 
content derives from particular communal structures, which , as modern life 
diversifies cannot be universalised. Thus Engelhardt (Ibid . ) contends Hegel 
holds "one must not seek secular moral content in an ever more encompassing 
!1:! Thi s can, as I see it, be likent:d to Mi lrs discourse-driven model of ethical engagemenl. (Sec chapter 3.) 
The social order in Hegel 285 
moral community, but in a moral structure that compasses diversity without 
itself being yet one more community". The interpretation of "true" vs. 
"formal" conscience in section 4.2.4 would indeed seem to support this, if we 
amend Engelhardt 's analysis to locate the basis of moral authority in the 
individual conscience, as I feel Hegel would. The communal moralities 
Engelhardt describes could, as I see it, be understood in Hegelian terms as 
merely common moral particularities . 
This, I believe, is a strong Hegelian answer to the key liberal concern that his 
theory instantiates a blind faith in existing social norms by casting any 
resistance to the moral norms social order as "moral self·conceit". But it does 
not remedy the issue of deeper level criticism of the social order itself. What 
of those that would reject parts of, or the entirety of the framework that 
"true" conscience qualifies as sacrosanct? 
iii. Possibilities of Active Dissent 
Neuhauser (2000: 256·259) puts forward that a crucial dimension of the grand 
Hegelian project is indeed to reconcile individuals to the world as it is, but this 
is not to be confused with the world as it stands. This becomes clear if we 
consider that nowhere in the historical or present social reality is there a social 
system that completely fulfils the criteria of Sittlichkeit. 
As Hardimon (1994: 254) points out, this project is born of the sense of modern 
alienation from the very structures that Hegel praises so highly in the structure 
of ethical life. It is Hegel's contention that this is a failure to understand how 
the modern social structure contains the possibility of individuals actual ising 
themselves as both particularised persons and members of the social order. 
The system of ethical life is thus , I believe, correctly interpreted by Neuhauser 
(2000: 256·259) as reflecting the ideal form of a set of structures already in 
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place in the modern social context. He and Hardimon thus join me in my 
contention that Sittlichkeit ultimately represents a set of normative standards 
by which we may evaluate where and how our already existing institutional 
structure does or does not measure up to ideal rational functionality. It is, as I 
described earlier, as if the social order is an assembled, but dysfunctional 
machine, and The Philosophy of Right is the technician's manual. 
Under this interpretation , there is a profound philosophical space for criticism 
of the social order, according to the principles and practices inherent, if not 
ful ly realised, in existing structures. As Neuhauser (Ibid.) describes it, 
members participate in a system which they affirm not as it is , but as it 
"aspires to be" . Under this analysis, the stagnating implications of this section 
of Hegel's doctrine disappear. 53 
This is, however, a little too neat. What happens , we may ask, when the 
dictates of these diverse moralities clash (as they inevitably must) with the 
framework itself? The broader question this raises is how the rational social 
order may deal with those whose individual conscience, wilful or not, will not 
allow them to affirm the laws and norms that Sittlichkeit interprets as fully 
justified. Across the board Neuhauser (Ibid . 262) argues, Hegel seems to allow 
no real space for the exercise of formal conscience against the state. But a 
more interesting and complete sense of the Hegelian stance on this issue 
emerges when we consider Hegel's own provision for religious minorities that 
dissent from certain widespread social practices: 
A state t hat is strong because its organisation is fully developed can adopt a more 
liberal attitude ... and can completely overlook particular matte rs that might affect it, 
or even tole rate communities whose re li gion does not recognize even their direct 
duties to the state ... The stat e does this by entrusting members of such communities to 
S] A question that remains to be answered is that of what occurs once the Ie/os itself is actualised 
completdy, a poin t Hegel was convinced social orders would even tually real.:h. This is an ckment only 
considered in the closing :-;ections of this chapter. 
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civil society and its laws, and is satisfied if they fulfil their direct duties to the state 
passively , by example through commutation, or substitution [of an alternate service] 
(PR §270A). 
Without getting into the minutiae of what this may entail , let us examine the 
principle that underpins this: the state may tolerate conscientious dissent in 
particular circumstances and for various reasons, but this is not enshrined as an 
unconditioned right. This amounts, in Neuhauser's (2000: 263-264) view, to 
affording the formal conscience the same provisional and cautious respect that 
another incomplete form of self-determination, personhood, is afforded in the 
social order. Both of these are respected as, to some extent, freely chosen, 
but are trumped when they come into conflict with a higher order right, such 
as the continued existence of the social order. Thus Hegel does in effect, 
support the conscientious objectors right to moral dignity, but not to the point 
of social disintegration. This, Neuhauser (lbid_) contends, is not to be 
understood as merely a pragmatic set of considerations, but rather a 
contention that the state may indeed tolerate a certain degree of particular 
moral dissent, but not to the extent that formal conscience is an unconditional 
justification for disavowing the duties imposed by the social order. 
iv. The Issue of Radical Social Criticism 
This does indeed find breathing room in Hegelian social philosophy for some 
degree of social dissent, but the theoretical structure is still resistant to what 
Neuhauser (Ibid. 260) terms "radical social criticism". This, he feels, can take 
two broad forms: either an outright rejection of the values the present social 
order embodies, or an acceptance of said values marred by a conviction that 
the current institutional structure is, at a fundamental level, incapable of 
realizing them . Thus, the question still at hand is what philosophical space is 
there in Hegel for those who outrightly reject the values modern institutions 
embody (radical socialist critiques of privatized civil society are one key 
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example here) or feel that they cannot attain their aims as they stand (radical 
feminist critiques of the structure of "enslaving" structure of the nuclear 
family are Neuhauser's example) . 
Part of this has already been answered in Chapter 2, in refere nce to 
individual's right to resist an inherently irrational social structure . If the rot is 
at the institutional level, the ethical (i.e. rational) process of reconciliation to 
it is doomed to failure, and the concomitant obligation to obey the social 
orders' laws falls away. Thus, Hegel is not asking the modern citizen to humbly 
reconcile herself to living under tyranny. 54 I believe I also sufficiently 
established in that discussion that rational dissent from the structural demands 
of social roles is indeed a possibility that is secured, and even encouraged, in 
the Hegelian system. 
What we are left with is the final bulwark of radical social criticism that 
Neuhauser has identified . those who would disavow Hegel's contention that 
the institutional structure of the modern social world is, in principle, 
inherently rational. Can we honestly share Hegel ' s conviction that the 
architecture of principle we find embryonically in the modern social space is 
rational beyond need of revision? 
It does seem rather ridiculous to speak of a unified conception of the "good" in 
a 21 st century democracy, until we consider that the "good" Hegel has in mind 
is , by exhaustive definition, a non· particularised one, as discussed above. The 
theory of Sittlichkeit, as discussed on several levels throughout this thesis, 
allows for a broad diversity in the nature of lifestyles and life commitments. 
The only real boundaries it ultimately sets are "broadly drawn" ones, and even 
those are not impermeable . It merely lays out the minimum institutional 
54 T he question of what Hegel would actually have individuals do in such cases is an ambiguous one. As 
Gregoire (Gregoire in Stewart (cd .), 1996: 108) in lcprets . his praise or the civil disobedience of Socrates 
and Antigone wou ld seem to suggest ind ividual and social insurrection is rationall y j usti fiabk in such 
cases, but this issue in Hegel remai ns somewhat unclear. 
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framework that most social members should embrace as constitutive of 
themselves if the social order is to have the capacities for self-reproduction 
and fostering/stabilizing practical freedom. There is nothing in the Hegelian 
principle structure that would, for example, set down marriage and child 
rearing as legal requirements for every citizen. 
It is true, Neuhauser (2000: 265-269) argues, that Hegel would see those who 
choose not to participate in the structure of the family as somewhat 
impoverished in their self-development, but this rams home the point. In the 
ideal, rationally healthy social order, people want to participate in the 
institutions that make them free (think of the lengthy exposition above of 
neediness as reason's help-mate). 
Encouragement and provision for these institutions should indeed be built into 
the policy framework of the ideal state (tax incentives for married couples and 
parental leave laws are just two examples of such measures). Beyond this, one 
can fully endorse the value of the family as an institution whilst choosing the 
single life for themselves. As Neuhauser (Ibid. 265-269) concludes, all that 
Hegel really requires is that the values of these institutions in general be 
recognised, not that every person be legally forced to fit some generalised 
social mould. 
v. Sittlichkeit and the Full Demands of Reason 
Neuhauser (Ibid.) does concede that there still remains a sense in which the 
Hegelian conception of the good seems strikingly at odds with both social 
reality and rational practice. It does , after all, propose an objective 
metaphysics as it's backing that is difficult to defend as some form of ultimate 
social truth. My contention in the final pages of this chapter is that Hegel's 
theodicy can be coherently re-interpreted in terms that make much more sense 
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to modern sensibilities, and leave him far closer to liberal conceptions than is 
usually thought. 
For the moment, though we must consider that Hegel's contention that the 
system of ethical life satisfies the full demands of reasonableness seems 
difficult to accept. The simple objection to this is that we exist now at a 
further stage of historical progress from Hegel, and his "final" formulation of 
the ideal social order includes elements that to us seem archaic and 
reactionary, especially in terms of elements such as economic class division and 
gender politics. It seems dubious that any social order could claim for itself 
the kind of finality of reasonableness that Hegel claims for his. This certainly 
holds true against the minutiae of the system described in The Philosophy of 
Right, but at no stage in this entire inquiry have I made any attempts to defend 
Hegel that embracingly. The question at hand, for my analysis, is whether a 
more open-ended conception of his principles is possible. 
As Hardimon (1994: 254) points out, at a broad level, the architecture of 
Hegelian principles is difficult to argue with . Hegel , ultimately, is asserting 
that the ideal social order includes certain key inter-related components, the 
resources and structure of which are already laid out in modern social life: A 
domestic sphere of affective emotional attachment providing emotional 
recognition, a private sphere of civil relations in which the capacity and right 
to pursue private ends is recognised and "a political sphere of republican 
relations within which citizens can collectively pursue their common good and 
recognise one another as members of a politically organised community" 
(Ibid.). From that broad and vague framework this chapter has etched out I 
believe the details of a normatively functional modern social schema, from 
which Hegel's more archaic minutiae can be safely purged . 
Neuhauser (2000: 271-278) proves the viability of such an approach admirably 
in the closing pages of his text. He takes what he sees as the most powerful 
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set of criticisms levelled at Hegel, the feminist critique of the inequality in the 
relationships of the nuclear family. This seems, at first sight, to be the kind of 
radical critique that Hegel discourages. Were this so, it would be fair to class 
his system as archaic in principle. But Neuhauser proves rather convincingly 
that it is more a case of imminent critique. Feminist "revisions" of the nuclear 
family structure do not advocate that the roles of parent and spouse be 
completely abandoned, but rather that the nature of what those roles entail be 
re·examined and purged of its freedom·crushing and alienating consequences 
for women . If we cast our eyes back to the role the family is to play in the 
framework of Sittlichkeit, we recall that its value has to do with sublimating 
the sexual need in a freedom enhancing structure, helping to shape the other· 
regarding capacities that make moral subjectivity possible, and engendering in 
children a respect for their own particularity. None of these is logically pegged 
to skewed gender relations. Even "re·interpretations" of the traditional family 
structures, such as gay and lesbian family setups, can amply fulfil these 
requirements. These can be highly attractive in Hegelian terms, in respect to 
their harmonizing a broader diversity of social members into the socially crucial 
task the family performs. 
The same methodology, as I see it, can be applied to any of the institutional 
aspects discussed above, thus to my mind, freeing a modern Hegelian position 
of the charge of archaism at a fundamental level. If the principles of an early 
19th century conservative philosopher can be harnessed to justify gay marriage, 
I believe that a claim can be made for the modern relevance of Hegel ian 
doctrine. 
There lingers in this interpretation one last grand concern. This harks back to 
the very foundations of Hegelian thought, and represents an issue any modern 
interpretation of Hegel must contend with, even if it does so by avoidance. 
What do we make of the great concrete universal, the world spirit that Hegel 
sees as concretised and objectified in the system we have been discussing? To 
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fully etch out a viable modern Hegelian position, we must make a definite call 
on what to do with Geist-
4.3 . 5) So, what do we do with Geist? 
I have, by a necessarily slow and careful route , finally reached the threshold of 
perhaps one of the more problematic and controversial areas of modern Hegel 
scholarship_ The question, as Neuhauser phrases it, of how Hegel's theodicy 
affects his social theory. In interpreting Hegel usefully for the modern age, 
one must decide how crucial the conception of Geist is to his theories, how 
much or how far the inclusion of it damns Hegel to misdirected antiquity_ 
This is not, as it might seem, a mere side-point of Hegel scholarship_ The 
concept of Geist as an objective universal which reason ultimately reveals , as 
the substantial telos towards which all history drives is the lynch-pin of Hegel's 
objective ideal ism _ It is what allows Hegel to set a finite standard towards 
which the human race drives, and what allows the ideal social order to in fact 
qualify as ideaL 
i. The Difficulties of Discounting Geist from Hegel's Principles 
To clarify, let us examine what becomes of Hegel's system if we conceptually 
amputate Geist in its entirety. In both principle and application, things 
become very messy_ Hegel's system is complex, but it is remarkably 
consistent. Without an objective universal that structures the rational world, 
both the Idea and the Concept are rendered entirely subjective_ The entire 
notion of making the world more rational and hospitable becomes severely 
problematic, as we have no final guarantor of its rationality. The 
interpenetrating unity of particular and universal falls to pieces: multiple 
possible universals spawn and abound, to the point where we are only 
reconciling particular individuals with particular social spaces. The necessity 
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of historically relative societies and their actions becomes far more difficult to 
discern, as they are no longer to be seen as works in progress of the larger 
historical dialectic, but rather by their own terms. With no objective telos 
which underpins human progress, we are left in a position when any set of 
widely distributed norms must be ascribed to as elements of some transitory 
"universal", and we would be thus forced to accord even racist and repressive 
social norms status as embodiments of the collective will. Individuals would 
have to be reconciled to such laws and thus learn to embrace them as their 
own. Hegel's position, in other words, is cast into a void of contradiction, 
confusion and impossibility, spinning in a hopeless gyre of non·proscriptive and 
toothless subjectivity. 
But what, then , may we replace Geist with, such that it fulfils both the spirit 
and practicality of Hegel's principles? I have already, in previous chapters, laid 
out Neuhauser's attempts to render Hegel's language more recognisable to 
modern sensibilities. It serves us to reconsider, in more detail, those claims 
here. 
ii. Essential Properties of Geist 
Neuhauser (2000: 221) traces Hegel's notion of the state as divine (as 
embodiment of Geist, as "G·d's march on the world"ss) to the pantheistic 
metaphysics of Spinoza. In according Geist the status as a "substance", Hegel 
is drawing on Spinoza's definitions. What is substantial to the Spinozist is that 
which possesses the qualities of self·sufficiency. What is divine, ultimately, is 
"that which is in itself and conceived through itself i.e. that whose concept 
does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed" 
(Allison, 1987: 46) . The divine, by these terms, is that which stands 
conceptually and ontologically distinct from anything other than itself. It is the 
first cause and ultimate result of itself. It is perfect in that it needs no other 
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context to be, or to be explained. The state, as an interlocked organic unity of 
elements (including both individuals and institutions of all forms) is divine in 
that it is the highest embodiment of this kind of explanatory perfection, aside 
from the organic interlocking and development that is the entire scope of 
human history itself. Thus, both the state (as well as the historical dialectic 
that allows for its idealized final formation) are higher embodiments of this 
self-sufficiency, and thus deserving of being esteemed higher than mere 
individuals as singular entities . 
This explains the genesis of Hegel's conception of the state as divine, but it 
still leaves us somewhat stranded in terms of the modern applicability of 
Hegelian principle. Are individuals honestly to revere the state with the awe 
that Hegel requires simply because it meets an obscure ontological standard of 
self·sufficiency? Neuhauser (2000: 221) believes this can be resolved by 
carefully thinking through the application of the divine within the system of 
Sittlichkeit, and realising that it brings us to the more recognisable condition 
that the state be a rationally organised system, one that balances and co· 
ordinates the elements that make it an organic, self-perpetuating whole. This 
goes some way to making the Hegelian position more elegant and attractive, 
but it has not given us enough yet. 
iii. Dangers of abstracting to vagary 
Repressive systems that express themselves through force can be self-
perpetuating, and even receive the conscious affirmation of their members if 
they undertake violent political education and propagandist tactics. By the 
above standards, do the dystopian monsters of Orwell's 198456 not qualify as a 
rational social order? Their society is indeed self-perpetuating, and is 
organised according to a most rigid rationality. 
" PR §258 Z. 
56 Orwell, G., 1948, Nineleen Eighty FOllr 
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Certainly, we can throw in some of the caveats we have eked out of Hegel's 
principles over the previous chapters. We could claim that personhood must be 
respected, moral subjectivity catered for, individual wills taken into account, 
and institutions of political representation must reflect and represent the wills 
of those who compose them. Brute coercion , as we have discovered, is 
profoundly un-Hegelian . So Orwell's O'Brian and his masters don't quite make 
the cut. But still, by the proposed standard of organic self-sufficiency and 
capacity for self-reproduction, they came close. In order to understand if 
there is anything in the currently explicated version of the Hegelian position 
that allows us to hold repressive orders to account, let me bring forth another, 
more ambiguous dystopia - Huxley's Brave New Worlc[>7 - and subject that to 
Hegelian analysis. 
We have, in this case, a society birthed by the very worst excesses of human 
violence and hatred. The worst of history has taught the human race valuable 
lessons and a superbly rational society has been constructed from the ashes. 
The social order is profoundly organic in its organization - the various social 
caste groups interact seamlessly. Beyond this , they are carefully conditioned 
and reconciled to the order as a whole. The lowly working castes are taught 
from bi rth that they are lucky in that they do not have to expend as much 
effort as the higher castes, who are in turn taught that they are superior and 
more important in their efforts than the lower castes . Citizens are conditioned 
from birth to the social role they will occupy. Any impulsive or emotive 
reaction is controlled in a hyper-rational manner, with the administration of 
soma, a hallucinogenic wonder drug that acts as a corrective to feelings of 
angst and displacement. People interact in a social order that is profoundly 
rational and self-perpetuating, where even consumerism and the economy are 
managed in a meticulously balanced and coldly reasonable manner by the 
:'i1 Huxley, A. 1932 Brave New World 
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controllers. Indeed, it might be claimed, there is no individual will in the 
picture. But this is never consciously brought out, except by those who seek to 
question and alter the social order, who are dismissed as volatile historical 
throwbacks and sequestered with fellow iconoclasts on an island colony far 
from the mainstream of society. The majority of the citizens act according to 
what they consciously believe is their free will. The sexual and physical needs 
of the citizens are amply and broadly catered for, and the broad masses of 
society affirm and willingly participate in a social order which they understand 
as intrinsically rational and hospitable to them. 
Questions as to whether classical liberal ideas of individual freedom are 
catered for become irrelevant, as there is no direct coercion in the broad social 
sense. Certainly the citizens are not, in the larger sense, self·determined, but 
the social whole they belong to amply fulfils the current criteria for being self-
perpetuating. 
So, the question arises, what precisely is wrong with this picture under the 
current analysis? Let us forego for a moment the obvious objection that some 
of the key structures of Sittiichkeit, such as the family and civil society are 
missing. They are, after all, necessitated by the objective universal we are 
questing after. If the conditions of Geist's highest embodiment were merely 
those laid out above, i.e. the rationally organised, individually affirmed, 
organically integrated state designed to strike a balance between consciously 
free individual action and social welfare, then there is nothing specific by 
which we may hold the Brave New World to account. 
The gut instinct is to see it as alien and offensive to Hegelian sensibilities, not 
to mention those of just about all modern social movements. It seems to 
offend the guiding spirit of Hegelian thinking, and if we are to effectively re-
interpret Geist we must establish precisely what this guiding spirit, this 
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objective universal is . I believe that the conceptual resources to do this have, 
to a large extent, already been laid out in the earlier chapters of this thesis. 
iii. Geist revisited 
Let us hark back first to the speculative metaphysics covered in the earlier 
sections on Hegelian individualism. If we recall Wallace's exposition of the 
metaphysical nature of will development as found in the Logic, as well as the 
preceding sections on Bildung and the developmental nature of the self, we 
can discern certain key patterns that the dialectical processes of the individual 
reflect. Human thought and will exhibit a constant tendency to overthrow 
themselves, as the constant stages of negation and re·definition highlight. 
Each higher phase of development exhibits two recurring elements - a sense 
that the current phase of understanding is limited (revealed through the 
tension of contraries) and the inclusion of a wider sense of awareness that 
sublimates new information within a broader understanding of reality. The 
rational development of the will is marked by coming to terms with factors 
once considered alien. This cannot therefore be a process with a finite end . 
This would be possible only in a world where all circumstances were static and 
finite . The constant flux of contingent factors that the will must apprehend 
dictate that there is always something new to be reconciled to. 
But, the objection might run, how then is there any real progressive 
development at all? If it is only a matter of coming to terms with new 
conditions, then are we not continuously finding ourselves at a newly 
constituted square one? This might be so, were it not for the element of 
Aufhebung. Foundational elements of the previous phase are not forgotten or 
discarded, merely sublimated and re·configured within the higher phase. Thus 
there is perpetual forward motion with ever·increased awareness. I feel it is 
fair to interpret the progress of the will as setting up an attitude. A pattern of 
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apprehension that becomes more capable of both flexibility and authenticity as 
it develops and refines itself. 
This, I feel, is best described as an attitude of tolerance and respect for co-
existing diversity that welcomes and seeks out progress. This is what I would 
enthrone in place of conventional interpretations of Geist in Hegel's system. 
As an organising principle, a gUiding spirit, it fits remarkably well into the 
remainder of his system, informing and underpinning the elements more 
classically Hegelian Geist is meant to. Allow me to demonstrate. 
Let us take one of Geist's key components, the Concept, and briefly re-
examine its key structure and foundational elements in this light. The three 
"moments" of the Concept - immediate unity, difference and mediated unity 
represent for Hegel a scientific approach to understanding the way individuals 
integrate with society and its institutions, i.e_ the way the Idea is made actual. 
So, what pattern of dealing with reality do the moments of the concept 
prescribe in plain language? We begin in a state of unreflective emotional 
attachment, as in the family. We progress to a point where we recognise the 
multiplicity of ends, ideas and projects, as in civil society. We eventually 
become harmonised to these as necessarily different elements of an organic 
whole, as in the state . All the way through, the central feature that allows for 
such progression is an ever more open and tolerant mind . After all, the 
diversities of the moment of difference, when we first become aware of them, 
must , as discussed earlier, seem at first alien to us , even if we respect their 
right to exist. Considering the constant flux of circumstance once more, this is 
something that will constantly recur. If we are to fulfil Hegel's project, if the 
concept is to indeed reconcile us to a rational reality, it must do so through 
allowing us to become more tolerant of the diverse and more open to the 
necessities of progress. Thus, the pOint we are ever progressing to is a point of 
non-stagnant mediated unity, the point at which we are at home in a 
diversified world , and comfortable with the rational provisions of freedom that 
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allow us to exist peaceably and progressively within it. The highest phase of 
the concept ultimately comes to represent an attitude of reflective tolerance. 
This idea of free-flowing thought as a founding principle is echoed in certain 
distinctive corners of Hegel's writing. Consider the following statements from 
his introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy: 
If we say that the consciousness of freedom is connected with the appearance of 
philosophy, this principle must be a fundamental one with those with whom philosophy 
begins ... Connected with this on the practical side is the fact that actual freedom 
develops political freedom, and this only begins where the individual knows himself as 
an independent individual to be uni versal and real ... Free philosophic thought has this 
direct connection with practical freedom: that as the former supplies thought about 
the absolute, universal and real object, the latter, because it thinks itse lf , gives itself 
the character of universality (IHP: 299) . 
I feel these references to the relation between the free-flow of ideas and the 
"absolute" or universal , make sounder modern sense if we consider this 
universal as a co-operative zone of rational engagement. 
And so too with the rational mechanisms of the state that we are to place our 
trust in as citizens. I have already brought out the elements of Kaufman's 
argument that Hegelian "trust" is ultimately founded on a "weak" 
identification with general principles . I feel that this makes even more sense 
in light of the position I present here. We grow to trust the developed state 
because it guarantees the structural freedoms examined at length in the 
preceding discussion. In so doing, it provides a means of organising the chaos, 
and allows us to be open to new ideas, new ways of life, and new ways of 
dealing with circumstance. It guarantees that the worst excesses of history 
will not be repeated, provides a framework for rational engagement on 
difficult questions, and thus allows the citizenry to feel secure in facing new 
and complex conditions of existence with an open mind. Thus, the "weak" 
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identification Kaufman speaks of can be understood as identification with the 
founding ideal of a liberal democratic space. 
The structures of rational engagement in question have already been laid out 
above when we discussed the objective conditions of social freedom in the 
Hegelian system. The mechanisms of representation, which perhaps should 
extend to a wider range of political organisations that Hegel originally allowed, 
provide channels of rational dissent that make the social space more rational 
and bearable, precisely because policies and ideas are changeable. This 
ultimately, makes perfect sense as a means of reconciling increasingly rational 
individuals to their social space. As we know more, we feel ever more at home 
in a society that has defined structures that allow it to grow and change 
rationally. In other words, a society that, in a world of shifting circumstance, 
more perfectly meets Neuhauser's interpretation of Hegel's conception of the 
divine - self-sufficient, and self-perpetuating as a structure. 
If we apply this framework of analysis to the broad range of structures and 
principle implications of The Philosophy of Right already discussed, I feel it 
slots in rather neatly with the remainder of the Hegelian system. It is not 
necessary for me to recount every mechanism of social integration discussed 
for one to see that an attitude of progressive tolerance can consistently vitiate 
the structure of Sittlichkeit. 
This interpretation is, I feel, backed up even further by the lead on elements 
examined above, particularly Patten's argument that an ongoing state of 
combating unfreedom lies at the very heart of Hegel's principles. An attitude 
of stagnation and intolerance in the face of shifting circumstance is often the 
most violent threat to freedoms of any form, individual as well as collective. 
Hegel's conviction, quoted in reference to this, that the very nature of 
objective spirit is to ever-increasingly limit the conditions that allow for 
unfreedom is, I feel, testament to the validity of my conclusion here. 
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But what, it may be asked , are the implications herein for Hegel's teleology 
and dialectic of history? I have already addressed segments and elements of 
the answer to this, specifically in terms of Neuhauser's discussion of the 
interpretations of moral subjectivity. The key problem that arises is that this 
seems to nullify the distinction drawn between the necessary historical 
relativity of social orders and the objective validity of the present. 
Neuhauser deals with this by, essentially, jettisoning Hegel's notion of a 
definitive telos and examining the rationality of his normative principles in 
isolation from it. This, I feel, is an amputation that is both unnecessary and 
distant from Hegel's theoretical intentions . This is not a reason, on its own, to 
rally desperately to its defence, but if there is a way to include the telos in a 
framework useful to modern thought, this way should be taken. 
The essential problem we are dealing with is that, by the terms of my analysis, 
the dialectical timeline is now infinite. The telos is open-ended, and there is 
no definitive point that the broad progression of social orders works towards. 
We are thus in theoretical danger of being forced , by Hegelian principle, into 
affirming any existent social order as a work in progress towards the normative 
standards, as Hegel did with the often horrific social orders of times preceding 
his own. Setting up the telos as open-ended seems to collapse together two 
dynamics in Hegel's theory that were originally distinct: the reconciliation to 
the excesses of the past with the reconciliation of citizens to the ideal present. 
We can however, avoid this if we remember that the dialectic does not move 
backwards. By the terms of my interpretation of Geist, the institutions of the 
modern world have, at least in structure, realised the objective conditions for 
a tolerant and progressive social order. We may indeed judge institutional 
aberrations that run counter to this from an objective standpoint: that they run 
counter to the ongoing move towards a social space avowed to tolerance and 
ever more capable of dealing with the diversity and space for re-interpretation 
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that progress requires in a world of shifting circumstances. Thus we are not 
bound to recognise repressive orders as works in progress, as they run counter 
to progress already achieved. 
This I feel is faithful to Hegel's intentions. The objective structuring of the 
modern world is such that the objective ideals of tolerance and progressive 
diversity can be realised in an ongoing fashion, with the fundamentals of 
ethical life guiding them as an objective framework. This framework meets 
Hegel's requirements for objective rationality precisely because it is flexible 
and integrative - these factors render it eminently suited to the reproduction 
of itself "as the kind of being it essentially is". My contention is simply that I 
have improved on this pOSition by allowing that the being's specifics - in terms 
of institutional practice - will be forever changing as new challenges arise for it 
to deal with. 
4.4) A Modern Hegelian position 
Through the broad sweep of the above discussion, this process of interpreting 
and assessing the modern implications of Hegelian principle has led us to a set 
of conclusions many might find surprising, considering Hegel's long standing 
reputation as a vindicator of conservatism. 
The picture of the Hegelian social order we have now is not one of intricately 
conditioned positive content so much as it is one of intricately conditioned 
rational tolerance. Sittlichkeit, if the above exposition and discussion stands, 
amounts to a set of normative standards that the present social order must live 
up to if it is to fulfil the aims inherent in its very construction, namely the 
realisation of a rational and integrated social space of diversity and co·existing 
particularity in which any citizen can trust and find her identity constituted 
and confirmed. Through this set of social ethics, the objective and universal 
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good of a tolerant and progressive society is made ever more actual, and ever 
more resilient to the nature of changing circumstance. 
In its profound divergence from the highly individualistic principles of 
normative justice that mark social contract theory, it does vindicate certain 
policies and principles that classical liberalism might find offensive . Most 
notably, it extends the political space to the entire social landscape, 
encompassing the family and civil society. In doing so it does not, as has been 
proven at some length, trample on individual particularity or moral dignity, but 
rather treats society as an interconnected system. This, ultimately, makes a 
great deal of sense. The interconnected nature of family dynamics, crime and 
poverty is by now almost a foregone sociological conclusion . The gang culture 
in the ghettoes of the US is just one notable proof of how skewed familial and 
economic dynamics create communal forms of social identification that are in 
fact harmful to the social order. This is a prime example of how negative 
elements in all spheres of social life supplement each other, and the same thus 
applies to the positive elements. 
Hegelian principle thus supports the state's mandate in rationally legislating 
towards healthier family and social environments. Social contract theory, with 
its egoistic caveats, shies away from this, purporting that the state oversteps in 
boundaries in attempting to secure general social welfare, instead of merely 
managing the clashing conditions of freedom . It is Hegel's profound 
contribution to this discourse that the two are rationally interlinked, and must 
both be catered for . The way of doing it is, as he sets out, to trust, reflect 
upon and, if necessary, redirect an institutional structure that understands 
itself as part of an organic and mutually affecting network of social relations . 
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Conclusion 
Hegel & Mill - revisited 
This thesis evolved out of a crucial dilemma for the modern social theorist. 
Both liberalism and communitarianism, in all their contemporary incarnations 
and variations, seem somehow incomplete as tools of assessment and social 
proscription. Liberalism, in its modern configurations, seems to fall prey to the 
criticism of being a callous and abstract cult of hyper·individualists that pay 
mere lip·service to notions such as compassion and the social basis of self and 
identity. Bell sets out what could be considered (in as much as it is possible) 
the distilled communitarian position: 
The deepest problem, as I see it, is that liberal theory continues to pay homage to the 
enlightenment ideal of the autonomous subject that successfully extricates herself 
from the immediate entanglements of history and the characteristics and values that 
come with that entanglement (Bell, 1993: 29). 
Modern liberalism can indeed stand accused of such social disembodiment of 
the individual, of leaving citizens alienated from the background moral norms 
that thread together social orders, and to a large extent provide the content of 
individual character in the first place. 
But things are no less messy on the other side of the line. As Holmes (1993: 
178) argues, communitarian rhetorical vagaries such as "shared self 
understanding" can apply with equal intellectual legitimacy to the Ku·Klux·Klan 
as they can to more supposedly healthy forms of communal association. The 
bigotries and prejudices that loom large and dangerous in modern society will 
not be resolved by "swapping a vocabulary of rights for a vocabulary of 
community" (Ibid.). If we allow background communal norms full access to the 
305 
hallways of legislation, we may often stand guilty of institutionalising such 
narrow and bigoted thinking. 
Whichever way one turns in this debate the issue of the individual vs. the 
community as the prime locus of political concern seems an insuperable clash 
point. It would be one thing if this were merely an abstract, if passionate, 
dispute confined to the hallways of academia. But these concerns, and their 
lack of resolution, are present at a fundamental level in many of the most 
virulent contemporary policy debates. Wherever background moral norms of a 
significant communal group butt heads with the liberal provision for freedom of 
individual action, the liberal-communitarian dispute has, at some level, found 
its way off the library shelves and into our social reality. 
So it often seems (at some ultimate principled level) that the modern theorist 
participating in the two broad schools of thought that vie for headspace in 
contemporary political and social theory is in the vice grip of a dichotomy. She 
must negotiate the treacherous waters between a callous, hyper-individualistic 
Scylla and a community-orientated proto-totalitarian Charybdis. It is 
insufficient to claim that concessions can be made to either side when the very 
structure of the principles at work seems so very different. 
Now, such debates are highly pertinent but they are by no means new. The 
high enlightenment stand-off between liberalism and Romanticism dealt with 
the same set of concerns in, to my mind, a far richer philosophical sense. It is 
on two inheritors of this discourse, on supposedly opposing sides, that this 
thesis has focused . In so doing, I have provided what I see as a compelling 
investigation of what underpins many of the hallmark conceptions in the 
liberal-communitarian discourse, and goes some way to showing that the above 
dichotomy is a false one. What I aimed to unearth is that at multiple levels, 
from the broader aims of the social order, through to the architecture of 
institutional provisions, there is a profound affinity between the Millian and 
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Hegelian social visions. In so doing, we may discern a commonality of 
consequence between the principles of a system that is commonly understood 
to emphasise liberal individualism , and one that is commonly understood to 
emphasise the individual as socially embedded and intersubjectively obligated. 
If I have been successful then, unlike Ulysses, we need not necessarily sacrifice 
anything to either the monster or the whirlpool. 
5.1) Confluences and affinities in the Hegelian and Millian social visions 
As a first point of confluence, both theorists put forward social visions that 
deal with the disposition, i.e. mental state of citizens, not merely the external 
conditions of freedom . The mainstream social contract or natural rights 
theorists that modern mainstream liberalism draws upon all follow an 
empiricist enlightenment tradition. The observed interactions of social beings 
are their proof, and the final imprimatur for the social order is given via a 
traded off set of external conditions that allow for the balanced co-existence 
of a pre-social freedom _ Mill and Hegel both accede to a vision of society more 
influenced by the Romantics - the state as having the duty to provide for the 
ongoing self-education of its citizenship, and by extension and embodiment, 
itself. 
This breed of social vision does not stop at external conditions - it attempts to 
investigate what makes for the most progressive and authentic mental life of 
its citizenry_ The locus of freedom is not merely in the non-interference of 
state, but in the encouragement of tolerance and diversity within the citizenry, 
which, aside from being a good in itself, works instrumentally towards a more 
progressive, fair and liveable social order (not to mention a diverse and 
progressive one)_ This is a politics of engagement as opposed to a politics of 
avoidance. Rights are not mechanisms set in place to safeguard an assumed 
pre-social autonomy, but post-social measures designed to safeguard the vital 
interests of individuals as harmonised within the social order. It can thus be 
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argued that both understood the institutional and rights strictures of the state 
as performing a similar function - providing an objective framework for social 
engagement worthy of the trust of its citizenry. To oppose or violate the 
provisions of such a framework is to work against the very measures that make 
freedom possible for all. 
Both sets of principles, as I have argued them, also point to this social 
framework being a zone of ethical engagement. Ethical conflict plays a 
significant role in both, as does conflict between particular individual ends. 
These confrontations need not be threats to the social order if they are seen as 
inevitabilities to be managed, rather than standing threats to be glossed over 
or repressed. It is in fact the social order's capacity for such management that 
makes it crucial in maintaining individual freedom, and thus worthy of 
individual obligation. 
Within this framework, both theorists can be understood as opposed to non· 
rational conceptions of the good ("intuitionist" moralities for Mill, "ethics of 
conviction" for Hegel) being institutionalised as social practice. The sphere of 
secular morality in both is a fairly content·neutral one, more of a structural 
management of competing conceptions of the good than a set of positive edicts 
governing individual and social action. Individual citizens, by both Millian and 
Hegelian standards, can (and should) rationally understand such a framework as 
worthy of their affirmation. Hegel's distinction between true and formal 
conscience captures this, a profoundly Millian conception of a rational and non· 
sectarian institutional ethos, with particular clarity. 
Both sets of principles also understand such conflict and coalescence of 
moralities and ideas, in constant public view, as in fact necessary to social 
progress. The ideal scenario proposed in Mill is one of constant debate from 
vigorous proponents of both sides, forcing the social intellect to remain vital, 
and the unconvinced bystander to have the benefit of full truth, tested by 
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passion made to counter passion, insight made to counter insight. As I argued 
in Chapters 2 and 4, Hegel's notion of societal and interpersonal development 
through the resolution of contraries suggests a similar notion of progress 
through adversarial intellectual confrontation, with other viewpoints and 
reality (and thus, in Hegelian terms, rationality) itself. More visibly in his 
theory is his view of the beneficial effect on the public of the spectacle of a 
policy forum "where one brilliant idea consumes another", as , in principle, a 
direct an,alogue to Mill. Ultimately both theorists believed that false and 
(especially self-righteous) beliefs were , in Mill's words "natural victims" to 
such a discourse between the individual, her social reality, and the insights of 
others as shared in a common discursive framework. 
The idea of interlinked individual and social progress is indeed, yet another 
point of confluence between the two sets of principles. Both theorists saw 
humanity driven towards ever more rational ways of handling the realities of 
human needs and ends, in the process refining both individual consciousness, 
and the social order itself. As Skorupski (1989: 323) interprets Mill's 
historicism: "Societies, like organisms, evolve historically, through a complex 
holism or 'consensus' of functions ... by way of adapting, albeit imperfectly, to 
human needs". This is , in essence, a simplified version of the Hegelian 
understanding of historical progress. As societies develop, driven to higher 
levels of complexity by need as reason's help-mate, their deficiencies become 
apparent and their social orders fall away to be superseded by more rational 
ones (which nonetheless institutionalise the valid elements of their 
predecessors). 
One of the upshots of this that I have identified in both Mill and Hegel (if we 
can accept my re-wiring of Hegel's teleology) is the position that no social 
order ever stands at the end point of all history, thus demanding that the right 
to question and scrutinise the practices of one's social order from a rational 
standpoint be enshrined at an institutional level. This confluence is of course 
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dependent on my re-interpretation of Geist. If the "spirit" in question is an 
attitude of progressive and inclusive tolerance inherent to the ideal of a liberal 
democracy, then the telos cannot be a definitive one - the positive content of 
the ideal social order ends at the institutional structure which composes it, 
thus setting Hegel and Mill firmly on common ground . History is , to both of 
them, the process of humanity's ongoing self-education . And history, if my 
interpretation of Hegel stands, is never at an end for either theorist. 
Related to this is another confluence at more abstract level. Both theorists 
understood freedom as more than simply the capacity to do as one chooses, as 
the developed capacity of rational self-determination . They both understood 
the free individual as she that can make herself into more than simply a link in 
the causal chain between her inclinations and her actions. Hegel 's version is 
certainly a richer and more complex configuration, but they both see the 
highest level of freedom in the individual's capacity to, in Hegelian terms, 
make herself into her own end. They both quest after a melding of what can 
be understood as the respectively classical and Judaeo·Christian ideas of 
individual perfectibility - virtue (including a significant element of mental 
courage) and restraint. As a rider to this, both held that the results of such a 
process of individual self· development could not, if they were to have any 
value, be institutionally forced upon the population . This capacity must be 
fostered, and nourished, never dictated. The external appearance of a 
rationally structured social order is completely insufficient if it is not pegged to 
the internal rational recognition of it as such by the citizenry. The state has 
neither the mandate (nor ultimately, the true capacity) to mould citizens into 
better people by mere edict. It is charged rather with providing the correct 
conditions for this development to happen . 
Both also, significantly, understood the individual's consciousness is to a large 
extent formed by her experience and environment, and were thus both 
sensitive to the impact of socio-political realities on individual perspectives. 
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This, I believe, can be understood as underpinning both of their demands for 
diversity within the social whole. Without the clashing of perspectives derived 
from differentiated particular experience, individuals are never fully able to 
escape the mentally stagnating effect of their own particularity. 
Out of this flows a common respect between the two theorists for the breed of 
individual mindset that can stand against the tide of orthodoxy (Mill's 'genius' , 
Hegel's 'great man') armed only with reasoned insight and a liberated mind. 
Both theorists laud this kind of intellectual revolutionary as one of the key 
forces for progress and social good. They both look to the likes of Socrates, a 
visionary mistaken for a heretic, and locate the first fount of true progress in 
the great mind that stands apart from the mass. 
On the balance of the above confluences, I feel both theorists would accede to 
Patten's interpretation of the grounding interest that halts the abstraction 
inherent in self·determination . freedom as an ongoing state of combating 
unfreedom. I believe I have shown that they both understood the truly free 
mind rationally seeking out a truly free society - one institutionally avowed to 
the necessity of tolerance, and constantly seeking to expose individuals as 
harmoniously as possible to an ever wider and more diverse social context 
overseen by a system rationally designed to manage such diversity. 
5.2) The Von Humboldt connection 
An interesting factor that points to a possible point of actual historical 
confluence between the two theorists is Von Humboldt's influence on Mill, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. Von Humboldt, as Beiser (1992: 111) reminds us, was 
not only a direct influence upon Millian ideals, but on the full scope of 
continental liberalism. This being said, as Beiser points out: 
3 11 
There are some remarkable affinities between Humboldt 's ideals and those of the 
young romantic circle in Berlin: an ethic of community claiming that individuals realise 
themselves only through a free and open exchange with others; an emphasis on 
Bi/dung, the all-around deve lopment of the pe rsona lity; an insistence on the value of 
individuality and the right of the individual to resist the pressures of social conformity 
... a recognition of the role of art in educating the whole personality ... and an ardent 
devotion to beauty and truth (Ibid. 113). 
While sympathies with Romanticism are certainly not a direct analogue with 
Hegel, certain elements of Romantic thought do indeed playa strong role in 
the Hegelian structure. As Taylor (1979 : 12) points out, the Romantic 
"ambition of combining the fullest rational autonomy with the greatest 
expressive unity" is perhaps the most distinct internal goal of the Hegel ian 
thought structure_1 
Thus it is not surprising that we can recognise several hallmark Hegelian 
concepts amongst Beiser's list of Humbdoltian conceptual goals. As an overall 
canon of social ideals, Humboldt's philosophy is not too far from where I left 
the Hegelian position at the close of Chapter 4_ There do seem to be 
significant differences between Von Humboldt and Hegel. Most notably, as 
Beiser (Ibid ., 131) explains, Von Humboldt viewed the state as a threat to 
individual self-perfection, as opposed to formative of it, and so laid out his 
treatise as argument for the limitation of state power. But the two theorists 
can be reconciled admirably if one notes Beiser's (Ibid.) further clarification 
that what Von Humboldt was reacting against was not the ideal state, but the 
paternalistic monarchy of 18th century Germany. Von Humboldt in fact sought 
to reform the state into "a Bildungsanstalt, an institution for the development 
of humanity" (Ibid.). As such, like Hegel he sought to make the state 
responsible for engendering the capacity for self-perfectibility in its citizenry, 
I Hegel, Taylor (1 979: 12) reminds us, fall s foul of Romanticism in that he insisted this unity be transparent 
to rcason, thus according what the romantics would consider the cold and inhumane capacity of rational 
assess mt!nt a role far too strong for their philosophical sentiments to allow (the romantic strains of Mill' s 
broadly empiricist project stand in similar opposition). 
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and, like Mill, as Beiser (Ibid.) notes, he felt the central ingredient of such 
development was liberty. This Humboldt defined in terms of freedom of 
choice, or availability of options. As Beiser (Ibid. 133) clarifies further on, 
Humboldt never advocated withering away of the state completely on the 
grounds that the framework and security the state provided, in terms of 
objective and universal rights structures, were necessary conditions of the kind 
of development he saw individuals undertaking. As Taylor argues, Humboldt's 
influence itself builds something of a bridge between contemporary 
communitarian and liberal notions: 
Humboldt was one of the important sources for Mill's doctrine of liberty. In the face of 
this, it is astonishing that anyone should read a defense (sic.) of holism as entailing an 
advocacy of collectivism. But the rich tradition that Humboldt represents seems to 
have been forgotten by Mill's heirs in the English speaking world (Taylor in Rosenbaum 
(ed.). 1989). 
As such, this brief analYSis shows us that Humboldt forms an intriguing 
historical connection point between Hegelian and Millian ideas, in that he 
possessed both the Romantics' zest for human perfectibility and the 
libertarians' concern for freedom from coercion, understanding the state as 
central to securing both2• Bearing this in mind, it is time to consider to what 
extent the two positions Yon Humboldt stands between are, in fact, 
compatible. 
1 If we reach back even further into their intclleClUallineage. ant! of the key points of commonality we can 
identify belwct!n all three of the theorists under discuss ion is that they o we some debt to Aristotle. Mill, 
Hegel , and Humboldt all conceive the full development of freedom as socially constituted. This draws 
upon the ArislOtdian conception that "society is the minimum self-sufficien t human reality" (Taylor, 1979: 
84). 
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5.3) The Millian and Hegelian projects - divergent or complimentary? 
There are many levels at which Mill and Hegel do indeed clash. Idealists and 
empiricists, for one thing, seldom keep pleasant theoretical company (even 
though Mill is not quite your typical empiricist, nor is Hegel anyone's standard 
idealist). The clashes between dialectical logic epitomised by Hegel, and the 
analytic school epitomised by Mill are also fairly substantial. But such 
divergence is , I believe, not relevant to the discussion in this thesis . I have set 
out to prove that both theorists ultimately present a similar architecture of 
social principle, not that they took similar theoretical routes to get there. 
This being said, the Hegelian and Millian social projects themselves still seem 
profoundly dissimilar . Mill was attempting to set out a rights structure that 
could guarantee individual autonomy and social progress, Hegel was attempting 
to reconcile the modern citizen to the modern social space by highlighting that 
the embryonic form of such a structure already existed in outline. Under the 
interpretation presented in this thesis, I believe that where key differences 
present themselves, the two sets of principles are not conflicting, but 
complementary. Each presents something that the other lacks, or failed to 
articulate sufficiently. Mill's theory lacks the enriched understanding of the 
interconnected nature of the social whole that Hegel's identifies, and does not 
include a sufficient sensitivity to the relationship between social roles and 
individual identity. Such understandings can indeed be spliced into Mill's 
theory without significant contradiction, if we bear in mind his conviction that 
perspective is formed by experience. Hegelian conceptions simply take such an 
analysis a few steps further, and examine how the interlinked institutions of 
modern social life, if rationally functional, allow for the fuller development of 
the capacities for self-development that Mill so lauded. If we understand the 
harm principle as general harm prevention, as argued in Chapter 3, then there 
is no real Millian objection to the social order deploying its resources to 
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facilitate a more interconnected sense of social functionality, so as to reduce 
the circumstances in which welfare is diminished by breakdown in the social 
system. As such, I would argue that the Hegelian project stands outside the 
Millian cannon, but by no means opposed to it. 3 
Hegel, on the other hand , displays an insufficient regard for the dangers that 
Mill saw lurking in the tyranny of the majority and the moralistically 
empowered social order. I believe, based on the interpretation of Hegel I have 
offered, that such provisions in no way stand against Hegelian principle. If we 
recall the distinction between formal and true conscience, the idea of freedom 
of rational autonomy and the social order as its guarantor, the idea of the 
social order as a zone of harmonised diversity and demarcated pluralism - all 
these point to the possibility of a Hegelian position in sym pathy with the Millian 
caveats. It seems perfectly consistent that such measures could form part of a 
social order worthy of rational trust, and could in fact contribute to the basis 
of said reconciliation between individual mind and social space. I would thus 
conclude that the Hegelian and Millian positions I present here are, if not 
conducive to seamless synthesis, still very much compatible. 
But where, the final question lingers does this leave us in terms of the liberal-
communitarian debate? It suggests that a "vocabulary of community" can 
ultimately be compatible with a "vocabulary of rights". It suggests that 
liberalism can retain its (justifiably) cherished freedoms within a structure 
more sensitive to the socially integrated nature of individuals and the 
interlinked structure of the social space. It suggests that a theory can begin 
with considering the ends and needs of individuals and end with outlining a 
rational structure of social obligation . Furthermore, it suggests that such 
frameworks, though they attempt to influence and improve individuals, need 
3 An interesting discussion on the possibility of a civic virtut!-framed liberali sm is found in an essay by 
Stephen Macedo entitled "Community Diversity and Civic Educati on: toward a liberal political sci ence of 
group life" in The Comlllllllicariall Challellge to Liberalism. Paul, F., Miller, F.D. et al. . (eds.), 1996, 
Cambridge: Cambridge UniversilY Press. 
315 
not appeal to some final and ultimate conception of individual good in doing 
so. It suggests, ultimately, that the key clash-points between liberalism and 
communitarianism are excesses of modern versions of these schools of thought 
that have forgotten the far richer conceptual frameworks of their early modern 
ancestry. 
This thesis has not carried such suggestions further. To outline the kind of 
value-pluralism that could validly fulfil both Hegel and Mill's conditions at a 
strictly practical level could indeed be a tricky and intricate process. All I have 
done here, I believe, is strike a preliminary, though important path. That, 
feel both Hegel and Mill would agree, is the progressive mind's first duty. 
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